|
The Voyage of Philosophy : Dr.Ahn’s YOUTUBE Philosophy classroom.
Unit 25 : Leibniz' Monad and Hegel's Reflection
Hegel’s “Perception” in “Phenomenology of Mind”, Part 2. para 121 ~ para 123
1. Reflection and Monad
In the foregoing lecture (The Voyage of philosophy, Unit 24) we investigated how Hegel attempted to solve the problem of substance : The “Reflexion-into-itself intervened in the “Pure-Apprehension” and corrected it. The result was successful : “We are the universal medium”. Namely the consciousness of us collects the diverse properties into a thing, substance.
In addition, the (absolute) Ego is the only substance according to Fichte.
"We are thus the universal medium within which such moments dissociate themselves from each other, and in which each is on its own. Thereby, since we regard this determinateness (that we are the universal medium) as our reflection, we preserve the self-equality and the truth of the thing, namely, its being One. (Phenomenology p.95 para 119)
Through the reflection that “we are the universal medium” the notion of substance is declared again positive; the self-equality and unity of substance are preserved because we are the substance. Namely the active I or the consciousness takes up the role of universal thing. The properties as well as the substance are in my mind.
It is the world of “Esse est percipi” by Berkeley. Otherwise it is the world of "Everything is made by mind" in the Buddhism. However Hegel says that there is more to say about the mind-world.
The notion of thing or substance is widely applied from the matter to the spirit and God.
The thing as one and the same which here Hegel has in mind indeed suggests the monad by Leibniz because he elsewhere says of the Monad : “The monads are simple substances”. (Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, hereafter Hegel’s History of Philosophy) https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hp/hpleibni.htm
Further with the appearance of “Reflexion-into-itself” the character of “thing” or “substance” has changed; from the external substance to the internal substance. However the internal substance still is not the mind itself, i.e. self-consciousness. It is the object to the consciousness. The internal substance is above all to be thought of as the Monad, which is represented as the “spiritual atom”. Leibniz’ Monadology might be called the “spiritual atomism” or the “idealistic atomism“.
The things themselves are thus determinate in and for themselves; they have properties whereby they are differentiated from others. As the property is the thing’s own property, or a determinateness in its own self, it has multiple properties. (ibid. para 120)
According to Hegel’s “Lectures on the History of Philosophy”, the monads must at the same time have certain qualities or determinations in themselves, inner actions, through which they are distinguished from others.
The quality as “inner action” refers to Fichtean way of thinking: “All reality is active; and all the active is reality. Activity is positive reality”. (Fichte : Science of Knowledge p. 134)
In the third place, “however, these monads must at the same time have certain qualities or determinations in themselves, inner actions, through which they are distinguished from others. There cannot be two things alike, for otherwise they would not be two, they would not be different but one and the same.” Here then Leibnitz's axiom of the undistinguishable comes into words. What is not in itself distinguished is not distinguished. (Hegel’s History of Philosophy)
Even if the Monad is a simple substance, it is said to have some qualities or properties in itself. Leibniz generalizes these qualities of the Monad as “perception”. In addition, he represents the function of “perception” as “the multiplicity in the unity”.
In this way Leibniz bestowed the function of perception on the Monad. By Leibniz the perception is the totality of human spirit : Sensation, Representation, Consciousness and Self-consciousness(=Apperception).
The so-called “axiom of the undistinguishable” is the most interesting aspect of the Monadology. Monads as simple substances are from each other distinguished not only numerically but also qualitatively. Each Monad has its own perception, i.e. sensations, representations and circumstantially thoughts.
● Leibniz's principle of identity of indiscernibles is until now hot issue in philosophy. I suggest only one point regarding this principle : Mass products are all same in their content but they have their own existences. Namely they are indistinguishable in their properties however they are not distinguishable in existence. (Writer)
It is true that consciousness is itself perception, but a higher grade of the same; perceptions of consciousness Leibnitz calls apperceptions. The difference between the merely representing and the self-conscious monads Leibnitz makes one of degrees of clearness. (Hegel’s History of Philosophy)
In this regard Hegel tried to reconstruct the formation of Monadology of Leibniz in his phenomenological dialectic. In advance to say it is that (natural) consciousness made the notion of Monad. However the process is very complicated.
First and foremost Hegel represents the “axiom of the undistinguishable” by Leibniz as follows:
For, in the first place, the thing is the true, it is in itself, and what is in its own self is in its own self its own essence, not on account of others. Second, the determinate properties thus are not only on account of other things and are for other things but are on their own.(para 120)
Now the relation of thing and its properties is rightly acknowledged; the thing has its own properties and a thing is distinguished from other things through its properties.
“The properties can be indeed considered as the essence or contents of the thing”. In other words in the notion of Monad, the thing and its properties constitute the perfect unity.
“What is in its own self is its own essence, not on account of others”.
“What is in its own self” is not different from the contents of individual Monad. It is the perception of Monad, qualities of it. Naturally they are not on account of others. The (determinate) properties are not only for other things but are on their own.
● The term "determinate" refers to something evident, distinguishable, decisive and objective.
Without its properties, the thing or the Monad cannot be discernible in itself, it cannot have self-identity.
Thus Hegel appreciates fully the Law of Leibniz, i.e. the principle of identity of indiscernibles or “axiom of the undistinguishable” in Hegel’s terminology.
Conclusively the “thing” in this stage refers to the Monad of Leibniz.
A Monad is a spiritual atom which has its own world, i.e. properties. These properties make up its essence. However the properties are actually determinate properties viz. each individual property is common, universal property. Namely the element of a property set(=thing, substance) can be found in other set of property(=thing, substance).
Therefore it is said : “The determinate properties thus are not only on account of other things and for other things but are on their own”.
This all refers to the finitude of Monad as individual substance.
Here is starting the end of Monad. The determinate properties of Monad is for itself as well as for others; the universal character of the property. In this regard the Monad as simple substance is changeable, destructible, i.e. contrary to Leibniz’s assurance his Monad loses its unity and self-identity. Monad is for itself and for other. This duality of Monad is indeed its finitude.
● However all this is Hegel's own thought about Monad which is different from Leibniz.
As is totally usual in phenomenological dialectic a property is unitary in itself, universal, self-identical, relating-to-itself therefore the owner of some properties, e.g. salt, cannot be dominant over its property.
● Property means ① possession ② quality.
The substance is to be dissolved into its elements, properties. From the same reason the unity of Monad is not ascribed to itself but to the (external) consciousness, the observer. We or the consciousness thinks that the unity or identity of Monad is posited by us because the Monad has no power of collecting the manifold properties. The simplicity of the Monad is changed into a mere bundle of perceptions by Hume.
Therefore the Monad as simple substance loses its foundation.
The Monad is finite, created entity by Leibniz. In this regard there is already some problem.
In this regard Hegel designates the universal, independent character of each property : “However, this moment is the unity of the thing with itself which excludes difference from itself”. (para 121)
In the same regard the unity of consciousness is found: “Quite rightly, consciousness takes upon itself the Oneness”.(ibid)
Hegel’s argumentation is clear: Regarding Monad as true substance, the unity of thing and that of consciousness are alternatively assured. In other words Leibniz’ Monad as “the multiplicity in the unity” is analyzed into dual directions of movement.
Namely in the “appearing knowledge” of “Reflexion-into-itself” the unity of thing and then that of consciousness were alternatively established while each of them denies the other.
The consciousness is not yet developed into the self-consciousness. Differently from the self-consciousness the (natural) consciousness opposes itself to the object. It cannot find itself in the object. It cannot understand the interplay of one(substance) and many(properties) integratively, for this reason the set of ‘consciousness and thing’ is matched with the set of “one and many” functionally. In the below diagram the two ways of combinations are rightly possible, i.e. the blue link and the red link can be respectively possible. However the consciousness viz. appearing knowledge doesn’t know two way of link are performed by same player, the consciousness. The consciousness does not know himself, it contraposes itself to its object.
The truth is the movement of reciprocity from thing to consciousness vice versa. It is genuine Fichte’s way of thinking.
● Fichtean way of thinking is, roughly to say, is that the subject is divided into subject and object and then again unified, returns to itself.
consciousness and thing vs one and many
If we look back at what consciousness previously took upon itself and look at what it now takes upon itself, or look at what it had previously ascribed to the thing and what it now ascribes to itself, it turns out that it alternately makes itself, as well as the thing, into both a pure One without multiplicity and into an Also dissolved into self-sufficient matters. (para 122)
Here we can be aware of the change of paradigm i.e. from the substance and its properties to the consciousness and thing. Originally the thing was the same as the substance. In this respect we can know that the notion of thing is broader than that of substance in the Phenomenology.
With the establishment of unity of consciousness, the property is represented as “free matter”.
Free matter is a usual term in the natural science of Hegel’s time. Heat, savoriness etc., would be called “free matter”. (Jean Hyppolite: Genesis & Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit trans. by Samuel Chernik and John Hecken, p 106)
The representation of “free matter” is actually not new; it refers to the from each other indifferent properties as before.
In addition, matter is to be exchanged with property in Hegel’s terminology.
In this way, the thing is elevated into being a genuine Also, while it becomes a collection of matters and, instead of being a One, it becomes merely an enclosing surface. (Phenomenology p.97, para 121)
The representation of “enclosing surface” (“umschließende Overfläche” in German) is not different from the foregoing “univeral medium” or “thinghood” except that this phrase alludes to Fichte’s “including sphere” (“umfassende Sphäre” in German).
Consciousness, then, gets away also from this second form of perceptual procedure, that, namely, which takes the thing as the true selfsame, and itself as the reverse, as the factor that leaves sameness behind and goes back into self. Its object is now the entire process which was previously shared between the object and consciousness. The thing is a "one", reflected into self; it is for itself; but it is also for an other; and, further, it is an other for itself as it is for another. (Phenomenology p.43 par. 123)
In this respect the thing is also counted as “Reflexion-into-itself”, i.e. “the thing is essentially reflected into itself”. “The thing is One, reflected into itself”.
As over said here the thing or Monad is not objective, visible entity; it is, so to speak, internal substance. It is spiritual atom.
However the usual consciousness or common sense hardly understand the hitherto process of the thing as Reflexion, therefore it would again rather ascribe itself to synthesize oneness and diversity into the identity. Therefore the consciousness will not accept the thing as substrate. It is stated in the conjunctive mood. Common sense is so stubborn; after the unity of thing and property is achieved it still imagines itself to collect manifold properties and denies the thing the function of collecting the properties.
However, its oneness contradicts its diversity; consciousness would thereby have to take this positing-into-a-one upon itself again and keep it apart from the thing. (para 123)
However we may understand the position of common sense or (natural) consciousness in the meaning of Hegel. The problem is the unity of the opposition or contradiction. Common sense will not accept the contradiction. The rational mediation of contradiction is the first and foremost task of German Idealism.
As the number of material atom is manifold so is the spiritual atom. The plurality of monad as simple substance is structurally represented as the relation of Being-for-itself and Being-for-other. This distinction between two Monads is necessary because spiritual atom, Monad is not same in its contents, property unlike the material atoms which are all the same in quality.
The thing is One, reflected into itself; it is for itself, but it is also for an other, namely, it is an other for itself as it is for an other. The thing thereby is for itself and also for an other, a doubly diverse being, but it is also One. (para 123)
Unlike Leibniz’ Monad which has no windows, i.e. the interaction between Monads Hegel regards Monad as having external relation: Being-for-itself and Being-for-other. He goes beyond Leibniz’s conception of Monad.
After the achievement of Monad as simple substance, the contradiction of thing and its properties is transferred into that of Being-for-itself and Being-for-other.
|