존 로크Locke 생애와 작품

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인터넷 철학 백과사전

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존 로크 (1632-1704)

존 로크는 17 세의 가장 유명한 철학자이자 정치 이론가 중 한 명이었습니다.일 세기. 그는 종종 영국 경험주의로 알려진 학파의 창시자로 간주되며, 제한적이고 자유주의적인 정부에 대한 현대 이론에 기초적인 공헌을 했습니다. 그는 또한 신학, 종교적 관용 및 교육 이론 분야에서 영향력을 행사했습니다. 로크는 그의 가장 중요한 저서인 『인간 이해에 관한 에세이』에서 인간의 마음과 지식의 습득에 대한 분석을 제시하기 시작했다. 그는 우리가 세계에 대한 경험을 통해 아이디어를 획득한다는 경험주의 이론을 제시했습니다. 그러면 마음은 이러한 관념들을 다양한 방식으로 검토하고, 비교하고, 결합할 수 있습니다. 지식은 서로 다른 관념들 사이의 특별한 종류의 관계로 구성된다. 로크가 세계와 그 내용에 대한 철학적 탐구의 예비로서 인간 정신에 대한 철학적 고찰을 강조한 것은 철학에 대한 새로운 접근 방식을 나타냈으며, 특히 영국에서 많은 개종자를 빠르게 얻었다. 이 광범위한 프로젝트 외에도 에세이에는 중요하고 광범위하게 다양한 철학적 주제에 대한 일련의 집중적인 토론이 포함되어 있습니다. 정치에서 로크는 제한된 정부의 지지자로 가장 잘 알려져 있습니다. 그는 자연권 이론을 사용하여 정부가 시민에 대한 의무가 있고, 시민에 대한 제한된 권한만 가지며, 특정 상황에서 궁극적으로 시민에 의해 전복될 수 있다고 주장합니다. 그는 또한 종교적 관용을 옹호하는 강력한 논거를 제시하였다. 이 글은 로크 사상의 모든 핵심 영역에 대한 광범위한 개요를 제공하려고 시도한다.

목차

1. 생애와 작품
2. 에세이의 주요 프로젝트
   1. 아이디어
   2. 자연주의에 대한 비판
   3. 아이디어 습득
   4. 언어
   5. 지식에 대한 이야기
3. 에세이의 특별 주제
   1. 1차 및 2차 자질
   2. 기구
   3. 의지와 선택의지
   4. 인격과 개인 정체성
   5. 실제 및 명목상 에센스
   6. 종교적 인식론
4. 정치철학
   1. 두 논문
   2. 재산
   3. 관용
5. 신학
6. 교육
7. 로크의 영향
8. 참고 문헌 및 추가 자료
   1. 로크의 저작
   2. 추천 도서

1. 생애와 업적

존 로크는 1632년 잉글랜드 남서부의 작은 마을인 링턴에서 태어났다. 존이라는 이름을 가진 그의 아버지는 법률 사무원이었고 영국 남북 전쟁에서 의회군과 함께 복무했습니다. 그의 가족은 부유했지만, 특별히 사회적, 경제적 지위가 높지는 않았다. 로크는 웨스트 컨트리에서 어린 시절을 보냈고 십대 시절에는 런던의 웨스트민스터 학교에 보내졌다.

로크는 웨스트민스터에서 성공을 거두었고 옥스퍼드의 크라이스트 처치에 자리를 잡았다. 그는 1652년부터 1667년까지 옥스포드에 머물렀다. 로크는 그곳에서 배운 전통적인 스콜라 철학에 대해 거의 이해하지 못했지만 학생으로서 성공했으며 학사 학위를 마친 후 대학에서 일련의 행정 및 학술 직책을 맡았습니다. 로크의 임무 중 일부는 학부생을 교육하는 것을 포함했다. 그의 초기 실질적 작품 중 하나 인 자연의 법칙에 관한 에세이는 그의 교수 임무 과정에서 개발되었습니다. 로크가 옥스퍼드에 있는 동안, 특히 옥스퍼드에서의 말년에 쏟은 지적 노력과 에너지의 대부분은 의학과 자연철학(오늘날 우리가 과학이라고 부르는 것)의 연구에 바쳐졌다. 로크는 이 분야에서 널리 읽었고, 다양한 실험에 참여했으며, 로버트 보일과 다른 많은 저명한 자연 철학자들과 친분을 쌓았다. 그는 또한 의사가 되기 위해 정상적인 교육과 훈련 과정을 밟았다.

로크는 1667년 옥스퍼드를 떠나 런던으로 가서 앤서니 애슐리 쿠퍼(Anthony Ashley Cooper, 당시에는 애슐리 경, 후에 샤프츠베리 백작)의 가문에 애착을 갖게 되었다. 로크는 집안에서 여러 가지 역할을 했을 수 있으며, 대부분 애슐리의 아들의 가정교사 역할을 했을 것이다. 런던에서 로크는 의학과 자연 철학에 대한 관심을 계속 추구했습니다. 그는 훗날 당대 가장 유명한 의사 중 한 명이 된 토마스 시드넘과 긴밀한 협력 관계를 형성했습니다. 그는 새로 결성된 왕립학회 내에서 많은 접촉을 가졌고 1668년에 회원이 되었다. 그는 또한 애슐리 경의 주치의로 활동했습니다. 실제로, 한번은 로크가 매우 섬세한 외과 수술에 참여했는데, 애슐리는 로크가 자신의 생명을 구해 주었다고 말했다. 애슐리는 당시 가장 저명한 영국 정치인 중 한 명이었습니다. 그의 후원을 통해 로크는 일련의 정부 직책을 맡을 수 있었다. 그의 작품 대부분은 영국의 아메리카 및 카리브해 식민지의 정책과 관련이 있습니다. 가장 중요한 것은, 이 시기가 로크의 생애에서 그의 가장 유명한 저작인 인간 이해에 관한 에세이(Essay Concerning Human Understanding)에서 절정을 이루는 프로젝트를 시작한 시기였다는 것이다. 그 작품의 가장 오래된 두 가지 초안은 1671 년으로 거슬러 올라갑니다. 그는 거의 20년 동안 간헐적으로 이 프로젝트를 계속해야 했다.

로크는 1675년부터 몇 년 동안 프랑스를 여행했다. 그가 영국으로 돌아왔을 때, 그것은 단지 몇 년 동안만 지속될 것이었다. 로크가 자리를 비운 사이 정치 상황은 크게 바뀌었다. 샤프츠베리(현재 애슐리로 알려짐)는 인기가 없었고, 로크와 로크의 관계는 골칫거리가 되었다. 로크가 그의 가장 유명한 정치 저작인 '정부에 관한 두 논문'을 쓴 것도 이 무렵이었다. 두 논문은 1689년까지 출판되지 않았지만, 그가 이미 정부의 본질과 적절한 형태에 대한 자신의 견해를 확고히 했음을 보여 준다. 샤프츠베리가 사망한 후 로크는 정치적 박해를 피하기 위해 네덜란드로 도망쳤다. 그곳에 있는 동안 로크는 많은 여행을 다녔고(때로는 자신의 안전을 위해) 두 가지 프로젝트를 진행했다. 첫째, 그는 에세이 작업을 계속했습니다. 둘째, 그는 1689년에 익명으로 출판된 Epistola de Tolerantia라는 제목의 작품을 썼습니다. 로크는 영국, 프랑스, 네덜란드에서 겪은 경험을 통해 정부가 종교적 다양성에 대해 당시보다 훨씬 더 관용적이어야 한다는 확신을 갖게 되었습니다.

1688-1689년의 영광스러운 혁명 이후, 로크는 영국으로 돌아갈 수 있었다. 그는 귀국 직후 에세이와 두 논문(두 번째 논문은 익명으로 출판)을 출판했다. 그는 처음에 런던에 머물렀지만 곧 에식스 주 오츠라는 작은 마을에 있는 프랜시스와 다마리스 마샴의 집으로 이사했다. 랠프 커드워스(Ralph Cudworth)라는 저명한 철학자의 딸인 다마리스 마샴(Damaris Masham)은 몇 년 전에 로크를 알게 되었다. 두 사람은 로크가 죽을 때까지 지속된 매우 친밀한 우정을 형성했습니다. 이 기간 동안 로크는 정치, 관용, 철학, 경제학, 교육 이론 등을 연구하느라 바빴다.

로크는 그의 생애 동안 관용에 대한 요나스 프로스트와의 주목할만한 논쟁을 포함하여 많은 논쟁에 참여했습니다. 그러나 로크의 가장 유명하고 철학적으로 중요한 논쟁은 우스터의 주교인 에드워드 스틸링플리트와의 논쟁이었다. 스틸링플리트는 강력한 정치적, 신학적 인물이었을 뿐만 아니라 기민하고 강력한 비평가였다. 두 사람은 일련의 출판된 편지에서 에세이의 여러 입장에 대해 토론했습니다.

말년에 로크는 신학에 많은 관심을 쏟았다. 이 분야에서 그의 주요 업적은 1695 년에 (다시 익명으로) 출판 된 기독교의 합리성이었습니다. 이 작품은 로크가 전통적으로 기독교인에게 의무적이라고 믿었던 많은 신념이 불필요하다고 주장했기 때문에 논란의 여지가 있었다. 로크는 매우 에큐메니칼한 형태의 기독교를 주장했다. 그가 죽을 무렵, 로크는 바울 서신에 관한 글을 썼다. 이 작품은 미완성이었지만 사후에 출판되었습니다. 기적에 관한 짧은 저서도 이때부터 시작되었으며 사후에 출판되었습니다.

로크는 성인이 된 후 대부분의 시간 동안 건강 문제로 고생했다. 특히 그는 호흡기 질환을 앓고 있었는데, 이는 공기질이 매우 좋지 않은 런던을 방문하면서 악화되었습니다. 그의 건강은 1704년에 악화되었고 점점 쇠약해졌다. 그는 1704년 10월 28일 다마리스 마샴이 그에게 시편을 읽어주고 있을 때 사망했다. 그는 오츠 근처의 하이 레이버에 묻혔다. 그는 겸손하면서도 솔직한 자신의 묘비명을 썼습니다.

2. 에세이의 주요 프로젝트

로크 자신의 설명에 따르면, 에세이를 쓰게 된 동기는 친구들과 관련 없는 주제에 대해 토론하던 중 떠올랐다고 한다. 그는 그들이 이 문제에 대해 거의 진전을 이룰 수 없었으며 매우 빨리 많은 혼란과 어려움에 부딪혔다고 보고한다. 로크는 이 주제에 대해 진전을 이루기 위해서는 먼저 더 근본적인 것, 즉 인간의 이해를 검토할 필요가 있음을 깨달았다. "우리 자신의 능력을 검토하고, 우리의 이해가 어떤 대상인지, 또는 다루기에 적합하지 않은지를 볼 필요가 있었다." (서한, 7항)

로크의 통찰은 우리가 세계와 세계에 대한 접근을 분석하기 전에 우리 자신에 대해 알아야 한다는 것이었다. 우리는 지식을 습득하는 방법을 알아야 합니다. 우리는 또한 우리가 어떤 탐구 영역에 적합한지, 어떤 영역이 인식론적으로 우리에게 닫혀 있는지, 즉 어떤 영역이 원칙적으로도 알 수 없는 영역인지를 알아야 합니다. 우리는 더 나아가 지식이 무엇으로 구성되어 있는지 알아야 합니다. 이러한 질문들에 맞추어, 로크는 에세이의 맨 처음에 "인간적 지식의 본래, 확실성, 그리고 범위를 탐구하는 것이 그의 목적이다. 믿음, 의견 및 동의의 근거와 정도와 함께." (1.1.2, 42). 로크는 우리가 우리의 인지 능력을 이해할 때에만 우리의 연구를 세계로 적절하게 이끌 수 있다고 생각한다. 이것은 로크가 에세이에서 자신의 야망 중 하나가 로버트 보일과 아이작 뉴턴과 같은 유명한 과학자들의 연구를 위한 토대를 마련하고 땅을 닦는 "하급 노동자"가 되는 것이라고 주장했을 때 염두에 두었던 것이었을 것입니다.

에세이는 4권의 책으로 나뉘며, 각 책은 그 내용과 작동과 관련하여 인간의 마음을 조사하려는 로크의 전반적인 목표에 기여합니다. 제1권에서 로크는 우리 지식의 한 가지 가능한 기원을 배제한다. 그는 우리의 지식은 타고난 것일 수 없다고 주장한다. 이것은 로크가 우리의 모든 관념이 경험에서 나온다고 주장하는 제2권을 설정한다. 이 책에서 그는 신, 무한, 공간과 같은 관념조차도 세계에 대한 우리의 지각적 접근과 정신 작용을 통해 어떻게 획득될 수 있었는지를 설명하고자 한다. 제3권은 로크가 언어와 언어가 우리의 이론화에서 수행하는 역할에 관심을 돌리는 일종의 여담이다. 여기서 로크의 주요 목표는 조심하는 것이며, 그는 언어가 종종 이해에 장애물이 된다고 생각하며 혼란을 피하기 위한 몇 가지 권장 사항을 제시합니다. 마지막으로 IV권에서는 지식, 신념, 의견에 대해 논의한다. 로크는 지식은 관념들 사이의 특별한 종류의 관계로 구성되어 있으며 우리는 그에 따라 우리의 신념을 규제해야 한다고 주장한다.

a. 아이디어

에세이의 첫 장에는 책에서 "아이디어"라는 단어를 자주 사용한 것에 대한 사과가 포함되어 있습니다. 로크에 따르면, 관념은 정신적 내용의 기본 단위이며, 따라서 인간의 마음에 대한 그의 설명과 우리의 지식에 대한 그의 설명에서 필수적인 역할을 한다. 로크는 관념에 중심적인 역할을 부여한 최초의 철학자가 아니었다. 예를 들어, 데카르트는 인간의 마음을 설명할 때 그것들에 크게 의존했습니다. 그러나 로크가 말한 "이데아"가 정확히 무엇을 의미하는지 알아내는 것은 주석가들 사이에서 논쟁을 불러일으켰다.

한 가지 출발점은 로크 자신의 정의입니다. 그는 "관념"이란 "인간이 생각할 때 이해의 대상이 무엇이든 간에... 환상(Phantasm), 관념(Notion), 종(種), 또는 그것이 무엇이든 간에, 마음은 생각에 사용될 수 있다." (1.1.8, 47). 이 정의는 로크의 이해에 대한 설명에서 관념이 갖는 중심적인 역할을 재확인하는 한 도움이 된다. 아이디어는 우리의 마음이 작동하는 유일한 실체입니다. 그러나 로크의 정의는 모호성을 내포하고 있는 한 도움이 되지 않는다. 한 번 읽어보면, 관념은 정신적 대상이다. 에이전트가 사과와 같은 외부 세계의 물체를 인식할 때, 그녀의 마음 속에는 그 사과를 나타내는 어떤 것이 있다는 생각이 든다. 따라서 에이전트가 사과를 고려할 때 실제로 하는 일은 그 사과에 대한 아이디어에 대해 생각하는 것입니다. 다르게 읽으면 아이디어는 정신적 행동입니다. 여기서 생각해야 할 것은 에이전트가 사과를 인식할 때 그녀는 실제로 사과를 직접적이고 매개되지 않은 방식으로 인식하고 있다는 것입니다. 아이디어는 외부 세계 대상과 지각적 접촉을 하는 정신적 행위입니다. 최근 몇 년 동안 대부분의 주석가들은 이 두 가지 해석 중 첫 번째 해석을 채택했습니다. 그러나 이 논쟁은 아래의 지식에 대한 논의에서 중요할 것이다.

b. 자연주의에 대한 비판

에세이의 네 권의 책 중 첫 번째 책은 어떤 아이디어는 경험으로 받아들이는 것이 아니라 인간의 마음에서 타고난 교리인 자연주의에 대한 비판에 전념하고 있습니다. 이 책에서 로크의 표적이 누구인지는 정확히 불분명하지만, 로크는 허버트 오브 체르베리(Herbert of Cherbury)를 인용하고 있으며, 르네 데카르트(René Descartes), 케임브리지 플라톤주의자(Cambridge Platonists), 그리고 잘 알려지지 않은 성공회 신학자들 등이 유력한 후보로 꼽힌다. 그러나 로크가 제1권에서 하고자 하는 것의 상당 부분이 동기를 부여하고 그가 제2권에서 제시하는 아이디어 획득에 대한 대안적 설명을 그럴듯하게 만드는 것이라는 점을 감안할 때 구체적인 목표를 찾는 것은 그다지 중요하지 않을 수 있다.

로크가 제1권에서 공격하는 자연주의적 관점은 인간이 마음 속에 타고난 정신적 내용을 가지고 있다고 주장한다. 이것은 경험을 통해 획득된 것도 아니고 경험으로 받아들인 관념으로부터 정신에 의해 구성되지도 않은 어떤 관념들(정신적 내용의 단위들)이 있다는 것을 의미한다. 이 입장의 가장 인기 있는 버전은 창조의 순간에 하나님께서 모든 사람의 마음에 심어 놓으신 어떤 관념들이 있다는 것입니다.

로크는 우리에게 어떤 타고난 원리가 있다는 견해(예를 들어, 전체가 부분보다 크다, 너희에게 해 주듯이 남에게 해 주라, 등)와 타고난 단일한 관념(예를 들어, 신, 정체성, 실체 등)이 있다는 견해를 모두 공격한다. 로크의 주장의 핵심은 선천적이라고 주장되는 정신적 내용 중 어느 것도 모든 인간이 보편적으로 공유하지 않는다는 점을 지적하는 데 있다. 예를 들어, 어린이와 정신 장애인은 "평등에서 취한 평등은 평등을 남긴다"와 같은 타고난 복합적 사고를 마음속에 가지고 있지 않다고 지적합니다. 그는 또한 여행 문헌의 증거를 사용하여, 많은 비유럽인들이 타고난 도덕적 격언으로 여겨지는 것을 부정하며, 일부 집단은 심지어 하느님에 대한 개념이 결여되어 있다고 지적한다. 로크는 모든 인간이 이러한 관념을 가지고 있는 것은 아니라는 사실을 신에 의해 인간의 정신에 심어지지 않았으며, 따라서 선천적인 것이 아니라 후천적인 것이라는 증거로 받아들인다.

로크의 반(反)자연주의를 고려할 때 피해야 할 한 가지 오해가 있다. 이러한 오해는 부분적으로 로크의 주장에 의해 암시되는데, 마음은 감각 경험 이전의 tabula rasa(백지 상태)와 같다. 이것은 관념이 출현하기 전에는 마음이 아무것도 아닌 것처럼 들리게 한다. 사실 로크의 입장은 훨씬 더 미묘하다. 그는 정신이 감각으로부터 어떤 관념을 받아들이기 전에 얼마든지 선천적인 능력, 성향 및 성향을 가지고 있다는 것을 분명히 한다. 그의 반(反)자연주의적 요점은 마음이 감각으로부터 관념을 받아들이기 전까지는 이들 중 어느 것도 촉발되거나 행사되지 않는다는 것이다.

c. 아이디어 습득

제2권에서 로크는 인간의 정신이 어떻게 그것이 가지고 있는 관념들로 채워지게 되는지에 대한 그의 대안적 이론을 제시한다. 우리는 매일 오렌지 주스, 성, 정의, 숫자, 움직임과 같은 복잡한 것들을 생각합니다. 로크의 주장은 이 모든 관념의 궁극적 기원이 경험에 있다는 것이다: "경험: 그 안에서 우리의 모든 앎은 기초를 둔다. 그리고 그것으로부터 궁극적으로 그 자체를 파생시킵니다. 우리의 관찰은 외부적이고 감각적인 대상에 대해 사용되었다. 또는 우리 자신에 의해 지각되고 반성되는 우리 마음의 내적 작용에 관한 것인데, 그것은 우리의 이해에 사고의 모든 재료를 제공한다. 이 두 가지는 지식의 샘이며, 우리가 가지고 있거나 자연적으로 가질 수 있는 모든 관념이 거기에서 솟아난다." (2.1.2, 104).

위의 구절에서 로크는 두 가지 유형의 경험을 허용한다. 외부 경험 또는 감각은 전통적인 오감의 아이디어를 제공합니다. 시각은 우리에게 색깔에 대한 아이디어를 주고, 청각은 소리에 대한 아이디어를 주는 식입니다. 따라서 특정 녹색 음영에 대한 나의 아이디어는 양치류를 보는 산물입니다. 그리고 특정한 음색에 대한 나의 생각은 피아노가 연주되는 동안 내가 피아노 근처에 있었던 결과물이다. 내면의 경험, 즉 성찰은 조금 더 복잡하다. 로크는 인간의 정신이 믿을 수 없을 정도로 활동적이라고 생각한다. 그것은 그가 작전이라고 부르는 것을 끊임없이 수행하고 있다. 예를 들어, 나는 종종 과거의 생일 파티를 기억하거나, 휴가 중이라고 상상하거나, 피자 한 조각을 먹고 싶거나, 잉글랜드가 월드컵에서 우승할 것이라고 의심한다. 로크는 우리가 이러한 행동을 하는 우리의 마음을 알아차리거나 경험할 수 있으며, 그렇게 할 때 우리는 반성의 관념을 받는다고 믿는다. 기억, 상상, 욕망, 의심, 판단, 선택과 같은 관념들이다.

로크의 견해는 경험(감각과 반성)이 우리에게 단순한 관념을 제시한다는 것이다. 이것들은 정신적 내용의 최소 단위입니다. 각각의 단순한 관념은 "그 자체로 복합되지 않고, 그 안에는 마음 속에 하나의 획일적인 모습 또는 개념 외에는 아무 것도 들어 있지 않으며, 다른 관념으로 구별될 수 없다." (2.2.1, 119). 하지만 제 아이디어 중 많은 부분이 단순한 아이디어가 아닙니다. 예를 들어, 오렌지 주스 한 잔에 대한 나의 생각이나 뉴욕 지하철 시스템에 대한 나의 생각은 단순한 아이디어로 분류될 수 없었다. 로크는 이러한 복잡한 관념과 같은 관념을 부른다. 그의 견해는 복잡한 아이디어는 우리의 단순한 아이디어를 다양한 방식으로 결합한 결과라는 것입니다. 예를 들어, 오렌지 주스 한 잔에 대한 나의 복잡한 아이디어는 여러 가지 단순한 아이디어(주황색, 시원함, 어떤 달콤한 맛, 어떤 신맛 등)가 하나의 대상으로 결합되어 있습니다. 따라서 로크는 우리의 관념이 구성적이라고 믿는다. 단순한 아이디어가 모여 복잡한 아이디어를 형성합니다. 그리고 이러한 복잡한 아이디어를 결합하여 훨씬 더 복잡한 아이디어를 형성할 수 있습니다.

We are now in a position to understand the character of Locke’s empiricism. He is committed to the view that all of our ideas, everything we can possibly think of, can be broken down into simple ideas received in experience. The bulk of Book II is devoted to making this empiricism plausible. Locke does this both by undertaking an examination of the various abilities that the human mind has (memory, abstraction, volition, and so forth) and by offering an account of how even abstruse ideas like space, infinity, God, and causation could be constructed using only the simple ideas received in experience.

Our complex ideas are classified into three different groups: substances, modes, and relations. Ideas of substances are ideas of things which are thought to exist independently. Ordinary objects like desks, sheep, and mountains fall into this group. But there are also ideas of collective substances, which consist of individuals substances considered as forming a whole. A group of individual buildings might be considered a town. And a group of individual men and women might be considered together as an army. In addition to describing the way we think about individual substances, Locke also has an interesting discussion of substance-in-general. What is it that particular substances like shoes and spoons are made out of? We could suggest that they are made out of leather and metal. But the question could be repeated, what are leather and metal made of? We might respond that they are made of matter. But even here, Locke thinks we can ask what matter is made of. What gives rise to the properties of matter? Locke claims that we don’t have a very clear idea here. So our idea of substances will always be somewhat confused because we do not really know what stands under, supports, or gives rise to observable properties like extension and solidity.

Ideas of modes are ideas of things which are dependent on substances in some way. In general, this taxonomic category can be somewhat tricky. It does not seem to have a clear parallel in contemporary metaphysics, and it is sometimes thought to be a mere catch-all category for things which are neither substances nor relations. But it is helpful to think of modes as being like features of substances; modes are “such complex Ideas, which however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as Dependences on, or Affections of Substances.” (2.12.4, 165). Modes come in two types: simple and mixed. Simple modes are constructed by combining a large number of a single type of simple ideas together. For example, Locke believes there is a simple idea of unity. Our complex idea of the number seven, for example, is a simple mode and is constructed by concatenating seven simple ideas of unity together. Locke uses this category to explain how we think about a number of topics relating to number, space, time, pleasure and pain, and cognition. Mixed modes, on the other hand, involve combining together simple ideas of more than one kind. A great many ideas fall into this category. But the most important ones are moral ideas. Our ideas of theft, murder, promising, duty, and the like all count as mixed modes.

Ideas of relations are ideas that involve more than one substance. My idea of a husband, for example, is more than the idea of an individual man. It also must include the idea of another substance, namely the idea of that man’s spouse. Locke is keen to point out that much more of our thought involves relations than we might previously have thought. For example, when I think about Elizabeth II as the Queen of England my thinking actually involves relations, because I cannot truly think of Elizabeth as a queen without conceiving of her as having a certain relationship of sovereignty to some subjects (individual substances like David Beckham and J.K. Rowling). Locke then goes on to explore the role that relations have in our thinking about causation, space, time, morality, and (very famously) identity.

Throughout his discussion of the different kinds of complex ideas Locke is keen to emphasize that all of our ideas can ultimately be broken down into simple ideas received in sensation and reflection. Put differently, Locke is keenly aware that the success of his empiricist theory of mind depends on its ability to account for all the contents of our minds. Whether or not Locke is successful is a matter of dispute. On some occasions the analysis he gives of how a very complex idea could be constructed using only simple ideas is vague and requires the reader to fill in some gaps. And commentators have also suggested that some of the simple ideas Locke invokes, for example the simple ideas of power and unity, do not seem to be obvious components of our phenomenological experience.

Book II closes with a number of chapters designed to help us eval‎uate the quality of our ideas. Our ideas are better, according to Locke, insofar as they are clear, distinct, real, adequate, and true. Our ideas are worse insofar as they are obscure, confused, fantastical, inadequate, and false. Clarity and obscurity are explained via an analogy to vision. Clear ideas, like clear images, are crisp and fresh, not faded or diminished in the way that obscure ideas (or images) are. Distinction and confusion have to do with the individuation of ideas. Ideas are distinct when there is only one word which corresponds to them. Confused ideas are ones to which more than one word can correctly apply or ones that lack a clear and consistent correlation to one particular word. To use one of Locke’s examples, an idea of a leopard as a beast with spots would be confused. It is not distinct because the word “lynx” could apply to that idea just as easily as the word “leopard.” Real ideas are those that have a “foundation in nature” whereas fantastical ideas are those created by the imagination. For example, our idea of a horse would be a real idea and our idea of a unicorn would be fantastical. Adequacy and inadequacy have to do with how well ideas match the patterns according to which they were made. Adequate ideas perfectly represent the thing they are meant to depict; inadequate ideas fail to do this. Ideas are true when the mind understands them in a way that is correct according to linguistic practices and the way the world is structured. They are false when the mind misunderstands them along these lines.

In these chapters Locke also explains which categories of ideas are better or worse according to this eval‎uative system. Simple ideas do very well. Because objects directly produce them in the mind they tend to be clear, distinct, and so forth. Ideas of modes and relations also tend to do very well, but for a different reason. Locke thinks that the archetypes of these ideas are in the mind rather than in the world. As such, it is easy for these ideas to be good because the mind has a clear sense of what the ideas should be like as it constructs them. By contrast, ideas of substances tend to fare very poorly. The archetypes for these ideas are external world objects. Because our perceptual access to these objects is limited in a number of ways and because these objects are so intricate, ideas of substances tend to be confused, inadequate, false, and so forth.

d. Language

Book III of the Essay is concerned with language. Locke admits that this topic is something of a digression. He did not originally plan for language to take up an entire book of the Essay. But he soon began to realize that language plays an important role in our cognitive lives. Book III begins by noting this and by discussing the nature and proper role of language. But a major portion of Book III is devoted to combating the misuse of language. Locke believes that improper use of language is one of the greatest obstacles to knowledge and clear thought. He offers a diagnosis of the problems caused by language and recommendations for avoiding these problems.

Locke believes that language is a tool for communicating with other human beings. Specifically, Locke thinks that we want to communicate about our ideas, the contents of our minds. From here it is a short step to the view that: “Words in their primary or immediate Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them.” (3.2.2, 405). When an agent utters the word “gold” she is referring to her idea of a shiny, yellowish, malleable substance of great value. When she utters the word “carrot” she is referring to her idea of a long, skinny, orange vegetable which grows underground. Locke is, of course, aware that the names we choose for these ideas are arbitrary and merely a matter of social convention.

Although the primary use of words is to refer to ideas in the mind of the speaker, Locke also allows that words make what he calls “secret reference” to two other things. First, humans also want their words to refer to the corresponding ideas in the minds of other humans. When Smith says “carrot” within earshot of Jones her hope is that Jones also has an idea of the long, skinny vegetable and that saying “carrot” will bring that idea into Jones’ mind. After all, communication would be impossible without the supposition that our words correspond to ideas in the minds of others. Second, humans suppose that their words stand for objects in the world. When Smith says “carrot” she wants to refer to more than just her idea, she also wants to refer to the long skinny objects themselves. But Locke is suspicious of these two other ways of understanding signification. He thinks the latter one, in particular, is illegitimate.

After discussing these basic features of language and reference Locke goes on to discuss specific cases of the relationship between ideas and words: words used for simple ideas, words used for modes, words used for substances, the way in which a single word can refer to a multiplicity of ideas, and so forth. There is also an interesting chapter on “particles.” These are words which do not refer to an idea but instead refer to a certain connection which holds between ideas. For example, if I say “Secretariat is brown” the word “Secretariat” refers to my idea of a certain racehorse, and “brown” refers to my idea of a certain color, but the word “is” does something different. That word is a particle and indicates that I am expressing something about the relationship between my ideas of Secretariat and brown and suggesting that they are connected in a certain way. Other particles includes words like “and”, “but”, “hence”, and so forth.

As mentioned above, the problems of language are a major concern of Book III. Locke thinks that language can lead to confusion and misunderstanding for a number of reasons. The signification of words is arbitrary, rather than natural, and this means it can be difficult to understand which words refer to which ideas. Many of our words stand for ideas which are complex, hard to acquire, or both. So many people will struggle to use those words appropriately. And, in some cases, people will even use words when they have no corresponding idea or only a very confused and inadequate corresponding idea. Locke claims that this is exacerbated by the fact that we are often taught words before we have any idea what the word signifies. A child, for example, might be taught the word “government” at a young age, but it will take her years to form a clear idea of what governments are and how they operate. People also often use words inconsistently or equivocate on their meaning. Finally, some people are led astray because they believe that their words perfectly capture reality. Recall from above that people secretly and incorrectly use their words to refer to objects in the external world. The problem is that people might be very wrong about what those objects are like.

Locke thinks that a result of all this is that people are seriously misusing language and that many debates and discussions in important fields like science, politics, and philosophy are confused or consist of merely verbal disputes. Locke provides a number of examples of language causing problems: Cartesians using “body” and “extension” interchangeably, even though the two ideas are distinct; physiologists who agree on all the facts yet have a long dispute because they have different understandings of the word “liquor”; Scholastic philosophers using the term “prime matter” when they are unable to actually frame an idea of such a thing, and so forth.

The remedies that Locke recommends for fixing these problems created by language are somewhat predictable. But Locke is quick to point out that while they sound like easy fixes they are actually quite difficult to implement. The first and most important step is to only use words when we have clear ideas attached to them. (Again, this sounds easy, but many of us might actually struggle to come up with a clear idea corresponding to even everyday terms like “glory” or “fascist”.) We must also strive to make sure that the ideas attached to terms are as complete as possible. We must strive to ensure that we use words consistently and do not equivocate; every time we utter a word we should use it to signify one and the same idea. Finally, we should communicate our definitions of words to others.

e. The Account of Knowledge

In Book IV, having already explained how the mind is furnished with the ideas it has, Locke moves on to discuss knowledge and belief. A good place to start is with a quote from the beginning of Book IV: “Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas. Where this Perception is, there is Knowledge, and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of Knowledge.” (4.2.2, 525). Locke spends the first part of Book IV clarifying and exploring this conception of knowledge. The second part focuses on how we should apportion belief in cases where we lack knowledge.

What does Locke mean by the “connection and agreement” and the “disagreement and repugnancy” of our ideas? Some examples might help. Bring to mind your idea of white and your idea of black. Locke thinks that upon doing this you will immediately perceive that they are different, they “disagree”. It is when you perceive this disagreement that you know the fact that white is not black. Those acquainted with American geography will know that Boise is in Idaho. On Locke’s account of knowledge, this means that they are able to perceive a certain connection that obtains between their idea of Idaho and their idea of Boise. Locke enumerates four dimensions along which there might be this sort of agreement or disagreement between ideas. First, we can perceive when two ideas are identical or non-identical. For example, knowing that sweetness is not bitterness consists in perceiving that the idea of sweetness is not identical to the idea of bitterness. Second, we can perceive relations that obtain between ideas. For example, knowing that 7 is greater than 3 consists in perceiving that there is a size relation of bigger and smaller between the two ideas. Third, we can perceive when our idea of a certain feature accompanies our idea of a certain thing. If I know that ice is cold this is because I perceive that my idea of cold always accompanies my idea of ice. Fourthly, we can perceive when existence agrees with any idea. I can have knowledge of this fourth kind when, for example, I perform the cogito and recognize the special relation between my idea of myself and my idea of existence. Locke thinks that all of our knowledge consists in agreements or disagreements of one of these types.

After detailing the types of relations between ideas which constitute knowledge Locke continues on to discuss three “degrees” of knowledge in 4.2. These degrees seem to consist in different ways of knowing something. The first degree Locke calls intuitive knowledge. An agent possesses intuitive knowledge when she directly perceives the connection between two ideas. This is the best kind of knowledge, as Locke says “Such kind of Truths, the Mind perceives at the first sight of the Ideas together, by bare Intuition, without the intervention of any other Idea; and this kind of knowledge is the clearest, and most certain, that humane Frailty is capable of.” (4.2.1, 531). The second degree of knowledge is called demonstrative. Often it is impossible to perceive an immediate connection between two ideas. For example, most of us are unable to tell that the three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles simply by looking at them. But most of us, with the assistance of a mathematics teacher, can be made to see that they are equal by means of a geometric proof or demonstration. This is the model for demonstrative knowledge. Even if one is unable to directly perceive a relation between idea-X and idea-Y one might perceive a relation indirectly by means of idea-A and idea-B. This will be possible if the agent has intuitive knowledge of a connection between X and A, between A and B, and then between B and Y. Demonstrative knowledge consists, therefore, in a string of relations each of which is known intuitively.

The third degree of knowledge is called sensitive knowledge and has been the source of considerable debate and confusion among Locke commentators. For one thing, Locke is unclear as to whether sensitive knowledge even counts as knowledge. He writes that intuitive and demonstrative knowledge are, properly speaking, the only forms of knowledge, but that “There is, indeed, another Perception of the Mind…which going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the name of Knowledge.” (4.2.14, 537). Sensitive knowledge has to do with the relationship between our ideas and the objects in the external world that produce them. Locke claims that we can be certain that when we perceive something, an orange, for example, there is an object in the external world which is responsible for these sensations. Part of Locke’s claim is that there is a serious qualitative difference between biting into an orange and remembering biting into an orange. There is something in the phenomenological experience of the former which assures us of a corresponding object in the external world.

Locke spends a fair amount of time in Book IV responding to worries that he is a skeptic or that his account of knowledge, with its emphasis on ideas, fails to be responsive to the external world. The general worry for Locke is fairly simple. By claiming that ideas are the only things humans have epistemic access to, and by claiming that knowledge relates only to our ideas, Locke seems to rule out the claim that we can ever know about the external world. Lockean agents are trapped behind a “veil of ideas.” Thus we cannot have any assurance that our ideas provide us with reliable information about the external world. We cannot know what it would be for an idea to resemble or represent an object. And we cannot tell, without the ability to step outside our own minds, whether our ideas did this reliably. This criticism has historically been thought to endanger Locke’s entire project. Gilbert Ryle’s memorable assessment is that “nearly every youthful student of philosophy both can and does in his second essay refute Locke’s entire Theory of Knowledge.” Recent scholarship has been much more charitable to Locke. But the central problem is still a pressing one.

Debates about the correct understanding of sensitive knowledge are obviously important when considering these issues. At first blush, the relation involved in sensitive knowledge seems to be a relation between an idea and a physical object in the world. But, if this reading is correct, then it becomes difficult to understand the many passages in which Locke insists that knowledge is a relation that holds only between ideas. Also relevant are debates about how to correctly understand Lockean ideas. Recall from above that although many understand ideas as mental objects, some understand them as mental acts. While most of the text seems to favor the first interpretation, it seems that the second interpretation has a significant advantage when responding to these skeptical worries. The reason is that the connection between ideas and external world objects is built right into the definition of an idea. An idea just is a perception of an external world object.

However the debates discussed in the previous paragraph are resolved, there is a consensus among commentators that Locke believes the scope of human understanding is very narrow. Humans are not capable of very much knowledge. Locke discusses this is 4.3, a chapter entitled “Extent of Humane Knowledge.” The fact that our knowledge is so limited should come as no surprise. We have already discussed the ways in which our ideas of substances are problematic. And we have just seen that we have no real understanding of the connection between our ideas and the objects that produce them.

The good news, however, is that while our knowledge might not be very extensive, it is sufficient for our needs. Locke’s memorable nautical metaphor holds that: “’Tis of great use to the Sailor to know the length of his Line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the Ocean. ‘Tis well he knows, that it is long enough to reach the bottom, at such Places, as are necessary to direct his Voyage, and caution him against running upon Shoales, that may ruin him. Our Business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our Conduct.” (1.1.6, 46). Locke thinks we have enough knowledge to live comfortable lives on Earth, to realize that there is a God, to understand morality and behave appropriately, and to gain salvation. Our knowledge of morality, in particular, is very good. Locke even suggests that we might develop a demonstrable system of morality similar to Euclid’s demonstrable system of geometry. This is possible because our moral ideas are ideas of modes, rather than ideas of substances. And our ideas of modes do much better on Locke’s eval‎uative scheme than our ideas of substances do. Finally, while the limits to our knowledge might be disappointing, Locke notes that recognizing these limits is important and useful insofar as it will help us to better organize our intellectual inquiry. We will be saved from investigating questions which we could never know the answers to and can focus our efforts on areas where progress is possible.

One benefit of Locke’s somewhat bleak assessment of the scope of our knowledge was that it caused him to focus on an area which was underappreciated by many of his contemporaries. This was the arena of judgment or opinion, belief states which fall short of knowledge. Given that we have so little knowledge (that we can be certain of so little) the realm of probability becomes very important. Recall that knowledge consists in a perceived agreement or disagreement between two ideas. Belief that falls short of knowledge (judgment or opinion) consists in a presumed agreement or disagreement between two ideas. Consider an example: I am not entirely sure who the Prime Minister of Canada is, but I am somewhat confident it is Stephen Harper. Locke’s claim is that in judging that the Canadian PM is Stephen Harper I am acting as though a relation holds between the two ideas. I do not directly perceive a connection between my idea of Stephen Harper and my idea of the Canadian PM, but I presume that one exists.

After offering this account of what judgment is, Locke offers an analysis of how and why we form the opinions we do and offers some recommendations for forming our opinions responsibly. This includes a diagnosis of the errors people make in judging, a discussion of the different degrees of assent, and an interesting discussion of the epistemic value of testimony.

3. Special Topics in the Essay

As discussed above, the main project of the Essay is an examination of the human understanding and an analysis of knowledge. But the Essay is a rather expansive work and contains discussion of many other topics of philosophical interest. Some of these will be discussed below. A word of warning, however, is required before proceeding. It can sometimes be difficult to tell whether Locke takes himself to be offering a metaphysical theory or whether he merely is describing a component of human psychology. For example, we might question whether his account of personal identity is meant to give necessary and sufficient conditions for a metaphysical account of personhood or whether it is merely designed to tell us what sorts of identity attributions we do and should make and why. We may further question whether, when discussing primary and secondary qualities, Locke is offering a theory about how perception really works or whether this discussion is a mere digression used to illustrate a point about the nature of our ideas. So while many of these topics have received a great deal of attention, their precise relationship to the main project of the Essay can be difficult to locate.

a. Primary and Secondary Qualities

Book 2, Chapter 8 of the Essay contains an extended discussion of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Locke was hardly original in making this distinction. By the time the Essay was published, it had been made by many others and was even somewhat commonplace. That said, Locke’s formulation of the distinction and his analysis of the related issues has been tremendously influential and has provided the framework for much of the subsequent discussion on the topic.

Locke defines a quality as a power that a body has to produce ideas in us. So a simple object like a baked potato which can produce ideas of brownness, heat, ovular shape, solidity, and determinate size must have a series of corresponding qualities. There must be something in the potato which gives us the idea of brown, something in the potato which gives us the idea of ovular shape, and so on. The primary/secondary quality distinction claims that some of these qualities are very different from others.

Locke motivates the distinction between two types of qualities by discussing how a body could produce an idea in us. The theory of perception endorsed by Locke is highly mechanical. All perception occurs as a result of motion and collision. If I smell the baked potato, there must be small material particles which are flying off of the potato and bumping into nerves in my nose, the motion in the nose-nerves causes a chain reaction along my nervous system until eventually there is some motion in my brain and I experience the idea of a certain smell. If I see the baked potato, there must be small material particles flying off the potato and bumping into my retina. That bumping causes a similar chain reaction which ends in my experience of a certain roundish shape.

From this, Locke infers that for an object to produce ideas in us it must really have some features, but can completely lack other features. This mechanical theory of perception requires that objects producing ideas in us have shape, extension, mobility, and solidity. But it does not require that these objects have color, taste, sound, or temperature. So the primary qualities are qualities actually possessed by bodies. These are features that a body cannot be without. The secondary qualities, by contrast, are not really had by bodies. They are just ways of talking about the ideas that can be produced in us by bodies in virtue of their primary qualities. So when we claim that the baked potato is solid, this means that solidity is one of its fundamental features. But when I claim that it smells a certain earthy kind of way, this just means that its fundamental features are capable of producing the idea of the earthy smell in my mind.

These claims lead to Locke’s claims about resemblance: “From whence I think it is easie to draw this Observation, That the Ideas of primary Qualities of Bodies, are Resemblances of them, and their Patterns do really exist in the Bodies themselves; but the Ideas, produced in us by these Secondary Qualities, have no resemblance of them at all.” (2.8.14, 137). Insofar as my idea of the potato is of something solid, extended, mobile, and possessing a certain shape my idea accurately captures something about the real nature of the potato. But insofar as my idea of the potato is of something with a particular smell, temperature, and taste my ideas do not accurately capture mind-independent facts about the potato.

b. Mechanism

Around the time of the Essay the mechanical philosophy was emerging as the predominant theory about the physical world. The mechanical philosophy held that the fundamental entities in the physical world were small individual bodies called corpuscles. Each corpuscle was solid, extended, and had a certain shape. These corpuscles could combine together to form ordinary objects like rocks, tables, and plants. The mechanical philosophy argued that all features of bodies and all natural phenomena could be explained by appeal to these corpuscles and their basic properties (in particular, size, shape, and motion).

Locke was exposed to the mechanical philosophy while at Oxford and became acquainted with the writings of its most prominent advocates. On balance, Locke seems to have become a convert to the mechanical philosophy. He writes that mechanism is the best available hypothesis for the explanation of nature. We have already seen some of the explanatory work done by mechanism in the Essay. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities was a hallmark of the mechanical philosophy and neatly dovetailed with mechanist accounts of perception. Locke reaffirms his commitment to this account of perception at a number of other points in the Essay. And when discussing material objects Locke is very often happy to allow that they are composed of material corpuscles. What is peculiar, however, is that while the Essay does seem to have a number of passages in which Locke supports mechanical explanations and speaks highly of mechanism, it also contains some highly critical remarks about mechanism and discussions of the limits of the mechanical philosophy.

Locke’s critiques of mechanism can be divided into two strands. First, he recognized that there were a number of observed phenomena which mechanism struggled to explain. Mechanism did offer neat explanations of some observed phenomena. For example, the fact that objects could be seen but not smelled through glass could be explained by positing that the corpuscles which interacted with our retinas were smaller than the ones which interacted with our nostrils. So the sight corpuscles could pass through the spaces between the glass corpuscles, but the smell corpuscles would be turned away. But other phenomena were harder to explain. Magnetism and various chemical and biological processes (like fermentation) were less susceptible to these sorts of explanations. And universal gravitation, which Locke took Newton to have proved the existence of in the Principia, was particularly hard to explain. Locke suggests that God may have “superadded” various non-mechanical powers to material bodies and that this could account for gravitation. (Indeed, at several points he even suggests that God may have superadded the power of thought to matter and that humans might be purely material beings.)

Locke’s second set of critiques pertain to theoretical problems in the mechanical philosophy. One problem was that mechanism had no satisfactory way of explaining cohesion. Why do corpuscles sometimes stick together? If things like tables and chairs are just collections of small corpuscles then they should be very easy to break apart, the same way I can easily separate one group of marbles from another. Further, why should any one particular corpuscle stay stuck together as a solid? What accounts for its cohesion? Again, mechanism seems hard-pressed to offer an answer. Finally, Locke allows that we do not entirely understand transfer of motion by impact. When one corpuscle collides with another we actually do not have a very satisfying explanation for why the second moves away under the force of the impact.

Locke presses these critiques with some skill and in a serious manner. Still, ultimately he is guardedly optimistic about mechanism. This somewhat mixed attitude on Locke’s part has led commentators to debate questions about his exact attitude toward the mechanical philosophy and his motivations for discussing it.

c. Volition and Agency

In Book 2, Chapter 21 of the Essay Locke explores the topic of the will. One of the things which separates people from rocks and billiard balls is our ability to make decisions and control our actions. We feel that we are free in certain respects and that we have the power to choose certain thoughts and actions. Locke calls this power the will. But there are tricky questions about what this power consists in and about what it takes to freely (or voluntarily) choose something. 2.21 contains a delicate and sustained discussion of these tricky questions.

Locke first begins with questions of freedom and then proceeds to a discussion of the will. On Locke’s analysis, we are free to do those things which we both will to do and are physically capable of doing. For example, if I wish to jump into a lake and have no physical maladies which prevent it, then I am free to jump into the lake. By contrast, if I do not wish to jump into the lake, but a friend pushes me in, I did not act freely when I entered the water. Or, if I wish to jump into the lake, but have a spinal injury and cannot move my body, then I do not act freely when I stay on the shore. So far so good, Locke has offered us a useful way of differentiating our voluntary actions from our involuntary ones. But there is still a pressing question about freedom and the will: that of whether the will is itself free. When I am deciding whether or not to jump into the water, is the will determined by outside factors to choose one or the other? Or can it, so to speak, make up its own mind and choose either option?

Locke’s initial position in the chapter is that the will is determined. But in later sections he offers a qualification of sorts. In normal circumstances, the will is determined by what Locke calls uneasiness: “What is it that determines the Will in regard to our Actions? … some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness a Man is at present under. That is that which successively determines the Will, and sets us upon those Actions, we perform.” (2.21.31, 250-1). The uneasiness is caused by the absence of something that is perceived as good. The perception of the thing as good gives rise to a desire for that thing. Suppose I choose to eat a slice of pizza. Locke would say I must have made this choice because the absence of the pizza was troubling me somehow (I was feeling hunger pains, or longing for something savory) and this discomfort gave rise to a desire for food. That desire in turn determined my will to choose to eat pizza.

Locke’s qualification to this account of the will being determined by uneasiness has to do with what he calls suspension. Beginning with the second edition of the Essay, Locke began to argue that the most pressing desire for the most part determines the will, but not always: “For the mind having in most cases, as is evident in Experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after another, is at liberty to consider the objects of them; examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others.” (2.21.47, 263). So even if, at this moment, my desire for pizza is the strongest desire, Locke thinks I can pause before I decide to eat the pizza and consider the decision. I can consider other items in my desire set: my desire to lose weight, or to leave the pizza for my friend, or to keep a vegan diet. Careful consideration of these other possibilities might have the effect of changing my desire set. If I really focus on how important it is to stay fit and healthy by eating nutritious foods then my desire to leave the pizza might become stronger than my desire to eat it and my will may be determined to choose to not eat the pizza. But of course we can always ask whether a person has a choice whether or not to suspend judgment or whether the suspension of judgment is itself determined by the mind’s strongest desire. On this point Locke is somewhat vague. While most interpreters think our desires determine when judgment is suspended, some others disagree and argue that suspension of judgment offers Lockean agents a robust form of free will.

d. Personhood and Personal Identity

Locke was one of the first philosophers to give serious attention to the question of personal identity. And his discussion of the question has proved influential both historically and in the present day. The discussion occurs in the midst of Locke’ larger discussion of the identity conditions for various entities in Book II, Chapter 27. At heart, the question is simple, what makes me the same person as the person who did certain things in the past and that will do certain things in the future? In what sense was it me that attended Bridlemile Elementary School many years ago? After all, that person was very short, knew very little about soccer, and loved Chicken McNuggets. I, on the other hand, am average height, know tons of soccer trivia, and get rather queasy at the thought of eating chicken, especially in nugget form. Nevertheless, it is true that I am identical to the boy who attended Bridlemile.

In Locke’s time, the topic of personal identity was important for religious reasons. Christian doctrine held that there was an afterlife in which virtuous people would be rewarded in heaven and sinful people would be punished in hell. This scheme provided motivation for individuals to behave morally. But, for this to work, it was important that the person who is rewarded or punished is the same person as the one who lived virtuously or lived sinfully. And this had to be true even though the person being rewarded or punished had died, had somehow continued to exist in an afterlife, and had somehow managed to be reunited with a body. So it was important to get the issue of personal identity right.

Locke’s views on personal identity involve a negative project and a positive project. The negative project involves arguing against the view that personal identity consists in or requires the continued existence of a particular substance. And the positive project involves defending the view that personal identity consists in continuity of consciousness. We can begin with this positive view. Locke defines a person as “a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it.” (2.27.9, 335).  Locke suggests here that part of what makes a person the same through time is their ability to recognize past experiences as belonging to them. For me, part of what differentiates one little boy who attended Bridlemile Elementary from all the other children who went there is my realization that I share in his consciousness. Put differently, my access to his lived experience at Bridlemile is very different from my access to the lived experiences of others there: it is first-personal and immediate. I recognize his experiences there as part of a string of experiences that make up my life and join up to my current self and current experiences in a unified way. That is what makes him the same person as me.

Locke believes that this account of personal identity as continuity of consciousness obviates the need for an account of personal identity given in terms of substances. A traditional view held that there was a metaphysical entity, the soul, which guaranteed personal identity through time; wherever there was the same soul, the same person would be there as well. Locke offers a number of thought experiments to cast doubt on this belief and show that his account is superior. For example, if a soul was wiped clean of all its previous experiences and given new ones (as might be the case if reincarnation were true), the same soul would not justify the claim that all of those who had had it were the same person. Or, we could imagine two souls who had their conscious experiences completely swapped. In this case, we would want to say that the person went with the conscious experiences and did not remain with the soul.

Locke’s account of personal identity seems to be a deliberate attempt to move away from some of the metaphysical alternatives and to offer an account which would be acceptable to individuals from a number of different theological backgrounds. Of course, a number of serious challenges have been raised for Locke’s account.. Most of these focus on the crucial role seemingly played by memory. And the precise details of Locke’s positive proposal in 2.27 have been hard to pin down. Nevertheless, many contemporary philosophers believe that there is an important kernel of truth in Locke’s analysis.

e. Real and Nominal Essences

Locke’s distinction between the real essence of a substance and the nominal essence of a substance is one of the most fascinating components of the Essay. Scholastic philosophers had held that the main goal of metaphysics and science was to learn about the essences of things: the key metaphysical components of things which explained all of their interesting features. Locke thought this project was misguided. That sort of knowledge, knowledge of the real essences of beings, was unavailable to human beings. This led Locke to suggest an alternative way to understand and investigate nature; he recommends focusing on the nominal essences of things.

When Locke introduces the term real essence he uses it to refer to the “real constitution of any Thing, which is the foundation of all those Properties, that are combined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with [an object]” (3.6.6, 442). For the Scholastics this real essence would be an object’s substantial form. For proponents of the mechanical philosophy it would be the number and arrangement of the material corpuscles which composed the body. Locke sometimes endorses this latter understanding of real essence. But he insists that these real essences are entirely unknown and undiscoverable by us. The nominal essences, by contrast, are known and are the best way we have to understand individual substances. Nominal essences are just collections of all the observed features an individual thing has. So the nominal essence of a piece of gold would include the ideas of yellowness, a certain weight, malleability, dissolvability in certain chemicals, and so on.

Locke offers us a helpful analogy to illustrate the difference between real and nominal essences. He suggests that our position with respect to ordinary objects is like the position of someone looking at a very complicated clock. The gears, wheels, weights, and pendulum that produce the motions of the hands on the clock face (the clock’s real essence) are unknown to the person. They are hidden behind the casing. He or she can only know about the observable features like the clock’s shape, the movement of the hands, and the chiming of the hours (the clock’s nominal essence). Similarly, when I look at an object like a dandelion, I am only able to observe its nominal essence (the yellow color, the bitter smell, and so forth). I have no clear idea what produces these features of the dandelion or how they are produced.

Locke’s views on real and nominal essences have important consequences for his views about the division of objects into groups and sorts. Why do we consider some things to be zebras and other things to be rabbits? Locke’s view is that we group according to nominal essence, not according to (unknown) real essence. But this has the consequence that our groupings might fail to adequately reflect whatever real distinctions there might be in nature. So Locke is not a realist about species or types. Instead, he is a conventionalist. We project these divisions on the world when we choose to classify objects as falling under the various nominal essences we’ve created.

f. Religious Epistemology

The epistemology of religion (claims about our understanding of God and our duties with respect to him) were tremendously contentious during Locke’s lifetime. The English Civil War, fought during Locke’s youth, was in large part a disagreement over the right way to understand the Christian religion and the requirements of religious faith. Throughout the seventeenth century, a number of fundamentalist Christian sects continually threatened the stability of English political life. And the status of Catholic and Jewish people in England was a vexed one.

So the stakes were very high when, in 4.18, Locke discussed the nature of faith and reason and their respective domains. He defines reason as an attempt to discover certainty or probability through the use of our natural faculties in the investigation of the world. Faith, by contrast, is certainty or probability attained through a communication believed to have come, originally, from God. So when Smith eats a potato chip and comes to believe it is salty, she believes this according to reason. But when Smith believes that Joshua made the sun stand still in the sky because she read it in the Bible (which she takes to be divine revelation), she believes according to faith.

Although it initially sounds as though Locke has carved out quite separate roles for faith and reason, it must be noted that these definitions make faith subordinate to reason in a subtle way. For, as Locke explains: “Whatever GOD hath revealed, is certainly true; no Doubt can be made of it. This is the proper Object of Faith: But whether it be a divine Revelation, or no, Reason must judge; which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to entertain Probability in opposition to Knowledge and Certainty.” (4.18.10, 695). First, Locke thinks that if any proposition, even one which purports to be divinely revealed, clashes with the clear evidence of reason then it should not be believed. So, even if it seems like God is telling us that 1+1=3, Locke claims we should go on believing that 1+1=2 and we should deny that the 1+1=3 revelation was genuine. Second, Locke thinks that to determine whether or not something is divinely revealed we have to exercise our reason. How can we tell whether the Bible contains God’s direct revelation conveyed through the inspired Biblical authors or whether it is instead the work of mere humans? Only reason can help us settle that question. Locke thinks that those who ignore the importance of reason in determining what is and is not a matter of faith are guilty of “enthusiasm.” And in a chapter added to later editions of the Essay Locke sternly warns his readers against the serious dangers posed by this intellectual vice.

In all of this Locke emerges as a strong moderate. He himself was deeply religious and took religious faith to be important. But he also felt that there were serious limits to what could be justified through appeals to faith. The issues discussed in this section will be very important below where Locke’s views on the importance of religious toleration are discussed.

4. Political Philosophy

Locke lived during a very eventful time in English politics. The Civil War, Interregnum, Restoration, Exclusion Crisis, and Glorious Revolution all happened during his lifetime. For much of his life Locke held administrative positions in government and paid very careful attention to contemporary debates in political theory. So it is perhaps unsurprising that he wrote a number of works on political issues. In this field, Locke is best known for his arguments in favor of religious toleration and limited government. Today these ideas are commonplace and widely accepted. But in Locke’s time they were highly innovative, even radical.

a. 두 논문

로크의 《정부에 관한 두 논문》은 1689년에 출판되었다. 원래는 영광스러운 혁명과 윌리엄의 왕위 계승을 방어하기 위한 것으로 생각되었습니다. 그러나 이제 우리는 그것들이 실제로 훨씬 더 일찍 작곡되었다는 것을 알고 있습니다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 그들은 윌리엄의 지지자들 중 다수가 정부에 순응할 수 있는 견해를 제시한다.

첫 번째 논문은 이제 주로 역사적 관심의 대상입니다. 로버트 필머(Robert Filmer)의 파트리아차(Patriacha)라는 작품에 대한 상세한 비평의 형태를 취합니다. 필머는 다소 정교하지 않은 방식으로 신성한 우익 군주제를 옹호하는 주장을 펼쳤다. 그의 견해에 따르면, 왕의 권세는 궁극적으로 하나님께서 아담에게 주신 통치권에서 비롯되었으며, 그 지배권은 여러 세대에 걸쳐 끊어지지 않는 사슬로 전해져 내려왔다. 로크는 여러 가지 역사적 근거를 들어 이 그림에 이의를 제기한다. 어쩌면 더 중요한 것은, 로크가 필머가 함께 운영했던 여러 가지 다른 유형의 지배 또는 통치 권력을 구별하고 있다는 점이다.

로크는 제1논문에서 어느 정도 근거를 정리한 후, 훨씬 더 잘 알려진 제2논문에서 정부의 본질에 대한 긍정적인 견해를 제시한다. 이 책에서 로크의 전략 중 하나는 정부의 기원에 대한 다른 설명을 제공하는 것이었다. 필머는 인간이 항상 정치권력에 종속되어 있었다고 주장한 반면, 로크는 그 반대를 주장한다. 그에 따르면, 인간은 원래 자연 상태에 있었다. 자연 상태는 정부가 없고 각 개인이 자신의 모든 자연권을 유지한다는 의미에서 비정치적이었다. 사람들이 이러한 자연적 권리(생명을 보존하려고 할 권리, 주인 없는 귀중품을 압류할 권리 등을 포함하여)를 소유할 수 있었던 것은 그러한 권리들이 하느님께서 그분의 백성 모두에게 주신 것이기 때문입니다.

자연 상태는 본질적으로 불안정했다. 개인은 신체적 상해의 끊임없는 위협에 시달리게 될 것이다. 그리고 그들은 안정과 다른 인간들과의 광범위한 협력을 필요로 하는 어떤 목표도 추구할 수 없을 것이다. 로크의 주장은 정부가 이러한 맥락에서 생겨났다는 것이다. 개인들은 얻을 수 있는 이익을 보고 다른 권리는 유지하면서 일부 권리를 중앙 권력에 양도하기로 결정했다. 이것은 계약의 형태를 취했다. 특정 권리를 포기하는 것에 대한 동의에 따라 개인은 신체적 손상으로부터 보호받고, 소유물에 대한 안전, 안정적인 환경에서 다른 사람들과 상호 작용하고 협력할 수 있는 능력을 받게 됩니다.

따라서 이 견해에 따르면, 정부는 그 정부의 시민들에 의해 설립되었다. 이것은 여러 가지 매우 중요한 결과를 낳습니다. 이러한 관점에서 통치자는 이러한 시민들의 필요와 욕구에 부응할 의무가 있다. 더욱이, 정부를 수립할 때 시민들은 그들의 본래 권리의 전부는 아니었지만 일부를 포기하였다. 따라서 어떤 통치자도 시민 생활의 모든 요소에 대해 절대적인 권력을 행사할 수 없었습니다. 이것은 특정한 개인의 권리나 자유를 위한 중요한 공간을 개척했다. 마지막으로, 아마도 가장 중요한 것은, 시민의 권리와 이익을 적절히 보호하지 못한 정부나 권한을 넘어서려고 시도하는 정부는 그 정부가 창설된 목적을 수행하지 못하는 것입니다. 따라서 시민들은 반란을 일으켜 기존 정부를 개인의 권리를 존중하면서 평화와 시민 질서를 보장하는 의무를 적절하게 수행할 수 있는 정부로 교체할 권리가 있다.

그래서 로크는 자연권에 대한 설명과 계약을 통해 만들어진 정부를 사용하여 여러 가지 중요한 임무를 수행할 수 있었다. 그는 그것을 사용하여 개인이 정부의 지배를 받을 때에도 특정한 권리를 유지하는 이유를 설명할 수 있습니다. 그는 시민의 권리를 부당하게 침해하려고 시도하는 독재 정부가 왜 나쁜지를 설명하기 위해 그것을 사용할 수 있었다. 그리고 그는 정부가 특정한 방식으로 실패했을 때 시민들이 반란을 일으킬 권리가 있다는 것을 보여주기 위해 그것을 사용할 수 있었다. 이러한 아이디어는 오늘날에도 여전히 중요한 강력한 아이디어입니다.

더 많은 것을 위해. 정치 철학 문서를 참조하십시오.

b. 재산

로크의 정부에 관한 제2논문은 사유재산의 본질에 대한 영향력 있는 설명을 담고 있다. 로크에 따르면, 신은 인간에게 세계와 그 내용물이 공통적으로 가질 수 있는 것을 주었다. 세상은 인간에게 생명의 지속과 즐거움에 필요한 것을 공급해 주어야 하였습니다. 그러나 로크는 또한 개인이 세계의 개별 부분을 전유하고 자신의 독점적 사용을 위해 정당하게 보유하는 것이 가능하다고 믿었다. 달리 말하자면, 로크는 우리가 사유재산을 취득할 권리가 있다고 믿었다.

로크의 주장은 우리가 우리의 노동을 어떤 천연자원과 혼합함으로써 재산을 획득한다는 것이다. 예를 들어, 포도나무에서 자라는 포도를 발견하면 그 포도를 따고 모으는 노동을 통해 포도에 대한 소유권을 얻습니다. 빈 밭을 찾은 다음 노동력으로 밭을 갈고 작물을 심고 키운다면 나는 그 작물의 올바른 소유자가 될 것입니다. 내가 주인 없는 숲에서 나무를 베어 그 나무로 식탁을 만든다면, 그 식탁은 내 것이 될 것이다. 로크는 자신의 노동과 천연자원을 혼합하여 재산을 취득할 수 있는 방법에 두 가지 중요한 제한을 둔다. 첫째, 폐기물 단서(Waste Proviso)로 알려지게 된 것이 있습니다. 너무 많은 재산을 가져다가 그 중 일부가 낭비되어서는 안 됩니다. 몇 개만 먹고 나머지는 썩어버린다면 포도 몇 갤런과 갤런을 전유해서는 안 됩니다. 만약 지구의 재화가 신에 의해 우리에게 주어졌다면, 이 선물의 일부를 낭비하도록 내버려 두는 것은 부적절할 것이다. 둘째, Enough-And-As-Good 단서가 있습니다. 이것은 자원을 전유할 때 다른 사람들이 충당할 수 있도록 충분하고 좋은 것을 남겨야 한다는 것을 말합니다. 만일 하나님께서 세상을 우리에게 공동으로 남겨 놓으셨다면, 나의 정당한 몫보다 더 많이 사용하고 다른 사람들을 위해 충분한 자원을 남겨 두지 않는 것은 잘못일 것이다.

화폐가 도입되고 정부가 수립된 후에는 재산의 성격이 크게 변한다. 동전으로 만들 수 있고 식품이나 다른 상품들처럼 소멸되지 않는 금속을 사용하여, 개인들은 그렇지 않은 경우보다 훨씬 더 많은 부를 축적할 수 있다. 따라서 폐기물에 관한 단서가 떨어지는 것 같습니다. 그리고 특정 정부는 재산 취득 및 분배에 관한 규칙을 제정할 수 있습니다. 로크는 이 점을 알고 있었고 재산의 본질과 연방 내에서의 재산의 적절한 분배에 대해 많은 생각을 했다. 경제, 통화 정책, 자선 및 사회 복지 시스템에 대한 그의 저술이 이에 대한 증거입니다. 그러나 커먼웰스 내부의 재산에 대한 로크의 견해는 자연 상태에서의 재산의 최초 취득에 대한 로크의 견해보다 훨씬 덜 주목을 받았다.

c. Toleration

Locke had been systematically thinking about issues relating to religious toleration since his early years in London and even though he only published his Epistola de Tolerantia (A Letter Concerning Toleration) in 1689 he had finished writing it several years before. The question of whether or not a state should attempt to prescribe one particular religion within the state, what means states might use to do so, and what the correct attitude should be toward those who resist conversion to the official state religion had been central to European politics ever since the Protestant Reformation. Locke’s time in England, France, and the Netherlands had given him experiences of three very different approaches to these questions. These experiences had convinced him that, for the most part, individuals should be allowed to practice their religion without interference from the state. Indeed, part of the impetus for the publication of Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration came from Louis XIV’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which took away the already limited rights of Protestants in France and exposed them to state persecution.

It is possible to see Locke’s arguments in favor of toleration as relating both to the epistemological views of the Essay and the political views of the Two Treatises. Relating to Locke’s epistemological views, recall from above that Locke thought the scope of human knowledge was extremely restricted. We might not be particularly good at determining what the correct religion is. There is no reason to think that those holding political power will be any better at discovering the true religion than anyone else, so they should not attempt to enforce their views on others. Instead, each individual should be allowed to pursue true beliefs as best as they are able. Little harm results from allowing others to have their own religious beliefs.  Indeed, it might be beneficial to allow a plurality of beliefs because one group might end up with the correct beliefs and win others over to their side.

Relating to Locke’s political views, as expressed in the Two Treatises, Locke endorses toleration on the grounds that the enforcement of religious conformity is outside the proper scope of government. People consent to governments for the purpose of establishing social order and the rule of law. Governments should refrain from enforcing religious conformity because doing so is unnecessary and irrelevant for these ends. Indeed, attempting to enforce conformity may positively harm these ends as it will likely lead to resistance from members of prohibited religions. Locke also suggests that governments should tolerate the religious beliefs of individual citizens because enforcing religious belief is actually impossible. Acceptance of a certain religion is an inward act, a function of one’s beliefs. But governments are designed to control people’s actions. So governments are, in many ways, ill-equipped to enforce the adoption of a particular religion because individual people have an almost perfect control of their own thoughts.

While Locke’s views on toleration were very progressive for the time and while his views do have an affinity with our contemporary consensus on the value of religious toleration it is important to recognize that Locke did place some severe limits on toleration. He did not think that we should tolerate the intolerant, those who would seek to forcibly impose their religious views on others. Similarly, any religious group who posed a threat to political stability or public safety should not be tolerated. Importantly, Locke included Roman Catholics in this group. On his view, Catholics had a fundamental allegiance to the Pope, a foreign prince who did not recognize the sovereignty of English law. This made Catholics a threat to civil government and peace. Finally, Locke also believed that atheists should not be tolerated. Because they did not believe they would be rewarded or punished for their actions in an afterlife, Locke did not think they could be trusted to behave morally or maintain their contractual obligations.

5. Theology

We have already seen that in the Essay Locke developed an account of belief according to faith and belief according to reason. Recall that an agent believes according to reason when she discovers something through the use of her natural faculties and she believes according to faith when she takes something as truth because she understands it to be a message from God. Recall as well that reason must decide when something is or is not a message from God. The goal of Locke’s The Reasonableness of Christianity is to show that it is reasonable to be a Christian. Locke argues that we do have sufficient reason to think that the central truths of Christianity were communicated to us by God through his messenger, Jesus of Nazareth.

For Locke’s project to succeed he needed to show that Jesus provided his original followers with sufficient evidence that he was a legitimate messenger from God. Given that numerous individuals in history had purported to be the recipients of divine revelation, there must be something special which set Jesus apart. Locke offers two considerations in this regard. The first is that Jesus fulfilled a number of historical predictions concerning the coming of a Messiah. The second is that Jesus performed a number of miracles which attest that he had a special relationship to God. Locke also claims that we have sufficient reason to believe that these miracles actually occurred on the basis of testimony from those who witnessed them first-hand and a reliable chain of reporting from Jesus’ time into our own. This argument leads Locke into a discussion of the types and value of testimony which many philosophers have found to be interesting in its own right.

One striking feature of The Reasonableness of Christianity is the requirement for salvation that Locke endorses. Disputes about which precise beliefs were necessary for salvation and eternal life in Heaven were at the core of much religious disagreement in Locke’s time. Different denominations and sects claimed that they, and often only they, had the correct beliefs. Locke, by contrast, argued that to be a true Christian and worthy of salvation an individual only need to believe one simple truth: that Jesus is the Messiah. Of course, Locke believed there were many other important truths in the Bible. But he thought these other truths, especially those contained in the Epistles rather than the Gospels, could be difficult to interpret and could lead to disputes and disagreement. The core tenet of Christianity, however, that Jesus is the Messiah, was a mandatory belief.

In making the requirements for Christian faith and salvation so minimal Locke was part of a growing faction in the Church of England. These individuals, often known as latitudinarians, were deliberately attempting to construct a more irenic Christianity with the goal of avoiding the conflict and controversy that previous internecine fights had produced. So Locke was hardly alone in attempting to find a set of core Christian commitments which were free of sectarian theological baggage. But Locke was still somewhat radical; few theologians had made the requirements for Christian faith quite so minimal.

6. Education

Locke was regarded by many in his time as an expert on educational matters. He taught many students at Oxford and also served as a private tutor. Locke’s correspondence shows that he was constantly asked to recommend tutors and offer pedagogical advice. Locke’s expertise led to his most important work on the subject: Some Thoughts Concerning Education. The work had its origins in a series of letters Locke wrote to Edward Clarke offering advice on the education of Clarke’s children and was first published in 1693.

Locke’s views on education were, for the time, quite forward-looking. Classical languages, usually learned through tedious exercises involving rote memorization, and corporeal punishment were two predominant features of the seventeenth century English educational system. Locke saw little use for either. Instead, he emphasized the importance of teaching practical knowledge. He recognized that children learn best when they are engaged with the subject matter. Locke also foreshadowed some contemporary pedagogical views by suggesting that children should be allowed some self-direction in their course of study and should have the ability to pursue their interests.

Locke believed it was important to take great care in educating the young. He recognized that habits and prejudices formed in youth could be very hard to break in later life. Thus, much of Some Thoughts Concerning Education focuses on morality and the best ways to inculcate virtue and industry. Locke rejected authoritarian approaches. Instead, he favored methods that would help children to understand the difference between right and wrong and to cultivate a moral sense of their own.

7. Locke’s Influence

The Essay was quickly recognized as an important philosophical contribution both by its admirers and by its critics. Before long it had been incorporated into the curriculum at Oxford and Cambridge and its translation into both Latin and French garnered it an audience on the Continent as well. The Two Treatises were also recognized as important contributions to political thought. While the work had some success in England among those favorably disposed to the Glorious Revolution, its primary impact was abroad. During the American Revolution (and to a lesser extent, during the French Revolution) Locke’s views were often appealed to by those seeking to establish more representative forms of government.

Related to this last point, Locke came to be seen, alongside his friend Newton, as an embodiment of Enlightenment values and ideals. Newtonian science would lay bare the workings of nature and lead to important technological advances. Lockean philosophy would lay bare the workings of men’s minds and lead to important reforms in law and government. Voltaire played an instrumental role in shaping this legacy for Locke and worked hard to publicize Locke’s views on reason, toleration, and limited government. Locke also came to be seen as an inspiration for the Deist movement. Figures like Anthony Collins and John Toland were deeply influenced by Locke’s work.

Locke is often recognized as the founder of British Empiricism and it is true that Locke laid the foundation for much of English-language philosophy in the 18th and early 19th centuries. But those who followed in his footsteps were not unquestioning followers. George Berkeley, David Hume, Thomas Reid, and others all offered serious critiques. In recent decades, readers have attempted to offer more charitable reconstructions of Locke’s philosophy. Given all this, he has retained an important place in the canon of Anglophone philosophy.

8. References and Further Readinga. Locke’s Works

• Laslett, P. [ed.] 1988. Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Locke, J. 1823. The Works of John Locke. London: Printed for T. Tegg (10 volumes).
• Locke, J. The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke, Oxford University Press, 2015. This edition includes the following volumes:
• Nidditch, P. [ed.] 1975. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
• Nidditch, P. and G.A.J. Rogers [eds.] 1990. Drafts for the Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
• Yolton, J.W. and J.S. Yolton. [eds.] 1989. Some Thoughts Concerning Education.
• Higgins-Biddle, J.C. [ed.] 1999. The Reasonableness of Christianity.
• Milton, J.R. and P. Milton. [eds.] 2006. An Essay Concerning Toleration.
• de Beer, E.S. [ed.] 1976-1989. The Correspondence of John Locke. (8 volumes).
• von Leyden, W. [ed.] 1954. Essays on the Law of Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

b. Recommended Reading

다음은 로크에 대한 추가 읽기를 위한 권장 사항입니다. 각 작품에는 내용을 나타내는 간단한 설명이 있습니다

• Anstey, P. 2011. 존 로크 & 자연 철학. 옥스포드 : Oxford University Press.
• 로크의 과학적, 의학적 사고에 대한 철저한 검토.
• 에어즈, M. 1993. 로크: 인식론과 존재론. 뉴욕: Routledge.
• 로크 연구의 고전. 에세이에서 철학적 주제를 탐구하고 로크의 프로젝트 전체를 논의합니다. 한 권은 인식론에 관한 것이고 다른 한 권은 형이상학에 관한 것이다.
• Chappell, V. 1994년. 로크의 케임브리지 동반자. 케임브리지: 케임브리지 대학 출판부.
• 로크 사상의 모든 측면에 초점을 맞춘 일련의 에세이.
• LoLordo, A. 2012년. 로크의 도덕적 인간. 옥스포드 : Oxford University Press.
• 로크의 도덕 사상과 정치 사상의 교차점에서 주제에 대한 탐구와 토론. 특히 선택의지, 인격, 합리성에 초점을 맞춘다.
• Lowe, E.J. 2005년. 로크. 뉴욕: Routledge.
• 로크의 철학적, 정치적 사상에 대한 개관.
• Mackie, J.L. 1976년. 로크의 문제. 옥스포드 : Oxford University Press.
• 로크의 저작을 사용하여 여러 철학적 쟁점과 수수께끼를 제기하고 토론합니다.
• 뉴먼, L. 2007. 인간 이해에 관한 로크의 에세이에 대한 케임브리지 동반자. 케임브리지: 케임브리지 대학 출판부.
• 로크의 에세이의 특정 문제에 초점을 맞춘 일련의 에세이.
• 파일, A.J. 2013. 로크. 런던: 정치.
• 로크의 사상과 역사적 맥락에 대한 훌륭하고 간략한 소개. 초보자가 시작하기에 아주 좋은 곳입니다.
• Rickless, S. 2014년. 로크. 매사추세츠주 몰든: 블랙웰.
• 로크의 철학적, 정치적 사상에 대한 개관.
• 스튜어트, M. 2013. 로크의 형이상학. 옥스포드 : Oxford University Press.
• 에세이의 형이상학적 문제와 문제에 대한 심층적인 치료.
• Waldron, J. 2002년. ↑ "God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundation of Locke's Political Thought". 《신, 로크, 그리고 평등: 로크의 정치 사상의 기독교적 기초》(God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundation of Locke's Political T 케임브리지: 케임브리지 대학 출판부.
• 로크의 정치 사상에서 몇 가지 주요 쟁점에 대한 검토.
• 울하우스, R. 2009. 로크: 전기. 케임브리지: 케임브리지 대학 출판부.
• 로크의 생애에 대한 가장 최근의 전기.

작성자 정보

패트릭 J. 코놀리(Patrick J. Connolly
) 이메일: pac317@lehigh.edu
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