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(paper) Confucianism and Daoism: On the relationship between the Analects, Laozi, and Zhuangzi, Part I(2020)
- Paul J. D'Ambrosio
1. INTRODUCTION
2. APPROACHES TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LUNYU, LAOZI, AND ZHUANGZI
3. PERSPECTIVES ON NAMES (MING) AND ACTUALITIES (SHI)
4. CULTIVATION, LEARNING, AND THE NATURAL
5. CONCEPTIONS OF THE PERSON
6. PRELIMINARY CONCLUDING REMARKS
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
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평소 궁금했던 부분을 짚어주는 글.
가장 인상적인 부분,
The major metaphors here are you 遊, “roaming” or “playing,” and jia 假, “assuming” or “taking on.”
저자가 登假의 假(가, 하, 격)에 대한 이해를 독특하게 함.
분석의 가장 중요한 부분인데, 예의 해석과는 전혀 다른 듯
古語를 다루는 동네라 그런지 설왕설래 갑론을박이 실로 많으네
登假於道: 若然者(약연자) 登高不慄(등고불률) 入水不濡(입수불유) 火不熱(입화불열)。
是知之能登假於道也若此(시지 지능등격어도야약차)
浸假而化 : 浸假而化予之左臂以為雞(침가이화여지좌비이위계) 予因以求時夜(여인이구시야)
假於異物: 假於異物(가어이물) 托於同體(탁어동체) 忘其肝膽(망기간담) 遺其耳目(유기이목)
彼且擇日而登假: 彼且擇日而登假(피차택일이등하) 人則從是也(인즉종시야)
(참고)
假 거짓 가, 끝날 가, 바꿀 가, 이를 격, 멀 하 1. 거짓 2. 끝나다 3. 바꾸다 4. 이르다5. 가짜
○ 知之能登假於道者也(지지능등격어도자야) 若此(약차) : 지식이 도(道)의 경지에 오름이 이와 같음. 登假의 假은 ‘격’으로 읽으며 도달하다[至]는 뜻이다(陸德明). 郭象은 오르다[登至]로 풀이했고, 成玄英도 같은 견해이다. 登假(등격)의 경우는 〈德充符〉편 ‘擇日而登假(택일이등하)’에 이미 나왔지만 ‘擇日而登假(하)’의 登假(등하)는 昇遐와 같은 의미이기 때문에 ‘하’로 읽고, 여기의 登假(등격)은 道의 경지에 오르다는 뜻으로 쓰였기 때문에 ‘격’으로 읽어야 한다. 王叔岷의 경우에도 〈德充符〉편에서는 ‘하’로 읽었고 여기의 경우는 ‘격’으로 읽어야 한다고 주장했는데 이 견해가 타당하다. ‘하’로 읽는 경우는 〈德充符〉편 ‘擇日而登假(하)’의 역주 참조. 若此의 此는 앞의 ‘登高不慄 入水不濡 入火不熱’을 받는 대명사.
○ 浸假而化予之左臂(침가이화여지좌비) 以爲雞(이위계) : 가령 나의 왼쪽 팔뚝을 서서히 변화시켜서 닭이 되게 한다면. 浸(침)은 점차의 뜻(郭象, 向秀)으로 侵의 假借字이다(王叔岷). 假는 假令의 뜻(成玄英). 林希逸은 使로 풀이했는데 같은 뜻이다.
○ 假於異物(가어이물) 託於同體(탁어동체) : 다른 사물을 빌려 한 몸에 의탁함. 다른 사물의 형체를 빌려 그와 한 몸이 된다는 뜻. 成玄英은 “여러 사물이 서로 의탁하여 함께 한 몸을 이루는 것이다[衆諸寄託 共成一身].”로 풀이했고, 曹受坤은 “다른 것들을 합쳐서 같은 것을 이루는 것이다[合異以爲同].”라고 풀이했다.
○ 擇日而登假(택일이등하) : 날짜를 가려서 아득한 곳에 올라갈 것임. 곧 언젠가는 도의 경지에 올라갈 것이라는 뜻으로, 왕태의 죽음을 도의 세계에 들어가는 것으로 표현한 것이다. 登假(하)는 昇遐와 같다. 林希逸, 羅勉道, 郭慶藩 등은 《說文解字》의 풀이에 근거하여, 假를 격(格)으로 읽고 이른다[至]는 뜻으로 보아야 한다고 주장했고, 宣穎, 奚侗, 朱桂曜, 聞一多, 王叔岷 등은 《爾雅》에 근거하여, 假를 遐(하) 또는 霞(하)로 보아야 한다고 주장했는데, 여기서는 뒤의 견해를 따랐다.
(출처 : 전통문화연구회의 동양고전종합DB(http://db.juntong.or.kr))
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Confucianism and Daoism: On the relationship
between the Analects, Laozi, and Zhuangzi, Part I
Paul J. D'Ambrosio
Abstract
The Lunyu 論語(Analects of Confucius), Daodejing 道德經
(Classic of the Way and Virtuosity) or Laozi 老子(Book of
Master Lao), and the Zhuangzi 莊子(Book of Master
Zhuang) have been broadly classified as representative of
Confucianism (Lunyu) and Daoism (Laozi and Zhuangzi). This
loose grouping, and the similarities and differences associated
with these “schools” include some of the most telling
and simultaneously misleading generalizations about Chinese
philosophy or thought in general. These articles seek
to provide an overview of the relationship between
Confucianism and Daoism. The first article begins before
with a generalized topics based comparison of the Lunyu,
Laozi and Zhuangzi. The latter two texts include their own
significant differences, but I will, wherever possible, look
for generalities that fit both. The major themes considered
in this first part are (1) the perspectives on names (ming 名)
and actualities (shi 實), (2) cultivation, learning, and what is
considered natural (ziran 自然), and finally (3) conceptions
of the person.
1 | INTRODUCTION
In the pre‐Buddhist formative years for “Chinese Philosophy” several texts emerged as key contributions to what
would become a lasting tradition. The Han and Wei‐Jin periods, which arguably saw the beginning of the commentarial
style that would dominate the development of philosophical and religious ideas in China until today,
ushered in the dominating influence of the Yijing 易經(Book of Changes), Lunyu 論語(Analects of Confucius),
Daodejing 道德經(Classic of the Way and Virtuosity) or Laozi 老子(Book of Master Lao), and the Zhuangzi 莊子
(Book of Master Zhuang). The latter three texts, Lunyu, Laozi, and Zhuangzi, were broadly classified by thinkers such
as Wang Bi 王弼(226–249)—who was following earlier depictions already found in Mohist texts and the Xunzi 荀子
(Book of Master Xun)—as representative of Confucianism (Lunyu) and Daoism (Laozi and Zhuangzi). Indeed, this
loose grouping (which at various periods saw other texts come in and out of favor1), and the similarities and differences
associated with these “schools,” include some of the most telling and simultaneously misleading generalizations
about Chinese philosophy or thought in general.
This article, and the one that follows, undertakes to look at the similarities and differences between major ideas
and terms in the Lunyu, Laozi, and Zhuangzi. The latter two texts include their own significant differences, but I will,
wherever possible, look for generalities that fit both. This article will also look at major scholars, especially
contemporary ones, who have weighed in on this issue.2
Given the scope of this article, plenty of essential Chinese philosophical concepts will not be evaluated. For
example, Robin Wang (Wang, 2012) and Chen Lai 陳來(Chen, 2017) have convincingly argued for the importance
of understanding qi 氣(material/life force, stuff) and yin‐yang 陰陽as the foundations of everything from ethics and
politics, to nature and family in Chinese civilization. While qi is important in the Zhuangzi and yin‐yang is included in
some of the more prominent passages of the Laozi, neither is directly considered in the Lunyu. The aim here is to
outline a discussion between the Lunyu and the Laozi and Zhuangzi, so these articles will be limited to concepts that
feature prominently in all three texts. This does not mean, however, that a term must be included in all three texts.
Below we will consider renxing 人性(human dispositions) and zhizu 知足(awareness of satisfaction) as ideas, but not
terms, that comprise unique ideological backgrounds to the Lunyu, Laozi, and Zhuangzi.
In this two‐part article, I will begin below by outlining general approaches to the relationship between the
Lunyu, Laozi, and Zhuangzi before engaging in a generalized topics‐based comparison of these works. In this first
part I will consider (1) the perspectives on names (ming 名) and actualities (shi 實); (2) cultivation, learning, and what
is considered natural (ziran 自然), and finally (3) conceptions of the person. In the second article, or second part, I
will look at (1) politics, nonaction (wuwei 無為), and virtuosity (de 德); (2) morality, virtues, and human nature
(xing 性); and finally (3) Dao 道or “the way.” Questions about the authenticity and dating of the texts will not be
taken up here. Speaking of the Lunyu, Laozi, and Zhuangzi, we will focus on the received versions, and how they have
been interpreted in the Chinese, and now Western, traditions. In terms of dating, the underlying assumption here is
that these ideas were, as Kongzi himself says, transmitted from the ancients (Lunyu 7.1).3 Thus, whether the Laozi or
the Lunyu was composed first, an issue Chen Guying 陳鼓應(Chen, 2015, 2020) has been extremely vocal about, is
more or less a moot point. We will assume that the Laozi reacts, if not to the Lunyu, then to ideas the Lunyu
elaborated on that were already in the culture. The Zhuangzi clearly is a reaction to and/or development of both.
2 | APPROACHES TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LUNYU, LAOZI, AND ZHUANGZI
As mentioned above, the Laozi and Zhuangzi have, for almost their entire history, been read as contiguous texts,
and, taken together, they comprise the foundation of “Daoist” thought. There is little doubt that the Laozi had a
major impact on the author(s) of the Zhuangzi—clearly many of the ideas found in the Zhuangzi are direct developments
of those found in the Laozi. When compared with the Laozi, the Zhuangzi is generally regarded as less
metaphysical, less political, and less cosmological. It is far more existential and offers more complex reflections on
Confucian themes—especially cultivation, exemplars, morality, and social relationships (including family). The
relationship of these texts to the Lunyu is much more complex.
Relying heavily on the Shiji 史記(Records of the Grand Historian), Zhuangzi, and Lüshi chunqiu (Spring and Autumn
Annuals of Master Lü), Chen Guying (Chen, 2015) has argued that the Laozi clearly predates the Lunyu, even going so
far as to suggest that Kongzi was given advice by the historical Laozi 老子(Lao Dan 老聃, d. 531 BCE). Chen's is a
minority view, but he does outline compelling evidence. This position is possible because, as Kongzi himself says
(Lunyu 7.1), the major ideas in the Lunyu were already very much alive in Chinese civilization long before Kongzi's time.
The more mainstream interpretation is that the Laozi was composed sometime after Kongzi died, and that many
sections, such as 5, 18, 19, and 38, are in direct response to Kongzi's own thought. Here, as in the relationship between
the Zhuangzi and the Lunyu, scholars differ in their evaluations of just how critical the Laozi passages really are toward
the Lunyu. Some, such as Wang Bi or Ames and Hall (2003), find Chapters 5, 18, 19, and 38 of the Laozi to be critical of
the fixation on the language or reification of moral virtues as developed after Kongzi's death. For the purposes of this
article, the dating of these is more or less a moot point—we will explore the dialog as going in many possible directions.
Mainly, we will explore whether these texts share comparable concerns, or are critical of one another.
Those who take the Lunyu and Laozi to be generally similar in terms of values make some version of the
following argument (as adapted from Wang Bi): Kongzi mentions virtues in particular settings as specific advice for
unique persons. When abstracted and generalized, these pieces of advice are made into standards that betray their
roots as entirely context dependent guidelines for reflection. Criticisms in the Laozi of the virtues expounded on in
the Lunyu are actually directed at the institutionalization of Kongzi's words. The Laozi prioritizes the “unnamable
(wu ming 無名)” or “ineffable” as the “naturalness/self‐so‐ness (ziran 自然)” or “way (dao 道)” Kongzi embodied.
Getting caught up in the examples or names of the virtues themselves is like trying to follow the “footprints ( ji 跡)”
of the Master. The terrain always changes, and one's feet and gait are not the same, so one had better follow the
“naturalness/self‐so‐ness” or “way” that left the prints, not the prints themselves. (Kongzi, by contrast, explicitly
praises following others' footprints in Lunyu 11.20.)
Others, including most prominently Moeller (2004, 2006), and to a lesser extent Chen Guying and Yang (2009,
2009), find the Laozi to be critical of the Lunyu. They do not find a huge separation between Kongzi's words and their
institutionalization, arguing that Kongzi held everyone to high and strict standards (e.g., 1.4, 6.12, and 17.21). Another
option, as in the case of the morally‐minded Hanfeizi 韓非子(Book of Master Hanfei)4 or the more religiously‐oriented
Heshang Gong 河上公(first century CE; dates unknown), in his Laozi Heshang Gong Zhangju 老子河上公章句(Heshang
Gong's Commentary to the Laozi), is to more or less ignore the relationship between the Laozi and Lunyu.
The relationship between the Lunyu and the Zhuangzi is arguably more complex than with other pre‐Qin
classics. Already in pre‐Qin works the Xunzi (22.5) accused the Zhuangzi as being blinded by tian 天(nature,
heavens, and sky) and not knowing humans. The accusation has proved lasting, with scholars throughout history
continuing to appeal to this criticism (e.g., Zhu Xi [1130–1200]; Chong, 2016; Yang, 2009). Indeed, there can be
little doubt that both the Laozi (e.g., 5, 25, and 42) and the Zhuangzi cast a broader net in their range of concern
when compared to the relatively strict focus on humans and social relationships in the Lunyu. Even more caustically,
some scholars (e.g., Chong, 2016; Moeller & D'Ambrosio, 2017) find the Zhuangzi to be nothing short of an attack on
Kongzi and the Lunyu, taking passages such as Robber Zhi's insults towards Kongzi (29.1) as broadly representative
of the attitude the Zhuangzi holds towards the Lunyu.5 Others, including Wang Bi, Guo Xiang (252–312), Wang
Fuzhi (1619–1692), Wang (2004, 2014), Wang (2010), and Nylan (2017), see the Lunyu and Zhuangzi as expressing
similar perspectives on morality and self‐cultivation, as well as criticizing the institutionalization of either. Wang Bo
even thinks that of all pre‐Qin texts these two are the closest.
Arguments for the similarities between the Zhuangzi and Lunyu follow a similar form (adapted below from Guo
Xiang and Wang Bo): Kongzi recognized that examples of virtuous behavior were crystallized into abstract and rigid
rules that people could adopt without the proper feelings, or even hypocritically (Lunyu 2.7, 17.13). Kongzi thereby
emphasized feelings, relationships, and situations so as to assemble a view of living that could not be hollowed out
and institutionalized as lifeless standards the clever and glib‐tongued could use to trick others. Unfortunately, even
the intention behind quotes such as “there is nothing I must do, and nothing I must not do”6 (Lunyu 18.8) or
emphasizing cultivation and developing one's own judgment, could be, and ultimately was devitalized and made into
an institutionalized code of ethics. The authors of the Zhuangzi saw this, and learned from it.7 Sharing the general
sentiments of the Lunyu authors, the Zhuangzi targeted the paradoxes of language, on the limits of shi 是(that's it,
right, and is)—fei 非(that's not it, wrong, and is not) disputes. So instead of giving the contextualized advice that
Kongzi gave—which was nevertheless divorced from its contexts—the Zhuangzi demonstrates the limits of human
understanding, the absolute uniqueness of situations, and a huge host of environmental (including non‐human)
factors that make the social world what it is. Thus, the criticisms of Kongzi or his values in the Zhuangzi are more
accurately read as targeting the institutionalization of the Lunyu, and not problems with Kongzi's own teachings. In
fact, this approach argues that Kongzi himself would agree with the critiques in the Zhuangzi, as they are nothing
but developments that echo Kongzi's own concerns over institutionalizing any moral values and the opportunity for
hypocrisy, lying, and pretense created therein.
3 | PERSPECTIVES ON NAMES (MING) AND ACTUALITIES (SHI)
Regardless of whether one reads the Laozi and Lunyu as having similar perspectives on morality and self‐cultivation,
or as being at odds with one another, or whether one takes the Zhuangzi to be a criticism of the Lunyu itself, or
sharing its criticisms of reified morality, the role of language plays a key part. Those who find similarities or differences
in these texts can agree on one thing: the approaches taken to the constituting relationship between ming
名(name, title, and role) and shi 實(actuality and reality) are broadly different. The role of ming and shi in early
Chinese thought can hardly be overestimated. The relationship between the two forms the basic structure of any
early philosophical approach—with the effects reverberating throughout every aspect of that system.
Though contested (Defoort, 2001), a large majority of scholars see zhengming 正名(“appropriate application of
names”) as a central teaching of the Lunyu. The actual term zhengming appears only once in the Lunyu (13.3), though
the concept is arguably reflected across many conversations in the text (e.g., 2.7, 6.25, and 12.11). Simply put,
zhengming demands that names and actualities correspond. In one paradigmatic example (12.11) we find:
Duke Jing of Qi asked Confucius about governing. Confucius replied, “Let a ruler be a ruler, a minister
be a minister, a father be a father, and a son be a son.”
“Good!” said the Duke, “If, indeed, the ruler be not ruler, the minister not minister, the father not
father, and the son not son, even if there were grain, how would I get to eat it?” (Ni, 2017, p. 289)
Someone who is not a ruler but who acts as one, endangers the entire state—and the same is true for all roles
(3.7, 3.22). Therefore, zhengming is a demand that people live up to their social roles and no one usurps titles. When
names are assigned appropriately, the entire state can be in order. But when names are misused, even though there
might be food, the ruler himself cannot eat. Matching names with actualities is not only a political project. It is, first and
foremost, a moral one. (The connection between the moral and political will be discussed in more detail below.) If we
accept this link, we note that the Lunyu repeatedly insists on one living up to their name/position/role in both their
“external” behavior as well as “inner” thoughts and feelings. In several places Kongzi admonishes those who act
appropriately but do not have the proper thoughts and feelings (2.7, 17.13, and 17.22). Indeed, there is an argument to
be made—(as found in Wang Fu 王符[85–163] and Xu Gan 徐干[170–217]; see also [D'Ambrosio, 2016])—that Kongzi
is more concerned about people who act morally, but do not have the corresponding thoughts and feelings, than about
thosewhosimply act inappropriately. The correspondence required for zhengming is thus a dual correspondence: one's
external behavior must correspond to the name, but so too must their inner thoughts and feelings.
The Laozi and Zhuangzi are suspicious of the very possibility of creating and moreover demanding correspondence
between names and actualities, and especially of the dual correspondence the Lunyu requires. The
opening lines of the Laozi (1) remark:
The way (dao) that can be spoken is not the constant way, the name (ming) that can be named is not
the constant name. The nameless (wuming 無名) is the beginning of heaven and Earth.
All things are generated from this constant way (42), and its inability to be accurately described in language
marks a theory about the incongruity of names and actualities. The way is also said to be or hidden in the
“nameless” or “without name” (wuming 無名; 1, 32, and 41) and is disassociated from language (yan 言; 56). On an
existential level, the first‐person perspective of the Laozi esteems being “nameless” as well (37), or else following
the teachings that have no language (yan; 2, 43), or having little language oneself (23). This is the model in the
political arena as well (37), which will be looked at in more detail below.
The Zhuangzi redoubles these efforts to reveal the incongruity between names and actualities, commenting, for
example, “names are the guests of actualities” (Zhuangzi 1.4). No constant name can accurately correspond to any
actuality. Not only is there a fundamental disconnect, as noted by the Laozi, but actualities constantly transform.
Hua 化, “transform” or “change,” appears 91 times in the Zhuangzi, and mostly refers to how one thing can become
another. A name is limited to a single actuality, frozen in time. But all things are constantly transforming, thus no
name can accurately capture any subject.
The Zhuangzi goes even further, directly challenging the Lunyu on its most cherished grounds. Section 6.7 of the
Zhuangzi features Kongzi's favorite student, Yan Hui 顏回, in Kongzi's home state of Lu, attending the funeral of
Mengsun Cai's 孟孫才mother. Yan Hui asks his beloved teacher, a master of mourning rituals, how Cai could be
considered a master mourner when he cries without shedding tears and mourns without sadness for his own
mother. In other words, Cai was “someone who does not have the actuality but yet still gets the name.” Kongzi, as a
mouthpiece for the Zhuangzi, answers simply that all things transform (wan hua 萬化), and Cai understands this, and
accepts it. The implication is that the correspondence‐based naming project of the Lunyu is limited and fails to fully
appreciate the transformation of things. The challenge to a moral commitment to names thereby comes from a
broad cosmological recognition of change.
The core difference between the dual correspondence theory about the congruence between names and
actualities in the Lunyu and the rejection of this view in the Laozi and Zhuangzi is reverberated throughout their
philosophies. It is perhaps most apparent, however, in their views on cultivation, morality, and politics.
4 | CULTIVATION, LEARNING, AND THE NATURAL
The key terms for cultivation in early Chinese thought are xiu 修and cheng 成. However, cultivation also plays a key
role in many passages where no term for “cultivation” appears. Chapters 10 and 23 of the Laozi, for example, do not
contain any word for “cultivation” and yet are often read as focused on self‐cultivation (Chen, 2020). Differences
between the type of cultivation advocated in the Lunyu, Laozi, and Zhuangzi mainly boil down to competing takes on
what is natural—sometimes ziran 自然(also, self‐so, cultivated spontaneity, and naturalness), or, to impose a term
used only rarely in these texts, xing 性(natural disposition, inclination, and nature). While not explicitly stated,
competing theories of what is natural for humans, or natural human dispositions, forms the background of these
discussions.
According to many thinkers, the Lunyu and Laozi propose quite similar models here. Both believe that the
individual's own self‐cultivation will have a strong influence on how others behave, think, and feel. The effect is
multiplied if the person in question is the ruler. Chen Guying summarizes this position in the Laozi:
“Cultivating oneself” is like solidifying the basis, it is the starting point both for establishing oneself as
well as bringing order to the world. Laozi further emphasizes the importance of cultivating virtuosity
(de 德) in the whole spectrum extending from the limited sphere of self‐cultivation to the broader field
of governing the state. (Chen, 2020, p. 306)
Chen expands further on the ruler's own self‐cultivation:
He not only expects the people to be genuine and simple, but he requires the rulers in particular to
pursue genuineness and simplicity for the sake of self‐cultivation. Therefore, in Chapter 20 there is
“my heart‐mind is truly that of a fool (我愚人之心也哉),” which indicates that genuineness and
simplicity (yu 愚) belong to the superior state of self‐cultivation of an ideal ruler. (Chen, 2020, p. 352)
The genuineness and simplicity Chen highlights are related to two other major concepts in the Laozi, namely
“returning (fan 反)” and “knowing satisfaction (zhizu 知足).” “Returning” means going back to one's natural (ziran),
genuine, and simple state. As Chapter 48 records, “For learning (xue 學), (one will) increase daily, for the way, (one
will) decrease daily.” The daily decrease indicates not getting caught up in achievements or other external
triumphs, such as titles or reputations. This “decrease” is a type of “returning” to a natural, genuine, and simple
state.
“Knowing satisfaction” invites people to fulfill their desires, needs, and even wants, without getting overly
attached to them. Genuineness and simplicity are again the background here. One practices a type of “anticultivation”
or guards against becoming infatuated with food, money, sex, property, and the like. The Lunyu shares a
similar attitude (4.5, 5.11), though it is not quite as concerned with the dangers of desires as the Laozi. The “learning
(xue 學)” or “studying” that the Laozi (48) says causes daily increase—and juxtaposes to the daily decrease of
practicing the way—is central for Kongzi's philosophy.
The Lunyu (1.1) opens with a mantra about cultivation “to study (xue 學) and often8 practice what one has
learned, is this not pleasant?” As Ni Peimin notes, “The process of xue is the process of appropriating what is
learned, the process of becoming and transforming” (Ni, 2017, pp. 70–71). Xue is an activity of self‐cultivation. In
the Lunyu people cultivate themselves for purposes similar to those expressed in the Laozi—that is, to be a better
person and to influence others. And the Lunyu too sees this as a “natural process”—at least according to the
interpretation given by Mengzi 孟子(372‐289 BCE). What counts as “natural” however, is quite different. For
Kongzi, one studies not for the sake of “returning” to a natural state, but as natural growth (6.19, 8.20), though it is
a development, not something everyone will engage in (16.9). An individual's cultivation has to do with being
“upright (zhi 直),”9 “humane (ren 仁),” “appropriate and dutiful (yi 義),” “filial (xiao 孝),” and practicing “ritual propriety
(li 禮).” All of this culminates in having “virtuosity (de 德)” and/or a higher level of “humaneness (ren 仁).” For Kongzi
this is what being human (ren 人) is all about. Pronounced the same as “humaneness (ren 仁),” being “human (ren 人)”
is not a biological designation; it is a moral one. Only those who study and practice—that is, cultivate themselves—
embody this characteristic.
Two major methods for study or cultivation are advanced in the Lunyu. The first, and perhaps most straightforward,
is studying texts. Kongzi is said to often discourse on the Book of Songs (詩) as well as the Book of
Documents (書; 7.18). Kongzi's own son Boyu 伯魚(530‐480 BCE) is recorded (16.13) as having said:
Once he [Kongzi] was standing alone when I passed the hall with hasty steps, and he said to me, “Have
you learned the Book of Songs?” I replied, “Not yet.” He said, “Not learning the Songs, you will not know
how to speak.” I retired and learned the Songs. Another day, he was again standing alone when I
passed by the hall with hasty steps, he said to me, “Have you learned the Book of Rites?” I replied, “Not
yet.” He said, “If you do not learn the Book of Rites, you will not be able to establish yourself.” (Ni, 2017,
p. 387; translation modified)
Clearly, studying is for the sake of transforming oneself. For this reason, Kongzi (2.15) notes that “to study
without thinking is confused, and thinking without studying is dangerous.” One has to be careful with what one
learns, and how it is applied.
The second, and equally important method for studying or cultivation, is emulating rolemodels. Xue not only
means “to study, to learn” but also to “imitate” and “copy.” The Lunyu includes dozens of positive and negative role
models (a few examples include: 3.1, 3.20, 8.20, 16.1, and 18.11). Perhaps the most famous line about role models is
found in Lunyu 7.22:
The Master said, “Walking along with two others, I am certain there is my teacher among them.
I select their good qualities to follow, and their bad qualities to rectify.” (Ni, 2017, p. 203)
This growing process is difficult, and at times uncomfortable. Kongzi thinks it may be important to “fake it until
you make it.”10 This is especially true for rituals. When his student Zai Wo 宰我(522‐458 BCE) says that the 3‐year
mourning period for one's parents is too long, and that he would feel fine (an 安) eating good food and wearing fine
clothing after only a year, Kongzi is disappointed (17.21). It is Zai Wo's unwillingness to even try that so upsets
Kongzi. It might be hard to imagine being upset for 3 years, not playing music or enjoying fine food or clothing, but
Kongzi expects that one learns their ability to do this or not through actually trying (14.38). There is a constant
emphasis on effort, one example reads (6.12):
Ranyou said, “It is not that I do not rejoice in the way (dao 道) of the Master, but that I do not have the
strength to walk it.” The Master said, “Those who do not have the strength for it collapse somewhere
along the way. But with you, you have drawn your own line before you start.” (Ames & Rosemont,
1998, p. 106)
The basic model is a familiar one. We often make children say or do polite things, such as saying “thank you.”
We believe this is important even if they only half‐heartedly mutter the words. Eventually, we hope, they will find
their value and come to really mean them. Cultivation and learning in the Lunyu operates in the same way. It is
exactly this time of assertive “trying”‐based behavior that the Laozi and Zhuangzi oppose with the idea of
“nonaction” or “non‐assertive action” (wuwei 無為).
Following the “decreasing” cultivation of the Laozi, the Zhuangzi responds to the Lunyu with a good deal of
skepticism about increasing one's knowledge of social conventions. For Kongzi it might be something natural, but
the Zhuangzi is concerned about getting caught up in always wanting to learn more, becoming overly vigilant and
anxious, or obsessed with gaining prestige, reputation, and other forms of benefit through appearing cultivated. The
attacks come from all different directions. However, as discussed above, there is room for competing
interpretations. The Zhuangzi can be read as responding to the Lunyu itself, the reception of this text, or some mix of
both.
First, there is a limit to what one can study. In keeping with “returning to genuineness and simplicity” as found
in the Laozi, the Zhuangzi does not think learning is essential for living well—especially learning not heavily
grounded in practice. One does not need to study endlessly and be constantly vigilant in order to ensure a life well
lived. The Zhuangzi (3.1) records:
My life has limits, but knowledge has no limits. To follow what has no limit with what has limits, it is
dangerous. Knowing this and going for knowledge, danger cannot be avoided. Doing what is
[considered] good, do not get too close to [getting a] reputation, doing what is [considered] evil, do not
get too close to [getting] punished. Tending to the central median as the normal course can preserve
our bodies, keep our lives safe, nourish our relatives, and we can live out our years.
So, where the Lunyu asks for constant study, emulation of role models, and a general “try hard” attitude, the
Zhuangzi seems to argue that one can do just fine without either.
Second, and perhaps most famously in English language scholarship on the Zhuangzi, skeptical, relativist, and
perspectivist veins radiate throughout the Daoist classic.11 Chapter 2 is recognized as housing the most distilled
illustrations of this tendency, with passages such as (2.5):
There is no being that is not “that.” There is no being that is not “this.” But one cannot be seeing these
from the perspective of “that”: one knows them only from “this” [i.e., from one's own perspective].
Thus, we can say: “That” emerges from “this,” and “this” follows from “that.” This is the theory of the
simultaneous generation of “this” and “that.” But by the same token, their simultaneous generation is
their simultaneous destruction, and vice versa. Simultaneous affirmability is simultaneous negatability,
and vice versa. What is circumstantially right is also circumstantially wrong, and vice versa.
Thus, the Sage does not proceed from any one of them alone but instead lets them all bask in the
broad daylight of Heaven. And that too is only a case of going by the rightness of the present “this.”
(Ziporyn, 2009, p. 12)
With this attitude, it is difficult to imagine any guidelines for cultivation. The Zhuangzi is instead asking for
people to follow what they naturally feel, or naturally see, to be “obvious” or what is clearly right in a given situation.
Still, we can imagine some type of cultivation might help one clear their mind and see “the rightness of the
present ‘this’” more clearly. Once again, we find that the only instructions rely heavily on decreasing orientation
(i.e., towards social conventions).
The zhenren 真人or “genuine people” are often presented in the Zhuangzi as persons deserving some level of
esteem. Modern Chinese academics often refer to them as “ideal personality types (lixiang renge 理想人格)” or
“someone who is in line with the way (you dao zhi ren 有道之人).” They are not really “role models” in the same way
the Lunyu presents role models. It has been argued, for example, that many of the seemingly exemplary persons in
the Zhuangzi (e.g., Cook Ding) are actually presentations of the ridiculousness of role models as found in texts such
as the Lunyu (Moeller, 2017).
With descriptions of people who are in line with the way (dao), the most consistent hint or guide at how they
reach their state revolves around “forgetting.” In one of the more satirical passages, the Zhuangzi (6.9) has Kongzi
taking advice from his favorite student Yan Hui about “making progress.” Yan Hui describes how he began with
forgetting “humaneness (ren 仁)” and “duty (yi 義),” and then moved on to forgetting rituals (li 禮) and music (yue 樂),
which have led to him unifying with the “great pervader” (probably the way, i.e., dao). The objects of cultivation for
the Lunyu are the first things dismissed for any “progress.” Relatedly, the roles and social positions that figure so
importantly in cultivation and naming projects are readily dismissed as well. As part of the “decreasing” or
“forgetting,” one does not attach themselves to social roles or esteem. Rather they play or roam (you 遊) through
them without overly identifying with any. The Zhuangzi (1.3) uses three variations on the “genuine person” to
outline how to become more in line with the way: “The utmost person is not (attached to) a (socially determined)
self, the spirit person is not (attached to) achievements, the sagely person is not (attached to) names/social identity
(ming 名).” Here the Zhuangzi is reacting to what the Lunyu considers natural, and its accompanying cultivation
methods. This difference reveals an underlying disparity between the way these texts conceive of the person.
5 | CONCEPTIONS OF THE PERSON
Any robust theory dealing with cultivation, politics, morality, or humanity in general relies on a certain conception
of the person. For the Lunyu, the person is part of a family and ancestry, a community and state, and the world and
cosmos. Meaning in one's life is derived therein, and without properly understanding one's roles one becomes lost.
Indeed, names and roles need to be correctly aligned, otherwise people will not even “know where to put their
hands and feet” (13.3). Punishments like chopping off a foot or tattooing one's face were not only meant to wreak
havoc on one's life and cause shame, they would bring disgrace before one's ancestors. It was considered a duty to
die with one's body “whole,” so that what was given can be returned in one piece.
On a more everyday level, family, social, political, and cosmic relations are constitutive of a person's identity.
One should first concentrate on being a child, sibling, cousin, and the like, before moving to being a friend, neighbor,
or political agent. Through these relationships, a person is situated. Who they are is simply this and nothing more.
Likewise, being a good person is nothing more than being good at these relationships. Confucian virtues are always
tied to a person's particular role, and the relationships that compose them.12 There is an emphasis on “doing what is
called for by one's role (ge de qi suo 各得其所).”13 For a ruler, this means making sure one is morally committed so
that their influence can radiate out to the people. One image from the Lunyu (12.19) carried throughout the Chinese
tradition14 says:
The excellence (de 德) of the exemplary person [or “ruler”] (junzi 君子) is the wind, while that of the
petty person is the grass. As the wind blows, the grass is sure to bend. (Ames & Rosemont, 1998,
p. 158)
According to a moralistic reading, this means cultivating oneself through both influencing others and being
influenced by them (1.8, 7.22). Much of the effort called for by the Lunyu is targeted at this concentration on roles
and relationships, and excelling at them. The Laozi and Zhuangzi have different takes on the person.
The Laozi does not expound heavily on any conception of the person outside of the political realm. Here there is
a shared sense of “doing what is called for by one's role” in the Lunyu. Chapter 11 of the Laozi, which says that
people are like the spokes of a wheel, is often interpreted as advocating that the people should do what is called for
by their roles. However, whereas the Lunyu centers this obligation in the family, subsequently extending to wider
social spheres, Laozi speaks almost exclusively of the political realm. Religious or spiritual readings—which have
been popular in China since, and largely based on, Heshang Gong's commentary—find much advice for the individual,
such as breathing techniques and ways to respond to social demands. These views often cast a skeptical eye
on playing an overly active part in society, or getting too caught up in social gain (e.g., reputation, money, and the
like). Furthermore, there are passages which expose a wish for small close‐knit communities (30, 80).
Much of the Laozi is devoted to describing the “sage (shengren 聖人).” Like the “exemplary person (junzi 君子)” of
the Lunyu, the “sage” can be indicative of an ideal person, or of a political ruler. From a philosophical perspective,
much of the Laozi is thus about the ruler, but can carry over to other people as well. Undoubtedly, the idea that one
should fulfill their duty and that superiors can heavily influence others can be found in both the Lunyu and the Laozi, but the expenditure of effort directed towards such behavior in the Lunyu is completely rebuffed in the Laozi.
Through nonaction the ruler influences others to not strive too strenuously, or be entranced by social gains. People
are primarily conceived in terms of the relationship humans have to what we would call “nature” today (5, 25) or in
terms of their place in the cosmos. They should be aligned with the Dao, which is a force that permeates, but is not
predominately centered on the human world.
The Zhuangzi also reacts critically to the view of people as entirely constituted by roles and relationships as
found in the Lunyu. Becoming aligned with a natural or cosmic Dao is part of its response, clearly borrowed from the
Laozi. The more novel aspect highlighted in the Zhuangzi asks one to play their role rather than live them. Or to live
them without becoming overly committed—as Zhuangzi 24.13 says, “do not with (your) personality enter into what
is ‘from heaven’ (bu yi ren ru tian 不以人入天).” The major metaphors here are you 遊, “roaming” or “playing,” and jia
假, “assuming” or “taking on.” In this way people do not get overly burdened or worried about trying to live up to
certain titles and thereby to influence or impress others. The Zhuangzi (4.2) suggests, “play (you 遊) within one's
social confinements without a concern for one's name or role (you qi fan er wu gan qi ming 遊其樊而無感其名).” One
who takes on this attitude may do the same things as others, but they are not internally restricted to thinking about
themselves or others through external social expectations. They are free to “assume any appearance on the way
(deng jia yu dao 登假於道)” (6.1). They recognize they are—like anyone else—composed of their own “dipping into
the borrowings and transform ( jin jia er hua 浸假而化)” (6.5) as well as “borrowing among all different things ( jia yu
yi wu 假於異物)” (6.6).
The person the Zhuangzi advises one to become is perfectly able to do well in relationships, but they do not
cultivate themselves accordingly or measure their own success and failures (or those of others) through social roles
and relationships. They can maintain a degree of distance that allows them to consider, but not get caught up in
social expectations, roles, and relationships.
6 | PRELIMINARY CONCLUDING REMARKS
The relationship between the Lunyu and Laozi and Zhuangzi is dynamic and shifts according to the context. In some
ways all three texts share quite similar approaches, while in others they are quite opposed. Part II of this article will
address three other themes, which also reflect on and further complexify the summaries given above.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Daniel Sarafinas for his help with this article. This work was supported by the Fundamental
Research Funds for the Central Universities (No: 2018ECNU‐QKT010).
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Connolly, T. (2021). Foundations of Confucian ethics: Virtues, roles, and exemplars. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
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Moeller, H.‐G. (2006). The philosophy of the Daodejing. Chicago, IL: Open Court.
Moeller, H.‐G. (2017). Hundun's mistake: Satire and sanity in the Zhuangzi. Philosophy East and West, 67(3), 783–800.
Moeller, H.‐., & D'Ambrosio, P. J. (2017). Genuine pretending: On the Philosophy of the Zhuangzi. New York, NY: Columbia
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Ni, P. (2017). Understanding the Analects of Confucius: A new translation of the Lunyu with annotations. Albany, NY: State
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Nylan, M. (2017). Zhuangzi: Closet Confucian? European Journal of Political Theory, 16(4), 411–429.
Wang, B. 王博(2004). The philosophy of Zhuangzi 莊子哲學. Beijing, China: Peking University Press.
Wang, D. 王德有(2010). Wei‐Jin Xuanxue: Leisurely Living Hermits 魏晉玄學:高蹈逸的閒適人生. Shanghai, China: Oriental
Publishing Center 東方出版中心.
Wang, B. 王博(2014). Zhuangzi: Thinking Through the inner chapters (L. kohn, Trans.). St. Petersburg, FL: Three Pines Press.
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FURTHER READING
Ames, R., & Hall, D. (1998). Thinking from the Han: Self, truth and transcendence in Chinese and western culture. Albany, NY:State University of New York Press.
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Graham, A. C. (1989). Disputers of the Tao. Chicago, IL: Open Court.
Lai, K. (2008). An introduction to Chinese philosophy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Puett, M., & Gross‐oh, C. (2016). The path: What Chinese philosophers can teach us about the good life. New York, NY: Simonand Schuster.
Sterckx, R. (2019). Ways of heaven: An introduction to Chinese thought. New York, NY: Basic Books.
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
Paul J. D'Ambrosio is associate professor of Chinese philosophy at East China Normal University in Shanghai,
China, fellow of the Institute of Modern Chinese Thought and Culture, Dean of the Center for Intercultural
Research. He is the author of 真假之间(Kong Xuetang Press, 2019), co‐author (with Hans‐Georg Moeller) of
Profile Yourself (Columbia University Press, 2021) and Genuine Pretending (Columbia University Press, 2017),
editor (with Michael Sandel) of Encountering China (Harvard University Press, 2018). Additionally, he has
authored over 70 articles, chapters, and reviews, and is translator of over a dozen books on Chinese philosophy.
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莊子 內篇 1 逍遙遊(소요유) 2 名實之賓(명실지빈) - Zhuangzi 1.4
堯讓天下於許由,曰:「日月出矣,而爝火不息;其於光也;不亦難乎!
時雨降矣,而猶浸灌;其於澤也,不亦勞乎!
夫子立而天下治,而我猶尸之,吾自視缺然,請致天下。」
許由曰:「子治天下,天下既已治也,而我猶代子,吾將為名乎?
名者,實之賓也,吾將為賓乎?
鷦鷯巢於深林,不過一枝;偃鼠飲河,不過滿腹。
歸休乎!君。予無所用天下為。
庖人雖不治庖,尸祝不越樽俎而代之矣。」
莊子 內篇 6 大宗師(대종사) 5 安排去化(안배거화) - Zhuangzi 6.7
顏回問仲尼曰:「孟孫才,其母死,哭而無涕,中心不戚,居喪不哀。
無是三者,以善處喪蓋魯國。
固有無其實而得其名者乎?回壹怪之。」
仲尼曰:「夫孟孫氏盡之矣,進於知矣。唯簡之而不得。夫巳有所簡矣。
孟孫氏不知所以生,不知所以死;不知就先,不知就後;
若化為物,以待其所不知之化巳乎!
且方將化,惡知不化哉?方將不化,惡知已化哉?
吾特與汝。其夢未始覺者邪!
且彼有駭形而無損心,有旦宅而無情死。
孟孫氏特覺,人哭亦哭,是自其所以乃。
且也相與吾之耳矣,庸詎知吾所謂吾之乎?
且汝夢為鳥,而厲乎天,夢為魚,而沒於淵。
不識今之言者,其覺者乎?其夢者乎?
造適不及笑,獻笑不及排,安排而去化,乃入於寥天一。」
莊子 內篇 3 養生主(양생주) 1 緣督(연독) Zhuangzi (3.1)
吾生也有涯,而知也無涯。
以有涯隨無涯,殆已。
已而為知者,殆而已矣!
為善無近名,為惡無近刑;
緣督以為經,可以保身,可以全生,可以養親,可以盡年。
莊子 內篇 2 齊物論(제물론) 5 是亦彼 彼亦是(시역피 피역시) - Zhuangzi (2.5)
物無非彼,物元非是。
自彼則不見,自知則知之。
故曰彼出於是,是亦因彼。彼是方生之說也。
雖然,方生方死,方死方生;方可方不可,方不可方可;
因是因非,因非因走。
是以聖人不由,而照之於天,亦因是也。
是亦彼也,彼亦是也。彼亦一是非,此亦一是非。
果且有彼是乎哉?果且無彼是乎哉?
彼是莫得其偶,謂之道樞。
樞始得其環中,以應無窮。是亦一無窮,非亦一無窮也。
故曰:莫若以明。
莊子 內篇 1 逍遙遊(소요유) 1-5 無己 無功 無名(무기 무공 무명) - Zhuangzi (1.3)
故夫知效一官,行比一鄉,德合一君,而徵一國者,其自視也亦若此矣。
而宋榮子猶然笑之。且舉世而譽之而不加勸,舉世而非之而不加沮,
定乎內外之分,辯乎榮辱之竟,斯已矣;
彼其於世,未數數然也。雖然,猶有未樹也。
夫列子御風而行,冷然善也,旬有五日而後反;
彼於致福者,未數數然也。此雖免乎行,猶有所待者也。
若夫乘天地之正,而御六氣之辯,以遊無窮者,彼且惡乎待哉!
故曰:至人無己,神人無功,聖人無名。
莊子 內篇 4 人間世(인간세) 1-7 虛室生白(허실생백) - Zhuangzi (4.2)
顏回曰:「回之未始得使,實自回也;得使之也,未始有回也;可謂虛乎?」
夫子曰:「盡矣。吾語若!
若能入遊其樊而無感其名,入則嗚,不入則止。
無門無毒。一宅而寓於不得已,則幾矣。
絕跡易,無行地難。為人使易以偽,為天使難以偽。
聞以有翼飛者矣,未聞以無翼飛者也,聞以有知知者矣,未聞以尤知知者也。
瞻彼闋者,虛室生白,吉祥止止。
夫且不止,是之謂坐馳。
夫徇耳目內通而外於心知,鬼神將來舍,而況人乎!
是萬物之化也,禹舜之所紐也,伏羲几蘧之所行終,而況散焉者乎!」
莊子 內篇 6 大宗師(대종사) 1- 2 眞人(진인) - Zhuangzi (6.1)
何謂真人?
古之真人,不逆寡,不雄成,不謨士。
若然者,過而弗悔,當而不自得也。
若然者,登高不慄,入水不濡,入火不熱。是知之能登假於道者也若此。
古之真人,其寢不夢,其覺無憂,其食不甘,其息深深。
真人之息以踵,眾人之息以喉。
屈服者,其嗌言若哇;其耆欲深者,其天機淺。
莊子 內篇 6 大宗師(대종사) 3-1 縣解(현해) - Zhuangzi (6.5)
子祀、子輿、子犁、子來四人相與語曰:
「孰能以無為首,以生為脊,以死為尻,孰知死生存亡之一體者,吾與之友矣。」
四人相視而笑,莫逆於心,逐相與為友。
俄而子輿有病,子祀往問之。
曰:「偉哉夫造物者,將以予為此拘拘也!」
曲僂發背,上有五管,頤隱於齊,肩高於頂,
句贅指天,陰陽之氣有沴,其心閒而無事,
跰癬而鑒於井,曰:「嗟乎!夫造物者又將以予為此拘拘也。」
子祀曰:「女惡之乎?」
曰:「亡,予何惡!浸假而化予之左臂以為雞,予因以求時夜;
浸假而化予之右臂以為彈,予因以求鴞炙;
浸假而化予之尻以為輪,以神為馬,予因以乘之,豈更駕哉!
且夫得者,時也;失者,順也。
安時而處順,哀樂不能入也。
此古之所謂縣解也。而不能自解者,物有結之。
且失物不勝天久矣,吾又何惡焉!」
莊子 內篇 6 大宗師(대종사) 4-1 逍遙無爲之業(소요무위지업) - Zhuangzi (6.5)
子桑戶、孟子反、子琴張相與友,曰:
「孰能相與於無相與,相為於無相為?
孰能登天遊霧,撓挑無極,相忘以生,無所終窮?」
三人相視而笑,莫逆於心,遂相與友。
莫然有間,而子桑戶死。未葬。
孔子聞之,使子貢往侍事焉。
或編曲,或鼓琴,相和而歌曰:
「嗟來桑戶乎!嗟來桑戶乎!而已反其真,而我猶為人猗!」
子貢趨而進,曰:「敢問臨尸而歌,禮乎?」
二人相視而笑,曰:「是惡知禮意!」
子貢反,以告孔子,曰:「彼何人者邪?修行無有,
而外其形骸,臨尸而歌,顏色不變,無以命之,彼何人者邪?」
孔子曰:「彼,遊方之外者也;而丘,遊方之內者也。
內外不相及,而丘使汝往弔之,丘則陋矣。
彼方與造物者為人,而遊乎天地之一氣,彼以生為附贅縣疣,以死為決疣潰癰。
夫若然者,又惡知死生先後之所在!
假於異物,託於同體;忘其肝膽,遺其耳目,反覆終始,不知端倪;
芒然彷徨乎塵埃(垢)之外,逍遙乎無為之業。
彼又惡能憒憒然為世俗之禮,以觀眾人之耳目哉!」
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