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Journey Through Philosophy 136. Heidegger and Shakespeare: Recognition Through Loss

This episode applies themes such as “loss,” “breakage,” “unavailability,” “inappropriateness,” and “obstruction”—as found in Heidegger’s work *Being and Time*— , “visibility,” “compulsion,” and “sustaining” as applied to an interpretation of Shakespeare’s tragedy *King Lear*. Part 1 primarily interprets the section on “being-at-hand” from *Being and Time*, while Part 2 interprets *King Lear* through the lens of Heidegger’s philosophy.

Loss and emptiness remind us of Being.

# Homo Faber and “Being-at-hand” Das Zuhan-dane

Heidegger’s philosophy begins with the most fundamental and everyday phenomena of human life: work and labor. This forms the core of Heidegger’s philosophy. Among these activities, Heidegger identifies the fundamental phenomena of the world and humanity in work performed with tools. He does not ask what the meaning of work is, but rather analyzes the phenomenon of tool use. For example, he does not ask about the meaning of work—such as whether humans survive through work or realize their dreams. *Being and Time* describes the essential structure of tool use as it appears. It analyzes tool-based work from the perspective of a kind of technical psychology, or *deskriptive Psychologie* in German. * *Being and Time* is a descriptive psychology of tool-using work. While *Being and Time* certainly addresses profound themes such as existence, death, anxiety, the world of people, and the sense of time, its description of tool-using work constitutes a single “original phenomenon.” And it is through this process that the essential structure of Heidegger’s theory of truth—namely, “unconcealment,” or aletheia—unfolds. It is unclear why, among all human activities, tool-use was chosen as the starting point for fundamental ontology, but this may reflect the German cultural tradition that holds craftsmanship in high regard. Heidegger’s concept of the “tool” pursues a meaning entirely distinct from that of the “tool” in philosophical anthropology, which views humans as Homo faber—the tool-making animal. To state the conclusion first: Heidegger constructs the world through tool-use. In other words, humans do not merely make or use tools within the world—that is, the given environment—but rather construct the entity known as the world through the phenomenon of tooling. The world flows forth from the tool.

# Instrumental Being

Before proceeding to the phenomenological analysis of tool use, I will briefly describe the so-called scientific world criticized by Husserl and Heidegger.

The modern world is constituted as an objective system. The objective world is constituted by mathematics and the laws of nature. However, the world revealed by Heidegger’s human being—that is, Dasein—is not composed of “objects” but of instrumental entities already in use within the surrounding world. These entities are not mere “things” but are always given as “tools” related to specific tasks; thus, their mode of being is “at-handness” (Zu-handenheit). The essence of Heidegger’s philosophy lies in re-constituting the relationship between the self and the world not through consciousness or thought, but through the phenomenon of tools, which are fundamental elements of human life. Machines and equipment are also included among tools. These are, in fact, things necessary for work and tasks. Heidegger conceptualizes tools and equipment as “at-handness.”

“At-handness” refers not so much to an object being spatially within the palm of the hand, but rather to a tool or piece of equipment that is within reach or can be grasped by the hand. This is also translated as “usefulness.” Alternatively, it is translated as “near the hand, prepared within reach,” or in English, “ready-to-hand.” Here, we will refer to it as “being-at-hand.” It can also be described as “an object that can be grasped.”

The meaning of “at hand” is “in use.” It can also be described as “ “in the process of working” or “in the midst of labor.” In other words, a tool that is in use is said to be “in the hand.” That is, when one is working with a tool, machine, or piece of equipment, that tool, machine, and equipment are described as being “in the hand.” Therefore, once the work is finished and those tools and equipment are no longer needed and are put away, they cease to be “beings-in-the-hand” and become “ presence-before-the-eyes.” These two modes—where a tool is either in use or not in use—constitute a key motif in Heidegger’s thought.

# Presence-before-the-eyes

Unlike tools held in the hand and moved, Heidegger refers to objects that have left the human hand or were unrelated to the working hand from the outset as “ presence-at-hand.” 3/23

For Heidegger, the meaning of all being is always discovered centered on being-in-hand, that is, being-in-the-hand. What is simply visible to us—that is, presence-at-hand—is regarded as a derivative form of being.

Presence-at-hand is also translated as “pre-being.” It is also called “presence.” Generally, Heidegger’s “presence-at-hand” is synonymous with “object.” In other words, the terms “object,” “entity,” or “thing” that we commonly use correspond to Heidegger’s “presence-at-hand.” What is interesting is that we do not usually view things as “objects.” It is only when a tool or object breaks, or when something seems amiss, that “being-at-hand”—Vor-handenheit in German—becomes apparent. For example, if a hammer breaks, we exclaim, “ “What on earth is this?” and look at the broken hammer. In other words, the collapse of “being-in-hand” reveals the presence of the thing. This is Heidegger’s groundbreaking insight: collapse reveals presence. This is also the logic behind Shakespeare’s King Lear. Let’s look at Heidegger’s text.

“The thing-in-hand” is not theoretically grasped at all, nor does it itself become the primary object of attention in the act of looking. The uniqueness of the primary “thing-in-hand” lies in the fact that it conceals itself, as it were, in its own being-in-hand, and precisely for that reason becomes originally a thing-in-hand. The place where everyday activity primarily resides is not the tool itself, but rather the work—that is, the [product]—which, in other words, is what must be produced at each moment and is thus also the thing-in-hand. The work—that is, the [product]—retains the totality of reference within which the tool is encountered. (Being and Time, trans. Lee Ki-sang, p. 111)

# Writing, Pencil, Existence-in-the-Hand

Let’s take the example from the text above. Suppose we are writing with a pencil. The situation of writing with a pencil is a prime example that best illustrates the concept of “existence-in-the-hand.” When we hold a pencil to write, our attention is not actually focused on the “object” of the pencil itself. The pencil in our hand recedes into the background as if it had vanished, and our attention is focused solely on what we intend to write—that is, on “writing.” The pencil functions naturally in accordance with its purpose, held in our hand in a way that is already usable without us consciously looking at it.

At this moment, the pencil is integrated into a kind of instrumental context and only holds meaning within the overall structural framework of the act of “writing.”

One point worth noting here is that when an object or tool is properly fulfilling its function, it goes unnoticed. The same applies to human relationships. A person who is doing their usual work properly does not stand out. However, if they suffer an accident, get into a fight, or are injured and unable to work, they become noticeable. Therefore, “going unnoticed” means that work, objects, or functioning people are in a normal state, and that such things suddenly become noticeable when their function is paralyzed, a part is missing, or they are rendered unusable due to loss of health or similar reasons. Or, in a family, it is only after a member disappears or dies that their existence and significance are recalled. The so-called “empty space” becomes visible. Heidegger and Shakespeare point out this “phenomenon of the empty space.”

Secondly, objects, tools, or people that suddenly catch the eye attract attention, prompting us to closely examine their broken or diseased state. Philosophically speaking, such objects are thematized and explicitly become the subject of observation.

The concept of thematizing an object through such abnormality constitutes a key element in Heidegger’s philosophy and Shakespearean tragedy. In other words, sudden abnormalization establishes an object—be it a thing or a person—as a subject. In other words, it makes them stand out. The loss of function or parts demands our recognition of the object. It is recognition through loss.

Returning to the example of using a pencil, the moment the pencil breaks or fails to write, it finally stands out as the “object of concern.” We find ourselves staring at the pencil. The pencil’s existence—that is, the pencil as an object—is established.

In this way, “ “thing-in-hand” represents an existential structure in which “the tool, precisely when it functions most naturally, disappears from consciousness.” This is also the most everyday and fundamental way we relate to the world. Heidegger described this as follows:

# Being-in-hand conceals itself

That is, the uniqueness of the primary “thing-in-hand” -in-hand” is that, by being in the hand, it conceals itself, and precisely because of this, it is originally in the hand. He stated that the being-in-hand—that is, a tool or material in use—conceals its own existence. A tool or material must remain unnoticed and hidden in order to perform its original function. In fact, a tool is not noticeable when it is being used properly.

This fact later plays a significant role in deriving the concept of being-in-hand and the concept of the world as its totality. The theme that something is true only when it performs its function while remaining hidden is also a crucial moment in *King Lear*. Cordelia, the youngest daughter of King Lear, exemplifies this. and the concept of the world as their sum. The theme that something is true only when it performs its function in concealment is also a crucial moment in *King Lear*. King Lear’s youngest daughter, Cordelia, is a person of this sort.

Deliberately displaying filial piety in a conspicuous manner should be seen as concealing some underlying truth. The things that are important and precious in our lives are not easily visible.

# Being-in-front-of-the-eye and Instrumental Being

For Heidegger, “being-in-front-of-the-eye,” or das Vor-handene, is a mode of being that appears when humans simply view an object as an object without actually using it as a tool. For example, when using a hammer, we do not see it as a mere object. However, when the hammer breaks or becomes unusable, we see it as a thing—that is, an observable object. At this point, the hammer manifests as “present-at-hand existence,” or Vor-handenes.

# A hammer for driving nails is solid

Instrumental existence is not fundamentally grasped first through theoretical concepts or analysis. We do not primarily perceive a hammer as a “physical object with length, weight, and material,” but rather experience it within its practical function as a “tool for driving nails.” Mechanical and physical explanations are secondary; that is, we come to know them later. In this way, Heidegger’s ontology differs from the modern, Cartesian world mentioned above. It views things not as physical objects but in a practical, existential manner. “ “Practical seeing” precedes “theoretical, objective seeing.”

Being-at-hand and tools are often equated. However, as mentioned above, being-at-hand refers to a tool in use. A tool that is not in use is being-before-the-eye. Therefore, being-at-hand emerges when the will of the user or worker acts upon the tool.

# Heidegger’s Being-at-Hand, the Objectification of Will

Due to the difficulty in grasping “being-at-hand” (Zu-handen-heit), the English-speaking world translates it as “ready-to-hand.” If we were to express this in traditional philosophical terms, we might call it the “unity of subject and object.” In other words, it is the act of treating an object—such as a hammer—as a subject of will, or the “objective expression‎ of will.”

The process by which the will becomes objectified is what constitutes “being-at-hand.” In contrast, “being-before-the-eye”—or Vor-handen-heit in German—refers to the objects we simply see every day. In English, this is called “the pre-sent-at-hand,” or “presence.” “Being-before-the-eye” refers to things upon which our will cannot act.

# The Concept of Looking Around

Observation, sensation, and vision also appear in Heidegger’s phenomenology.

First, let’s call the act of looking closely “observation.” However, most of our everyday “seeing” does not involve looking closely at something, but rather glancing over it roughly. In *Being and Time*, this rough glancing is called “looking around.” In contrast, observation is explicit seeing. “Explicit” means looking with a specific focus.

In contrast, looking around is implicit and lacks a specific focus. Its purpose is not to recognize objects but rather to view the world in order to determine one’s own position. More specifically, it is the perspective through which Dasein establishes its position. This always involves both tools and materials.

Furthermore, it is said that Dasein-in-the-hand, or instrumental Dasein, is not initially explicitly thematized even within “looking around” (Um-sicht in German), or in English, circum-spection, is not initially made explicit as a subject.

Just as we do not consciously look at or analyze a doorknob when opening a door, tools require almost no attention or “focus” from our gaze and function like a transparent background. However, it is only when a tool breaks down or when such instrumental means are not present in our surroundings that this existence—that is, the existence-in-use—emerges from its hidden state to highlight its necessity.

The presence-in-hand and the presence-before-the-eye alternate.

The question of whether we use a tool or not is not addressed in *Being and Time*. Instead, the process by which “being-in-hand” transforms into “being-before-the-eye” as the tool breaks down is analyzed in great detail.

# Heidegger’s Concept of Truth, Unconcealment, and Aletheia

Unconcealment is Heidegger’s concept of truth. Simply put, Heidegger’s famous concept of unconcealment can be understood as truth being like the true face that emerges after removing a mask. In other words, Heidegger views truth as a phenomenon that emerges by shattering concealment and disguise. This is the concept of truth as “unconcealment.” However, both concealment and unconcealment possess equal standing. It is not the case that one is true and the other is false. To put it another way, the concealed and disguised, and the unconcealed and revealed, are two sides of the same coin. Therefore, I understand Heidegger’s truth as a dialectical union of concealment and unconcealment. Such truth as unconcealment—or truth emerging from the breaking of the shell—and for this unconcealment, negative elements such as loss, inadequacy, breakdown, collapse, and resistance are essential. This structure reveals Heidegger’s truth. Moreover, this structure can be observed throughout Shakespeare’s tragedies. In English literature, this is referred to as “awareness through loss.” It is also the phenomenon of the “empty space” mentioned above—that is, the “empty space of the dead.” As noted earlier, the loss of a function or an accessory demands the recognition of the object.

In the play “ King Lear,” the true emotions of life and interpersonal relationships are revealed when the everyday human and power structures of the court are shattered and those who held wealth and power are stripped of their facades. The original nature of humanity emerges. However, Heidegger’s concealment and unconcealment are two sides of the same coin.

# The Problem of Contemplation, Theorization, and Thematization

While discussing Dasein, Heidegger introduces the concepts of “thematization” and “theorization.” In other words, Dasein is in a state of non-theorization and non-thematization.

Science is the theoretical grasping of things. To be “theoretical” means, first and foremost, to express things mathematically. For instance, saying “Today’s temperature is minus 10 degrees” is far more scientific than saying “It’s cold today.” “Where there is matter, there is physics,” said the modern physicist Johannes Kepler. As this scientism spread widely, Western society began to view even the realm of the mind through a mathematical and scientific lens. However, in his analysis of Dasein, Heidegger regards this theoretical, scientific world not as the primordial world, but rather as a derived one. The starting point for this endeavor is precisely the problem of “being-in-hand.” As stated in the passage above, “what is in hand” cannot be grasped theoretically, nor does it itself become the primary object of contemplation. Prior to this sentence, Heidegger noted that when using a hammer to strike, “we do not thematically grasp this entity as an ‘object before our eyes,’ nor is the act of using it based on knowledge of the tool’s structure itself” (p. 110). The fact that we can immerse ourselves in work without such thematic grasping is partly because, through prior learning, the use of the tool has already become like an extension of the body.

The structure of the tool itself may also have been learned initially through instruction or by consulting manuals. This is particularly evident in the playing of musical instruments. In any case, the concept of “being-in-hand” that Heidegger discusses is a characteristic of human activity in which the object and the body move as one. That is, tools are machines created to enhance the functions of bodily organs, particularly the hands and arms.

Therefore, in the use of tools, there is no distinction between the self and the object. That is, the distinction between subject and object does not exist— . It is against this backdrop that Heidegger conceived the concept of “being-in-the-hand.”

This concept actually corresponds to the non-intentional experience in Husserl’s phenomenology. Intentionality is a characteristic of consciousness that grasps an object as an object. In contrast, non-intentional experience refers to situations where, for example, “I am in pain” or “I am cold”—where the experience is clear but the object of that experience is unknown.

Therefore, the phenomenon where Heidegger’s “being-in-the-hand” and “being-before-the-eye” intersect is, in Husserlian terms, equivalent to the intersection of non-intentional and intentional experience.

# Being-in-the-hand is an extension of the body.

However, “being-in-hand”—the existence in which objects and the human body become one—does not stop there but looks further ahead.

In other words, each of the minor tasks of daily life has no meaning in and of itself. Even the act of driving a nail into a wall with a hammer is merely a means to an end—a measure taken so that humans may live comfortably, at ease, happily, and well. All tools point toward some purpose. This purpose lies at the end of the task: life, fulfillment, and happiness.

# Being-in-hand and the Purpose of Life

Heidegger’s concept of “being-in-hand” is linked to the concept of the purpose of life. This is called “teleological indication.” It adds the supplementary concept of “indication” to the traditional concept of purpose. Therefore, Heidegger referred to purpose simply as “in order to” (in English) or “um-zu” (in German). In this context, Heidegger emphasizes that the relationship between humans and tools always takes place within a teleological structure of “in order to” (Um-zu). In traditional terms, this is the relationship between end and means. Machines and tools are merely means.

Consequently, we do not view tools as individual, independent objects, but rather use them naturally within a given network of reference—that is, within a totality of reference. As Heidegger noted above, work— [the work of art], retains within itself the totality of reference in which we encounter tools. Here, the totality of reference means, for example, that a hammer exists to drive a nail, a nail exists to secure a board, and this teleological connection continues to expand into other uses and worldly contexts. In this way, tools always derive their meaning from the totality of reference—that is, the sum of various references.

# Looking Around and Indicative Totality, the Extension of the Body and Tools

The practical insight through which humans attune themselves to this purposeful connection and grasp the situation is precisely “looking around,” or Um-sicht. This is not theoretical observation, but an immediate and existential mode of understanding that emerges within action.

We perceive objects and tools much as we perceive our own arms. We adapt our own hands and arms to the tools and their use. The observation of the work environment and one’s own body in this process is what constitutes “Um-sicht.” “Looking around” refers to the confirm‎atory recognition of, say, looking at a door handle in order to turn it. “Looking around,” or Umsicht, does not involve handling tools one by one while thinking about them. As mentioned above, tools are handled as if they were part of the body. A hammer is part of my fist, and a fly swatter is an extension of my arm. And a knife operates as sharply as a tooth.

Of course, machines are far more complex and specialized. However, basic ontology always considers tools first and from the most general perspective. In such situations, we move as if using our own hands and arms, without fully recognizing the tools we are using.

# The Collapse of Means and the Recognition of Purpose

When we observe the phenomenon of “being-in-the-hand” while using tools to work, we see that the starting point for human understanding of the world is not the structure through which the perceiving subject views objects, but rather the human being as a being already active and forming relationships within the world—that is, Dasein (German for “being-there”). Dasein is thus a being situated at the center of instrumental activity. As an example, the distinction between “being-in-the-hand” and “being-before-the-eye” “care.”

As such a Dasein, humans were, first and foremost, beings who used tools. Tools exist within the flow of activity as “the way they are used and function,” and it is only when their function is interrupted or they break down—that is, when they become problematic—that the nature of the tool rises to the surface. Only then can the tool be analyzed or made the subject of inquiry.

And the teleological reference mentioned above, along with its association—that is, the entire reference-association—becomes apparent.

In other words, it is at this moment that the world, having been hidden, finally reveals itself. This is called “unveiling” . It reveals itself after having been hidden. In other words, this means that true recognition is achieved only when the structure and order of the work are disrupted, when it loses its function, or when it collapses. This aspect also aligns with the structure of *King Lear*, which will be discussed in detail later. Specifically, the relationship between King Lear and his true daughter Cordelia, as well as the dramatic scenes involving the loyal -Roster and his loyal son Edgar.

Therefore, Heidegger rejects the traditional philosophical approach of seeking the essence of things through abstract cognition and presents practice, activity, and Dasein as more fundamental dimensions. This sentence succinctly reveals his philosophical stance that the way we live in the world begins not with “theoretical observation” but with “practical use and action.” Furthermore, the aforementioned “indicative-totality ” is Heidegger’s core concept, stating that the mode of being of a tool is understood not in terms of the attributes of an isolated object, but within a relational context.

# Tools and the World

Martin Heidegger viewed tools as deriving their meaning from a functional chain in which they are always used “for what,” “with what,” and “within what task.” For example, a hammer points to a nail; a nail to a plank; a plank to the activity of building; and building to the broader human purpose of dwelling. These references are not fragmented connections but are interwoven to form a single holistic structure, and it is precisely this whole that constitutes “ “indicative-totality.” Since this concept of the whole interweaves instrumental activities and ultimately points to the final endpoint of that activity—that is, the purpose of the work—the concept of the whole inevitably emerges in the use of tools. One issue we discover here is that the world is derived through this structure of the whole. That is, in the state of “being in the hand,” the tool itself is not objectified, and thus one cannot think of the tool as a single tool. Just as when one is deeply engrossed in work, the hammer, nails, and boards appear as a single unit. Here, it is not a process where individual elements come together to form a whole. Therefore, from the author’s perspective, the world only emerges when the existence in one’s hand transforms into an existence before one’s eyes, and purposeful connections and “indication-wholeness” are added to it.

In other words, the world phenomenon is generated only when a consciousness arises that multiple existences before one’s eyes—such as a hammer, nails, and planks—multiple entities before one’s eyes—and the awareness that they form a single whole must arise for the phenomenon of the world to emerge. I will address this point in more detail later.

# Unprepared Tools

Above, we discussed the specific mode of being of “being-at-hand”—that is, the entity in the hand or the entity graspable by the hand, or das Zu-handene. When the being-at-hand is disrupted, that entity reveals itself. In Heidegger’s terms, this occurs when things in the hand become unusable , when they are not in their place, when they do not fit the hand, or when they are not where the hand reaches, what is at hand appears as presence before the eyes. For example, when dissatisfaction arises—such as “There is no hammer here” or “These gloves do not fit my hands”—only then is the presence before the eyes of the hammer and gloves demanded. Prior to that, the presence of these instrumental entities—that is, their being before the eyes—was concealed. In this way, the worldliness of the world emerges anew. That is, when we encounter the world and things, we do not initially perceive the hammer as a ‘ a physical object with length, weight, and material’ , but rather experience it within its practical function as a “tool for driving nails.” Mechanical and physical explanations come later. Heidegger describes this phenomenological context as follows:

an entity close at hand may be encountered as unusable in the act of care—as something not prepared for its specific use. The work tool turns out to be broken, and the material proves to be unsuitable

. The tool is, after all, still in the hand. However, the act of discovering its unusability is not a gaze that determines its properties, but a looking-around within the movement of use. It is in this discovery of unusability that the tool becomes visible. (Being and Time, p. 116)

In this paragraph, concepts characteristic of Heidegger’s epistemology—such as unpreparedness, malfunction, damage, inadequacy—which characterize Heidegger’s epistemology—are brought to light.

When things-in-hand or objects within reach encounter unreadiness, breakdown, damage, and inadequacy, the perspective of the task shifts to a looking around.

Let us examine Heidegger’s explanation of the shift in perspective from “things-in-hand” to “things-before-the-eye” once more.

As one comes to realize that the thing-in-hand is not in one’s hand, a compulsion—that is, [urgency]. The more essential the void is, the more it is used, and the more one encounters it in its original state of not being in the hand, the more the thing in the hand seems to take on a sense of compulsion, appearing to lose the character of being in the hand. It reveals itself as merely a thing before the eyes —something that cannot be separated from that spot without the very thing one is begging for—. Standing before it, at a loss, is a deficient mode of care in which one discovers that a thing in one’s hand is merely right before one’s eyes. (Being and Time, p. 116 ff.)

# The Feeling of Urgency Through Loss

As seen in this example, the thing-in-hand transforms into a thing-before-the-eyes when it breaks down. When a single part is missing from a machine or tool, rendering it unusable, the worker first frantically searches for the missing part. The urgency or desperation in the above sentence describes such a situation. The more indispensable the missing or broken part is, the more intense this feeling becomes. One cries out, “Where did this go?” while searching for the missing part.

Heidegger describes this state somewhat paradoxically as “the thing-in-hand is not in the hand.” This refers to a situation where a tool is held in the hand but cannot perform its function due to a malfunction or the loss of a part. Heidegger calls this a state of functional emptiness. Emptiness means the tool cannot perform its original task. He also expresses it as “the thing-in-hand imposing its necessity.” It is a descriptive technique that suggests the tool is alive and appealing to the person—the worker—about its own state of incapacity. It is as if I have lost some important tool or equipment, and because the necessity of that tool is so critical, the tool itself seems to be crying out its own urgency and

urgency. Of course, in reality, it is I, the owner of that tool or equipment, who feels this way.

Heidegger describes this emotion and use as the psychological state of “care.” Care simply refers to the user’s state of mind. In this context, standing before the tool at a loss is described as a deficient form of care.

It refers to the situation of a worker standing in a daze after a machine part falls out or becomes damaged while working. A tool that suddenly appears as a thing—that is, as a presence right before one’s eyes—must now be dealt with. However, the broken tool has not yet been put away. It is still in the hand. That is why

Heidegger described above that one discovers the mere presence of something in one’s hand. Here, the meaning is that the tool has become unusable, so one is simply looking at it.

# Mere presence hinders work

Heidegger describes this as “mere presence.”

However, a tool that cannot be used and is merely present—that is, a broken tool or machine—appears as an obstacle to the worker’s state of mind, or care. The reason is that human concern, or care, causes one to look at the tool with the expectation of resuming the activity one was previously engaged in, even if the tool is broken. Since the work has come to a halt, the worker perceives the breakdown as an obstruction. A broken tool evokes emotions such as obstruction, resistance, and endurance. Heidegger describes this simply as a form of care. Care—or Besorgen in German—thus carries a complex meaning encompassing action, strength, habit, and emotion. The care we usually speak of refers primarily to interpersonal relationships, such as understanding and concern.

As it passes through these modes of care—namely, hindrance, resistance, and steadfastness—the being-in-hand loses its meaning and transforms into a being-before-the-eye. And the being-before-the-eyes then progresses further into scientific subjects and objects. Of course, this process is viewed from the perspective of a philosopher, specifically a phenomenologist.

Ordinary people cannot perceive the inner nature of such instrumental beings or beings-in-hand, nor do they usually need to think about it.

Only when negative factors such as malfunction, damage, detachment, or collapse occur do we finally recognize the inner nature of the instrumental being—that is, its method and purpose of use— and, furthermore, pay attention to its very form. Only when loss, damage, or detachment—that is, when tools depart from the existing world—does their true nature emerge. This is why Heidegger calls this “de-worlding.” The methods and purposes of use of instrumental entities are usually hidden. It is the phenomenologist who brings these to light.

# The Discovery of the World Through Lack

Heidegger later referred to this as the structure of “A as B.” Here, we discover a formula: the discovery of being through lack. Let us call this, more simply, “the discovery of the world through lack.” This resonates with the theme of Shakespearean tragedy, which we will discuss shortly: “awareness through loss.” From here on, we will examine the process by which what is “in the hand” transforms into what is “before the eyes,” leading to the emergence of the world as the totality of beings before our eyes.

# Various Forms of “Not-in-the-Hand”

Heidegger introduces the term “not-in-hand.” Let’s look at the text.

In our interaction with the cared-for world, what is not-in-hand may be encountered not merely as something unusable or simply as a void, nor merely as something that is not empty yet unusable, but also as that which obstructs care—as “something lying in the way”—as such a not-in-hand. That which care cannot reach “for lack of time” is not at hand in the manner of something that does not belong here or of something unfinished. (Being and Time, p. 117)

The loss of meaning in “being-at-hand” appears not only in tool-being but also in various situations of life. That is, it is not merely the case of work being interrupted by a broken tool or unsuitable materials; even a being that simply hinders the work—a being “lying in the way”—can be encountered as something not-at-hand. Thus, “being-at-hand” refers to practical and utilitarian existence. When “being-at-hand” is lacking or hindered, the nature of presence before one’s eyes comes to the fore.

. Furthermore, situational and temporal factors that hinder the task negate “being-in-hand” and shift it toward “not-being-in-hand.”

Thus, in the passage above, Heidegger states that what one cannot reach “because there is no time” does not belong here; and is not in the hand in the manner of something left unfinished.

For example, when knitting and having to stop because there is no more time, the knitting tools and yarn move away from their original state—that is, “being in the hand”—and simply exist before one’s eyes as knitting needles and yarn; they are present.

# Transition through Visibility, Compulsion, and Resistance

Tools that are denied use are not simply discarded but are seen as engaging in a form of resistance. Let’s look at the text.

The modes of visibility, compulsion, and resistance serve to bring the presence before one’s eyes to the forefront, shifting the focus from what is in one’s hands. However, at this point, what is in one’s hands is not yet merely regarded as what is before one’s eyes, nor does it appear as a mere object. The presence before one’s eyes, which is asserting itself, is still connected to the tool’s presence in one’s hand. This tool has not yet revealed itself as a pure object. The tool becomes “that sort of thing”—meaning the very thing people wish to cast aside. Even amidst such a tendency toward resistance, the object in one’s hand still reveals itself as the object in one’s hand through its firm presence before one’s eyes. (Being and Time, p. 117)

Here, Heidegger redefines the attitude of Dasein toward a broken tool or machine—that is, care. Through this, he gradually brings forth the phenomenon of the world. Care toward a broken tool involves, as in the above quotation, drawing attention, compulsion, and support. A new form of care—or looking around—called “drawing attention” emerges.

These feelings arise from a broken object. “Noticing” is easy to understand. That is, an object that was originally in one’s hand does not readily catch the eye. The mode of perception known as “surveying” sometimes involves intuiting tools and equipment without even looking at them. For example, skilled chefs can slice vegetables without looking. A knife used on a cutting board suddenly becomes clearly visible only when a finger is cut by it. Therefore, “noticing” occurs when an object in one’s hand ceases to function and transforms into an object right before one’s eyes.

# Coercion and Resistance

And the emotion of “coercion” is, in fact, more accurately described as “being coerced.” That is, even if a tool or piece of equipment breaks down, the person working does not give up but wants to keep going. In other words, they are coerced into continuing to work even with a broken object. This can also be described as a law of inertia. Humans have a tendency to continue what they are doing. They must proceed until the task is completed without interruption. Finally, “resistance” refers to the tool’s defiance. Even if the person wants to continue working, the broken tool resists that tendency. Therefore, compulsion and resistance represent opposing directions of action. In other words, the law of action and reaction applies between the human trying to force the work and the tool preventing it. . In this situation of work cessation, the object before one’s eyes—still a pure thing, standing on its own without relation to human concern or care—remains 100% unestablished.

Heidegger described this above by stating that the tool has not yet revealed itself as a pure thing. However, he also notes that even in the process where the entity in one’s hand resists care and attention—and even within that tendency to resist—the entity in one’s hand still reveals itself as such, through its firm presence right before one’s eyes.

# Visibility, Compulsion, and Resistance in King Lear

In the above quotation, Heidegger states that the modes of visibility, compulsion, and resistance serve to bring the presence-in-front-of-the-eye of the thing-in-hand to the forefront. This logic is also evident in King Lear.

When the existing order collapses, the hierarchical structure of harmonious relationships is disrupted, and the succession of power in the kingdom is not prepared in the usual way—that is, according to custom and history—the superior in the human order, namely the king, intuitively perceives the modes of visibility, compulsion, and support in the attitudes of his subordinates . Consequently, the king fails to understand his silent daughter’s pure heart and perceives it as a rebellion against his authority. That is, King Lear becomes enraged upon seeing and hearing Cordelia’s strange behavior—her somewhat taciturn words and actions. Seeing that Cordelia cannot follow in her sisters’ footsteps by submitting to power and even abusing parental love, Lear regards this as conspicuous and irritating behavior. He views his daughter—who believes that loving her father is a given and sees little need to say more—as ignoring his fatherly wish for something more and instead asserting herself. In Heidegger’s world of tools and objects, this is considered an act of resistance.

# Purpose and Means, Indication-Totality

Existence-in-hand—that is, the use of tools and the act of working—can sometimes consist of a single process, but usually involves multiple processes. In other words, as mentioned earlier, work consists of various processes and elements, such as a hammer, nails, plywood, construction, and housing. Furthermore, there are various types of tools and implements. The breakdown of objects or tools also occurs within this context of interrelation. If we look at a so-called tool set, we can see the interrelationships among the tools.

To further explore these complex circumstances, the concept of “indicativity” or “indicative totality” is required. This, of course, has already been discussed earlier in this essay. Let us revisit Heidegger’s text. Reference is the relationship between means and end. That is, when we say “B is used for A,” this configuration is called reference. Heidegger avoids using terms from traditional philosophy as much as possible. This is because, in his view, such terms and concepts lack phenomenological rigor and clarity. For example, he rarely uses terms such as subject, object, and cognition. Furthermore, the totality of indication refers to a teleological connection.

He defined the existential structure of the thing-in-hand as a tool through indication. The care that uses things while not clearly attending to their unique and self-evident “being-in-itself”—this can encounter the unusable. —is encountered within this. A tool can become unusable. It is precisely here that the constitutive reference, in which “for doing” points to “for it,” is obstructed. Reference itself is not being examined; rather, it is present “there” while being followed with care

“there.” Yet, amidst the disruption of indication—in the very place where it cannot be used—the indication becomes clear. (Being and Time, p. 118)

Heidegger is now speaking about the existential structure of the thing-in-hand. It is precisely indication. Moreover, the indicativity that appears here is also directly linked to the thing-in-hand. When things are going smoothly, the thing-in-hand goes unnoticed. Yet, in reality, the thing-in-hand moves within the invisible connectivity of indication.

Heidegger analyzes indicativity more concretely as “for doing” and “for it,” stating that “for-doing” indicates “for-it.”

Thus, in the preceding paragraph, Heidegger limited the existence of the thing-in-hand to that of a tool. In this way, tools—that is, tools in use—receive indication. As stated in the text, “for-doing” pointing to “for-it”—that is, a constitutive indication.

And during operation—that is, when the machine runs smoothly without breaking down—indicativity is concealed. Yet, interest in the machine or tool remains ever-present. This living concern, like that for tools, is care. This care must be seen as lying beneath the structure of indication. However, when situations such as breakdowns, disruptions, or interference arise, that aspect of indication—namely, the coercive nature of the tool’s function and use—comes to the fore. This is why the passage above states, “In the midst of the disruption of indication, indication becomes evident.”

# For-doing, For-that

Here, “for-doing” (German: Um-zu) refers to the purpose of an object, while “for-that” (German: Dazu) refers to its method of use. In other words, “for-doing” denotes the purpose of the work—for example, dwelling—while “for-that” refers to the specific details of the work activity, such as hammering. The purpose of dwelling directs the specific detail of hammering. Once the goal of a task is given, the specific processes are derived from it. Heidegger referred to this above as “constitutive indication.” This is commonly called the “work process.” Once the goal of a task is determined, the work process is derived.

Heidegger’s “indication” or “indicative-totality” is actually similar to the concept of teleology in traditional philosophy. That is, it is a way of explaining the existence and function of things through the relationship between means and ends. As mentioned earlier, for example, a hammer is for driving nails; nails are for joining plywood and timber; the joining of plywood and timber is for the activity of building; and building points to the broader human purpose of dwelling. These indications are not merely fragmented connections but are intertwined to fulfill a single purpose. Therefore, what Heidegger refers to as “indication-totality” is simply another expression‎ of teleology.

However, what Heidegger emphasizes here is that this concept of indication usually remains unnoticed; it only becomes evident when its indicativeness is disrupted by a malfunction or obstacle. Heidegger thus takes this further. To understand this simply, one can rephrase “indicativeness” as “teleology.” If we reinterpret Heidegger’s indicativeness in a teleological or intentional sense—meaning that “the purpose requires the means” or “the purpose indicates the means”—

.

From another perspective, when we encounter obstacles while going about our daily lives, we are compelled to reconsider the ultimate purpose of that endeavor. For example, suppose we work hard to earn money so that our children can go to school. When we can no longer earn money and lose our jobs, we think about the ultimate purpose—our children’s future—and feel even greater sorrow. In other words, we become pessimistic, thinking that our child will be unable to study and that their future will be bleak. Interpreted teleologically, we earn money in order to ensure our child receives a good education. That is, the means are dictated by the end. However, the logic is that when the means collapse, we come to recognize the purpose anew.

This serves as a concrete analogy for the concepts of “in order to” (Um-zu) and “for that” (Dazu) that Heidegger spoke of.

# Being-in-itself

The next important point we will examine is the concept of “being-in-itself.” In German, this is “An-sich,” and in English, “in itself.” This term is commonly referred to as “being-in-itself.” It is a concept widely known through Sartre’s concepts of “being-in-itself” and “being-for-others.” Originally, “being-in-itself” implies existing on its own, being unaffected by others, or existing in an original, unmediated state. It shares the same meaning as “essence.” Therefore, the opposite of this term is “being-for-others.” However, Heidegger interprets the “being-in-itself” of things in terms of “being-at-hand,” “care,” and “pointing.” In other words, this interpretation differs from the original concept of Dasein. However, Heidegger interprets it within the context of “Dasein-in-use”—specifically, within the context of a network of indications and the totality of indications. March 18, evening

Therefore, the essence or self-being of a thing is actually “being-in-hand,” and within the network of indications that connects them, its essence, self-being, or

“being-in-itself” is revealed.

Furthermore, Heidegger states that the concept of the world as a whole was already potentially present within the act of looking around. Thus, Heidegger expressed that the tool-relation does not shine forth as a whole that has never been seen before, but rather as a whole that has always been seen from the very beginning within the act of looking around. He stated that “the world reveals itself together with this whole” (Being and Time, 118). In other words, he emphasizes that the world reveals itself together with this whole. Here, Heidegger’s intention is to express that the world is not an abstract concept but a seen whole. He is saying that the world is seen and perceived. Behind our consciousness as we look at individual objects, the image of the world is already hidden.

# Glancing and Grasping the Whole

Even in a glance—that is, a casual view without explicit focus on a specific subject—the whole is already grasped. Heidegger states that in this glance, the world always shines forth from the very beginning as a whole that has already been seen. Here, the totality—a constituent element of the concept of the world—finally emerges. The world as we commonly understand it refers to the totality of things.

Therefore, Heidegger wrote that the world reveals itself through this totality. However, this totality is not merely the totality of things; it includes referential totality, as well as the modes of use that follow, and meaningfulness. In this context, Heidegger states:

The fact that the world does not “come into being” from what is in the hand reveals, among other things, the following: namely, that in the modes of care interpreted above, the shining of the world and the goes hand in hand with the de-worlding of the thing-in-hand, and thus the fact that mere presence-at-hand is brought to the fore in this thing-in-hand. (Being and Time, p. 119)

Here, it is declared that the “appearance of the world” goes hand in hand with the de-worlding of the thing-in-hand. This is precisely what is explained immediately afterward: namely, the fact that mere presence-at-hand is brought to the fore in this thing-in-hand.

Here, we must examine Heidegger’s four definitions of the world. First, the first definition is as follows:

That is, the world is used as an existential concept and, in this case, signifies the totality of entities that can exist within the world (before one’s eyes). (Being and Time, p. 104) This is the commonly used concept of the world. The author conducts this analysis based on the passage in the above quotation—namely, the stipulation that the “shining of the world” and the “de-worlding of the thing-in-hand” go hand in hand. That is, if the world refers to the totality of things before one’s eyes, then the shining of the world implies that the things-in-hand withdraw from it. In other words, neutral, visual existence abandons the existence-in-hand. As analyzed above, existence-in-hand refers to the relationship between the worker and the tool. Therefore, when the world before one’s eyes is highlighted, instrumental and utilitarian existence naturally withdraws from it. This is the meaning of the concept of de-worlding.

# Panoramic View of the Whole

The world is thus accompanied by the comprehensive highlighting of what is before one’s eyes. However, the world is not merely a single presence before one’s eyes. Even among these immediate presences, a connection of “indication-totality” is required. Therefore, the world is only possible when the things before one’s eyes are connected through the categories of totality and intentionality, rather than remaining in a state of isolation. Thus, Heidegger stated the following:

The instrumental relationship shines forth not as a whole that has never been seen before, but as a whole that has always been seen from the very beginning in the act of looking around. Together with this whole, the world reveals itself. (Being and Time, p. 118)

The meaning hidden here is that the whole has already been seen in the act of looking around.

The “whole” here refers to the “tool-relatedness.” In other words, the act of looking around—that is, cognition—may not fully grasp the whole at first, but upon closer examination, it reveals that the concept of “tool-relatedness,” a notion of wholeness, was already concealed within it. However, as seen in the expression‎ “the whole that has been seen,” ,” the “whole” was not grasped through thought but sensually—that is, visually.

In other words, what is revealed in the act of looking is the whole. Here, “revealed” means that, for instance, when there is a referential totality—such as driving a nail with a hammer, then connecting planks, then constructing a building, and finally setting the goal of comfortable habitation—one can intuitively perceive these various stages visually, one after another, as if viewing a panoramic photograph .

This is the meaning of the “intuitive whole” that Heidegger speaks of. The world is the completion or referential-totality of the beings before one’s eyes, grasped intuitively in this way. Although they are beings before one’s eyes, the objects connected by this referentiality are precisely the world. Let us look at the main text.

In order to encounter the tool in one’s hand in its “being-in-itself” amidst the everyday care of the “surrounding world,” the indication and indicatory totality in which this looking is “immersed” must remain non-thematically present not only for this looking but also for the “thematic” grasping as well. The fact that the world does not reveal itself is the condition of possibility for the object in one’s hand not to emerge from its own invisibility. And within this lies the phenomenal structure of this being’s own being. (Being and Time, p. 119)

What we can first discern from this passage is that the so-called “surveying” of perception carries the meaning of being non-thematic. The entity before one’s eyes is what makes thematic perception possible. However, Heidegger states that this indication and the totality of indication must also remain as a non-thematic grasp. In other words, he asserts that the intentional indication must also remain non-thematically—that is, implicitly or potentially. Only in this case can one know the entity’s own —that is, its essence—can be known. Furthermore, the statement that the world’s failure to reveal itself is the condition of possibility for the thing-in-hand not to emerge from its own invisibility applies to the first meaning of the world mentioned above. The world’s failure to reveal itself is equivalent to the “de-worlding” discussed earlier. That is, only through de-worlding can the thing-in-hand be grasped in its original mode—that is, as invisibility, non-imposition, and non-persistence. In other words, it functions as a tool.

# The Relationship Between Intra-Worldly Being and the World

Above, we studied the being-in-hand, the being-before-the-eye—that is, the emergence of the being-before-the-eye through the failure of the being-in-hand, and the emergence of the concept of the world through knowledge and indexical-totality. Heidegger later defines this as the worldliness of the world. Here, the concept of meaningfulness is added. Significance is also similar to indication-totality. March 19, Morning

However, significance is a concept that further expands upon the previously mentioned “doing-for” and “for-it.” That is, “doing-for,” “for-it,” and “for-whom”—that is, Worum-willen in German—are further connected through intentionality. Therefore, Heidegger states the following:

“Worldliness was interpreted above (Section 18) as the totality of reference of meaningfulness. (· · ·) The referential connection of meaningfulness is fixed in Dasein’s own most proper being-in-itself.” (Being and Time, p. 186)

# Recognition Through Loss: Humanity in Shakespeare’s King Lear

Above, we saw how crucial the concepts of breakdown and loss are in Heidegger’s phenomenology. Specifically, when the being-in-hand as a tool breaks down, that being-in-hand is discovered as being-before-the-eye. And in that process, the relationality of tool-beings—that is, their indicativity—is thematically recognized. In other words, prior to the breakdown, the network of purposeful indicatory relations is not visible and remains unconscious. For example, tasks like hammering or drilling are such self-evident routines that when performing them, we do not look closely at the tools or consciously consider their purpose. In other words, we do not think about why we are hammering; we simply move according to the established routine of hammering. In Husserl’s terms, this process lacks intentionality. That is, objectivity is not established.

The concept of “the entity in the hand” is also a concept devised and applied by the phenomenologist observing the action, not by the person performing it. No one performing tool-based work is conscious that they are currently dealing with the “object in hand.” That is, they cannot grasp it thematically but simply plod along, performing the task assigned to them. Especially in fast-paced work, thematic grasp and objectivity disappear even further. In other words, the “object in hand” cannot appear in consciousness. Of course, the mode of observation known as “looking around” does pay attention to certain characteristics of the machine or tool to some extent, but it remains incomplete. To put it bluntly, one could say that the “object in hand” and the “object before the eyes” . Then, when the machine breaks down, it catches the eye; and through a process of resistance and rebellion, the tool is discarded and left to languish. At this point, the entity before one’s eyes comes to the fore. It then follows the path of thematization, objectification, and consciousness. In this process, the interconnectedness of tools and materials—that is, their indexicality and total indexicality—which had been hidden until then, is properly recognized through the machine’s breakdown. This is the world.

In Heidegger’s terminology, this is the worldliness of the world. Therefore, Heidegger’s concept of Dasein and his theory of the world can be simply described as the recognition of true being through loss. In other words, this is consistent with what is known as “unconcealment.” Heidegger states that truth is “unconcealment.” Unconcealment does not mean simply accepting what is concealed as it is, but rather casting off the disguise to reveal the true form. When the “being-in-hand”—that is, the tool—breaks, it is no longer an object to be used but is unconcealed as a being-before-the-eye. In other words, it is exposed as a being-before-the-eye. It is like taking off one’s clothes and becoming naked. It sheds the “clothing” of being-in-hand and appears as being-before-the-eye.

# Shakespeare’s Tragedy *King Lear* and Heidegger’s Philosophy of Unworldliness

In literature and in our lives, such cases are often expressed as “awareness through loss.” It could also be described as “awareness through the destruction of illusion.” As we saw earlier, Heidegger’s theory explores how the loss or breakdown of “being-in-hand” reveals “being-before-us,” and upon this foundation, the nature of the world is revealed. A similar logic is vividly depicted in Shakespeare’s tragedies. Among them, *King Lear* provides the most apt example. Cordelia, Lear’s loyal youngest daughter, is banished from court because she does not receive her father’s love. The narrative skillfully reveals how King Lear, having failed to see the truth, only comes to fully recognize his youngest daughter’s sincerity and love after being stripped bare and wandering in the wilderness.

William Shakespeare’s tragedy *King Lear* was written in 1606 and first published in 1608. The play depicts King Lear, who rules England, his three daughters, and the courtiers who remain loyal to the king in their respective roles. It is a masterpiece that stands out as the largest and most harrowing of Shakespeare’s four great tragedies. Even so, this play

explores the emergence of tragedy stemming from self-loss and the restoration of existence through the arduous process of shattering illusions. It highlights the restoration of humanity’s shared existence and the recognition of primal love as one of its central themes.

“ The central premise of “King Lear” begins with the division of the kingdom. At that time, Britain is depicted not as a nation ruled by a single sovereign, but as a system built upon the loyalty and fiefdoms of various regional lords. King Lear intends to divide his kingdom into three parts and bequeath them to his three daughters: Goneril, Regan, and Cordelia. However, before distributing the kingdom as an inheritance to his daughters, King Lear demands their love and loyalty, asking, “Tell me who loves me most.”

This line appears in the play.

“My daughters, speak now—for we are about to withdraw from the affairs of state, the benefits of sovereignty, and the care of the realm—tell me who loves us most. Then we shall bestow our greatest favor upon the one whom nature deems most worthy. Goneril, my eldest daughter, speak first.” (King Lear, Act 1, Scene 1)

In other words, King Lear and his courtiers are stepping down from state affairs, yet they wish to know the qualifications of the heirs. So he asks his eldest daughter, Goneril, first. Goneril’s response is as follows:

“My lord, I love you more than words can express;

more than sight, space, or liberty; more than wealth or rarity, which cannot be valued; as much as a life endowed with grace, health, beauty, and honor;

as much as a child loves a father; with a love that leaves me breathless and speechless; beyond all this, I love you so much.” (King Lear, Act 1, Scene 1)

Thus does Goneril express her utmost love. However, this was a thoroughly calculated praise, unrelated to her actual feelings. Even if he is my father, to say that I love him more than my sight, my health, and my life is a statement made for purposes other than love. To say that I love him with a love so intense that my breath is taken away and my words fail is not so much a statement born of filial piety as it is . Next, the second daughter, Regan, responds with flattery no less intense than Goneril’s.

She claims that her sister’s declaration of love is not yet sufficient, asserting that she possesses a deeper and more absolute love. Both of them select only the words King Lear wants to hear; these words were political rhetoric far removed from the truth and served as strategies to secure power. In fact, I believe that the situation came to this because there were unnatural and strange aspects to the father’s intentions from the start. Therefore, the very act of forcing individuals to declare their subjective loyalty and qualifications must be seen as the seed of tragedy. King Lear and his daughters’ praise of their father reveals a calculation aimed at fulfilling human infinite greed and selfishness, as well as their own desires. This situation parallels Heidegger’s concepts of the “loss of the world” and “loss of self.” Furthermore, the relationship between King Lear and his daughters—especially the two mentioned above—can be viewed, in some respects, as stemming from structural issues rather than merely personal character or evil intent. That is, swearing an oath of loyalty is a customary practice when transferring the throne. Therefore, King Lear

ceremony. In other words, the oaths of loyalty and love shown by a subordinate to a superior reveal that person’s true character. Thus, Lear declared that “the greatest favor I bestow shall be upon that which nature deems worthy.” The term “nature” in Shakespeare’s original text refers to “nature.” That is, the expression‎ of love is a test of a person’s natural ability or virtue . In other words, it is a test of merit. If this statement was not merely a rhetorical device but reflected the prevailing mindset of the time, then the succession to the throne through the verification of love could also be viewed as an expression‎ of custom and conventional ritual.

In this context, the statement I mentioned earlier—that “the true nature of life and human relationships emerges when the everyday structures of human relationships and power within the court are shattered, and those who have seized wealth and power are stripped of their facades”—takes on significant meaning.

In contrast to her sisters’ well-rehearsed speeches, the youngest daughter, Cordelia, expresses the truth not with words but from the depths of her heart. Unlike her sisters, who display their eloquence with flowery rhetoric as if in a speech contest on the theme of love, she initially says she has nothing to say, but when her father presses her repeatedly, she expresses her feelings as follows:

Lear: Nothing comes from nothing: Say it again.

Cordelia: I, wretched as I am, cannot pour out my heart with my mouth.

I love you, Your Majesty, as my duty commands. No more, no less.

Lear: How, how, Cordelia? Reword your speech, lest you ruin your fate.

Cordelia. Gracious Father, you gave me birth, raised me, and loved me. I shall duly repay that grace by following you, loving you, and hold you in the highest esteem. My sisters all claim to love you,

but why then have they taken husbands? When I marry, the lord who receives my vows will take half my love, half my care, and half my duty. I will certainly not marry as my sisters have, so that I may love my father with my whole heart. (King Lear, Act 1, Scene 1)

Cordelia cannot put her heart into words. So she is content to express the most basic emotions toward her parents: “My loving father, who gave me birth, raised me, and loved me. I shall surely repay that kindness by following, loving, and honoring you above all,” and is content to express only the most basic emotions toward her parents. However, she remains unmarried, dedicating her pure devotion to King Lear—her father and sovereign—and to the kingdom. This is akin to Elizabeth I’s declaration: “I am married to the state.” Cordelia, who loves her father completely and loves the kingdom, may well have waited for this day—the day of succession to the throne and the kingdom—without ever marrying. .

In contrast, King Lear harbors no suspicion whatsoever regarding the flattery of his two elder daughters mentioned earlier. He takes their exaggerated praise at face value and acts as if deeply moved by it. For Lear, who was already advanced in age and sensing the waning of his authority, their flattery served as a comfort, seemingly reaffirming his own dignity. He believes Goneril and Regan’s lip service to be

“proof of true love,” and based solely on the flowery rhetoric they displayed, he opens his heart and hands over his lands and power to them. In particular, the more elaborate and lengthy their speeches were, the greater the trust and satisfaction Lear felt in proportion.

Ultimately, Lear mistook love crafted by the tongue for the truth, choosing to listen to dazzling rhetoric rather than honest words.

# Loss of Self

From the perspective of Heidegger’s philosophy, this represents the disjunction between the authentic self and the inauthentic self. Heidegger also refers to this as “das Man” (the world). “Das Man” refers to the majority of people who fail to hear the true “inner voice”—that is, the “call of conscience”—and instead mistake the views of their neighbors or public and social opinions for their own essence. The King and his two daughters fail to hear the call of conscience. Based on the order of the world before their eyes, they loudly suspect others for the sake of their survival and power. Seduced by flowery rhetoric, they wish to transfer power just as the people of the world do, and in return, they desire to be supported in their old age. Let us look at Heidegger’s text.

Perhaps Dasein always says most intimately of itself, “Yes, that is me,” yet ultimately it says this most loudly precisely when it is “not” that being. (· · ·) Here, the “non-self” does not refer to a being that is essentially devoid of “selfhood,” but rather to a specific mode of existence of the “self” itself—for example, self-loss. (Being and Time, 176)

According to Heidegger’s theory of the self—that is, his phenomenological theory of the self—“ ‘Yes, that’s me’—it is actually when it is not one’s true inner voice that one speaks the loudest. Heidegger calls this characteristic of the self the non-self. He states that self-loss is a characteristic of the self. Traditionally, this phenomenon was referred to as the duality of the soul. The Apostle Paul also speaks of the duality of the soul in Romans 7. Specifically, in verse 15, he says, “For I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate.”

In this way, Western texts have highlighted the division of human nature, that is, the coexistence of good and evil within a single mind. Let us return to Heidegger and Shakespeare. As mentioned above, Heidegger states that the human psyche—that is, the self—often remains unaware of its own loss.

Sometimes we mistake that lost self for our true self and shout loudly, “That is me!” Of course, since Heidegger’s work is phenomenological, he does not specifically address the division between good and evil. Regardless of the division between good and evil, phenomenologically speaking, the subject “ “I,” loses itself, raises its voice to declare “That is me,” and, like King Lear, confuses love with flattery, leading to tragedy. The story of King Lear also revolves around the themes of self-loss and self-recovery.

King Lear’s language, born of self-loss, becomes the seed of tragedy. Having fallen for empty flattery, King Lear ends up punishing Cordelia, who had shown him true and quiet love; that is, mistaking Cordelia’s “silent love” for insincerity, King Lear, in a fit of rage, completely excludes her from the succession to the kingdom. This bold declaration by Lear stems from a cause unknown even to Lear himself. Deep in his unconscious, King Lear’s rage and actions were driven by circumstances and prejudices that distorted his human nature. Heidegger’s interpretation of this is as follows. Heidegger’s “Dasein” refers to the human being.

The explanation of “being-in-the-world” has already demonstrated, first and foremost, that a pure subject without a world is never “given” or “exists” in a world-less state. And likewise, ultimately, an isolated self without an Other does not exist in the first place. (Being and Time, p. 177)

When people forget that they are essentially “in-the-world” and act or speak as if an isolated self—devoid of both the world and the other—primarily exists, they fall into self-alienation. In such cases, the risk of becoming arrogant or committing evil increases. Heidegger’s concept of the world presupposes a being that engages with the world while performing tasks. From the author’s perspective, if one always remembers “being-in-the-world” and engages with others, one cannot fall into sin or arrogance.

Furthermore, one can be said to live a righteous life by treating others—that is, co-presence—as equals and engaging with them.

In her conversation with her father, Cordelia simply said quietly, “I love you just as you are,” but Lear interpreted this as disloyalty and rebellion. Therefore, the punishment itself was an emotional outburst of violence that erupted excessively due to Lear’s misunderstanding and selfish egocentrism. In this way, true reality is, as Heidegger’s slogan suggests, primarily hidden. Heidegger defines truth as “unconcealment.” Unconcealment does not mean simply accepting what is concealed as it is, but rather casting off the disguise and revealing the true form. Thus, Heidegger stated the following:

However, what is concealed in a special sense, or returns once again into concealment, or appears only in a distorted form, is not this or that individual entity. As the earlier , what is concealed is the very existence of beings. Existence can be so thoroughly concealed that it ultimately falls into oblivion, and consequently, the question of existence and its meaning may cease to be raised. (Being and Time, p. 64)

Cordelia’s heart is, for the most part, concealed. Her love and loyalty toward her father are veiled. Similarly, the hearts of Goneril and Regan are also revealed in a veiled and distorted form. In other words, both truth and greed were concealed and veiled.

Through this process, the king sets himself on the path to ruin by ceding power to his hypocritical daughters. Goneril and Regan’s flattery went beyond mere praise; it was a fatal temptation that clouded Lear’s judgment, and Lear’s response was the result of forgetfulness and arrogance that accepted it uncritically. Consequently, their flattery and Lear’s poor judgment become the pivotal starting point of the tragic catastrophe.

In this way, wealth and power become means of distorting and destroying human nature.

# How did Goneril and Regan betray King Lear?

Goneril and Regan’s betrayal was not mere filial disobedience, but but a systematic process of destruction driven by a combination of lust for power and cold calculation. They reveal a completely different face from the flattery they showed their father earlier, shattering even the last remnants of Lear’s dignity.

After the two daughters, wearing masks of loyalty, achieve their goals, they reveal their wicked nature toward the former king—who now stands in the way of their power and asset management—through the following stages.

1. The Moment the Mask of Flattery Is Removed

The betrayal was set in motion the moment King Lear announced he would divide the kingdom among his daughters and take turns residing at each of their homes. Goneril and Regan were the first to realize that their father had entered a state where he could no longer exercise absolute power. To them, Lear was no longer a “king” but had become a “burdensome old man.”

Goneril takes action first. She exaggerates her discomfort, claiming that the 100 knights King Lear travels with are too rowdy. This was not merely a complaint but “the first step toward weakening Lear.” Since the knights are symbols of Lear’s authority, attempting to reduce their number was an attempt to strip him of his political and symbolic power.

2. Regan Joins the Fray: A Strategy of Joint Pressure

When Lear, having been insulted by Goneril, goes to Regan for help, Regan responds with the same attitude, and the sisters’ betrayal becomes fully evident. Regan defends Goneril by claiming that “Father’s temperament is capricious,” and instead points out Lear’s faults. Then, as if they had planned it in advance, the two sisters pressure Lear to drastically reduce the number of his knights.

At this point, the two sisters exploit Lear’s emotional vulnerability, forming a united front to pass him back and forth between them and render him powerless. Left without even a place to stay, Lear suffers the humiliation of becoming a wanderer after having surrendered his kingdom.

3. The Betrayal’s Culmination: Driving Out the Father

Goneril and Regan’s betrayal grows increasingly blatant. Even as Lear wanders in the midst of a storm, they refuse to open the door and coldly cast him out. This decisive act is not mere neglect but the result of viewing their father as a superfluous presence deep within their hearts.

Goneril and Regan pay no heed to norms such as “royal lineage” or “family ethics.” For them, maintaining power and their own interests were the sole criteria for judgment. Ultimately, having completely abandoned paternal love and morality, they treat their father merely as a political obstacle.

4. The Deepening of Betrayal: Mutual Destruction

Even as they strive to maintain the power they gained through betrayal, Goneril and Regan destroy one another. Both fall in love with Edmund, the illegitimate son of the Duke of Gloucester, King Lear’s loyal subject. They fight over Edmund’s love and power, gradually descending into a hostile relationship. Ultimately, Goneril poisons Regan, and the story ends tragically with Goneril taking her own life.

In other words, their betrayal was not directed solely at Lear; it evolved into a self-destructive cycle. The moment they abandoned their father, they too lost the foundation of order and relationships, and that chaos inevitably led to the destruction of their sisterly bond.

5. Cordelia’s Path After Marriage

Although Cordelia is banished by her father, she does not lose her true love. After marrying the King of France, she leads the French army back to England to rescue her father. However, Cordelia is defeated in battle, taken prisoner, and executed by hanging on Edmund’s orders.

Ultimately, Lear dies in despair, clutching Cordelia’s body.

This ending illustrates the tragic fate of human arrogance, the lust for power, and true love.

# Realization Through Loss

Above, we introduced the story of how King Lear was betrayed by his daughters, lost his loyal youngest daughter, and was ultimately driven from his kingdom to wander the wilderness.

From here on, we will follow King Lear’s existential suffering, his realization, and the path leading to his death.

It is only after losing everything that King Lear finally comes to understand himself and the world. At first, he relies on outward displays of loyalty, flowery words, and the illusion of power, failing to distinguish true love from falsehood. However, as he relinquishes the throne and is betrayed by his two daughters, he gradually realizes the fragility of human existence and the limits of his own arrogance. Furthermore, he finds himself wandering naked and homeless in the midst of a storm. He laments his plight, asking, “How can a homeless head, a starving body, and tattered rags possibly withstand such weather?”

Drifting through the storm, King Lear, in this extreme situation, recalls the plight of others in similar circumstances and appeals to the compassion of those in power for them. Thus, he says, “O Power, take medicine (heal yourself). Reveal yourself and feel what those wretched souls feel.” Let us look at the text and dialogue from the play *King Lear*. Here, we witness the concrete manifestation of Heidegger’s concept of “being-with,” or “co-presence.” Going further, King Lear delivers a soliloquy urging those in power to “reveal yourselves and feel what those wretched people feel,” while reflecting on his own failure to do so when he held power in the past. In this way, the loss of wealth and power through his daughters’ betrayal, along with the loss of material comforts and pleasures, finally awakens in him a realistic awareness of “being-with,” as well as compassion and empathy. Let us look at the text of *King Lear* “Wretched poor people, wherever you may be, you who are enduring this merciless storm—how can you possibly withstand such weather with your homeless heads, starving bodies, and ragged, tattered clothes? Ah, I have been so indifferent to such things!”

“Power, take medicine (heal yourself). Reveal yourself and feel what those wretched ones feel. Only then can you share your abundance with them and show a little more justice to heaven.” (King Lear, Act 3, Scene 4) March 19, night

The passage above illustrates how those in power, unaware of the suffering of the homeless, wield their authority arbitrarily, exposing the poor and pitiful to a merciless storm. They must take the medicine and heal themselves. Only then, it is said, can they show even a little more justice to Heaven—that is, to God.

The extreme loss he experiences while wandering in the storm causes him to see anew the common human destiny, the suffering of the poor, and the illusory nature of power and status. Here, if we recall the concept of “Dasein” from Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, we can gain a deeper understanding of Shakespeare’s anthropology. Dasein refers to human beings living together. Let us look at *Being and Time*.

Based on this being-in-the-world-together, the world is, at every moment, already and always the world that I share with others. The world of Dasein is a shared world. Being-in-the-world is being-with-others (co-existence). The inner self-existence of the other within the world is co-presence (being there together). (Being and Time, p. 180)

King Lear fought desperately until the very last moment to save Cordelia, but faced with the fact that he ultimately failed to save her, he oscillates between deep denial and despair. Unable to accept that Cordelia is dead, he repeats, “She is still breathing,” displaying a psychological resistance to deny the truth even in the face of death. This is also similar to the psychology of a human worker who refuses to acknowledge that a tool is broken and insists on continuing to work.

King Lear’s denial of his daughter’s death is not mere grief, but a sign of deep confusion stemming from his inability to accept that his own world has collapsed. He is caught in a chaos of self-reproach and regret, love and anger, sorrow and denial. In particular, his lament—“Why must Cordelia die, while dogs and rats, those insignificant creatures, live on?”—marks the moment when Lear realizes that the order of the world has collapsed. Here, we are reminded of the lesson of recognition through loss. Furthermore, it evokes the sentiment described by Heidegger regarding a broken tool—namely, the emotion of still clinging to the tool and longing to use it even before discarding the broken object. before discarding it—that is, the emotional attachment and longing for its use that persists even as we let go. In other words, this brings to mind the state of broken-ness, unusability, or unsuitability of Heidegger’s “Dasein-as-tool”—the “being-in-hand”—as we noted earlier: the phenomena of visibility, compulsion, and holding. # The Philosophy of Emptiness

Heidegger stated that the modes of “standing-for,” “compulsion,” and “holding-on” serve to bring what is “in-hand” to the forefront as what is “before the eyes.”

He said that after undergoing this process, the tool finally becomes “that sort of thing”—meaning the very thing people want to throw away. A similar process occurs in human relationships.

Tragedy, in *King Lear*, what is shattered is not Heidegger’s “thing-in-hand”—that is, a tool or material—but the child itself. His daughter is gone, yet he has not yet come to terms with it. He holds his dead daughter and wails. Here, the heart is not about consideration but about care. Let’s look at the original text of *King Lear*.

The child is gone forever! I know who is dead and who is alive.

This child lies dead as earth.

Bring me a mirror. If her breath fogs the glass,

then she is still alive.

This feather moves—she lives! If so,

it would be the one chance

to undo all the suffering

I have endured.

(King Lear, Act 5, Scene 3)

In this scene, King Lear is in a state of clinging to his last hope even amidst extreme despair. Although he is almost fully aware that his daughter Cordelia is dead, he refuses to accept it until the very end. His demand for a mirror and a feather is not an expression‎ of reason, but of a desperate obsession and denial. In other words, he is not simply grieving;

1. in a “state of psychological collapse” where he cannot accept death, and

2. simultaneously clinging to a “desperate hope” of grasping even the faintest possibility.

At this moment, Lear stands on the border between reason and madness. On the one hand, he knows reality well enough to say, “She is dead,” but on the other, he seeks to confirm‎ life in the movement of a breath or a feather.

Ultimately, this scene depicts a tragic moment in human existence—the inability to accept complete loss—a state in which love is so great that it leads to a rejection of reality. Cordelia, who has already vanished, remains in King Lear’s world as an empty space.

Heidegger once said, “The empty is more essential.” In other words, when a necessary person disappears, their necessity becomes all the more evident. The presence of the dead is demanded even more urgently. We refuse to let the departed go. This is the meaning of the phrase “emptiness is more essential.”

We experience this frequently in our daily lives as well. When those around us—our family, our fellow co-existents—fall, the rhythm of life collapses. It can even hasten the death of the living. Thus, the living, like King Lear above, refuse to accept even the death of the deceased. No, they rebel against and resist death. Yet ultimately, they are confronted with the corpse of the deceased—that is, the presence before their eyes that no longer shows any reaction.

King Lear embodies this subjective psychology of not wanting to let go of a presence held in one’s hands. Faced with the death of a relative or spouse, we say, “Why were you in such a hurry to leave so soon?” . In “The Silence of the Beloved,” we sing, “Though you have gone, I have not sent you away.”

In this way, obstructing death, resisting it, and rebelling against it is the essence of human existence—that is, life.

Had there been a pioneering resolve to “remember death,” King Lear might have escaped his extreme arrogance and avoided the human tragedy of abandoning his daughters.

# “Awakening Through Loss in ‘King Lear’”

Within the basic semantic structure of King Lear presented above, we can explore in greater detail the hidden semantic association of “awareness through loss.” This motif—awareness through loss—is one of the core tragic structures of King Lear. In this play, Shakespeare structured the narrative so that the characters’ true insights do not emerge at the beginning or during a time of order, but only become possible through a process of dramatic exposure.

The loss of power, social status, recognition, and ultimately, loved ones, is not merely an external downfall but an essential process leading to a profound, existential realization. The tragedy stems from the fact that this realization comes too late to revive a life that has already been destroyed .

# The Storm as a Site of Radical Exposure

The storm is the most symbolic scene in this play. It represents not only the external forces of nature but also Lear’s internal collapse. Everything that once protected him—the palace, his status, his servants—no longer exists. He stands, literally and figuratively, naked before the world.

In this extreme situation, Lear realizes for the first time the injustice of his past actions. He comes to understand how much he had neglected the poverty and suffering of his subjects. The loss of his own security has forced him to see things from others’ perspectives.

The words he utters in the storm reveal a newly awakened moral sensibility. He comes to see not only his own suffering but also the structural injustices of human society. Thus, the storm marks a turning point: the king becomes human. Loss strips him bare, yet at the same time, it enables true vision for the first time. And so, King Lear, encountering the storm in the wilderness, cries out:

You may think it a great misfortune that this violent storm pierces our very skin,

and so it may be for you. But where a greater illness has taken root,

a lesser one is scarcely felt. You will flee from it as you would from a bear;

But if you flee and face the raging sea, you will meet a bear within your own mouth. When the mind is free, the body grows weak: the storm within my mind robs my senses of all other feelings, leaving only the beating of my heart. O ingratitude of my children!

(King Lear, Act 3, Scene 4)

This soliloquy, spoken by Lear amidst the storm, reveals that the immense suffering raging within him is far more overwhelming than the violent storm raging outside. Furthermore, the lines “You will flee as from a bear; but if you flee and meet the raging sea, you will meet a bear in your mouth” mean that a person fleeing to escape a bear cannot avoid the bear even upon reaching the sea, and will encounter it in an even more terrifying way—as if meeting a bear in one’s own mouth. bear, and indeed encounters it in an even more horrific way, as if meeting it right in his own mouth.

# Parallel Story: Gloucester and Blindness

Shakespeare reflects Lear’s path through the character of Gloucester.

Gloucester is one of the central figures in the tragedy *King Lear*; he is the king’s loyal subject and the father of two sons—namely, the legitimate heir Edgar and the illegitimate son Edmund. By suspecting his good son Edgar and placing excessive trust in the cunning Edmund, he creates the cause of his own tragedy. This misjudgment parallels King Lear’s mistake of abandoning Cordelia and trusting Goneril and Regan, reinforcing the theme of “parental misjudgment” throughout the play. Gloster, while attempting to aid Lear, becomes entangled in a plot by Goneril and Regan’s faction, is captured, and has his eyes brutally gouged out by Regan’s husband, Cornwall. Ironically, it is only after losing his sight that he “sees” the truth, realizing Edgar’s goodness and Edmund’s betrayal. Though he wanders in despair after his blindness, he is a tragic and symbolic figure who ultimately demonstrates the possibility of human redemption under his son’s protection.

He, too, initially failed to see his children’s true hearts. He trusted Edmund and misunderstood Edgar, only to suffer the worst loss—the agony of losing his sight. It is only after he literally goes blind that he finally begins to see clearly. Gloucester is the most obvious example of the theme of “ enlightenment through loss”: he had to lose his physical sight to gain moral and emotional insight. This parallel structure underscores that Shakespeare treats this theme as universal: not only kings, but all humans can live in self-deception unless they suffer a loss. Enlightenment is not a gift of power, but the result of suffering.

Gloucester’s eldest son, Edgar, attempts to assist King Lear alongside his father, Gloucester, but is branded a traitor and forced to flee from Cornwall. In this state, to protect himself, Edgar covers his naked body with mud.

He also changes his name and takes on the role of Poor Tom. When King Lear encounters Edgar, who appears encounter with Edgar, who appears naked as “Poor Tom,” comes across as an existential shock. In this moment, Lear recognizes “humanity itself”—a being who possesses nothing, owns nothing, and simply exists. He exclaims, “Is man any better than this?” The instant he sees the naked Edgar, King Lear cries out:

King Lear is saying that an “unadorned” human is nothing more than a pitiful, naked, two-legged animal, just like you. Edgar’s existence is not expressed through words or power. This is the same situation as with King Lear’s youngest daughter, Cordelia. Cordelia did not express her love for her father with long speeches. We often hear the advice that we must express love through words. However, in the so-called “limit situation” where King Lear and the Earl of Gloucester clash in the play, such human language—flattery, intrigue, and betrayal—is nothing more than a means and a tool to conceal the truth. Here, we must embrace Jaspers’ concept of the “limit situation.” Heidegger’s “anxiety” is also akin to such a situation. Heidegger describes this limit situation even more starkly through “Being-toward-death .” In ordinary times, the depths of the human heart remain hidden. Even in the Christian faith, prayer urges us to “go forth as we are.” Unless we abandon everything we possess, we cannot see the face of God.

This situation is also expressed in literature and philosophy. Human nature is concealed amidst material possessions and power. When we lose this disguise and concealment, human existence reveals its essence. The author emphasizes the passive meaning of “being deprived of,” rather than “losing.” Human beings—or, in Heidegger’s terms, Dasein—intuit their essence within the so-called “thrownness.” Thus, Heidegger stated in *Being and Time*: “Anxiety reveals the thrownness of Dasein as being-in-the-world.” in *Being and Time*. Thus, the situations of King Lear, the Earl of Gloucester, and Edgar can be described as the “thrownness” revealed through anxiety. Furthermore, the fate—or thrownness—they face is not something they have orchestrated themselves, but rather an objective environment created by various people, the circumstances they find themselves in, and so-called opportunists who pursue their desires and plans amidst it all. In other words, the reason Edgar roams around naked, covered in mud, and acting mad— —is because their enemies, namely the Duke of Cornwall and King Lear’s two daughters, have branded them as traitors and are seeking to kill them. Let’s look at the text.

“Is man any better than this? Look at him closely.

You owe no silk to the worm, no hide to the beast, no wool to the sheep, no scent to the cat. Ha! Here are three well-bred men!

You are that: a plain man is but a wretched,

naked, two-legged animal like you.” (King Lear, Act 3, Scene 4) The night of March 20

The blind Duke of Gloucester did not recognize the naked madman standing before him as his own son. Edgar recognized his father the moment he heard his voice, but he could not reveal his identity. The fear that his father would face even greater punishment if his survival were known, and the thought that his current wretched appearance might cause his father even greater pain, silenced him. Thus, father and son face each other in the state of greatest distance at the moment they are closest. This dramatic irony is a core device of tragedy frequently employed by Shakespeare, dramatically illustrating how the breakdown of communication, misjudgment, and the concealment of truth in human relationships deepen tragedy.

In his despair, Gloucester requests, “ Take me to the cliffs of Dover,” asking Poor Tom to lead him to his death. Edgar, while deeply understanding his father’s despair, stages a fake cliff to save him. He changes his voice, adjusts his gait, and convinces his father that he has climbed a high cliff, causing him to leap from what is actually level ground. Gloucester believes he has survived his fall from the cliff, and through this miraculous survival, he is led to reconsider God’s will and the meaning of life. By staging a fiction rather than telling the truth, Edgar fulfills a dual role in preserving his father’s life.

In this encounter, Edgar’s nakedness and Gloucester’s blindness symbolically illuminate one another.

The naked Edgar demonstrates that a human being can still practice love and responsibility even after losing everything, while the blind Gloucester embodies the paradox that moral insight is gained only after losing one’s sight. In other words, Edgar loses his body but gains his father, and Gloucester loses his eyes but sees the truth. This scene reveals a realization that humans can attain only through loss. As in Heidegger’s , loss and destruction reveal the truth. Though their reunion is a meeting in which they fail to recognize one another, it gives rise to a deep solidarity and care born of shared human suffering. Heidegger, too, spoke of “care” (Fürsorge) in human relationships. These two figures symbolize Heidegger’s concept of “Dasein.”

# Heidegger’s Ontology and the Motif of Recognition Through Loss

We have previously examined Heidegger’s concept of “being-in-hand.” Let us revisit that passage.

In this way, “the thing-in-hand” emphasizes an existential structure where “the tool disappears from consciousness precisely when it functions most naturally.” This is also the most everyday and fundamental way we relate to the world. As Heidegger stated above: “The uniqueness of the ‘thing-in-hand’ lies in the fact that, by being in the hand, it conceals itself—and precisely because of this, it is originally in the hand.” He stated that a being-in-hand—that is, a tool or material in use—conceals its own existence. A tool or material must remain unnoticed and hidden in order to perform its original function.

In this way, ordinary beings conceal themselves. This statement must be read in a phenomenological sense. That is, it does not refer to the fact of existence from the perspective of existing sciences or history; rather, it refers to the meaning of phenomena that emerge through intuition, not in an empirical sense. Heidegger called this kind of knowledge “opening” or “disclosure.”

Let us look at *Being and Time*.

That which remains concealed in a peculiar sense, or falls back into concealment, or reveals itself only “in disguise”—this is not this or that entity, but, as the preceding consideration has shown, the existence of the entity. The being of the being is so deeply concealed that it is forgotten, and not even a question about it or its meaning is raised. (Being and Time, p. 64)

However, this unveiling is by no means an acquisition in the general sense; it is not a way of empirically learning about this or that. It is, as in the example above, the way in which being reveals itself. Of course, this involves the observation and analysis of the philosopher, that is, the phenomenologist .

The phenomenological truth obtained through this process—that is, most of Heidegger’s analysis of Being—argues that Being only experiences its essential possibility of existence through loss, damage, the collapse of familiar structures, and a departure from the world. Therefore, cognition is essentially structured negatively.

In other words, as indicated in the original text above, the existence of a being is concealed, hidden, and disguised. Consequently, the truth of this state is revealed only through processes such as loss, damage, collapse, and withdrawal. This fact was discussed in Shakespeare’s play *King Lear*, as seen above.

This section details how, in Heidegger’s ontology, cognition is linked to loss, collapse, and deprivation, and why loss, in particular, constitutes the condition for a more primordial form of understanding. First, this situation was already explored in the earlier discussion of “being-in-hand” and “being-before-the-eye.” Let us organize these points a bit further.

# Concealment and Appearance

Above, we examined Heidegger’s concepts of concealment and disclosure. Heidegger argued that the being of a being is so deeply concealed that it is forgotten, and questions about it or its meaning are not even raised. As a concrete example, in his famous analysis, Heidegger described a tool as generally “that which is in the hand” or “that which is grasped by the hand.” It is so familiar to us that we hardly perceive it consciously. A hammer does not appear to our eyes as an object; rather, it exists as an extension of our practical actions. But how do we come to recognize the hammer as a hammer? It is not when it functions, but when it does not function—that is, when it disappears, breaks, or becomes useless.

In other words, a thing does not first approach us as an object with characteristics, but as a tool bound up in our practical relationship.

The hammer did not approach us as “a wooden handle + a metal head,” but as a tool for striking. Therefore, its meaning is not inherent in itself but arises from the relationship of “for the sake of.”

The hammer is for striking,

the nail is for fastening. A plank is for building.

These referential relationships form a network of meaning—what Heidegger calls the world—that is, a totality of reference.

Therefore, the world is not a space filled with things, but a structure of reference and purpose. The important point here is that objects generally remain unnoticed. When we hammer, we do not look at the hammer. Its function works behind the scenes to maintain the stability of the world. This is the loss, damage, collapse, and deprivation mentioned above.

This process signifies a revelation as “inappropriateness.” In phenomenology, “inappropriateness” is also simply called negation. It refers to the phenomena of loss, damage, collapse, and deprivation or detachment mentioned above. Fundamentally, these are relationships between humans and the surrounding world in Heidegger’s phenomenology. However, the thesis of this essay was that these arguments can also be applied to Shakespeare’s King Lear. Heidegger presented a decisive observation: as mentioned above, an object is only truly revealed when we fail to use it. He distinguished three forms of impairment.

Namely, damage is when a tool breaks; malfunction is when it does not work properly; and absence is when we seek it but cannot find it. At such moments, the object undergoes a phenomenological transformation. Heidegger called this “transformation.” There is also the term “derivation.” This means that various forms of meaning are derived from a single fact. From a Husserlian perspective, this can be described as follows: first, there is the selection of an object—“There is a rose over there”—then a judgment arises that “that statement is true,” and subsequently, value judgments such as “the rose smells fragrant” or “I like it” may emerge. However, since Heidegger’s phenomenology is not idealistic but existential—that is, a phenomenology that begins with the human being as a single entity—he traces meaning in a manner diametrically opposed to Husserl’s. In this process, a phenomenology of Dasein emerges rather than a phenomenology of consciousness, and from this concept, he walks the path of existential inquiry into concealment, unconcealment, or unveiling. For Heidegger, the term “phenomenon” means “truth.”

Dasein —the truth of Dasein. In phenomenological terms, a phenomenon is initially concealed. The path of phenomenology lies in escaping this concealment and disguise. Heidegger describes it as follows:

Concealment (Verdecktheit) is the antithesis of “phenomenon” (Phänomen). The ways in which phenomena are concealed manifest differently.

First, a phenomenon may be concealed in the sense that it has “never been discovered.” In this case, one is in a state of neither knowing nor not knowing whether the phenomenon exists. Furthermore, a phenomenon may be ‘buried’ (ver-schüttet). This implies that the phenomenon was once discovered but has since ‘sunk back into concealment.’ (Being and Time, p. 64)

The concealment mentioned above is also referred to as “being hidden.” A phenomenon may be concealed in the sense that it is “in a state of never having been discovered.” In this case, it is said to be a state in which one neither knows nor does not know whether the phenomenon exists. Furthermore, it is said that a phenomenon may be “buried.” Being buried refers, for example, to scientific or everyday entities that are right before our eyes. Because these are usually so self-evident, we fail to see their essence—that is, their existence in our grasp.

This principle can be applied to the play *King Lear*. For example, it was well-structured in the bizarre events involving Gloucester, the father who had his eyes gouged out and could no longer see, and his son Edgar, who had to pretend to be naked and mad.

Edgar is branded a traitor due to the conspiracy of his half-brother Edmund and is forced to flee. and to survive, he disguises himself as “Poor Tom,” a vagrant, madman, and beggar. He smears mud on his body, wanders around nearly naked, and speaks in a deranged manner. This disguise is a strategy for him to evade pursuit and survive.

In the case of tools, what was previously “usable” becomes “unusable,” and may even appear to simply “exist”—that is, to appear as a mere object that can be observed theoretically. In other words, the structure of the world becomes visible for the first time through functional failure and damage. We come to realize how much we depend on familiar processes and how our daily lives are sustained by a well-functioning network. Heidegger called this “withdrawal from the world, or Ent-weltlichung.” Only when things are removed from their semantic context and the world is torn apart at a single point can it be recognized as the world.

Here, the recognition of things is conveyed through loss: the loss of functionality, the loss of tool-ness, and the loss of taken-for-grantedness.

The world reveals itself through absence. This analysis can be generalized. We recognize the world only when the structure of our relationship with it breaks down. In Heidegger’s terms, it is only when concealment disappears that it opens up brightly. That is, when familiar meanings collapse, the ontological layer of our existence is revealed. In this way, loss becomes a phenomenological key. Through loss, unconcealment—that is, the revelatory nature of truth—is revealed.

# The Collapse of the World as the Pioneering of Being

Heidegger refers to situations where the everyday world “slips away” or “collapses” as particularly “epistemic.” This may be an existential crisis—such as grief, fear, or loneliness—but it may also be a moment of sudden change or meaninglessness. In such situations, the world does not merely change; it loses its structure. And it is precisely because of this that phenomena are revealed.

Amid terror, fear, and a state of utter uncertainty, the abyss of Being—usually concealed—is revealed. Fear renders the world itself “unsettled.” That is, it shows that familiar meanings are not self-evident. Here, Being faces itself unprotected and without an interpretive framework. Fear is not harmful; it is ontologically beneficial. It is a shift toward a true perspective on the world. The loss of the familiar world opens up a view of its ontological foundation.

The hammer reveals itself in the act of breaking. The world reveals itself in the act of slipping.

The self reveals itself in the act of losing. Conscience appeals through deprivation.

Heidegger describes the so-called “call of conscience” as follows:

That call lacks any proclamation or utterance. It is not expressed in words to begin with, and yet it is never obscure or unclear. Conscience speaks only and ceaselessly in the mode of silence. (Being and Time, p. 397)

Here, Heidegger emphasizes that conscience does not speak in the form of linguistic commands or moral rules.

Conscience does not appear as clear statements such as “Do this, do not do that.” Instead, it functions as a wordless call—an appeal in silence urging one to return to oneself. Therefore, the voice of conscience is understood not as audible speech, but as a call of existential awareness experienced in the moment when everyday certainties crumble.

The truth of being is revealed in existence-toward-death. Recognition is a movement of emptying, separation, and stripping away. It is a movement that returns being to the bare structure of its being. Human beings, who live as “worldly people,” return to themselves only when they abandon their worldly lives—that is, when they are stripped of their worldliness.

For Heidegger, true cognition is always cognition through loss. It is like the kernel being revealed when the shell is peeled away. It is unconcealment.

Only when a person temporarily withdraws from the world and from themselves do they truly become themselves. And it is precisely within this loss that they gain a deeper and more primordial mode of understanding.