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[해외논단]경제 실패한 러시아 개혁·개방 | ||
- 윌리엄 파프(美 칼럼니스트) - | ||
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러시아 국민들은 20년 세월이 흐른 지금 페레스트로이카(개혁)에 대해 어떻게 생각하나. 러시아 국민의 거의 절반은 그것이 아마도 필요했을 것이라고 생각한다. 이것은 지난 10년간 의미있는 변화이다.
러시아에서 페레스트로이카는 유리 안드로포프가 1년 임기로 소련공산당 중앙위원회 서기장으로 취임한 1982년 11월에 시작된 것으로 일반적으로 생각되고 있다. 그렇지만 소련 지도층의 일부 구성원들 사이에서는 이미 국가와 경제 개혁의 필요성이 분명히 조성되어 있었다.
당시 중국 공산당 지도자들도 안드로포프와 같은 생각이었지만 그 이유는 달랐다. 중국 지도자들은 국민들에게 스스로 부자가 되라고 말하면서 경제성장과 부의 창출을 독려했는데 이것은 그들 자신의 권력을 지키기 위해서였다.
지금까지 중국 지도층은 긍정적인 정치개혁의 필요성이나 불가피성을 결코 진지하게 인정한 적이 없었다. 천안문 광장 시위대의 진압은 중국 국민과 엘리트들의 자연발생적인 개혁 욕구에 대한 그들의 응답이었다.
안드로포프는 소련의 정치개혁이 필수적이라는 점을 알았다. 단지 그는 경제개혁에 차질을 빚지 않기 위해 그것을 연기해야 한다고 생각했다.
고르바초프의 통치 하에서 개혁정책은 “의식 혁명(글라스노스트, 즉 과거와 현재에 대한 진실 수용)에 이어 차례로 정치개혁과 경제혁신을 단행”하는 것이었다. 이렇게 하여 86년 하반기까지 페레스트로이카와 글라스노스트는 점차 암묵적으로 혁명적 속성을 띠게 되었고 급진적이고 결정적인 민주화와 개혁을 추구하게 되었다.
그렇지만 소련은 시장경제나 시장민주주의를 수용할 수 있는 준비가 되어있지 않았다. 소련 사회는 기업가적 전통과 정신, 시민사회의 가치관과 조직, 신세력을 포용할 수 있는 제도적 및 법적 구조를 결여하고 있었다.
89년 말까지 고르바초프는 레이건 행정부와의 관계를 개선하고 아프가니스탄에서 철군하고 중부 및 동부 유럽에서 공산당의 권력독점을 종식시키는 등 대외관계에서 큰 성과를 거두었다.
그러나 절실한 경제적 발전에 실패했고 소수민족들을 독립시킴으로써 USSR(소비에트연방공화국)의 해체는 불가피해졌다.
러시아학술원 사회과학연구소는 지난 1월과 2월 중 페레스트로이카에 대한 여론조사를 실시했다. 이 조사에서 러시아의 젊은이와 중년층, 그리고 교육받은 적극적인 엘리트 계층들은 역사적인 페레스트로이카에 대해 아주 높은 긍정적인 반응을 보였다.
다수의 러시아 국민들은 페레스트로이카의 초기단계(85∼88년)에 대해 긍정적으로 평가했다. 고르바초프는 페레스트로이카 그 자체보다 한층 더 긍정적인 평가를 받았다. 그러나 페레스트로이카의 마지막 단계(89∼91년)에 대한 긍정적인 평가는 전체 응답자의 4분의 1에 미치지 못했다.
이 조사에서 절대 다수의 러시아인들은 페레스트로이카 기간에 소련 사회가 “안정의 상실, 사기 저하, 안정과 미래에 대한 자신감의 상실, 국가 질서의 잠식” 등 “큰 손실”을 겪었다고 생각하는 것으로 나타났다. 현재 블라디미르 푸틴 대통령은 러시아 국민들의 바로 이러한 상실감을 이용하려 하고 있다.
윌리엄 파프(美 칼럼니스트)
TMSI 정리=권화섭 객원편집위원
MORE RUSSIANS NOW SEE VALUE IN GORBACHEV'S REFORMS
By William Pfaff
PARIS -- Twenty years after, what do the Russians think of perestroika?
Nearly half of them think that it probably was necessary. Only a third (35 percent) say otherwise. This represents a small but significant change since 10 years ago. Then, only 40 percent of Russians said perestroika had been necessary or desirable.
Perestroika is generally thought in Russia to have started in November 1982, with Yuri Andropov's one-year tenure as general secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. The need for state and economic reform was nonetheless already evident to some members of the ruling elite.
Andropov was too briefly in office to impose a coherent line of change, but he did make his belief clear that the economic system had to be reformed before the state structure should be changed.
This is what the leaders of Communist China have thought, but for a different reason.
The Chinese leaders have forced economic growth and wealth-creation -- telling the Chinese to make themselves rich -- out of fear for their own power. So far as one can tell, the party leadership has never seriously accepted the desirability (or inevitability) of positive political reform.
Crushing the demonstrations at Tiananmen Square was their response to the spontaneous reform impulses arising from the Chinese people and elites.
Andropov knew that political change was essential. He believed that it should be delayed in order not to interfere with economic reform.
According to an interesting study of perestroika's development, prepared by Victor Kuvaldin for the Gorbachev Foundation, there were members of the Soviet leadership in Andropov's time who doubted that economic reform could be separated from political change.
Georgi Shakhnazarov -- later one of Mikhail Gorbachev's inner-circle advisers -- did not think it would succeed. He believed that the Communist nomenklatura would use the power it retained in order to prevent reform.
Under Gorbachev, the intended reform sequence became ``revolution in consciousness'' (meaning glasnost: truth-telling about past and present), ``followed by political reform, followed by economic transformations.''
Gorbachev accelerated perestroika, creating ``a leap to freedom,'' in order to overwhelm entrenched obstacles and make existing reforms irreversible.
Thus by the second half of 1986, perestroika and glasnost increasingly were recast as implicitly revolutionary in nature, seeking rapid and decisive democratization and reform. The authors of Gorbachev's policies were also much influenced by the Western emphasis on individualism and the still-fashionable American idea that democracy is a spontaneous market phenomenon.
However the Soviet Union proved unready for market economics or market democracy. Its society lacked the entrepreneurial tradition and spirit, the ``civil society'' values of accommodation and cooperative organization, and the institutional and legal structures able to contain the new forces.
The dislocations and distortions produced by economic change threatened to destroy the reforms. Gorbachev, in Kuvaldin's account, then decided that mere renovation or overhaul of the Soviet system was useless. It had to be entirely replaced.
In January 1987, the Plenum of the Central Committee opted for radical change and accelerated democratization. Controlled and authoritarian modernization was abandoned.
At this point, the key issue was whether groups at the peak of the Soviet power structure would support Gorbachev, recognizing in his program the outline of a new structure in which they would still have their place, or conclude that Gorbachev's changes threatened them. ``The most influential stratum of party bosses,'' Kuvaldin writes, turned increasingly against Gorbachev.
By the end of 1989, Gorbachev had produced great achievements in foreign relations and arms control, transforming relations with the Reagan administration in Washington, ending the occupation of Afghanistan and terminating the Communist monopoly of power in Central and Eastern Europe.
But he had failed to produce needed and expected economic progress, and he had set loose those non-Russian nationalisms that had been suppressed for generations by Russian imperial power and then by Soviet power. The breakup of the U.S.S.R. had become inevitable.
The ruling position of the Communist Party was no longer perceived as legitimate, and party rule was ended in March 1990. The immense and terrible political and human adventure that began with Lenin's seizure of power in the October Revolution had come to an end.
A social sciences institute of the Russia Academy of Sciences questioned a representative selection of Russian citizens about perestroika during January and February of this year. The findings were that the greatest amount of sympathy for historical perestroika is felt today by the young and middle generations of Russians, and by the educated and active elites.
The initial stage of reform (1985-88) is viewed favorably by the majority of all Russians. Gorbachev himself is now judged more favorably than perestroika itself. The final stage (1989-91) is seen positively by less than a fourth of the population.
The survey found a huge consensus of belief that ``significant losses'' were experienced during the perestroika period. There was ``loss of stability; decline in morals; loss of the feeling of security and confidence in the future; erosion of order in the country.'' These, of course, are the losses to which Vladimir Putin in 2005 attempts to respond.
첫댓글 좋은 글이네요.. 스크랩 해갈게요.. 감사합니다
좋은 게시물이네요. 스크랩 해갈게요~^^
좋은 게시물이네요. 스크랩 해갈게요~^^
좋은 게시물이네요. 스크랩 해갈게요~^^
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