01 Small Boats and Large Ships

TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE 800 _ ------ other Types A Trawlers / \ /* -Total / \ / o> 60? ~ / V APRIL o K I 2002 1 N \ A /3 400 ~ /v \/\ hV VOL 43 ? /a/ VaV// * H i A\ r /200 r n i^yr^J* 0 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 FIG. 9 Demersal catches by type of vessel, 1898-1990. (Gudmundur J Magnus S. Magnusson, eds., Hagskinna: Icelandic Historical Statistics [ 1997], 326-27, table 5.10.) had to move their operations outside territorial waters.39 When ernment extended the fishing limits unilaterally from four to tw cal miles again in 1958, it pushed the aging trawler fleet into cr trawlers' annual catch hit bottom in 1962 at 50,724 tons. In the s the motorboat fleet reported a total catch of 300,059 tons. That expanded in both numbers and average size during the fifties, a gear and engines evolved continuously as well.40 The government did not initiate another attempt to rebuild th fleet until the mid-1970s. Its aim was to create more stable empl sea and ashore in the fishing villages that earlier relied on the ev small-scale fisheries and continued to do so to a large extent, the ers notwithstanding. Figure 9 summarizes the developments discussed so far. The pe trawler catch in 1925 is easily visible, as is the lead taken by other v during the thirties. After World War II the trawlers caught up never gained a decisive advantage. The crisis of trawling in the ear 39. Jon Jonsson, Hafrannsoknir vid Island, vol. 2 (Reykjavik, 1990), 19 son, Sjdvarutvegur Islendinga, 244. 40. Catch statistics are from Statistical Abstract of Iceland, 1984 (Reykjavik fleet development information is from Jonsson, Sjdvarutvegur Islendinga, 1 Jonsson and Magnusson, Hagskinna (n. 3 above). 244 SVERRISSON I The Icelandic Fisheries, 1800-1960 apparent, as is the recovery in the mid-1970s. The development of small scale fishing continued as well, and satellite navigation, sonar devices, and computerized fishing reels joined a long succession of innovations that found a niche there. Starting in the 1960s, if not earlier, the technological constellations and social forces discussed in this article gave way to new actors and other direc tions of change. The scope of this article does not permit an in-depth analysis of these later trends. However, it can be noted that in the more diversified economy that began to evolve the position of fisheries as the main engine of growth slowly eroded. Mass education provided new, urban opportunities for the children of small-scale fishermen and processing workers. New exports were developed, ranging from aluminum to software and music. Together these developments strongly increased the attractive power of the southwest, and of Reykjavik, the capital city, in particular. As a result, the fishing villages declined, slowly at first but at an increasingly precipitous rate, a decline that persists as I write. While the fisheries have continued to develop, particularly in technological terms, they have been unable to reverse this trend. Social Conflicts and the Politics of Mechanization Two distinct sociotechnical dynamics were at work between 1900 and 1940. One shaped the flexible small-boat fisheries, while the other decided the fortunes of the trawlers. This division had its roots in the nineteenth century, as we have seen, and it continued to influence developments after World War II. The relevant actors or, to use a term suggested by Charles Edquist, the social carriers of each type of fishery operated differently at the enterprise level and at the institutional level.41 Both aspects can be seen at work in the development of vessel-owner organizations in the twentieth century. In 1916, trawler owners set up an association that played a leading role in founding the Employer's Federation of Iceland in 1934. Many motorboat owners declined to join the federation, but they did maintain their own mutual insurance societies, initially organized in each fishing village.42 Thus, while the owners of large vessels organized themselves nationally, small-boat owners relied on local associations. The main controversies over economic policy in Iceland between 1900 and 1940 pitted advocates of decentralized settlement, agriculture, craft production, and small-boat fisheries (whom I will call technological con 41. The concept of social carriers of techniques was developed by Charles Edquist in several publications in the 1980s. See, for example, Capitalism, Socialism and Technology: A Comparative Study of Cuba and Jamaica (London, 1985). 42. Gislason, Enter the Bourgeoisie (n. 26 above), 178. 245 TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE APRIL 2002 VOL. 43 servatives) against proponents of large-scale fisheries, through mass-production methods, and mechanized farm call modernizers). The debates between the conservatives izes touched the very core of national identity, as each sid position was the most progressive and patriotic.43 In a country, a part of the Kingdom of Denmark embarking would lead to complete independence, patriotism was not ical device. Nation building framed every issue?technolog and social.44 In addition, the debates between conservativ ers shaped and were shaped by class interests and politica which I now turn. The first half of the twentieth century saw continued although the resilience of fishing villages and agricultur reinforced by the motorization of the small-boat fleet, ac the process.45 But Iceland's system of representation favo fishing villages even as the internal migration to the sout ital continued. Each rural member of parliament was b cantly fewer voters than his or her counterparts from th result, the farmer-based, left-liberal Progressive Party, instrument of the technological conservatives, could com portionately large number of seats in Parliament. The socialist and communist working-class organiza tween the wars tended to side with the modernizers on te while disagreeing among themselves and with the emergi other points. Economic crisis and the approach of war in to forge an alliance with rural interests and the Progressiv ties. This brought the left into the camp of the technologi if not by conviction then for the sake of political advanta The main political vehicle of the modernizers, the righ pendence Party, was a coalition of varied petit bourgeois oriented ideologues, and conservatives of different hues sought support from a broad section of the electorate.46 diverse interests united around a rather pragmatic, even phy, the party was unable to focus exclusively on the im of trawler owners and other urban modernizers. Yet it w 43. Olafur Asgeirsson, Idnbylting hugarfarsins: Atok um atvin 1900-1940 (Reykjavik, 1988). 44. Contemporary historiography was appropriated by the nati as well, but a discussion of this lies outside the scope of this article 45. Not every community was the same, of course. See Gisli A and Loftur Guttormsson, "Household Structure and Urbanization Fishing Districts, 1880-1930," Journal of Family History 18 (1993): 3 sis of the effects on families and households of dependence on fishe 46. Svanur Kristjansson, Sjdlfstoedisflokkurinn: Klassiska timabil javik, 1979). 246 SVERRISSON I The Icelandic Fisheries, 1800-1960 likely to support them at all at this juncture. Measures that threatened the existence of small-scale producers and created privileges for trawlers and factories were, in consequence, difficult to get on the political agenda, and even more difficult to get through Parliament. Government intervention in economic life increased dramatically dur ing the 1930s in Iceland as elsewhere. But the peculiarities of the political system benefited the technological conservatives, while the modernizers were hampered by the vote-maximizing imperative during the period dis cussed in this article. The left-center alliance cemented its position during the decade, and rural and petit bourgeois interests were able to maintain a technological space for the small-scale fisheries and other craft-level pro ducers, and to resist attempts to privilege the relatively large-scale capitalist enterprises. Fisheries policy in particular was geared to helping the small boat fleet and processing units in small towns and villages. By comparison, attempts by the nearly bankrupt trawling companies to curry political favor were coldly received.47 The disjunctions created by these different and competing fisheries technologies fueled conflicts that reverberated throughout society. Each set of technologies?including not only fishing vessels but also processing sys tems?was embedded in and sustained by distinct social and economic networks. These networks formed communities, in which distinctive class structures emerged that shaped political agendas and outcomes through the party system. The significance of the postwar Reconstruction Government should be understood in this context. For the first time in its history, all of the coun try's urban and modernizing forces, both right and left, were brought together to form a government. The new government's prime minister, (Mafur Thors, would lead a total of five cabinets in his political career, the last in 1959-63. Born in 1892, the son of a merchant shipowner, at twenty one Thors became a director of one of the largest trawling companies, founded by his father. He drifted into politics, became a member of parlia ment in 1926, and served as chair of the Independence Party from 1934 to 1961. He was also active in the organizing efforts of the trawler owners and, later, in the founding of the employers' federation.48 Thors's career provides a living link between the merchant families, who first accumulated significant wealth in Iceland, and the political lead ership of the bourgeoisie in the postwar period. A staunch supporter of the capitalist variant of the modernizing cause in Iceland, he was the perfect 47. A major policy document, written on the initiative of the farmer-worker alliance and published in 1936, was devoted to these issues; see Skipulagsnefnd atvinnumdla: Alit og tillogur (Employment Planning Commission: Eval‎uation and recommendations) (Reykjavik, 1936). 48. Agnar Kl. Jonsson, Stjornarrdd Islands 1904-1964, vol. 1 (Reykjavik, 1969), 210 11. 247 TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE APRIL 2002 VOL. 43 candidate for prime minister when major government intervention appeared on the agenda. Many on the right were wary of the Reconstruc tion Government's program, and even saw it as tantamount to nationaliza tion, but Thors was beyond suspicion in that regard. It is difficult to imag ine who else could have proposed such a program at the time and carried the day.49 After the Reconstruction Government was dissolved, Icelandic politics reverted to the pattern established during the 1930s. Changing government coalitions, which generally included the Progressive Party, continued the interventionist approach established earlier. In 1959, the forces of modern ization joined to form another government, this time without the Social ists. They remained in power for a decade, during which relations between labor and capital and the building of a modern welfare state displaced the political cleavages discussed in this article at the top of the political agenda. Middle-Ground Technical Change Today, the village communities that matured during the first half of the twentieth century are fading again. But they played an essential role in Iceland's economic growth during the mechanization period, as did the small-scale fisheries on which they were based. I have argued here that in Iceland an evolutionary process?the mechanization of small boats and their overall improvement?created a distinctive technological and social dynamism. This avenue of technical change fit existing and traditional social arrangements better than the alternatives available at the time, and technical change proceeded hand in hand with the evolution of earlier pat terns of settlement. Analyzing this process revealed how a separate, small scale, gradual sociotechnical trajectory coexisted with the social and techni cal dislocations created by the trawlers, large-scale processing, and urbanization in the southwest of Iceland. As time went by, the technologi cal undergrowth?small boats, small processing units, small towns and vil lages?turned out to be economically more effective and politically stronger, particularly during the economic crisis of the 1930s and after World War II. Later, although the fisheries retained their position as the main export industry, their importance in the economy as a whole declined. This process can be related to more general concerns in the analysis of industrialization processes. First, in the development of small-scale fish eries we have an example of growth through stepwise expansion and deep ening of an existing complex of production arrangements. Second, this tra jectory coexisted with a competing technology characterized by leaps (or attempts at leaps) in the social and technical configuration of production. 49. One-third of the Independence Party members of parliament did not support the Reconstruction Government; Jonsson, Stjornarrdd Islands, 259. 248 SVERRISSON I The Icelandic Fisheries, 1800-1960 While primarily manifest in the central sector of the Icelandic economy, this dualism echoed through the rest of society, influenced politics and pol icy, and, ultimately, shaped the fundamental parameters of social life.50 Thus, the mechanization era in Iceland can be understood in terms of two coexisting technological complexes, to adopt a term used by Arnold Pacey.51 Each complex included basic technological paradigms, manifested materially in the core techniques of central branches of production. How ever, these complexes also included the social actors or social carriers of technology, who sustained these core techniques by their everyday prac tices, their social networks, their ideas and mentalities, and their commu nities. Thus, during the entire mechanization period a technological com plex characterized by large-scale production existed alongside another characterized by the gradual development of small-scale and intermediate technologies. The former was export oriented, while the latter catered to both foreign and domestic markets. Logically, the coexistence of different technological complexes is in evitable during industrialization; therefore we can expect it to appear in other cases as well. Any new technology that assumes the functions of an ear lier technology will need some time to replace it, and during this period the two will coexist. In addition, the old technology will become more sophisti cated, so long as some still use it. The duration of this coexistence varies, of course, as does the persistence of efforts to improve on the old technology. In Iceland the technological complex that evolved from the peasant fish eries of the nineteenth century proved particularly resilient. Incremental evolution of the old fishing techniques actually continued to a point where little remained of the original technology. More was retained of the social relations in which that technology was embedded. The small-scale fisher men improved their boats and gear continuously, eventually achieving a comprehensive metamorphosis of vessels and techniques. This happened within a framework defined by strongsocial and political continuities. Two additional reasons, one material and the other social, underpin the argument that the evolution of small-scale production is generally an important element in industrialization. Physical continuity, or artifact iner tia, is the first reason; it is crucial in explaining the persistence of small scale forms of production, as is the issue of the backward compatibility of new equipment, as George Basalla has suggested.52 The second is that peo 50. See Ami Sverrisson, "Economic Cultures and Industrialization Processes," in Local Economies in Turmoil: The Effects of Globalization and Deregulation, ed. Ami Sver risson and Meine Pieter van Dijk (Basingstoke, 2000). 51. Arnold Pacey, Technology in World Civilization (Oxford, 1990). A third, house hold, complex can be identified, but it has been passed over here and with it the ques tion of how the boundaries between petty commodity production and household pro duction should be drawn. 52. George Basalla, The Evolution of Technology (Cambridge, 1988). "The artifact? 249 TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE APRIL 2002 VOL. 43 pie are more likely to extend, modify, and improve what they already have than to turn to totally different production practices. This latter possibility, which is sometimes taken to be the paradigmatic mode of industrial change, can only arise and thrive in special circumstances. Among these cir cumstances, as we have seen in the case of Icelandic fisheries, are substan tial capital infusion from the outside and the provision of an adequate infrastructure. To this could be added a preferential government policy, which in the Icelandic case was generally short-lived. The story does not end here, however. Radically new social arrange ments are needed to make radically new technologies viable. The diffusion of revolutionary technologies depends on this, rather than on technical efficiency or economic competitiveness. A society can only receive radically new industrial technologies and the production systems that come with them to the extent that it can simultaneously reconfigure itself to accom modate new social units of production, different forms of work discipline, and changed settlement patterns. People are often suspicious of unproved techniques and unlikely to change their entire way of living, working, and being together unless forced to do so. Young, experimentally minded, and mobile people can often mod erate this kind of inertia, but they cannot eliminate it. Hence, gradual tech nical change, which reinforces existing social networks and increases their power and potential, is likely to proceed continuously, in the shadow of technological upheavals. Gradual change is welcomed by the many who benefit from it, even if not greatly. Cor relatively, it will pose serious prob lems for competing large-scale producers. Only time can tell in each case which of the contending technological complexes will prevail. As this article has shown, the issue can remain undecided for up to fifty years, and even then it may be resolved only tem porarily. But the long duration of dualism in the mechanized fisheries?the mainstay of the Icelandic economy?was the key to dynamic development. The owners and managers of large-scale fisheries mobilized capital, mod ern management methods, and the labor of young people attracted to the modernizing southwest. In contrast, the small-scale fisheries survived and prospered in rural villages around the coast where, although the pace was slower and money scarce, people continued to hope that hard work would lead to economic independence, if not to wealth. No complicated mathe matics is needed to understand that the existence of two trajectories of mechanization, rather than one, and of two very different technological complexes based on them, greatly increased the social and cultural re sources that Icelanders could marshal behind technical change. Based on these observations it is possible to outline a constructive cri not scientific knowledge, nor the technical community, nor social or economic factors? is central to technology and technological change" (p. 30). 250 SVERRISSON I The Icelandic Fisheries, 1800-1960 tique of three existing theories of industrial development and technical change and to suggest avenues for their improvement, particularly in regard to macro-level patterns.53 First, consider the new comparative political economy of development. This approach contends that there is not one general path to economic and social development but several, the features of which can be fruitfully com pared. These paths are partly molded by historical contingencies, and each is, in this sense, unique. However, they also share general patterns and mechanisms.54 One way to advance research on industrialization processes is to identify shared sociotechnical patterns and analyze their manifesta tions in particular instances. Likely candidates for this role are the impact of resilient and resistant social complexes (not necessarily village-based or rural), the appearance of technological dualism, and the formation of coex isting and competing technological complexes constituted by typical tech nologies and the social relations sustaining them. These classes of phe nomena can be found in cases widely separated in time and space. Adding these and other patterns to the general concepts used in comparative stud ies (such as the relation between state and civil society, for instance) would facilitate a more adequate analysis of economic and social development. Second, we can question a basic feature of the protoindustrialization ap proach, if not all the insights it has generated. The proponents of this school "assume the factory to be the ultimate method of organizing labor, and modern power-based machinery to be the best-practice technology."55 As we have seen, however, protoindustrial techniques in Icelandic fisheries fol lowed their own evolutionary path and did not give way to the floating fac tories. Hence, we can dismiss the idea that factory regimes and mass pro duction (or the American system, or the capitalist mode of production) are intrinsically more efficient than small-scale forms of mechanization. At some times, in some places, factory-scale production has been able to crowd out other forms. At other times, in other places, it has not been able to do so. Thus, it is imperative to specify the social circumstances in which one kind of technical change prevails over others. This suggests a rich area of com 53. The micro-level patterns of local innovation, such as the actual network mecha nisms through which ideas and innovations diffused, and the rationalities that influenced individual decisions have largely been passed over here. The available evidence in biogra phies, diaries, and local histories is fragmented, even anecdotal. It can only be interpreted within a general framework, the outline of which is established in this article. 54. Peter Evans and John D. Stephens, "Studying Development since the Sixties: The Emergence of a New Comparative Political Economy," Theory and Society 17 (1988): 713-45; Nicos P. Mouzelis, "Sociology of Development: Reflections on the Present Crisis," Sociology 22 (1988): 23-44. 55. Maxine Berg, The Age of Manufactures: Industry, Innovation and Work in Britain, 1700-1820 (London, 1985), 83. See also Peter Kriedte, "Proto-industrialization between Industrialization and De-industrialization " in Industrialization before Industrialization, ed. Peter Kriedte, Hans Medick, and Jiirgen Schlumbohm (Paris, 1981). 251 TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE APRIL 2002 VOL 43 parative research into both European and non-European patterns of indus trialization. This area has been explored, but it is far from exhausted.56 Third, we can extend the flexible specialization approach to small-scale commodity production. This approach, the original source of inspiration for this article, emphasizes the continued role of small enterprises and flex ible techniques throughout the industrialization process. Flexible mecha nization of craft production is seen as an alternative form of technical im provement, coexisting with the factory system for long periods. In Iceland such alternatives did indeed arise, in local communities based on relatively small-scale technologies on the colonial periphery of a second-rate power. This development effected a transition to modernity in spite of the burdens sometimes imposed by comparatively large-scale ventures. This argument may be taken one step further. Small-scale forms of production develop gradually in communities where they fit the lifestyles of some people. In turn, this type of technical change reinforces the forms of social life on which it thrives. In other words, technical evolution and social continuities are symbiotic. In communities that have thrived on gradual technical change, people are likely to approach all technologies in the same way, unpacking large-scale techniques if they are at all divisible, and preferring small-scale production, if at all possible, because that is how they know how to work. This does not lead to stagnation, as we have seen in the Icelandic case, nor will the small-scale forms last forever. But they should be taken seriously as important elements of industrialization and social change in peripheral areas.57 Finally, what is the relevance of this discussion for the majority of the world's population?those who participate only peripherally in the global industrial system? One striking characteristic of underdevelopment is the relative absence of middle-ground technical change, such as the evolution of small-scale fisheries discussed in this article. In most cases this situation is associated with weak or nonexisting channels for popular participation in political life and the formation of public policy. These are, instead, dic tated from abroad by creditors, international organizations, and global cor porations, and implemented by elitist or dictatorial governments. In these circumstances, people have found it hard to maintain social spaces where 56. This research area was opened up by Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin in "Historical Alternatives to Mass Production: Politics, Markets and Technology in Nine teenth-Century Industrialization," Past and Present, no. 108 (1985), 133-76. See also Paul Hirst and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Flexible Specialization versus Post-Fordism," Economy and Society 20 (1991): 1-56. For more recent contributions, see n. 1 above. 57. This argument can probably be extended to the heartland of industrial capital ism. A very instructive discussion is this regard can be found in Johzen Takeuchi, The Role of Labour-intensive Sectors in Japanese Industrialization (Tokyo, 1991). I believe it is quite possible to read some of Scranton's Endless Novelty (n. 1 above) in this way, partic ularly his discussion of furniture manufactures in the United States. 252 SVERRISSON I The Icelandic Fisheries, 1800-1960 they can incrementally improve local crafts and industries, an effort which, as we have seen, was greatly facilitated by democracy and independence in Iceland.58 Latecomers to industrialization import techniques and adapt them to local circumstances. But they also import ideas about technological devel opment. Today, mainstream ideas about technological change obscure rather than illuminate the role of small-scale production in industrializa tion. They also hide from view the local potential for gradual development. Hence, leaders of developing nations depend on external resources, partic ularly on capital and markets; but even more significantly, mainstream the ory increases their mental dependence on models that are not particularly likely to work, because a central component?small-scale enterprise?is missing. Setting the record straight is therefore of more than historical interest. 58. This option was first discussed systematically in regard to current peripheral industrialization by Hubert Schmitz, Flexible Specialisation: A New Paradigm of Small Scale Industrialisation? (Brighton, 1989). This discussion has since been developed in, among other works, Poul Ove Pedersen, Ami Sverrisson, and Meine Pieter van Dijk, eds., Flexible Specialization: The Dynamics of Small-Scale Industries in the South (London, 1994), and Sverrisson and van Dijk, Local Economies (n. 51 above). 253