|
(paper) The Coming Time "Between" Being and Daoist Emptiness :
An Analysis of Heidegger's Article Inquiring into the Uniqueness of the Poet via the Lao Zi(2009)
- Xianglong Zhang
Philosophy East and West, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Jan., 2009), pp. 71-87
--------------------------------
Heidegger 실존철학의 많은 부분(특히 "Being and Time")이 노자와 괘를 같이 한다는 점에 대해 마침내 수긍하게 된 듯.
어쩌면 "Being and Time"의 완성되지 않은 부분(Part II. III)이 도덕경에 그대로 녹아있지는 않은걸까.
(Bergsong의 Duration 개념과 흡사한 무어가 Heidegger에 있는 듯, 잘은 몰라도)
"Being and Time"은, 37~8세 정도인가 교수 임용되는 와중(그 이전에 실적 부족으로 수차례 임용 탈락)에서 실적이 있어야 하는 상황에서 써야했던 책인 것으로 회자되는 일설이 있다. 이에 따르면, 3부작을 생각하고 있음에도 결국 급히 1부를 미리 탈고할 수밖에 없었는데(임용서류로 책이 아니라 탈고용 원고를 제출했을 정도), 결과적으로는 이 책이 철학계에서 이른바 공전의 히트를 하고(?) 무사히 교수에 임용되었다고 한다. 그것도, 애초 가고자 하는 대학이 아니라 지도교수가 있었던 모교로부터 초빙을 받으면서.
이러한 상황에도 불구하고 이 책이 Heidegger의 수많은 저서 증 가장 대표 저서로 인정되는 듯 한데, 화두만을 던전 상태에서 이 책이 결국 완성되지 않은 것도 흥미로운 점으로 얘기되는 듯.
한편, 비록 언어적 틀 그리고 대상은 전혀 다른 듯 하지만, 하이데거가 얘기하고자 하는 그 골자에 있어서는 노자 도덕경에 흐르는 저변 기조와 판박이같다는 느낌을 받는 건 나만이 갖는 느낌일까? 글쎄, 철학동네가 내 취미가 아님에도 노자를 아끼는 하이데거에 대해 사뭇 궁금해지는 듯.
어쨋거나, 지금까지 접한 Heidegger와 노자 비교 분석 중 무게감이 가장 나가는 paper.
-------------------------------
道德經 11, 三十輻共一穀(서른 개 바퀴살이 하나의 바퀴통으로 모이는데)
三十輻共一穀, 當其無, 有車之用,
埏埴以爲器, 當其無, 有器之用,
鑿戶牖以爲室, 當其無, 有室之用,
故有之以爲利, 無之以爲用.
道德經 50. 出生入死(사는 것은 나오는 것이고 죽는 것은 들어가는 것이다)
出生入死,
生之徒十有三, 死之徒十有三,
人之生, 動之死地, 亦十有三,
夫何故, 以其生生之厚,
蓋聞善攝生者, 陸行不遇兕虎, 入軍不被甲兵,
兕無所投其角, 虎無所措其爪, 兵無所容其刃,
夫何故, 以其無死地.
道德經 2. 美之爲美(아름다운 것이 아름다운 줄로만 아는데)
天下皆知美之爲美, 斯惡已,
皆知善之爲善, 斯不善已,
故有無相生, 難易相成, 長短相較,
高下相傾, 音聲相和, 前後相隨,
是以聖人處無爲之事, 行不言之敎,
萬物作焉而不辭, 生而不有, 爲而不恃,
功成而弗居, 夫唯弗居, 是以不去.
Being and Time(1927, 2010) - Martin Heidegger & Joan Stambaugh(trans.)
- This term, which does not express any negative value judgment, means that Dasein is initially and for the most part together with the "world" that it takes care of. This absorption in ... mostly has the character of being lost in the publicness of the they. As an authentic potentiality for being a self, Dasein has initially always already fallen away from itself and fallen prey to the "world." Falling prey to the "world" means being absorbed in being-with-one-another as it is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. What we called the inauthenticity of Dasein13 may now be defined more precisely through the interpretation of falling prey.
- What crowds in upon us is not this or that, nor is it everything objectively present together as a sum, but the possibility of things at hand in general, that is, the world itself. When anxiety has subsided, in our everyday way of talking we are accustomed to say "it was really nothing." This way of talking, indeed, gets at what it was ontically. Everyday discourse aims at taking care of things at hand and talking about them. That about which anxiety is anxious is not [nchts] innerworldly things at hand. But this not [Nichts] any thing at hand, which is all that everyday, circumspect discourse understands, is completely nothing [Nichts]. The nothing of handiness is grounded in the primordial "something" ["Etwas"],* in the world. The world, however, ontologically belongs essentially to the being of Dasein as being-in-the-world. So if what anxiety is about exposes nothing, that is, the world as such, this means that that about which anxiety is anxious is being-in-the-world itself.
- If temporality constitutes the primordial meaning of being of Dasein, and if this being [Seienden] is concerned about its being in its very being, then care must need "time" and thus reckon with "time." The temporality of Dasein develops a "time calculation." The "time" experienced in such calculation is the proximate phenomenal aspect of temporality. From it originates the everyday, vulgar understanding of time. And this understanding develops into the traditional concept of time.
- How are we to grasp this unity? How can Dasein exist as a unity in the ways and possibilities of its being that we mentioned? Evidently only in such a way that it itself is this being in its essential possibilities, that I am this being [Seiende]. The "I" seems to "hold together" the wholeness of the structural whole. The "I" and the "self" have been conceived for a long time in the "ontology" of this being as the supporting ground (substance or subject). Even in its preparatory characterization of everydayness, our analytic also already encountered the question of the who of Dasein. We found that Dasein is initially and for the most part not itself, but is lost in the they-self.t The they-self is an existentiell modification of the authentic self. The question of the ontological constitution of selfhood remained unanswered. It is true that we already fundamentally established the guidelines for the problem:12 if the self belongs to the essential qualities of Dasein, whose "essence" however lies in existence, then I-hood and selfhood must be conceived existentially. Negatively, we also saw that our ontological characterization of the they ruled out any application of the categories of objective presence (substance). In principle it became clear that care cannot be derived ontologically from reality or be constructed with the categories of reality" Care already contains the phenomenon of self, if indeed the thesis is correct that the expression "care for self" would be tautological"
- Dasein does not first fill up an objectively present path or stretch "of life" through the phases of its momentary realities, but stretches itself along in such a way that its own being is constituted beforehand as this stretching along. The "between" of birth and death already lies in the being of Dasein. On the other hand, it is by no means the case that Dasein "is" real in a point of time, and that, in addition, it is then "surrounded" by the nonreality of its birth and its death. Understood existentially, birth [Geburt] is never something past in the sense of what is no longer present, and death is just as far from having the kind of being of something outstanding that is not yet present but will come. Factical Dasein exists as born [existiert gebilrtig]*, and in being born it is also already dying [gebtirtig stirbt es] in the sense of being-toward death. Both "ends" and their "between" are as long as Dasein factically exists, and they are in the sole way possible on the basis of the being of Dasein as care. In the unity of thrownness and the fleeting, or else anticipatory, being-toward-death, birth and death "are connected" in the way appropriate to Dasein. As care, Dasein is the "between."
- Nevertheless, Dasein must also be called "temporal" in the sense of its being "in time." Factical Dasein needs and uses the calendar and the clock even without a developed historiography. What occurs "with it," it experiences as occurring "in time." In the same way, the processes of nature, whether living or lifeless, are encountered "in time." They are within-time. So while our analysis of how the "time" of within-time-ness has its source in temporality will be deferred until the next chapter, it would be easy to put this before the discussion of the connection between historicity and temporality. What is historical is ordinarily characterized with the aid of the time of withintime-ness. But if this vulgar characterization is to be stripped of its seeming self-evidence and exclusiveness, historicity is to be "deduced" beforehand purely from the primordial temporality of Dasein. This is required by the way these are "objectively" connected. But since time as within-time-ness also "stems" from the temporality of Dasein, historicity and within-time-ness turn out to be equiprimordial. The vulgar interpretation of the temporal character of history is thus justified within its limits.
- The temporality of factical being-in-the-world is what primordially makes the opening up of space [Raumerschliefgung] possible; and spatial Dasein has always been referred to a here of the character of Dasein out of an over there that has been discovered. Because of all this, the time taken care of in the temporality of Dasein is always bound up with some location of Dasein with regard to its datability. It is not that time is tied to a location, but rather temporality is the condition of the possibility that dating may be bound up with the spatially-local in such a way that the latter is binding for everyone as a measure. Time is not first coupled with space, but the "space" that is supposedly to be coupled with it is encountered only on the basis of temporality taking care of time. Inasmuch as both the clock and timereckoning are grounded in the temporality of Dasein, which constitutes this being as historical, we can show ontologically how the use of the clock is itself historical and how every clock as such "has a history."
- Something like "being" ["Sein"] has been disclosed in the understanding of being that belongs to existing Dasein as a way in which it understands. The preliminary disclosure of being, although it is unconceptual, makes it possible for Dasein as existing being-in-the-world to be related to beings, to those it encounters in the world as well as to itself in existing. How is the disclosive understanding of being belonging to Dasein possible at all? Can the question be answered by going back to the primordial constitution of being of Dasein that understands being? The existential and ontological constitution of the totality of Dasein is grounded in temporality. Accordingly, a primordial mode of temporalizing of ecstatic temporality itself must make the ecstatic project of being in general possible. How is this mode of temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way leading from primordial time to the meaning of being? Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being?
Being and Time (1927)
The Uniqueness of the Poet : Holderlin (1943)
Letter on Humanism (1946)
The Principle of Identity (1957)
The Essence of Language (1957/1958)
The Basic Principle of Thinking (1958)
Traditional Language and Technical Language (196)
--------------------------------
From The Coming Time "Between" Being and Daoist Emptiness
----------------------------------
|