중국에 접근하는 방글라데시

[위종민]

작년 7월 정부 붕괴 이후로 방글라데시를 이끌고 있는 무함마드 유누스 임시정부 수반이, 인도를 첫 순방하던 관례를 깨고 올 3월 중국을 처음으로 방문했네요. 방글라데시 제2의 항구인 몽글라항 현대화와 티스타강 치수계획에서 협력을 확대하기로 했다고 합니다. 티스타강은 인도와 방글라데시간의 물 배분 문제가 있었던 곳이라고 하고, 이전 정부에선 이 계획을 인도에 맡기기로 했었다고 하네요. 

방글라데시, 인도-중국 간 줄타기 끝냈나…그러나 신중한 행보는 여전히 필요하다

By Wahiduzzaman Noor & Samantha Wong | Atlantic Council, 2025년 5월 22일

올해 3월, 방글라데시 임시정부의 수반인 무함마드 유누스(Muhammad Yunus)가 베이징에 도착해 붉은 융단을 밟는 순간, 그는 단순히 외교 관례를 깬 것만은 아니었다. 그는 남아시아의 외교 지형에 불을 붙였다.

그동안 방글라데시 지도자들은 첫 양자 방문지로 인도를 선택해왔지만, 유누스는 중국을 택했다. 그는 베이징대학으로부터 명예박사 학위를 받았고, 주다카 중국대사는 이번 방문을 “지난 50년간 방글라데시 지도자의 가장 중요한 방문”이라 평가했다. 유누스 자신도 “방중 관계가 새로운 국면에 접어들었다”고 선언했다. 상징은 분명했다. 다카는 수십 년간 유지해온 인도-중국 간 균형외교를 내려놓고, 중국과 보다 적극적인 협력에 나선 것이다.

중국의 이득과 인도의 손실

방문 기간 동안 방글라데시는 21억 달러 규모의 투자·대출·지원금을 확보했다. 그러나 중국이 얻은 진짜 승리는 전략적이었다.

몽글라항(제2의 항구) 현대화 계약 (4억 달러 규모) 티스타강 종합관리사업에서의 협력 확대

특히 티스타강은 지역 갈등의 핵심이다. 10여 년간 방글라데시와 인도는 이 강의 물 배분 문제로 협상을 이어왔으나 교착 상태였다. 이 강의 수원은 **인도의 "치킨넥(Chicken’s Neck)"**이라 불리는 좁은 지협 인근에 위치하며, 이는 인도 본토와 동북부 7개 주(일명 “세븐 시스터즈”)를 연결하는 전략 요충지다. 중국의 군사적 영향력이 이 지역에 확대되는 것은 인도 안보에 치명적인 위협이 된다.

작년까지만 해도 전 총리 셰이크 하시나는 티스타 프로젝트를 인도에 맡기겠다는 뜻을 비쳤지만, 유누스는 중국의 참여를 승인했다. 이는 중국의 외교적 승리이자 인도에 대한 도전이었다.

더불어 중국의 라울모니하트 지역 공항 건설 제안이 보도되면서 인도는 인근 군사력을 강화했고, 방글라데시는 대만 독립 반대 입장을 공식화했으며, 몽글라항 확장에 중국 투자를 허용했다. 유누스는 방글라데시를 “중국 경제의 확장” 혹은 “세븐 시스터즈를 위한 유일한 해양 관문”으로 묘사하며, 사실상 인도의 주요 전략지대를 ‘내륙국’이라 칭했다. 이는 뉴델리의 심기를 자극했다.

하시나 정권은 중국과의 협력을 확대하면서도 인도와의 동맹관계를 유지해왔다. 하지만 2024년 7월의 학생 시위로 하야한 이후, 인도-방글라 관계는 급속히 악화되었다.

국경 분쟁 재점화 유누스의 발언: 인도의 불안정한 동북부로 “파장이 번질 수 있다” 양국 간 소수자 문제 및 홍수 피해 책임 공방 하시나의 인도 망명 및 방글라데시의 송환 요구 → 인도의 거절

4월에야 유누스와 인도 총리 모디가 첫 회담을 가졌으나, 이는 상호 불만의 나열에 가까웠고, 실질적 진전은 없었다.



신중함이 필요한 네 가지 이유

1. 중국의 투자 약속은 아직 현실과 차이

2014년 이후, 중국은 400억 달러를 공약했으나 실제로 집행된 금액은 70억 달러 남짓. 파드마 대교나 파이라 발전소 같은 주요 프로젝트는 비용 초과·지연 문제가 있었고, 3% 이자율의 중국 대출은 타국보다 높은 편이다. 유누스 정부는 무분별한 의존을 피해야 한다.

2. 인도와의 지정학적 공존은 불가피

방글라데시는 거의 인도에 둘러싸여 있으며, 양국은 상호 의존적이다. 특히 티스타처럼 전략적 이해관계가 겹치는 사업에서의 갈등은 심각한 안보·경제적 여파를 초래할 수 있다. 단기 감정이 아닌 전략적 계산이 외교의 기준이 되어야 한다.

3. 미국은 '제3의 이웃'

미국은 방글라데시 최대 수출시장이며, 중국 견제와 민주주의 후퇴 문제로 압박을 가하고 있다.

하시나 시절: 인도와의 협력을 통해 미국의 비판을 완화 유누스 정부: 그 완충장치 없음 → 미중 사이에서의 줄타기 어려움

최근 미국은 방글라데시 수입품에 37% 관세를 부과했다가 일시적으로 10%로 완화했지만, 향후 미국의 정책 변화는 방글라데시에 경제적 타격을 줄 수 있다.

4. 외교 대전환은 임시정부가 감당할 범위일까?

현재 방글라데시는 의회가 해산된 상태에서 임시정부가 운영 중이다. 이런 상황에서 국가 외교노선 대전환은 국내 갈등, 정책 불안정, 외교 마찰을 유발할 수 있다.

국민의 민주적 위임, 의회의 비준, 정책 일관성 없이 향후 정권에서 뒤집힐 수 있는 선택은 위험하다. 안정과 개혁, 어느 것이 임시정부의 우선순위인가?



요약: 전략적 기회인가, 조심해야 할 덫인가?

방글라데시는 이제 더 이상 ‘작은 국가’가 아니다.

1억 7천만 인구, 남아시아 주요 경제권, 지정학적 요충지

이런 배경 속에서 외교적 자율성을 확대할 기회가 생겼지만, 중국으로의 급격한 경도는 신중히 고려되어야 할 문제다.

방글라데시는 중국과의 기회를 쫓되, 인도의 분노와 고립을 자초하지 않도록 민감한 균형과 절제된 조정 능력이 필요하다.

향후 방글라데시가 **지정학적 '다리'**가 될지, 아니면 강대국 간 충돌의 무대가 될지는, 지금의 선택에 달려 있다.



📌 핵심 요약

●방글라데시 임시정부 유누스, 중국과 밀착 → 인도와 긴장 고조
● 몽글라항·티스타강 프로젝트 등에서 중국 참여 확대
● 미국·인도와의 관계 악화 우려, 무분별한 경도는 위험
● 임시정부의 외교 노선 전환, 민주적 정당성 부족 우려
● 신중한 외교 설계가 향후 국가의 안보·경제·외교적 위치를 좌우

몽글라 항(적색)과 티스타 강(청색)의 위치

Bangladesh may have ended its India-China tightrope game, but it must continue to tread carefully - Atlantic Council

Bangladesh may have ended its India-China tightrope game, but it must continue to tread carefully

Bangladesh may have ended its India-China tightrope game, but it must continue to tread carefully

By Wahiduzzaman Noor and Samantha Wong

When Muhammad Yunus, chief adviser of the Bangladeshi interim government, stepped off his plane and onto a red carpet in Beijing in March, he did not just break tradition: He lit a fuse in South Asia.

Typically, new Bangladeshi leaders head to India for their first bilateral visit abroad, but Yunus instead traveled to China. Peking University bestowed him with an honorary doctorate. China’s ambassador in Dhaka hailed the trip as the “most important visit” by any Bangladeshi leader in the last half a century. Yunus himself declared that the Bangladesh-China relationship has entered “a new stage.” The symbolism was unmistakable: Dhaka is abandoning its decades-long balancing act between India and China for a more assertive embrace of Beijing.

Bangladesh, with which India shares its longest international border, is critical to India’s security. For China, Bangladesh is a vital partner in its Belt and Road Initiative and String of Pearls ambitions, offering a strategic foothold in India’s backyard. Welcoming Chinese influence may put wind in Bangladesh’s economic sails, but it comes with the risk of transforming the nation into a battleground for the Sino-Indian rivalry. Bangladesh, in its hasty geopolitical gambit, may have just traded a delicate tightrope for treacherous quicksand.

China’s gains and India’s losses

China didn’t hold back during Yunus’s visit. Bangladesh secured $2.1 billion in investments, loans, and grants. The real wins for Beijing, however, were strategic: a $400 million modernization deal for Mongla Port—Bangladesh’s second-largest seaport—and increased engagement with the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project.

The Teesta project, in particular, strikes at the heart of regional tensions. For over a decade, negotiations between India and Bangladesh over sharing the river’s water have stalled, with Bangladesh wanting a larger share to address water scarcity in the north. The Teesta Barrage, built to direct the flow of the Teesta River, sits perilously close to India’s “Chicken’s Neck”—the narrow corridor linking India’s mainland to its turbulent northeastern states, known as the Seven Sisters. This narrow corridor lies just a few hundred miles south of an area where China’s military presence is growing, positioning the strip as a strategic chokepoint. India perceives Chinese military presence in the region as an existential threat, as Chinese boots on the ground could quickly divide India in two.

For years, China has expressed its interest in the Teesta River management project due to the river’s strategic significance. Just last year, then Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina indicated that she would cede the project to India, given both nations’ shared stake in the river’s water, or perhaps a calculated measure aimed at soothing New Delhi’s security concerns regarding Chinese influence in the region. Yunus’s decision to greenlight China’s involvement constitutes a major shift, representing a diplomatic coup for China and a direct challenge to India.

Compounding this tension, some media outlets reported a possible Chinese proposal to construct an airfield in Bangladesh’s Lalmonirhat district, which is also near India’s “Chicken’s Neck” region. Soon afterward, media outlets also reported that India has bolstered its military presence in the area.

Bangladeshi diplomatic moves toward China didn’t stop there. For the first time, Dhaka explicitly opposed Taiwan’s independence. And the two countries brokered a deal to invite Chinese investment to modernize and expand facilities at the Mongla Port, which hands China another strategic foothold in the Bay of Bengal.

Yunus appears to see China as a springboard to elevate Bangladesh’s global stature. He even mused that Bangladesh could serve as “an extension of the Chinese economy” and the sole oceanic gateway for India’s Seven Sisters states, calling the states “landlocked”—a remark that surely rattled New Delhi.

This pivot toward China marks a stark departure from Hasina’s cautious ambiguity in balancing China and India during her fifteen-year tenure. Over the last decade of Hasina’s administration, China has become Bangladesh’s largest trading partner, top supplier of military hardware (including two submarines and support for a naval dock), and leading development partner under the Belt and Road Initiative. Yet, Hasina ensured that economic cooperation with China never undermined Dhaka’s relationship with New Delhi—especially given that her political party, the Awami League, has long been India’s ally.

Since Hasina’s dramatic exit amid the July 2024 uprising, India-Bangladesh relations have plummeted to their lowest ebb. Tensions along the border have flared. Just before taking power, Yunus issued a warning that any Indian attempt to destabilize Bangladesh could spill over to India’s volatile Seven Sisters states—a statement many Indian analysts interpreted as a veiled threat. Last year, Dhaka accused India of opening water gates to flood Bangladesh. India, in turn, raised alarms over attacks on minorities in Bangladesh—claims Dhaka dismissed as grossly exaggerated. In addition, the spread of disinformation among Indian media has added to these tensions.

On top of that, Hasina, now exiled in India, remains a festering sore in bilateral ties. Bangladesh has demanded her extradition to face charges related to mass killings and forced disappearances during student-led uprisings in July and August 2024, but India has so far refused. The Indian Army chief has publicly stated that normalized relations between the two nations hinge on Bangladesh installing an elected government—a pointed jab at Yunus’s unelected interim regime.

Eight months into his tenure, Yunus finally secured face time with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in April after New Delhi rebuffed Dhaka’s earlier overtures before the pivotal Chinese visit in March. Yunus brought up long-standing issues such as border killings and Hasina’s extradition, while Modi reiterated concerns about minority oppression in Bangladesh and cautioned against provocative rhetoric—likely referencing Yunus’s recent comments about India’s Seven Sisters region. Although a necessary first step toward repairing relations, the talks more closely resembled a recitation of grievances than an attempt at reconciliation. The ice finally cracked—but hardly melted.

Why Bangladesh must move with caution

Bangladesh has outgrown its days as a small power. As one of South Asia’s largest economies—and with a strategic position at the Bay of Bengal and a population of 170 million—Bangladesh now wields considerable political clout. With that clout, Bangladesh can more easily chart an independent foreign policy.

As the global order continues to evolve, great powers are realigning, and nations across Asia (including Bangladesh) are recalibrating their relationships to match new realities and national interests. Yet, this moment of opportunity demands caution. A headlong rush toward China risks Bangladesh’s future for four critical reasons.

First, China’s allure comes with caveats. Though Bangladesh has benefited from Chinese investment, there are still risks. Since 2014, China has pledged forty billion dollars to Bangladesh through its Belt and Road Initiative, yet only $7.07 billion has materialized. Although now operational, ventures such as the Padma Bridge and Payra Power Plant faced delays and cost overruns during construction. Furthermore, Chinese loans come with a 3 percent interest rate, higher than the rates offered by other lenders, though Beijing is now considering lowering the rate. Yunus’s government must continue to pursue careful loans and avoid the common risks associated with an overreliance on Chinese investments to secure Bangladesh’s economic future.

Second, India, a geopolitical heavyweight next door, cannot be ignored. Bangladesh sits nearly encircled by India, leaving both countries mutually dependent. Any friction with India over strategic projects like Teesta would trigger cascading security and economic consequences. Bangladesh’s ties with China must be fostered with careful geopolitical calculation, not as an impulsive reaction to the friction with India that has appeared since Hasina’s ouster. Strategic clarity, not emotion, should guide Dhaka’s choices.

Third, the United States looms as Bangladesh’s “third neighbor,” meaning that Dhaka’s shift toward China may have consequences beyond South Asia. As Bangladesh’s largest export market, the United States wields outsized influence over Dhaka’s policy. In Hasina’s final years, Washington ramped up pressure over Bangladesh’s closeness to China and democratic backsliding. Hasina was able to juggle US demands and maintain bilateral ties with the United States by leveraging her connections with India. Indian officials were concerned about the opposition in Bangladesh gaining power and lobbied their US counterparts to temper their criticism of Hasina’s administration. Yunus’s interim government lacks that buffer. The interim government is courting the United States—seeking energy deals, rolling out Starlink, and implementing changes to secure lower tariffs on US goods—hoping that the Trump administration will prioritize trade over geopolitical considerations and will see Bangladesh on its own terms, not as India’s junior partner. Yet the United States announced a 37 percent tariff on all imports from Bangladesh—though that has been temporarily reduced to 10 percent, alongside most of the world—which would be a significant economic hit. Amid the US-China trade war, Dhaka should at least aim to understand Washington’s evolving red lines before doubling down on closer ties to Beijing.

Lastly, a major foreign policy shift by the interim government, currently operating with a dissolved parliament, may trigger domestic unrest, policy inconsistency, and diplomatic friction. The interim government’s stated priority is to guide Bangladesh toward reform and elections. But the interim team may not have the democratic legitimacy that is needed to make a sweeping foreign policy change. Yunus’s pivot to China could commit Bangladesh to a course that the public may not support and the next elected government might not honor. Decisions of this magnitude—potentially redrawing Dhaka’s regional and global stance—would ideally require parliamentary backing, a democratic mandate, and political weight to handle the consequences. An interim regime, by its very nature, may be better suited to prioritize stability over implementing revolutionary shifts.

Bangladesh can continue to chase opportunistic gains with China, risking Indian ire and isolation (without a clear signal from its people that it has a mandate to do so), or it can recalibrate with restraint, preserving the equilibrium that has long underpinned its rise. Regardless of what choice it makes, Bangladesh must tread with caution. The paths it chooses will ripple across South Asia, determining whether Bangladesh emerges as a bridge between giants or a battleground where they clash. For a nation outgrowing its small-power past, the stakes have never been higher.

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Wahiduzzaman Noor is a Bangladeshi national security professional and former diplomat at the Embassy of Bangladesh in Washington, DC, with expertise in South Asian affairs, Indo-Pacific Security, and counterterrorism.

Samantha Wong is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Her work centers on the technology and security portfolio, where she researches and develops collaborative solutions to global challenges arising from China’s rise.