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Pyongyang hits US with one-two punch
By Donald Kirk
Apr 18, 2012
SEOUL - No doubt about it, United States negotiator Glyn Davies got suckered into one of the all-time negotiating tricks when he fell for the deal with North Korea's veteran double-talker Kim Kye-gwan on February 29 in which Kim convinced him, really, this time North Korea would honor a "moratorium" on all missile and nuclear tests.
The trick, when you think about it, was basic. All Kim needed was for Davies to promise 240,000 tons in food aid - "nutritional" stuff for kids, not rice for soldiers - and the great North Korean disinformation machine could then advance to phase two of the trick.
First, the North Koreans could say, we were planning this missile shot for a long time, since way before the passing of our beloved leader Kim Jong-il in December, and anyway the missile was going to put a weather satellite into orbit, nothing to do with eventually tipping it with a nuclear or biological or chemical weapon and firing it all the way to California.
Next, while the US was raging over that one and suspending the food aid, the North Koreans could then say, look, you broke the deal, all bets are off, and now we're going ahead with our third nuclear test. Simple. The North Koreans, thanks to the "agreement" that Davies thought he had hammered out with Kim Kye-gwan in Beijing, are in the right, and who cares if the United Nations comes out with a "condemnation" and warnings of "tightened sanctions" for firing the missile?
Actually, however, the North Koreans do care - after a fashion. The UN Security Council's "condemnation" on Tuesday brings them to the final stage of the game plan initiated in Beijing. With all the important global powers seemingly against them, they have added incentive to demonstrate their place as the world's ninth nuclear power and press on with the test.
All the while, the North Koreans can be pretty sure China, although it signed on to the statement of condemnation along with the other security council members, is not going to do much by way of depriving the North of the fuel it needs for its dilapidated economy or the luxury products the elite count on to maintain their lifestyles.
The Chinese are primarily concerned about their own investments in North Korea, notably joint projects with relatives of the Kim dynasty and the top generals and party officials surrounding them, for extracting precious metals and minerals from remote mountain mines. The Chinese might not endorse the North's wasting its money on nukes and missiles, but they're not going to jeopardize those relationships. Even if they clamp down somewhat, enough filters across the porous Yalu and Tumen river frontiers.
The "Leap Year" deal in Beijing served yet another purpose - as a prelude to new Supreme Leader Kim Jong-eun's maiden address at Sunday's massive outpouring for the 100th anniversary of the birth of his grandfather, "Great Leader" Kim Il-sung. With the US now proven to be the one that broke the deal, Kim Jong-eun could build on the "military first" policy of his grandfather and father, Kim Jong-il, as he has been doing in visits to military units ever since taking over after his father's death in December.
In the biggest such event in North Korea since the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army in 1992, the celebration on Pyongyang's Kim Il-sung Square left no doubt of the primacy of North Korea's armed forces.
They, and they alone, are responsible for perpetuating the hard-line policies of the dynasty, in power since the Russians packed the young revolutionary Soviet army captain, Kim Il-sung, onto a ship and sent him down the coast to the port of Wonsan. The understanding at the time was that he would take over the regime in the Soviet "half" of the Korean Peninsula, above the artificial line at the 38th parallel. Who knew about his dream to invade the South in June 1950 and reunite the country?
North Korea's "powerful military," Kim Jong-eun assured the throng - and millions more listening on the North's state TV and radio networks - was "capable of waging modern warfare with offensive and defensive tactics". In a clear allusion to North Korea's nuclear program, he said the era in which foreign powers could intimidate the North "with atomic weapons is forever gone".
That remark, if nothing else, fortified the widespread view that Kim Jong-eun, spurred on by the generals who dominate the power structure, will surely press ahead with a third nuclear test. The betting now is that he press the button the device before October 10, the anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party.
Bolstered by his newly acquired titles of chairman of the national defense commission and first secretary of the party, Kim Jong-eun appeared solemnly confident as he stepped forward on a balcony high above the square, grasped the podium behind six or seven microphones and in a heavy monotone paid homage to the legacy of both his father and grandfather. Clad in a dark Mao Zedong-style suit, in contrast to the uniformed, bemedalled generals ranged on either side of him, he read from a prepared text as he spoke defiantly of the country's need to defend itself against the menace of foreign aggressors.
The grand occasion, under clear skies in cool spring weather, was intended to solidify the authority of the new leader, believed to be 29 years old, as much as to honor his grandfather, who ruled for nearly half a century before dying in 1994. Kim Jong-eun now has "all the formal levers of power", said Lee Jong-min, dean of the graduate school of international studies at Yonsei University, "and this is the world's most militarized state".
Kim Jong-eun did not mention the failure of the long-range missile that broke up and plunged into the Yellow Sea 80 seconds after its launch, but he may have had that embarrassment in mind when he remarked, "Our beloved soldiers and commanders," not "modern weapons," counted the most.
Doubtless he felt a special need to demonstrate his military strength since he has no real military experience beyond the few years that North Korean propaganda claims he spent at the Kim Il-sung Military Academy. "This young chap has to burnish his military credentials," said Lee, though "I don't think anyone in North Korea is going to tell him to his face" that he has little or no military experience.
In contrast, said Lee, Kim Il-sung, after years as a revolutionary fighter in Manchuria and then his service as an officer in the Soviet army in World War II, "had the charisma of direct military experience" and could make the party the center of power. Kim Jong-il, well before his father's death, had to establish himself as leader of the national defense commission as it gained ascendancy over the party.
Pyongyang-watchers will doubtless debate which is more important, the party or the army, but the question in a sense is moot since Kim Jong-eun, like his father, is in charge of everything. "The party is not supposed to control the military as in the Kim Il-sung era," said Choi Jin-wook, senior fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification. "After Kim Il-sung died, Kim Jong-il bypassed the party to control the military."
The fact that Kim Jong-eun spoke at all was perhaps the most significant aspect of the festive occasion in which thousands of troops in dress uniform stood in close formation on Kim Il-sung Square before thousands more civilians who alternated between listening intently and breaking into cheers during his 22-minute address. The kid's father, Kim Jong-il, was heard to speak only once, very briefly, in public during the 17 years in which he ruled North Korea after the death of his own father, Kim Il-sung, in 1994.
In a parade immediately after Kim Jong-eun's address, it was the sight of heavy-duty weaponry that caught the most attention. The most fearsome was a missile said to be about five meters longer than the one that failed so abysmally on Friday. The missile, painted olive drab and black, rested ponderously on a slow-moving 16-wheel vehicle. Although it was unclear if the missile was genuine or a dummy, South Korea's 24-hour cable network, YTN, described it as "an advanced version" of the long-range missiles that North Korea fired successfully in 1998 and 2009 and unsuccessfully in 2006 and again on Friday, April 13.
There could have been no more visible evidence than that of this giant missile on parade to demonstrate that Kim Kye-gwan had enticed Glyn Davies into a deal that North Korea had not the slightest notion of observing.
The idea all along, according to North Korean experts here, has been to miniaturize a nuclear weapon to the stage at which the long-range missile can deliver it to its target - and then reunite the Korean Peninsula on the terms of the Kim dynasty. Davies should have figured that out before bothering to go to Beijing in February.
Donald Kirk, a long-time journalist in Asia, is author of the newly published Korea Betrayed: Kim Dae Jung and Sunshine.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/ND18Dg03.html
What's good for Iran is bad for Pyongyang
By John Feffer
Apr 18, 2012
WASHINGTON - In early February, Iran launched its third successful commercial satellite in three years. The Barack Obama administration, the United Nations and the news media barely acknowledged the accomplishment. North Korea, on the other hand, has created a furor each of the three times its satellites failed to reach orbit.
Its latest effort, on April 13, broke up within two minutes of launch. Pyongyang acknowledged the failure and went on with its celebrations of the 100th anniversary of the birth of the country's founder, Kim Il-sung.
The Obama administration immediately condemned the North Korean launch. It followed through on its threat to suspend its participation in the February 29 agreement that would have sent 240,000 tonnes of food assistance to North Korea.
"We want to make clear to them.that each step that they take in terms of provocations will only lead to a deeper isolation, increase consequences," stated Ben Rhodes, deputy national security advisor for strategic communications. "And frankly, that's not just a message they're hearing from us, they're hearing it from the Chinese and the Russians as well."
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) released a "presidential statement" on April 16 accusing North Korea of violating a 2009 sanctions resolution that barred the country from missile tests, including satellite launches. The council's sanctions committee will look into freezing the assets of additional North Korean entities and preventing additional "proliferation-sensitive technology" from entering or exiting the country.
Iran and North Korea are both already subject to considerable sanctions, and the United States routinely expresses concerns over the missile programs of both countries. That hasn't prevented either country from moving forward with its space program.
Iran and North Korea view satellites as a sign of technological achievement and, given that satellites are a multi-billion-dollar industry, potential economic gain. North Korea is additionally motivated to get a satellite in orbit because of the two-time failure of South Korea to launch one of its own.
So attractive is the prospect of having a satellite in orbit - and the requisite rocket capability - that North Korea gave up the promised US food aid just on the eve of its "barley hump", when the winter stores are depleted and the new barley crop has not yet come in.
Part of the reason why Iran's satellite launches don't attract nearly the same attention as North Korea's lies in the origins of North Korea's space program, which began with an unannounced 1998 launch that particularly shocked Japan.
"North Korea's apparent readiness to launch multi-stage rockets back then with little warning came as a surprise, one that it seems we've never quite gotten over," an arms control expert told Inter Press Service (IPS) on a non-attribution basis. "Now add to that their nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] withdrawal and nuclear tests, and these launches look very threatening, indeed.
"Iran, by contrast, seems to avoid overflying other countries when conducting space launches. Even though the UNSC says they shouldn't be doing that sort of thing, either, it never gets the same sort of reaction. They're still in the NPT, of course."
Other factors include the lack of allied support for North Korea. Iran, with its considerable energy exports, continues to trade with China, Russia, India and Turkey, and can count on those countries for a measure of diplomatic support. North Korea, by contrast, has little to offer, and even its putative allies Russia and China have joined in the condemnation of its satellite launch.
In the aftermath of the failed launch, Pyongyang has indicated that it will pursue the construction of a larger rocket. The South Korean government, meanwhile, anticipates a third nuclear test from North Korea.
But the international community has few levers with which to influence North Korean behavior. The country is already heavily sanctioned, and the UN will be hard-pressed to find ways to tighten the screws.
"The United States is best advised to let the launch's failure be its own 'punishment'," argues John Delury, an assistant professor at Yonsei University in Seoul. "Sanctions have long passed the point of utility. Likewise 'tough' language from the UNSC only plays into the hands of hardliners in Pyongyang.
"More constructively, the diplomatic focal point - and Beijing might want to take the lead here - should be continuing with the plan to allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors in to monitor the freeze at Yongbyon. Were that to proceed, President Obama would have justification for going through with the US side of the Leap Day deal after all. The alternative is probably an intensified version of the worst of 2009-10."
In an April 13 New York Times op-ed, Sung-Yoon Lee, a scholar of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts, takes the opposite tack. "Spectacular failure though it was, North Korea's latest rocket launching calls for punitive measures from America and its allies," he writes. "Bad engineering is no reason for complacency; the benchmark for American policy must be North Korea's intent."
For the better part of its term, the Obama administration maintained a policy of "strategic patience" toward North Korea. During an election year, with many other issues competing for the administration's attention, neither a proactive nor a severely punitive approach is likely.
"I see relative continuity among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, with the exception being that there is little likelihood of serious or high-level dialogue through the end of the year," observes Scott Snyder, the director of the Program on US-Korea Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.
"North Korea's advantage currently comes from our respective preoccupations with domestic politics. Otherwise, I wonder whether there might have been the prospect of a more robust response."
(Inter Press Service)
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