8. Schelling: The Philosophy of Five Stages of Transformation**

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8. Schelling: The Philosophy of Five Stages of Transformation**

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (January 27, 1775 to August 20, 1854) was a German philosopher who, according to standard histories of philosophy, represents the midpoint in the development of German Idealism, positioned between his early mentor Johann Gottlieb Fichte and his former university roommate, early friend, and later rival, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Born in Leonberg, Württemberg, as the son of a Lutheran pastor, Schelling was a child prodigy who entered the theology department at the University of Tübingen at the age of 15, where he shared a dormitory and forged a lasting friendship with Hegel and Hölderlin, who were five years his senior. During this time, as the French Revolution unfolded in neighboring France, these three "movement-oriented" figures rebelled against the orthodox theology of their conservative university, immersing themselves in a new interpretation of Christianity and challenging the validity of traditional theology in relation to Kantian philosophy. Influenced by Fichte, they sought to absolutize human freedom and revolted against the concept of a transcendental God, following Fichte's idealistic approach of deriving the world from a transcendental concept of the self. Beyond Fichte, this Tübingen trio was characterized by two major focuses: the concept of "the Absolute" and the harmony between reason and emotion, with the former being heavily shaped by F.H. Jacobi's "Spinoza Letters," which famously argued that while Spinoza's philosophy was the most rational system, the Absolute could only be grasped intuitively rather than conceptually. While adopting Jacobi’s concept of the Absolute, they differed by striving to grasp it conceptually as a primary goal of their philosophy.

Interpreting Schelling’s work is considered difficult due to its evolving nature and complex historical context, but in 1795, he addressed these core issues in two texts: *On the I as Principle of Philosophy* and *Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism*.

Stage 1 : Philosophy of the Absolute Self

Regarding his philosophical development, Instructor Ahn Jae-oh summarizes the first stage (1794) as the **Philosophy of the Absolute Self**, where Schelling's early masterpiece closely followed Fichte’s *Science of Knowledge* by defending the "I" as an active act of self-positing rather than a fixed substance. In the tautology "I am I," Schelling sought a ground for existence and cognition within the self’s own activity, moving beyond Descartes' *cogito* to suggest that the world is revealed through the relationship between the "I" and the "Not-I." Influenced by Jacobi, Schelling reinterpreted Fichte’s self-principle as the "Absolute I" and defined it as the "unconditioned," asserting that the existence of an absolute self cannot be proven objectively because it is the very foundation that must be proven. He argued that in the unconditioned, the principle of being and the principle of thought must coincide—it exists because it is thought, and it is thought because it exists—thereby elevating the thinking self to an absolute existence that produces itself through its own thought.

This transformation of the Cartesian principle "I think, therefore I am" was so radical that Schelling eventually compared the absolute self to a divine self, essentially attempting to position philosophy in the place of theology. In *On the I as Principle of Philosophy*, he declared the self to be absolute, suggesting that everything "not-I" can only be determined by presupposing the "I," a view that implies the world and the universe depend on the self’s own attributes and negations.

However Scelling’s position that the I produces everything must position the concept of negation in the I selbst. The I would have his negation in iteslf.

This precocious genius was rumored to explain Fichte's thoughts better than Fichte himself, and within this context, he planned a synthesis of dogmatism and criticism, much like Rousseau’s integration of materialism and idealism. Schelling accepted Fichte's three principles of knowledge—1. self-positing, 2. the positing of the non-self, and 3. mutual limitation—using them to criticize both Spinozistic rationalism and Kantian transcendental philosophy by arguing that their opposition could be resolved within the philosophy of the absolute self. Ultimately, Schelling's proposition that the self is absolute reflects the view that the thinking substance is self-sufficient and that the human "I," mirroring the divine image, stands as the absolute center of the universe.

**Stage 2 : Philosophy of Nature – The Philosophy of Schelling’s Rise to Success (1797)**

After graduating from the Tübingen Theological Seminary at the age of twenty in 1795, Schelling spent three years working as a private tutor in Leipzig. During this period, he immersed himself in the natural sciences and constructed his own independent philosophy. This bore fruit in his *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature* (1797), a concept he further developed a year later in his book *On the World Soul* (1798). Johann Wolfgang von Goethe was deeply impressed by this work, which led him to actively recommend Schelling for a professorship at the University of Jena. However, I would argue that the reason Schelling abruptly shifted from Fichte’s philosophy of self-consciousness to the philosophy of nature was precisely to gain favor with Goethe, who was a dominant literary and political figure at the time. While I will elaborate on the reasons later, one fundamental fact remains: Fichte’s philosophy of the transcendental ego (I am I) and Goethe’s philosophy of nature were diametrically opposed, a fact Schelling was well aware of.

To understand this, we must look at Goethe’s adoration of nature. As both a man of letters and a natural scientist, Goethe loved nature deeply. In a letter to Knebel in the summer of 1787, after observing plants and fish in Naples and Sicily, he wrote: "If I were ten years younger, I would feel the urge to travel to India... not to discover new things, but to see what has already been discovered in my own way." He further noted that "if we wish to perceive nature in a living way, we must follow her example and become as mobile and as gentle as nature itself." Beyond such tributes, Goethe conducted scientific research, publishing works like *The Metamorphosis of Plants* and *Theory of Colours*. It was to align with this Goethean spirit that Schelling pivoted from Fichteanism to the philosophy of nature. The move was successful, earning him a professorship at Jena at an exceptionally young age. His friend Hegel eventually joined him there as a lecturer to obtain his doctorate.

Schelling’s philosophy of nature argued for an organicist view, opposing Newton’s mechanistic perspective that separated matter from force. Schelling asserted that matter possesses force within itself. While Kant had already suggested an organic nature, Schelling differed: whereas Kant speculated that life forms might have an organic purpose existing *for* humanity, Schelling claimed that humans are simply a part of nature, and thus the entirety of nature—including inanimate matter—constitutes one massive organism. In this organicist view, every part is inseparable from the whole, and the idea of the whole determines the position of each part. Nature is self-generating and self-organizing, with every part being mutually the cause and effect of one another, requiring no external cause. In essence, nature's design and purpose emerge from within according to an internal principle.

Based on these principles, Schelling defined three basic "potencies" (powers) of nature. First, he viewed the most fundamental force of nature as **unlimited activity**, which produces quantitative matter when balanced by a restraining force—defining the former as expansion (repulsion) and the latter as attraction. Second, this unlimited activity re-emerges at unrestrained points as **motion**, encompassing the laws of dynamics, electricity, magnetism, and chemical properties. Third, these forces ultimately constitute an **organism**, manifesting sensibility, irritability, and reproduction. Within the organic realm, there are stages: lower levels show prominent reproduction but less developed sensibility, while higher levels show increased sensibility and individuality. At the summit stands the human being, the organism that most clearly reveals the ideality of nature. From a modern scientific standpoint, one might criticize Schelling’s ideas as overly arbitrary. However, a philosophical analysis reveals profound concepts; viewing nature as a single giant organism offers excellent guidance for modern environmental protection, and his claim that higher forms emerge from lower ones is, in a sense, remarkably similar to the theory of evolution.

**Stage 3: Philosophy of Transcendental Idealism (1800)**

In 1800, Schelling published his definitive work on transcendental idealism, titled *System of Transcendental Idealism* (*System des transcendentalen Idealismus*). In this book, Schelling explained transcendental philosophy and the philosophy of nature as being complementary to each other, representing an attempt to synthesize his previous research on Fichte’s transcendental theory of the self with Goethe’s philosophy of nature. In doing so, Schelling also utilized Kant’s philosophical system, a move that caused dissatisfaction for his former mentor, Fichte. Nevertheless, at this stage of transcendental idealism, Schelling successfully integrated the ideas of Fichte, Goethe, and Kant. This stage is also referred to as "transcendental idealism," a central work of German Idealism that concluded the first major phase of Schelling’s philosophical journey. By making nature-philosophy compatible with transcendental philosophy, he completed a true system of idealism.

Published in Tübingen, the *System of Transcendental Idealism* begins with theoretical considerations of human consciousness, draws conclusions regarding the practical ethics and history of human life, and finally formalizes a philosophy of art. Through this system, Schelling intends to lead readers to a self-awareness of their own mode of perception, with the goal of making us realize that what we "naively" call external objects are actually created by ourselves. Thus, according to Schelling, our world is a construction of our own self. He seeks to correct the fundamental misunderstanding of naive consciousness, which assumes a world of objects exists independently of us. Like other idealists, Schelling believes the world we experience exists only within our consciousness, relying on Fichte’s transcendental idealism—often called "Subjective Idealism"—to support this. In Schelling's own words:

> "This self is not different from thinking; the self's thinking and the self itself are absolutely one. Therefore, the self is not something entirely different from thought and is thus not a 'thing' but a non-objective entity extending into infinity. This must be understood in this way: the self is indeed a thing, but only for itself; it does not originally exist in the world of things but becomes a thing only by making itself one, always existing as a thing for itself rather than for something external."

This distinction between matter (or nature) and the self forms the basic framework of Schelling’s transcendental idealism. Upon this logic, Schelling seeks a new, supreme principle that satisfies both nature-philosophy and transcendental philosophy: the "I" or the Self from Fichte’s philosophy. Schelling describes this principle as follows:

> "The Self, or 'the I,' is nothing more than a product that is its own end—namely, an intellectual intuition. However, since this intellectual intuition is in itself an absolutely free act, it cannot be proven but only postulated; since the Self is nothing but this intuition, the Self as the principle of philosophy is also merely something postulated."

Here, Schelling identifies the self with **intellectual intuition** (*intellektuelle Anschauung*), a divine-like intuition which manifests one’s thought immediately as reality. He likens the transcendental "I am I" to this intuition, noting that while it is not a tangible reality, it must be postulated—much as Kant argued that God, freedom, and the soul are postulates. By equating the transcendental principle of "I am I" with intuition, Schelling derives nature from the philosophy of the self and eventually extends his reach into art. He applies this Fichtean principle to the very generation of nature, intending for everything to be derived from the "I am" principle.

In the theoretical section of the book, the means of cognition pass through four stages: 1) fundamental sensation, 2) productive intuition, 3) reflection, and finally 4) the absolute act of will. Despite these developments, the principle of the self remains hidden throughout. Through this process, Schelling derives various categories similar to Fichte, revealing the determinations of thought through the interaction of the self and the non-self. Notably, Schelling derives the category of **"becoming"** through the opposites of self and non-self (affirmation and negation, or being and nothingness). From my perspective, this provided a crucial hint for the first chapter of Hegel’s *Logic* regarding the dialectic of being, nothingness, and becoming. Naturally, because Schelling dealt with nature, he focused deeply on the concept of becoming, leading to a "philosophy of creation" within transcendental philosophy. This allowed him to derive the basic concepts of nature-philosophy, that is matter, mechanism, teleology, and organism alongside fundamental Kantian ideas such as time, space, causality, substance, and relationship, as well as the Kantian *Schematismus*.

The second part of the *System* is **Practical Philosophy**. Before entering this section, some study of Kant and self-consciousness is required. Schelling identifies Fichte’s transcendental self with self-consciousness, which is effectively Kant’s "transcendental apperception"—the "I think" that accompanies all representations. Furthermore, he uses the terms "ideal" and "real": the **ideal** is the state of knowing that the "other" is actually oneself, while the **real** is the state of feeling the "other." Schelling’s thought fundamentally moves from the real to the ideal, similar to an external experience becoming an internal one. If theoretical philosophy was the "history of self-consciousness" ending in the production of ideal intelligence, practical philosophy aims to realize one’s freedom in the objective world based on that intelligence. This culminates in the question of how to live a moral life, leading to systems of law and the state, and eventually to a "state of states"—a global organization to end international conflict. Only through such a global body can the universal moral order of political society be fully realized. This moral progress unfolds within a history of infinite advancement, which Schelling views as a process of continuous revelation where the Absolute gradually reveals itself.

The third part, **Philosophy of Art**, synthesizes the theoretical and practical sections. While the first two parts focused on how the self views the world to create knowledge and how it acts in reality, a gap remains because the self’s knowledge is constantly changing (producing). Therefore, the coincidence of knowledge (idea) and reality (the real) becomes paramount, and this coincidence is achieved through **aesthetic intuition**. When we view a work of art, we do not perceive it through the reflective knowledge of theoretical philosophy or the moral practice of practical philosophy; rather, through aesthetic intuition, we feel satisfaction when the unconscious and conscious, the real and ideal, and the objective and subjective reach unity. Why do we feel that nothing should be added or removed from a masterpiece, and why do we feel a sense of resolution even if the problem itself isn't "solved"? In Schelling’s view, contemplating a finished work of art is the highest possible **objectification** the subject can perform upon itself.

**Stage 4. Identity Philosophy (1801 to 1806)**

Schelling’s closest friends were Hölderlin and Hegel. In 1795, Friedrich Hölderlin published an essay titled *"Judgment and Being,"* which would later exert a decisively important influence on the development of German Idealism. In this brief text, Hölderlin attempted to conceive of an **absolute identity**—a prior and primordial ground of consciousness that cannot be grasped within the structure of self-consciousness itself. Hölderlin called this primordial identity **"Being"** (*Sein*) and distinguished it from "Judgment" (*Urteil*). He argued that judgment implies a separation (literally *Ur-teil*, or "original division"). Thus, for Hölderlin, Fichte’s "I am I" was also a division of judgment.

Another noteworthy element in Hölderlin’s essay is **Intellectual Intuition**. To summarize his thought: fundamental unity is Being, and Being can only be grasped through intellectual intuition. This idea influenced both Schelling and Hegel. While the concept of Being is central to Western philosophy, it had become somewhat debased in Idealism, often referring only to external, sensible, or spatial existence. Hölderlin’s "philosophy of unity" decisively impacted Schelling, specifically by providing a critique of Fichteanism. This transition is evident in Schelling’s 1801 work, *Presentation of My System of Philosophy*. It was no longer possible to use the sentence "I am I" as the sole foundation of philosophy. Schelling wrote:

> "I had always represented what I called the Philosophy of Nature and Transcendental Philosophy as opposing poles of philosophy. With the present description, I stand at the **point of indifference**."

This sentence indicates that while Schelling previously viewed his system’s two main pillars—Nature-philosophy and Transcendental Philosophy—as two completely opposing peaks like the North and South Poles, his **Identity Philosophy** claimed they were no different. He proclaimed that Spirit and Nature are identical, or "indifferent." This suggests that the Infinite and the Finite are the same, a view reminiscent of Spinozism. However, as Spinoza is categorized under dogmatism, Schelling took a different direction. Explicitly criticizing Fichte, Schelling used the concept of absolute identity to break through Fichte’s subjective idealism and Kant’s dualistic philosophy.

Schelling introduced the concept of the **Absolute**, which proved crucial for German Idealism as a whole. The Absolute is an unconditioned identity that immediately affirms subject and object, idea and existence, and the ideal and the real all at once. This system of identity is closely linked to intellectual intuition as a means of immediate knowledge of the Absolute. This concept of intellectual intuition, also mentioned by Spinoza, was passed to the "Tübingen trio" through Jacobi, though Kant viewed it negatively. In Schelling’s hands, it became the means to "see" the Absolute. However, this intention of Identity Philosophy was difficult to achieve because equating complete opposites challenges formal logic; for instance, saying "man and woman are the same" defies common sense and breaks the law of identity ("A is A"). Therefore, a true "Identity Philosophy" would only be realized later by Hegel through the necessity of the **dialectic**. To avoid such contradictions, Schelling attempted to set a quantitative relationship between nature and consciousness, but this was essentially an imitation of Fichte’s **Quantitative Idealism**, which argued that the "Not-I" is a part (rather than a negation) of the "I." Consequently, Schelling’s concept failed to harmonize its principle with its system. He had to descend from "indifferent identity" back to "differentiation," leading Hegel to famously mock his Absolute as **"the night in which all cows are black."**

Stage 5: Positive Philosophy and the Philosophy of Mythology (1841 to 1852)**

After Hegel died in 1831, Schelling was called to Berlin in 1840 to fill the vacant professorship. The following year, he began lecturing on **Positive Philosophy**, attended by figures such as Kierkegaard, Bakunin, Humboldt, and Engels. These lectures proceeded in three stages: the foundation of Positive Philosophy (introducing it in light of the history of "Negative Philosophy" since Descartes), the **Philosophy of Mythology**, and the **Philosophy of Revelation**.

In his lectures on the **Philosophy of Mythology**, Schelling achieved a paradigmatic revolution in German Romanticism and Idealism, later influencing Carl Jung. As a student of Fichte, Schelling remained one of the most important, though often forgotten, figures of German Romanticism. Based on his *Naturphilosophie*, his explanation of mythology serves as the foundation for **intuitionist psychology**, prioritizing the "facts of the mind" or human instinct over objective reality. This sparked a boom in the study of various myths that had previously been ignored.

Schelling’s core claim was that **philosophical concepts are rooted in mythology**, a radical shift from previous thought. He believed philosophy shares similarities with mythical thinking in that both are distant from empirical or positive science. He argued that myths are fundamental to human nature and evolution—they are not human "creations" but expressions of a more primordial Nature. Here, "Nature" refers to the entire universe rather than just the visible world. Thus, mythology grows alongside human consciousness and exerts a profound influence on the intellect. Reflecting Aristotle’s sentiment that "the lover of myth is a lover of wisdom," Schelling argued that human understanding is formed by mythology, not vice versa.

Mythology was the first embodiment of deep human thought, expressing intuitive truths through narrative. He defended mythology against Enlightenment thinkers who dismissed myths as "unscientific superstitions" or products of "ignorant eras." Schelling argued that mythology is the **"first grammar of the spirit."** Following the biblical hermeneutic tradition, he maintained that truth exists in the allegorical meaning and the symbolic expression‎ of the myth, rather than its literal history. For example, early myths about the sea and monsters (like Tiamat) embody the primordial danger of the uncontrolled waters threatening the "home" of land. For Schelling, mythology is "unprethinkable" (*unvordenklich*) because it is the origin of thought itself; we cannot go "beyond" mythology because it is where everything—and human consciousness—began. Truth in mythology is found in the story's expression‎ of destiny, struggle, and the human condition, often reflecting historical precedents where heroic individuals saved their people from hostile natural forces.