내가 본 박정희, 그 핵무기 개발계획과 카터(영어 논문)

[권영민]

내가 본 박정희, 그 핵무기 개발계획과 카-터(영어 논문)

주: 하기 논문은 외교협회에서 발간하는 The IPFANS Review 지에 2005년 7월에 실렸던 글을 그대로 연제한다. 참고로 동 논문은 필자가 애틀랜타 총영사로서 당시에 현지에서 느끼고 실지로 미국 애틀랜타에서 있었던 일, 즉 카-터의 하기 94년 북한 방문기를 쓴 글이다. 이 논문을 추후에 카-터 대통령을 수행하여 그때 94년, 북한을 방문하였던 Marion Creekmore, Jr (전 미국 스리랑카 주재 대사) 대사를 통해 카-터 대통령에게도 보고토톡 한바도 있었다. 그 후, 2010 에 Creekmore 대사는 A Moment of Crisis 라는 당시의 카-터의 노력을 Memoire 형식으로 기술하며, 나에게 의전상의 잘못을 저질렀다고 솔직히 인정하여 쓴 웃음을 지은 적이 있다. 이도 모두 애국적인 교포들이 있었기에 가능하였던 일이다.

CARTER’S VISIT TO PYONGYANG

AND NUCLEAR ISSUE: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO THE NUCLEAR CRISIS *

Kwon Young-min

Introduction

Since the inauguration of the Bush administration, North Korea had appeared to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. However, and not unexpectedly, this posture changed dramatically after the summit between Presidents Kim Dae-jung and George W. Bush in March 2001. Since then, a series of statements and comments has made it clear that Pyongyang has become increasingly irritated. The entire propaganda apparatus have accused the Bush administration of adopting a hard-line stance, and threatened to jettison its agreements to freeze its nuclear development program and to suspend its missile program. The dialogue between South and North Korea at the governmental level also gradually came to a standstill.

Even though the new administration in Washington appeared to have belatedly made its policy toward North Korea, it has responded in a rather off-hand manner, and with an overwhelming tone. Our ongoing concern is that the North could feel tempted again to resort to its unique style of diplomatic brinkmanship. This poses a challenge not only to Washington but also to Seoul, by fueling hard-line sentiments in Washington and prompting an irrevocable backfire.

Recalling the nuclear crisis with North Korea half a dozen years ago reminds us so vividly how dangerous a game Pyongyang had played and how effectively Kim Il Sung used the visit of former President Jimmy Carter to dissipate the pressure for sanctions and split the allied coalition. The visit appeared as an unqualified success, in that it brought about a breakthrough in resolving the nuclear crisis by providing North Korea with a good excuse to retreat in a face-saving manner. President Carter himself called it “a miracle.”

Former President Jimmy Carter, who secured his fame in post-presidential intermediary roles from Ethiopia to Nicaragua, has, however, been remembered in Seoul only for his abortive efforts to withdraw U.S. troops from Korea. The public reception of his return to Korean affairs was rather cool and negative to some extent.

Regardless of liking it or not, many analysts in Seoul generally agreed that Carter’s trip could serve to relieve tensions―as it did. His visit turned a confrontation, which was at the brink of war into a new set of negotiations. It is, therefore, worth recalling the case especially at this juncture, when the future seems murky again and Carter is reportedly pushing for his second visit to North Korea.

Carter’s Decision to Intervene

Startling Tip-off on Carter’s Engagement

A telephone call from a certain ‘T’ to the Korean Consul General in Atlanta on Wednesday, June 8, 1994 sounded the alarm and tipped off the Korean government to the existence of this mission. The latter was taken aback when he heard about the imminence of the planned visit, which was supposed to commence on Sunday, June 12, 1994, merely four days away.

The Consul General hastened to contact Mr. Marion Creekmore, the former U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka and a director of the conflict resolution program at the Atlanta-based Carter Center, in order to confirm‎‍! the news. To his distress, however, the answer was curt, “Nothing could be confirm‎‍!ed.” Recalling their intimate relationship of exchanging information and sharing luncheons made him feel a little troubled, although he had always maintained the imperative duty of observing security rules. With a disturbing sense of evasiveness, he continued attempting to locate Carter’s long-time secretary as well as other acquaintances at the Carter Center, albeit in vain.

The Consul General’s requests to the Embassy in Washington DC to sound out the White House and the State Department on this information were also unproductive. Their responses were identical in talking about the lack of information and related consultations. His impatience grew.

Unique Style of Management

Since leaving the White House in 1981, Carter has carved out for himself a mission of peaceful resolution of conflicts. He has become an earnest missionary for non-violence, an election-monitor and an emissary at-large by talking peace and preaching reconciliation, and staking his personal prestige on the results. He used to even emerge in the desert to meet with the leaders of the so-called “rogue states,” thus opening up lines of direct communication in case of emergency.

This is the why his reputation has grown since his return to Atlanta. This is also the reason why some critics cast doubts on his true motives by alluding to the Nobel Peace Prize that he failed to receive after the Camp David accords in the Middle East.

The Carter Center, which he established and so successfully mobilized for his activities, appears to have a unique organizational structure. Unlike the ordinary triangular-shaped organization, it resembles a dandelion flower. Everyone seems to have access to the President at the center. The 350-odd staff members (including volunteers) appear not to have horizontal cooperation, but vertical connections only.

In this regard, there has been suspicions that this structural peculiarity could facilitate impulsive and the spur-of-the-moment decision-making, rather than a process of careful consideration, sufficient consultations and prudent eval‎‍!uation. Of course, there are many potential advantages to this system as well. One of them would be the efficiency of the operation, assuming that it is led by an intellectual, bright and nimble-witted person like Carter. All in all, however, the staff in Carter Center could very well carry out their specially assigned tasks without giving a hint to the colleague next door.

The Consul General suspected that something was indeed underway in the Carter Center. Convinced of this, but having no way of finding out about the planned visit, the Consul General repeatedly referred to his informant for reconfirmation. However, the responses were the same and even accompanied by an unexpected warning to keep the lid on the source of this information.

It was around that moment when a familiar voice was heard. Ambassador Creekmore, without even saying a word of greeting, began to apologize and explain the situation he had been forced to find himself in. Relieved of his frustration, the Consul General expressed his understanding and agreed to a proposed meeting at his office in an hour. It was half past nine on Friday, June 10, 1994.

The Press Release and Requests for Cooperation

One of the virtues a Foreign Service officer should be armed with would be perseverance and tolerance, especially as national interests should be given priority. Flushed with regret, Ambassador Creekmore bashfully handed a press release to the Consul General, adding that the release would be distributed to the press a couple of hours later.

As expected, the press release disclosed the plan of Carter’s visit. Every detail proved the veracity of the original tip. Shyly broaching the subject, Ambassador Creekmore explained “the President is planning to arrive in Seoul around ten o’clock on Tuesday, June 14, by private jet and cross the border to the North next morning. After spending three nights, he will take the same route back to Seoul Saturday morning. That is June 18. He wishes to leave, if permitted, immediately after being received by President Kim.” He continued that Mrs. Rosalynn Carter, Mr. Dick Christensen, Consul at the U.S. Consulate in Okinawa (Korean desk officer-designate), himself, and 10 security guards would accompany the President. He glossed over the matters related to the visit to the North, as these had already been discussed with North Korean authorities.

“Even though it was really short notice and caused some inconvenience, your friendly cooperation would be highly appreciated; 1) Meetings with President Kim to exchange views prior to and after his visit to the North, 2) Briefings by the Ministers concerned, 3) Understanding for crossing the DMZ, and, 4) President Carter headed already to Washington DC to meet with the White House people. If available, he also wishes to meet with the Korean Ambassador tonight.” He continued. “For your reference, Ambassador Laney got the same information and similar requests and as I understand, he already got in touch with your home Government.” he concluded.

Looking at him flinch, the Consul General again resolved to tone down his protests. However, he could not help but to point out that: 1) four days (including a weekend) meant really short notice; he couldn’t be sure whether the requests could be met and, 2) he wanted to be informed and consulted a little earlier, even though it was a track II diplomacy.

What has later become known was that Ambassador Laney had contacted Foreign Minister Han Sung-Joo and presidential aide Chung Chong-Wook on Friday, June 10 (in tandem with working-level contacts such as the meeting between US desk officer of the Foreign Ministry and First Secretary Russel of the US Embassy) on the same subject.

They tried to emphasize again that the nature of the visit was a purely private one with no official message.

The reason why they so hastily announced the plan of the visit has also become known. It turned out that they misunderstood the Consul General’s inquiry as a leak of the plan to the press, which surprised them tremendously, according to subsequent statements by Ambassador Creekmore.

Political Resistance

Events were at a critical juncture when Carter decided to intervene. Diplomatically, in close consultations with Japan, Western countries and the IAEA, South Korea and the U.S. Administration drew up a program of gradually enforced sanctions against North Korea for refusing to cooperate with the IAEA. North Korea, on the other hand, repeatedly proclaimed that the sanctions meant a declaration of war. Consequently, to prepare for potential contingencies, the Pentagon implemented its plan for additional U.S. military deployment.

That is why Carter’s visit may be interpreted in different ways. Under such circumstances, the press release read; “We will be going (to North Korea) as private citizens, representing the Carter Center. The initiative for this trip has been from (North) Korea, not Washington and I will have no official status relating to the U.S. Government· My hope is to discuss some of the important issues of the day with the leaders in the area· As is the case with other international issues since leaving the White House, I have attempted to stay adequately briefed on the Korean situation.”

After browsing the text, the Consul General immediately sensed the political sensitivity that Carter was heeding was not relations with Korea, but the sitting Clinton Administration. From his political point of view, domestic political considerations preceded any foreign relations that could be, after all, manageable. That is why he emphasized his status as private citizen, and that North Korea was the source of the initiative. He seemed sensitive to the explicit expression‎‍!s of reservation from the current administration.

Actually, to the Clinton Administration, the Carter mission was a gamble. It could always be disowned, although not without political repercussions. Even if Carter succeeded, the administration would be open to criticism from Republicans who disparaged Carter’s willingness to take risks for peace. Yet turning down the former President was also risky, especially if it came to be portrayed publicly as a missed opportunity to avoid war.

In South Korea, Carter’s involvement in Korean issues was not welcome either. As Carter later confessed, the South Koreans seemed somewhat troubled about his planned visit to Pyongyang. Before his arrival, President Kim Young Sam expressed worries as to whether Carter’s visit would give a misleading signal to the North Korean leadership. He said that Kim Il Sung might attempt to convey a message of peace to the West through Carter, while telling his own people that the former U.S. President is in Pyongyang to pay respects to him. It should be also pointed out that the visit had intensified the political rivalry in Seoul. Then-opposition leader Kim Dae-jung had endorsed a high-level American mission to Pyongyang at a Washington press conference on May 18, 1994, insinuating his own previous encouragements to Carter to visit Pyongyang at the latter’s office in Atlanta.

Intransigency Attracts Attention

Carter had built up his prowess by carrying out extraordinary missions that ordinary citizens wished to avoid. By establishing channels of communication with eccentric leaders, he would turn up to mediate conflicts in case of urgency. This champion of human rights and born-again Christian had already surprised the world several times. Therefore, the apparent lack of an avenue of communication with the top leader of North Korea and the technical grasp of nuclear issues naturally attracted this previous nuclear engineer.

It was later asserted that Carter had watched North Korea with rising concern as the nuclear crisis heated up. He appealed to some North Korean experts to provide him with briefs in order to renew his knowledge and also spoke to Reverend Billy Graham and others who had visited North Korea (Thomas Graham (Rockfeller Foundation), Tony Namkung (Asia Society), Stephan Linton (Columbia University), Selig Harrison (Carnegie Endowment), Peter Hayes (W. Alton Jones Foundation), Han S. Park (University of Georgia), among others). On several occasions, Carter received North Korean representatives to the United Nations at his office. Furthermore, his long association with Ambassador James Laney in Seoul, and easy access to Atlanta-located CNN (which was on a campaign in 1994 to expose the North Korean nuclear issue) might have prodded him to make a decision.

Carter had already received invitations in the name of Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam from North Korea in 1991 and 1992 to visit Pyongyang through representatives at the U.N., but each time he had been asked by the State Department not to go on grounds that his trip would complicate the Korean problem rather than help to resolve it, in addition to engendering opposition in Seoul. In 1992, the presidential elections further complicated a potential visit. That is why other staff members of the Carter Center went to Pyongyang.

In connection with financial matters, Carter had already secured support. The Rockfeller Foundation had decided to pay the expenses for Carter’s mission to North Korea, should Carter ever decide to visit. Thomas Graham of the Foundation met again with Marion Creekmore in December 1993 and made good on Rockfeller’s April 1993 commitment to fund Carter’s travel expenses.

North Korean Nuclear Diplomacy

The First Evidence of Nuclear Capability

The brinkmanship diplomacy related to the North Korean nuclear program began with some photographs of a nuclear plant taken by a U.S. surveillance satellite in April 1982. The identified reactor, an indigenous one located at Yongbyun, was a relatively modest plant deemed capable of producing 5 megawatts of electric power. It started operation in 1987 and includes one reprocessing plant where plutonium can be extracted from the spent fuel.

Another reactor, allegedly designed to produce 50 megawatts, was spotted in June 1988. But the real specter began to loom when a reactor, purported to produce 200 megawatts of power (together with a second reprocessing plant), was spotted by both U.S. and French satellites in 1989. It was presumed that these two reactors could begin operation in 1995 and 1996 respectively, and the second reprocessing plant would be completed within months. The completion of these facilities meant that North Korea’s capacity to produce weapons-grade plutonium would increase to 200～260 kilograms a year―enough for 20 to 26 bombs. These large plants put aside, the small 5-megawatts experimental reactor, by reprocessing spent fuel, could produce enough plutonium to manufacture one Hiroshima-size nuclear bomb every year.

North Korea’s nuclear program seemed to date back to around the end of Korean War. Even though North Korea and the Soviet Union signed two agreements on cooperation in nuclear research (including the teaching of nuclear physics at Dubna Nuclear Research Center near Moscow) after the war, the nuclear program itself was secretly implemented on an independent basis. That is why it is only possible to speculate exactly when and how the program had been launched. The site-preparing construction for the first indigenous reactor, the one spotted by US satellite in April of 1982, was presumed to have begun around 1979.

However, the origin of the program could be traced back to 1967, when North Korea started operation of a small research reactor acquired from the Soviet Union. It was also sited at Yongbyon. The reactor was immediately placed under inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Soviets wanted to ensure that material was not diverted to weapons, even though at that time North Korea was not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Soviet Union maintained that its assistance to North Korea did not include weapons development but was limited to civilian activities.

North Korea, suffering from a growing power shortage in the 1980s, sought to acquire nuclear power plants. According to the agreement of the summit between Konstantin Chernenko and Kim Il Sung in May 1984 and subsequent Prime Ministers’ talks, Moscow agreed to supply four light-water nuclear power reactors (the same type as Chernobyl), but only if North Korea joined the NPT. Accordingly, North Korea joined the treaty on December 12, 1985.

Under the provisions of the NPT, North Korea was obliged to negotiate and sign a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, to accept international inspections and to refrain from acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons. During the negotiation process in 1987/88, however, the international situation had changed drastically; worsening relations with Moscow and the Soviet economic tailspin made the prospects for obtaining the Soviet-built reactors bleak. As a result, the hopes that North Korea would join the NPT and sign the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA evaporated.

Dawning International Pressure

After the Bush administration took office in January 1989, information and concern about the North Korean nuclear program began to spread rapidly. Most intelligence officials shared no doubt about the seriousness of the danger and reached the conclusion that North Korea might be able to produce atomic bombs by the mid-1990s. This news, of course, startled South Korea and its neighboring countries.

Even in this atmosphere of uneasiness, North Korea remained determined to resist the IAEA inspections, despite having signed the NPT in December 1985. The Bush Administration encouraged the agency to exercise pressure against Pyongyang to force them to live up to their obligations to sign a safeguards agreement. The IAEA, which is primarily responsible for policing nuclear activities around the world, took a hard line with North Korea. In the end, the agency was forced to tackle the North Korean issue as the first test case of its capabilities and attitudes.

Until 1991, The IAEA limited itself to checking civilian nuclear facilities and materials that NPT signatories reported in voluntary compliance with the agency. In the aftermath of the Operation Desert Storm, however, it was disclosed that Iraq, which was an NPT signatory, had carried on an intensive and sophisticated nuclear weapons program at secret sites adjacent to those being inspected by the agency. The impact on the IAEA was profound. In a withering criticism for ineffectiveness and timidity, the IAEA (under Director General Hans Blix, a former Swedish foreign minister) underwent an upheaval in personnel and a fundamental change in attitude, from complacency to alert!ness about suspicious nuclear activities. The IAEA also established additional rights to accept intelligence information from member states (including the US) and to demand access to suspicious facilities through mandatory “special inspections”. After the Iraqi revelations, North Korea was set to become the first test case of these new procedures.

In the face of international efforts to ensure the fulfillment of its obligations, Pyongyang stuck to its insistence that it would never agree while under the threat of US nuclear weapons in South Korea. In an effort to reassure the North, the United States (in close consultations with South Korea) withdrew all its nuclear warheads from the Korean peninsula. The removal of the last nuclear device from South Korea was officially pronounced by President Roh Tae Woo in December 1991.

The withdrawal brought about the consequences of ushering in a brief era of compromise and reconciliation between the two Koreas. Following the two Prime Minister’s talks in Seoul and Pyongyang, “The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation (The Basic Agreement)” was signed on December 13, 1991; “The Joint Declaration of the De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” (an agreement not to manufacture, produce, receive and use nuclear weapons and to permit reciprocal inspections of facilities of the other side) was agreed to on December 31, 1991. In compliance with this conciliatory atmosphere, the 1992 Team Spirit military exercise was cancelled in return for a North Korean concession to allow outside inspection of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon.

With the nod from South Korea to the bilateral US-North Korean meeting at the political level, the first high-level meeting between Arnold Kanter, the undersecretary of state for political affairs and Kim Yong Sun was held in New York on January 21, 1992. After hearing the hard-line stance of the US Government at this contentious meeting, North Korea hurriedly signed the safeguards agreement with the IAEA in Vienna on January 30.

Onset of Crisis

Over the course of the inspections, conflict grew between Pyongyang and the IAEA due to the exposure of discrepancies. As a result of six rounds of inspections conducted between May 1992 and January 1993, the IAEA identified critical inconsistencies between its findings and North Korea’s claims regarding the irradiation history of the reprocessed fuel and the details of the reprocessing campaign. In January 1993, the frustrated Director General of the IAEA began to speak explicitly for the first time of a “special inspection.” Except for the case of Iraq, the agency had never made such a demanding inspection before.

In the meantime, The U.S. was busy preparing November presidential balloting and polls were registering public disenchantment with President Bush’s preoccupation with foreign policy. Like the U.S., immobilized in external affairs, the preparation for South Korea’s presidential election in December 1992 also added to a worsening political climate between the South and the North, including red-baiting against the opposition candidate. Moreover, in the absence of meaningful improvement on inter-Korean relations including the agreed bilateral nuclear inspections, it was announced as a part of the presidential campaign in October 1992 that the Team Spirit Exercise would be resumed. Pyongyang reacted furiously.

The newly installed Governments of President Kim Young Sam in Seoul and President Bill Clinton in Washington could not change policy abruptly at the beginning. The Team Spirit Exercise already set in motion kicked off on March 9, 1993. North Korea found a good pretext to bolt and announced its withdrawal from the NPT on March 12, 1993. The unexpected turnabout sparked a small firestorm in Washington and Seoul. State Secretary Warren Christopher told the Defense Appropriation Subcommittee that he might favor an oil embargo on North Korea. Not to be out-muscled, subcommittee chairman John Murtha (D-PA) said “military action” might be necessary. When Defense Secretary Les Aspin made his first official visit to Seoul a few weeks later, however, Defense Minister Kwon Young Hae warned that even a “surgical strike” against the Yongbyon reactor would lead to a major escalation of hostilities on the peninsula. He strongly advocated the then-prevailing “stick and carrot” approach for moderating the hawkish view in Washington.

Negotiations quickly emerged as the consensus solution. An intense process of diplomatic efforts ensued in order to bring Pyongyang back to the NPT regime and ensure the continuity of the safeguards through resumption of inspections. The first meeting between deputy foreign minister Kang Sok Ju and Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Robert Gallucci was held at the US Mission to the U.N. between June 2～11, 1993, the very time when the withdrawal was to become effective, after the three-month waiting period. The first meeting brought about an important breakthrough. North Korea decided to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT as long as it considered necessary.

The second meeting, which was held in Geneva July 14 through 19, 1993, would be a turning point. Even though the meeting adjourned without progress in terms of special inspections of the two suspect nuclear waste sites, North Korea tabled an initiative that totally changed the nature of the talks. North Korea put forward a proposal to replace its gas-graphite reactors with light-water reactors (LWRs), if these reactors could be supplied by the international community. The two sides agreed to continue meeting, but a US statement specified that it would not begin the third meeting until serious discussions were underway on nuclear issues in North-South channels and between North Korea and the IAEA.

With little progress being made, Seoul and the IAEA became fretful, and toughened their stand. The IAEA Director General reported to the UN General Assembly on the Agency’s standoff with Pyongyang on November 1 and the General Assembly urged North Korea to cooperate immediately with the IAEA (with a resounding 140-to-1 vote, China abstaining and Pyongyang dissenting); Seoul, frustrated in making no headway in inter-Korean relations and depending on the U.S. in dealing with the North, thereby eventually came to insist to make the exchange of “special envoys” a prerequisite for the next round of U.S.-North Korea’s talks during the summit between Presidents Kim Young Sam and Bill Clinton in Washington on November 23, 1993. This demand meant a voice of partial displeasure of “the package deal” agreed between the U.S. and North Korea immediately before the summit meeting.

Escalation of Crisis

Since Defense Secretary Les Aspin (on his way home from Seoul in early November) haphazardly gave rise to alarming reports by mentioning to the press that war was on the verge of breaking out, and President Clinton fueled the fire by warning two days later that North Korea couldn’t be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb (thus implying that the United States would take military action to stop it), North Korea was at the top of the news in the U.S. By then, a US intelligence estimate concluded that North Korea already had one or two nuclear weapons and would never agree to give up its bomb program.

Following the remarks of General Gary Luck, the US military commander, about possible deployment of Patriot missiles as a way to thwart the North’s attacks with Rodong missiles, another announcement on the resumption of the 1994 Team Spirit Exercise was made, in response to Pyongyang’s continuing prohibition of nuclear inspections. This only hardened an already-tense situation. On January 31 North Korea threatened to break off the talks with the U.S., pull out of the NPT and accelerate its nuclear program. Continuously frustrated with several rounds of abortive negotiations, the IAEA finally set a February 21 deadline for the inspections. Sensing the impending danger coming from overseas, Ambassador Laney returned to Washington to warn of the risk of accidental war and reported Seoul’s concerns about Washington’s overheated rhetoric, which were much more exaggerated than the real nuclear threat from North Korea. He emphasized that Gen. Luck agreed on these points.

The North’s disapproval of taking sophisticated measurements of the sensitive sites, i.e., the plutonium reprocessing plant, caused the withdrawal of IAEA inspectors from North Korea on March 15 and the consequent vote of the IAEA board meeting to pass the dispute over to the UN Security Council on March 21. The next day the United States canceled high-level talks with the North and resumed preparations to seek UN sanctions.

The incident which turned everything downhill was the remark of a North Korean negotiator at the South-North working level meeting at Panmunjom on March 19. The meeting was aimed at discussing the deadlock on the exchange of special envoys for an inter-Korean summit meeting. After exchanging harsh words, North Korean negotiator Park Yong Su suddenly threatened his southern counterpart, Song Young Dae, by saying “Seoul is not far from here. if a war breaks out, it will be a sea of fire. Mr. Song, it will probably be difficult for you to survive.” After the “sea of fire” remark, the southern team broke off the meeting, and an emergency cabinet meeting of National Security Council was summoned in Seoul. Two days later the Patriot deployment was announced.

The U.S. and South Korea (together with their allies) pushed for UN Security Council sanctions against Pyongyang; North Korea fiercely responded that sanctions meant a declaration of war. The US military began consulting the South Korean army about rescheduling the Team Spirit Exercise and accelerating a military buildup in and around Korea at the end of April. The reinforcement of troops and the import! of additional military equipment (such as a battalion of Apache attack helicopters) were on the agenda.

Finger on the Trigger

The turning point that precipitated the tug of war was the defueling of the reactor at Yongbyon. Without international observation, the removal of spent fuel rods from the 5-megawatt reactor began on May 8, 1994, and set off alarms all over the world. When the defueling crisis worsened, President Clinton asked Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar to go to Pyongyang to see Kim Il Sung in late May 1994. However, Pyongyang turned down this hastily prepared visit at the last minute.

As tension continues to rise over the defueling of the reactor, Gen. Luck flew to Washington to attend an extraordinary military meeting to prepare for hostilities on May 18. Secretary of Defense Perry and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. John Shalikashvili summoned every active four-star general and admiral in the US military to this meeting to support Gen. Luck’s war plan with troops, material and logistics. The following day, Perry, Shalikashvili and Luck took the sobering results of the meeting to the President and informed him of the gravity and consequences of the conflict. If war broke out in Korea, they estimated it would cost 52,000 US military casualties (killed or wounded) and 490,000 South Korean military casualties in the first three months, plus an enormous number of North Korean and more than a million South Korean civilian lives, at the financial outlay exceeding $61 billion.

The report sent chills up the President’s spine and made him veer back toward diplomatic efforts. With a nod from North Korea, the working-level meeting was held in New York on May 23 to plan for the third round of high-level meetings. But before progress could be made, the IAEA sent a strong letter to the UN Security Council on June 2, which was an implicit call for international action. Since long, North Korea had translated it as a declaration of war. The announcement of North Korean withdrawal from the IAEA on June 13 further accelerated the diplomatic and military confrontation between Pyongyang and the international community. The majority of public opinion in the U.S. began to favor a surgical military strike to destroy the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon in case of North Korea’s continued refusal of international inspections. (51 percent in CBS and Time poll in June 1994).

Even in Seoul, Gen. Luck and Ambassador Laney came to a gloomy conclusion on the morning of June 16. Looking back upon the agreement, it was mainly based on the observations of what was going on in Washington rather than what was happening in Pyongyang. Both of them felt that there was no choice but to proceed with the evacuation planning on an urgent basis. Ambassador Laney told his daughter and three grandchildren, who were visiting at the time, that they should leave Seoul by Sunday, three days hence.

Carter’s Brokerage in Pyongyang

Preparing the Outfit

As the U.S. strategy turned to coercive diplomacy involving sanctions and possible military action, Carter called President Clinton to express his anxiety and concern about the worsening crisis with North Korea. It was about an hour before President Clinton departed for Europe to attend the Normandy Landing Ceremony (the 50th Anniversary of D-Day) and the White House arranged for Robert Gallucci to come to Plains, Carter’s hometown, on June 5 to brief him.

The briefing, as Carter recalled later, convinced him of the seriousness of the situation and the need for direct contact with Kim Il Sung. Possessing North Korean reassurances of the standing invitation from Kim Il Sung, Carter sent a letter to President Clinton on June 6, saying he intended to go to Pyongyang as a private citizen. With a positive signal from the White House through Al Gore, Carter hastened to prepare the visit. The Korean Consul General happened to hear a rumor at this very moment.

Then, why did the former President keep the secret from South Korea, even though he must eventually ask for cooperation prior to his visit to Pyongyang? Perhaps Carter felt it was unnecessary because: 1) the mission was only in the planning stage, even though he had already asked for reconfirmation of the standing invitation to a country like North Korea; 2) he was unaware of the diplomatic precedent and custom to inform the parties concerned first, especially an ally. (After all even Ambassador Laney, one of the supporters of his visit to North Korea and the very person in charge of preparations in Seoul was not informed in a timely manner. That still remains a puzzle.); or, 3) his concerns were maybe focused on the negative interference of South Korean Government, because of Seoul’s reaction to his previous policies. This last scenario appears to be probable because the Consul General’s inquiry surprised his office and, as he confessed, Seoul seemed somewhat troubled about his visit.

Even without knowing the itinerary not only in Pyongyang but also in Seoul, mere obscure expectations drove him and his entourage to hastily leave Plains for Seoul two days later. Assistant Secretary Gallucci’s briefing on the technical issues of the NPT, Korean Ambassador Han Sung Soo’s explanation of the situation over dinner, and Lake’s reaffirmation of his status of no authority to speak for the U.S. on June 10 were all that he heard before the departure. He should most probably have been self-assured that he would be more welcome in Pyongyang than in Seoul, because he was the very president who initiated the withdrawal of US troops and who could save the face of North Korea if it were to step back and reestablish a dialogue with the U.S. He should also have been confident that South Korean leaders would comply with his initiative at last, regardless of the timing, because of the advantages to be gained. Political context was again conspicuous, keeping in mind his previous successful deal-brokering in other countries.

As expected, Seoul was receptive. In addition to the talks with President Kim Young Sam over dinner, briefings by Foreign Minister Han Sung Joo and Unification Minister Lee Hong Koo greatly inspired Carter. Even though he agreed on Gen. Luck’s concern of the consequences of a war in terms of the costs, Clinton’s message to President Kim reminded everyone again of his gate-crasher’s status.

Tensions Come Down a Notch

As Carter was proceeding to Pyongyang, a series of new developments (including North Korean withdrawal from the IAEA) were irritating the public, and seen as typical tactics of foot-dragging and reversal. Under these circumstances, the U.S. and South Korea drew up a sanctions program. As prepared for the Security Council, the sanctions solution would have given North Korea a thirty-day grace period to change its policies, after which such relatively lightweight measures as a ban on arms sales and transfer of nuclear technology to Pyongyang would take effect. This would be followed, if necessary, by a second group of more painful sanctions, including a freeze of North Korean assets abroad, a ban on remittances from abroad (such as those from Chochongyun, the pro-North Korean group in Japan), and a cutoff of the vital oil supplies furnished by China and others. A potential third stage, if others failed, was a blockade of shipping to and from North Korean ports.

Among other major powers directly involved--Japan, Russia, and China--there was lukewarm enthusiasm for even the mildest set of sanctions. Japan, due to possible domestic disturbances, had discreetly argued for moving cautiously toward any tough sanctions, while Russia continuously reminded others of its proposal for an international conference on the two Koreas, in order to resolve the nuclear issue. China consistently opposed sanctions against North Korea on the one hand, saying that the negotiations should provide the only solution, but on the other hand strongly urged Pyongyang to take action to accommodate international opinion in its own interest.

With these bizarre and disturbing impressions, President Carter crossed the DMZ on June 15, as the first person ever permitted into North Korea by this route. “Seoul would help the North restore its sagging economy and establish diplomatic ties with Washington if Pyongyang accepts international demands to guarantee its nuclear transparency.” President Kim also made it clear at the previous meeting that South Korea has no intention to achieve unification by absorbing the North, contrary to the fears of the Communist regime. In opposition to this gesture, however, the White House was supposed to convene a council of war on June 16, Washington time, to authorize the reinforcements for Korea in anticipation of sanctions.

Meanwhile, in his first meeting with the ceremonial host, Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam who was terribly uncompromising and negative, Carter was so distressed that he woke up at 3 a.m. to dispatch his aide, Ambassador Marion Creekmore back to Panmunjom with a message to be sent through secure phone line to Washington, seeking authorization from President Clinton for a third round of high-level talks to defuse the crisis. Carter believed it to be likely that North Korea would go to war by ousting IAEA inspectors and would not allow them back in until a deal could be worked out at a third high-level meeting. But he asked Creekmore to refrain from sending the message until the meeting with Kim Il Sung later that morning.

The meeting took place at the presidential palace next morning on June 16, 1994. From Kim Il Sung’s point of view: 1) the meeting with the former President of the U.S. at his palace was the culminating moment of his long and desperate efforts to establish a direct contact with an American core group, 2) he had eagerly sought this kind of meeting to create a turning point in the escalating crisis in a face-saving manner; 3) it had also a symbolic meaning of accepting the courtship of Jimmy Carter, who wanted to remove US troops from the South; and, 4) Carter had become a missionary of peace after leaving the White House, and had come here to oppose the imposition of sanctions that would be, otherwise, very costly for him to break.

Carter described his unofficial role, the contents of talking points and his talks with President Kim Young Sam and then made the presentation that he had prepared before leaving Washington. He pointed out that the high-level talks could make progress if the nuclear issues would be resolved. Looking sanguine and straightforward, Kim Il Sung accepted his proposals with two requests. One was that the U.S. support the North’s acquisition of light-water reactor technology. He told Carter that he had previously been promised a 2,000-megawatt reactor by Soviet President Brezhnev in the late 1970s, but the Soviets later defaulted after Chernenko became leader. He realized that the funding and equipment could not come directly from the U.S. He declared that if the U.S. could help supply light-water reactors, North Korea would dismantle its gas-graphite reactors and return to the NPT. His second request, as part of a solution, was that the U.S. guarantees that there would be no nuclear attack against North Korea. Kim Il Sung was willing to freeze their nuclear program during the talks, and to consider a permanent freeze if their aged reactors could be replaced with modern and safer ones.

Assuring Kim Il Sung that there are no nuclear weapons in South Korea or tactical weapons in the waters surrounding the peninsula, it was agreed that the entire Korean peninsula should be nuclear-free. Cater explained his understanding that the U.S. also desired to see North Korea acquire light water reactors and further asked that the two remaining IAEA inspectors at Yongbyon, who were scheduled to be expelled from the country on the next flight to Beijing, be allowed to remain. Apparently unfamiliar with the issue, Kim consulted with Kang Sok Ju, one of the advisers present, who announced that North Korea would reverse the previous decision and leave the inspectors in place.

Carter felt that he had gotten everything he needed. He had Christensen call Creekmore to tell him to return to Pyongyang without sending any message to Washington. To pin down the freeze and other details, Carter met Kang Sok Ju in the afternoon and found him again very sensitive to the sanctions, like his immediate superior Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam.

After dinner, Carter called Bob Gallucci, who was attending the council of war at the White House, to report the agreement. On the morning of June 16, 1994, Washington time, President Clinton, Vice President Gore, State Secretary Christopher, Defense Secretary Perry, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Shalikashvili, CIA Director James Woolsey, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and other senior foreign policy and defense officials were gathered in a climatic decision-making meeting about the Korean nuclear issue. They were in the middle of a discussion about the military buildup in and around Korea, including the dispatch of war-planes, another aircraft-carrier battle group and more than 10,000 additional troops. The drive for sanctions was already approved to proceed by the President. The call interrupted the meeting and Gallucci was designated to answer the call.

Fifteen minutes later Gallucci returned and stunned the gathering with the news that Kim Il Sung had agreed to freeze the nuclear arms program under IAEA monitoring and resume high-level talks on a comprehensive settlement of the nuclear issue. Carter, Gallucci concluded, was about to go on CNN live to announce the deal. The room erupted in exasperation.

CNN had established a clandestine connection with Kim Yong Sun and, under his tacit approval, had enjoyed sole access to the closed society of North Korea. Eason Jordan, the news gathering president and Mike Chinoy, its Beijing correspondent, who had been permitted to report Kim Il Sung’s eighty-second birthday celebration in April, were again allowed to return to Pyongyang to cover the visit. Apparently, the network’s broadcasting guideline to report any event strictly based on the facts (without criticism) had drawn the attention of not only Pyongyang’s leadership but also leaders of other countries, including Iraq. The guideline was the reason that CNN had attracted a world audience during the Gulf War. In any case, Carter’s interview stunned not only the White House but also the whole world.

In connection with the additional requests originally put forward by Lake for 1) not placing new fuel rods in the 5-megawatt reactor and, 2) not reprocessing the irradiated fuel rods that had been removed, North Korea quickly accepted the next morning, perhaps because of its own urgent desire to end the dangerous confrontation. To make certain of agreement on the details, Gallucci subsequently sent the conditions in writing to Kang through the North Korean Mission in New York and Carter sent a parallel letter to Kim Il Sung.

On Friday, June 17, 1994, Kim Il Sung invited them to a long boat ride on the Taedong River. During the trip, both of them had a long discussion about future relations between the Koreas. Carter brought up a South-North summit meeting that President Kim Young Sam had asked him to propose. Kim Il Sung described, responsively, several South-North discussions that had been held, but expressed his frustration that no results had ever materialized. He further stated that fault for lack of progress lay on both sides, and responsibility for mistakes had to be shared. After expressing pleasure that President Kim Young Sam had proposed a summit meeting during his political campaign as well, he went on to say that the summit should be held without preconditions or extended preparatory talks and asked him to convey the message.

Taking advantage of the leisurely cruise, Carter proposed that joint US-North Korean teams discover and return the remains of US soldiers buried during the war. Kim Il Sung first listened to the comments of his wife, Kim Sung Ae, who had been rarely seen with her husband in public and joined them only due to the presence of Mrs. Rosalynn Carter. He later agreed to permit joint teams to find and return these bodies to the U.S. Kim Il Sung also recounted his willingness to work on other issues, such as follow-up measures to the Basic Agreement, the reciprocal military site inspections to implement the Joint S/N Declaration of De-nuclearization of the peninsula, a step by step reduction of Korean armed forces to 100,000 men on each side (with US forces to be reduced in the same proportions), weapons removal from within the DMZ and a joint pull-back of the military away from the DMZ, the permission of cross border visitation, etc. Kim Il Sung said that no progress had been made for 40 years and asked if the Carter Center would be willing to provide good services to bridge the existing gaps and to help insure the success of South-North talks in the future. Carter promised to mention all these things to President Kim Young Sam on his return to Seoul.

Turnaround in the Crisis

The next morning (Saturday, June 18), Carter left North Korea via Panmunjom where Ambassador Laney greeted him, and the two proceeded to the Blue House. President Kim Young Sam was very excited when Carter delivered Kim Il Sung’s surprising acceptance of a summit meeting. Over lunch, they talked at length about Kim Il Sung’s reaction to a proposed inter-Korean summit. Kim Il Sung was ready to meet anywhere, at any time and without any preconditions and President Kim Young Sam also responded in a manner of “the sooner, the better.” Within a couple of days (actually on Monday, June 20), the South proposed a preliminary contact to arrange the summit meeting at Panmunjom on June 28 between delegations headed by persons at the level of Deputy Prime Minister, and received an affirmative response from the North two days later. The entirely unexpected agreement to hold a summit represented a great turnaround in the crisis and gave way to bright hopes of reconciliation and peace.

After the meeting at the Blue House, Carter held a press conference at the Ambassador’s residence. He again explained the contents of the talks and voiced strong opposition to the drive of imposing sanctions on North Korea, expressing doubts about their effectiveness. Making it plain that he was speaking as a private citizen representing the Carter Center, he also indicated his intention to suggest the establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Pyongyang.

Until returning to Panmunjon a few hours earlier, Carter was confident that all his actions had been in accord with the policies of the administration. However, he was very surprised to discover that his actions in Pyongyang had been met by criticism and partial rejection in Washington and in Seoul. The Clinton Administration appeared to be reluctant to take yes for an immediate answer. Carter returned to Washington via Atlanta with Marion Creekmore, and debriefed the results of his trip to Anthony Lake, Winston Lord and Robert Gallucci at the White House, and reported over the telephone to President Clinton at Camp David. In an interview with CNN after the briefing, he announced that the crisis was over.

Consequently the sanctions drive and reinforcement plans were stopped. The written confirmation from Pyongyang to Gallucci’s inquiry concerning the acceptance of the freeze of the nuclear program accelerated, with relief, the announcement of proceeding to the third round of high-level talks between the U.S. and North Korea on July 8 in Geneva. Carter succeeded again in his role of bringing the parties from the point of showdown back to the negotiating table.

The Korean Consul General in Atlanta was instructed to meet with Ambassador Marion Creekmore at the Carter Center on Monday, June 20, and explain the preliminary contact proposal already sent to Pyongyang a couple of hours earlier in Seoul. A letter from President Kim Young Sam to former President Carter in this regard was also delivered.

Conclusion

Commentators in the vernacular newspapers in Seoul were exhilarated by Carter’s deal, and the diffusion of a dangerous situation. The tensions heightened by the nuclear issues dissolved rapidly thanks to his unorthodox initiative. It would be, therefore, desirable to think of a few lessons taken from the experience. They might be summarized as: a) To help North Korea open and change; b) To support Track II diplomacy; c) To enhance vigilance on all fronts. It would be useful to examine these lessons at some length.

a) To help North Korea open and change is a policy-oriented matter. The current Administration has undoubtedly achieved successful inter-Korean relations. However, these efforts have always been challenged, not only internally but also externally. Since the election of President Bush, there have been continuously hawkish remarks and statements by his aides, assistants and friends, reflecting a hard-line stance against North Korea. They tended to assert that the relations with North Korea should be strictly based on reciprocity and verification. Their voices mirrored the deep-rooted skepticism of the new Administration due to the previous duplicity and diplomatic cunning that typified North Korean behavior and have deepened suspicions and distrust on the part of conservative forces in the U.S.

Even though inter-Korean relations have been tremendously improved since the historic summit meeting between President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong Il last June, the reputation and image of the North Korean leader have not yet sufficiently mended to the levels of international expectations. The memories of brinkmanship and other controversial accidents are still vivid.

It is in this context that the engagement policy of the Government should be further intensified in order to help North Korea open and change on the one hand, and enhance the understanding of the US conservative forces about the real purpose and value of the policy on the other hand. The policy of openness and reform would be the only way to overcome the challenges North Korea faces at this time, dissolve the Cold war structure in the Korean Peninsula and eventually ensure its survival through coexistence and co-prosperity.

b) Supporting Track II diplomacy would be another good lesson to take note of. In advanced countries, it is a general practice to expect close cooperation between the governmental and non-governmental sectors. Diplomacy should not be the exclusive domain of the government alone. It should be supported by people-to-people diplomacy undertaken by individuals and private organizations. In case of Carter’s intervention, he splendidly demonstrated the skill and knowledge of resolving the crisis, even without an endorsement of the foreign policy establishment. He emphasized his status of private citizen time and again, and put his previous Presidency aside as such, it was truly an inspiring victory of Track II diplomacy. In this regard, the role of the private sector should be reeval‎‍!uated, and thereby respected and accommodated in a more receptive manner by the government.

Track II diplomacy could sometimes be decisive in averting a confrontation and collapse of talks. It could also show how a relatively small amount of money could have a disproportionately large impact on policy.

c) To enhance our vigilance on all fronts would be another factor we should always keep in mind. In the post-Cold War era, we have witnessed here that the fate of the country could be under negotiation between the third parties without our participation, and a situation could develop contrary to our expectations. This would be more probable in case of the inter-Korean rivalry, because of the brinkmanship diplomacy of North Korea. In this context, official consultations and cooperation together with the multidimensional contacts with the Bush Administration would be very desirable. 끝.

<권영민/순천향 대학 초빙교수/전 주 애틀랜타 총영사, 주 노르웨이 대사, 주 덴마크 대사, 주 독일 대사, 제주 평화연구원장 대리 역임/저서: 베를린 맑은 하늘에 그림을 그리자, 자네 출세했네, 권대사, 자네 큰 실수 했군/서울대 독문과 卒/아산 産>

[예쁜 별]

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[금순]

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[권영민]

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