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Viewing cable 10SEOUL272, VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
10SEOUL272	2010-02-22 09:09	2010-11-30 16:04	SECRET	Embassy Seoul

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0272/01 0530932
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 220932Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7125
INFO RUCNKOR/KOREA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7305
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 7377

S E C R E T SEOUL 000272 

SIPDIS 

EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2034 
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KNNP, ECON, SOCI, KS, KN, JA, CH 
SUBJECT: VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS 

Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
------- 

쨋1. (S) Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo told the Ambassador February 17th that China would not be able to stop North Korea��셲 collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically and would collapse politically two to three years after the death of Kim Jong-il. Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North��셲 economy. Beijing had ��쐍o will��� to use its modest economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang��셲 policies -- and the DPRK characterized as ��쐔he most incompetent official in China��� -- had retained his position as chief of the PRC��셲 6PT delegation. Describing a generational difference in Chinese attitudes toward North Korea, Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX  believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. Chun acknowledged the Ambassador��셲 point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula. End summary.
VFM Chun on Sino-North Korean Relations...
------------------------------------------ 

쨋2. (S) During a February 17 lunch hosted by Ambassador Stephens that covered other topics (septel), ROK Vice Foreign Minister and former ROK Six-Party Talks (6PT) Head of Delegation Chun Yung-woo predicted that China would not be able to stop North Korea��셲 collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically; following the death of KJI, North Korea would collapse politically in ��쐔wo to three years.��� Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North��셲 economy; there was ��쐍o substance��� to the reports, he said. The VFM also ridiculed the Chinese foreign ministry��셲 ��쐀riefing��� to the ROK embassy in Beijing on Wang Jiarui��셲 visit to North Korea; the unidentified briefer had  ��쐀asically read a Xinhua press release,��� Chun groused, adding that the PRC interlocutor had been unwilling to answer simple questions like whether Wang had flown to Hamhung or taken a train there to meet KJI.

쨋3. (S) The VFM commented that China had far less influence on North Korea ��쐔han most people believe.��� Beijing had ��쐍o will��� to use its economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang��셲 policies and the DPRK leadership ��쐊nows it.��� Chun acknowledged that the Chinese genuinely wanted a denuclearized North Korea, but the PRC was also content with the status quo. Unless China pushed North Korea to the ��쐀rink of collapse,��� the DPRK would likely continue to refuse to take meaningful steps on denuclearization.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
----------------------------------------- 

쨋4. (S) Turning to the Six Party Talks, Chun said it was ��쏿 very bad thing��� that Wu Dawei had retained his position as chief of the PRC��셲 delegation. XXXXXXXXXXXX said it appeared that the DPRK ��쐌ust have lobbied extremely hard��� for the now-retired Wu to stay on as China��셲 6PT chief. [NAME REMOVED] complained that Wu is the PRC��셲 XXXXXXXXXXXX an arrogant, Marx-spouting former Red Guard who ��쐊nows nothing about North Korea, nothing about nonproliferation and is hard to communicate with because he doesn��셳 speak English.��� Wu was also a hardline nationalist, loudly proclaiming -- to anyone willing to listen -- that the PRC��셲 economic rise represented a ��쐒eturn to normalcy��� with China as a great world power.
...China��셲 ��쏯ew Generation��� of Korea-Hands...
--------------------------------------------- 

쨋5. (S) Sophisticated Chinese officials XXXXXXXXXXXX stood in sharp contrast to Wu, according to VFM Chun.XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control.XXXXXXXXXXXX, Chun said, were ready to ��쐄ace the new reality��� that the DPRK now had little value to China as a buffer state -- a view that since North Korea��셲 2006 nuclear test had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC leaders.
...PRC Actions In A DPRK Collapse Scenario...
--------------------------------------------- 

쨋6. (S) Chun argued that, in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly ��쐍ot welcome��� any U.S. military presence north of the DMZ. XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun XXXXXXXXXXXX  said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the United States in a ��쐀enign alliance��� -- as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labor-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help salve PRC concerns about living with a reunified Korea. Chundismissed the prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event of a DPRK collapse, noting that China��셲 strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, Japan, and South Korea -- not North Korea. Moreover, Chun  argued, bare-knuckle PRC military intervention in a DPRK internal crisis could ��쐓trengthen the centrifugal forces in China��셲 minority areas.���
...and Japan
------------ 

쨋7. (S) Chun acknowledged the Ambassador��셲 point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul��셲 control. Chun  asserted that, even though ��쏪apan��셲 preference��� was to keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in the event the DPRK collapses. STEPHENS

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