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The Voyage of Philosophy : Dr.Ahn’s YOUTUBE Philosophy classroom.
Unit 26 : From Leibniz to Spinoza
Hegel’s “Perception” in “Phenomenology of Mind”, Part 3. para 124 ~ para 131
In the foregoing lecture we have seen that through the process of “Reflexion-into-itself“ Hegel could reconstruct the Monad as true unity of substance and its properties: Even if Monad has no windows, it is said to have inner activity which is called “perception”, therefore Leibniz called this activity of inner perception “multiplicity in unity”.
Leibniz said of the principle of identity of indiscernibles, viz. there are no same things in the world. which indeed refers to the inner property of Monad: Every Monad is for itself, individual, unique.
In this regard Hegel counts the notion of Monad as principle of individuation, personality.
However each Monad is said to be indifferent to other Monad.
“On account of their simplicity the monads are not susceptible of alteration by another monad in their inner essence; there is no causal connection between them.” Each of them is something indifferent and independent as regards the rest, otherwise it would not be an entelechy. (Hegel : History of Philosophy)
However Hegel connects a Monad with other Monads, because the world of Monads is in the plural, they are finite beings. In order to preserve the independence and totality of each Monad Leibniz supposes the pre-established harmony on the basis of Christian theology. In this relation Leibniz’s Monadology has inconsistence in its system. Therefore Hegel’s division of Monad into “being for itself” and “being for other” is looked upon as reasonable.
The next step starting from the opposition of “being for itself” and “being for other” can be without difficulty suggested because we have seen until now many times the process of phenomenological dialectic Hegel’s : Natural consciousness is obsessed with either or selection between the one or the other. But the truth is revealed as the synthesis of opposition. Natural consciousness is called also “understanding”, which has the meaning of common sense by Hegel.
“Understanding” or natural consciousness opposes the one to the other, which appears this time as the alternative of “being for itself” or “being for other”.
Hegel represents the Monad of Leibniz as the “principle of individuation” or “being for itself“
Leibnitz, by means of his fundamental principle of individuality, brings out the essentiality of the opposite aspect of Spinoza's philosophy, existence for self, the monad. (Hegel : History of Philosophy)
Natural consciousness tends to regard the relation of “being for itself” and “being for other” as separated. Moreover it considers “being for other as accidental, inessential. The self-identity or “being for itself” ignores “being for other”. For example the Monad represents itself as individual, ”being for itself“, Because the Monad has its own properties, determinations which makes up the essence of the ”being for itself“ : The Principle of Identity of Indiscernables.
An individual or “being for itself” imagines to be able to eliminate all the external determination. However the elimination of “being for other” results in the denial of its own ”being for itself“ because being for itself is relative to being for other: I am also the other to the other himself.
In Hegel’s words it reads as follows:
The necessity of the experience for consciousness is that the thing perishes through the very determinateness which constitutes both its essence and its being-for-itself. According to its simple concept, this experience can be briefly looked at in this way. The thing is posited as being-for-itself, or as the absolute negation of all otherness. Thus, it is posited as the absolute negation relating only itself to itself, but negation relating itself to itself is just the sublation of itself, or it has its essence in an other. (Phenomenology, p.89 para 126)
Thus the Monad as absolute self-identity loses its self-identity because of its own determination : Monad has no windows, it is self-sufficient being.
According to Leibniz a Monad has nothing to do with other Monads. However because of this determination, Hegel thnks, the concept of Monad cannot last.
According to Hegel’s history of philosophy “Leibniz’ philosophy makes fundamental the absolute multiplicity of individual substances, which after the example of the ancients he named monads”. (Hegel: History of Philosophy)
The Monad perishes indeed by the reason which makes up its own characteristic. Being for itself turns into Being for other. A dialectical turn around!
The phrase of “negation relating itself to itself” (=die sich auf sich beziehende Negation in German) is i.e. the absolute negation. The absolute self-identity is actually the negation of self-identity. A typical paradigm of Hegel’s thought!
Therefore a true nagation is negation of negation, determinate negation!
No man is an island, Entire of itself. Each is a piece of the continent, A part of the main. (For Whom the Bell tolls by John Donne)
The thing is One, reflected into itself; it is for itself, but it is also for an other, namely, it is an other for itself as it is for an other. The thing thereby is for itself and also for an other, a doubly diverse being, but it is also One. (para 123)
The natural consciousness or the “understanding” cannot apprehend “a doubly diverse being”: The denial of the other is actually that of the self because the self is connected to the other. “The connection to others is posited, and the connection to others is the cessation of being-for-itself”. (para 125)
Therefore the self-sameness of independent substance cannot be preserved. Namely substance or thing cannot be eternal or unchangeable; they are not individaul or independent in the rigorous sense even if the thing as individual acquires the true identity, i.e. the thing with many properties.
Hegel was opposed to the English empiricism, which denies the notion of substance, substrate. And Hegel saw the identity of substance realized in the notion of Monad by Leibniz.
However now Hegel is opposed to Leibniz’ idea of Monad; Monad is simple substance, which means that Monad is self-same, unalterable and eternal.
However Monad is finite, i.e. limited by another Monad. It is evidently against the original intention of Leibniz.
Moreover through the dialectic of being for itself and for other Hegel point to the finitude of individual thing, substance, which actually refers to the “finite” by Spinoza.
The finite is in other words “the limited”. Finite thing is not alone but always together with other finite things of a same kind. Therefore the notion of finitude comprises in itself plurality necessarily. The finite beings must have a relation to each other. As over said Hegel represented the Self in relation to the Other ”Being for other“. In other words ”Being for other“ implies logically ”other being“ in itself.
Other being is the end of oneself. The Other is opposed to the Self. A Monad is limited by another Monad. Monad or the thing perishes because of itself, its definition. ”The thing perishes through the very determinateness which constitutes both its essence and its being-for-itself“. The thing is “a doubly diverse being”.
Natural consciousness cannot apprehend the “doubly diverse” aspects of Monad as simple substance. Therefore natural consciousness considers the being- for-other aspect of Monad as inessential (=unwesentlich in German).
E.g. the essence of Myself can be reflected in the other people differently from my thought about myself. Moreover I can belittle or ignore the reflection of myself in the other people.
This thought reminds us of John Donne’s poem : For Whom the Bell tolls.
No man is an island,
Entire of itself.
Each is a piece of the continent,
A part of the main.
However owing to the dualism of thought and body, Spinoza restricts the meaning of finitude to the same nature: “Thus a thought is” only “limited by another thought, a body by another body, but thoughts are not limited by bodies”.
The second definition is that of the finite. “That thing is said to be finite in its kind which can be limited by another of the same nature.” For it comes then to an end, it is not there; what is there is something else. This something else must, however, be of a like nature; for those things which are to limit each other must, in order to be able to limit each other, touch each other, and consequently have a relation to each other, that is to say they must be of one nature, stand on a like basis, and have a common sphere. (Hegel : History of Philosophy)
As above mentioned Hegel describes the finitude of finite things as “negation relating itself to itself” (“die sich auf sich beziehende Negation” in German).
The negation relating itself to itself is just the sublation of itself, or it has its essence in an other.
The phrase “it has its essence in an other” refers to a determination of finite being in traditional philosophy. Moreover Spinoza used this expression in order to designate his notion of Mode.
By mode, I mean the modifications or affections of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself. (Spiniza: The Ethics)
According to Hegel, human understanding cannot apprehend the doubly diverse being which makes up the essence of the finite being: Being for itself is connected with being for other.
Thus the plurality of Monad is related to the finitude of the finite being. The finite being is sublated in the absolute being, which is called also the substance in the system of Spinoza.
Moreover Spinoza’s concept of substance is completely different from that of Leibniz.
According to Leibniz “Monad is nothing but a simple substance” (Leibniz: Monadology). But “Monad can come into being only by creation and it can come to an end by annihilation”. From this regard we can infer that Leibniz’ Monad is finite substance.
Contrary to Monad as simple substance, Spinoza’s substance is like God; infinite, unique, eternal and absolute. Moreover Spinoza conceived his notion of substance as the unity of essence and existence after the Scholastic philosophy.
By that which is self—caused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent. (Spinoza: Ethics)
The definition of substance by Spinoza is well known:
By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception. (Spinoza : The Ethics)
Spinoza’s notion of Substance might be related to the name of God given to Moses in the Old Testament : “I am that I am”.
What is God’s personal name? The answer to that question is found in the story of Moses at the burning bush (Ex. 3). After receiving his call from God, Moses offers several objections, one of which is that he doesn’t even know God’s name. God responds by stating, “I AM WHO I AM” and then commands Moses to say two things to the people of Israel: “I AM has sent me to you” (Ex. 3:14) and “‘The LORD, the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, has sent me to you.’ This is my name forever” (3:15 ESV). (https://www.bible-bridge.com/gods-name-revealed/)
The Substance as Being-in-itself has a serious implication that the beginning and end of something is implicit in its present existence. Nothing has its beginning and end in its existence save God. Therefore Spinoza says of the “Cause of itself”(cause sui) in order to designate God and Substance.
By that which is self—caused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent. (Spinoza : The Ethics)
In the finite and individual things, the existence of themselves can be separated from their essence.
For example the beginning of myself is not myself but my parents. In addition I will disappear ,i.e. sometime my spirit will be separated from my body.
From this view Spinoza links his Substance with God in the biblical meaning.
God and Substance are both endless, eternal. They are existent as Being-in-itself. The Substance is identical with the God. Namely Substance is the name of God by Spinoza.
# Hegel’s reinterpretation of Spinoza’s Substance
Hegel regards first of all the philosophy of Spinoza as that of One Substance, which is also infinite. Through this characterization of Spinozism Hegel tries to link the Substance of Spinoza with the tradition of Oneness in the western philosophy.
It is also remarkable that Hegel represents the over said Substance of Spinoza as the (absolute) Universal.
However the Universal is here to be understood as not only logical but also cosmological or ontological. Further Hegel’s estimation of Spinoza is negative as well as positive.
On the one hand Hegel praises Spinoza the most : “Spinoza is the key point of modern philosophy: Either Spinozism or no Philosophy”.
For as we saw above (Vol I. p. 144), when man begins to philosophize, the soul must commence by bathing in this ether of the One Substance, in which all that man has held as true has disappeared; this negation of all that is particular, to which every philosopher must have come, is the liberation of the mind and its absolute foundation. 1)
Hegel as well as Spinoza goes with the tradition of
of Being-philosophy 2) and monotheism. The Being-philosophy originated from Parmenides, who asserted that Being is unchangeable and infinite and united whereas the world of becoming and destruction was denied.
The monotheism which I mean originates from the Old Testament in which the one and only God is contrasted to the created, finite All.
In this respect Hegel wonders at the philosophy of Spinoza: “Either Spinozism or no Philosophy” and “Philosophy with bathing in this ether of the One Substance”. The One Substance is opposed to the world of becoming and extinction, the world of individuals, the phenomenon.
Conclusively Spinoza’s philosophy of One Substance conforms to the Western tradition of Christian religion and Greek philosophy. 3)
In other aspect however Hegel criticizes Spinozism in that his Substance lacks vitality, subjectivity and “negation of negation”. Accordingly Hegel said in the preface of his “Phenomenology of Mind”:
Everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well. (PM p.7 ff.)
(•••)
The living substance, further, is that being which is truly subject. (ibid. p.8)
Otherwise Hegel said of “the need to think of the Absolute as subject”. (ibid. p.9)
# One Substance as the cause of all the finite beings
In addition to the over said definition of One Substance, it has other properties to which belongs the efficient cause :
God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence. (Spinoza Ethics PROP. XXV.)
Even though Spinoza averts the biblical notion of creation, his appreciation of the term “efficient cause” suggests generation, production or creation.
Existence comes to an essence under the action of the efficient cause, such as is found in the order of nature in generation-corruption or as is taught in the biblical account of creation. 4)
In this regard Hegel represents Spinoza’ Substance as the unconditioned, absolte universal, which comes logically from the contradiction of plurality of self-existent substance, i.e. Monad. In the theory of Monad Hegel saw the contradiction of Being-for-itself and Being-for-Others. The former is self-determination of things whereas the latter is the relation between both self-related (two) things.
Since, however, both essentially exist in a single unity, we have before us now unconditioned absolute universality; and it is here that consciousness first truly passes into the sphere of Understanding, of Intelligence. 5)
Hegel’s deduction from the Monad to the One Substance is not so persuasive, however his aim and design of the development is clear: From the finitude to Infinitude, from the individual to the universal.
The Monad as Being-for-itself was not mere single self-existence but a substance which has many properties as its essence. In this regard Leibniz compared Monad with the whole universe; a single Monad reflects the cosmos. Therefore Monad is also the universal. However in the eye of Hegel a single Monad is finite, i.e. other Monad violates the self-identity of one Monad. Monad has windows contrary to original intention of Leibniz.
Therefore the realm of absolute reality is to be found in the One-Substance philosophy of Spinoza.
This idea of One and All, “hen kai pan”, was the common motto of the young Hegel and his friend Hölderin. Hegel seems to find the ideal of his youth, “hen kai pan”, in the philosophy of Spinoza.
In the text of Phenomenology of Mind Hegel finds the (unconditioned) absolute universality in the contradiction of finite beings. The finite being cannot exist for itself, it is for other. It is dependent being.
Spinoza apprehended the finite, individual being as Mode or Modification of attributes of Substance.
# Spinozism as Metaphysics of Understanding
As over cited “consciousness first truly passes into the sphere of Understanding, of Intelligence” with the concept of unconditioned absolute universality, which refers indeed to the substance as the true Being-for-itself or “Being-in-itself” in the words of Spinoza.
The notion of Understanding has as regards Hegel’s thinking horizon lower degree than reason. According to Hegel, Understanding is the thinking art in accordance with formal logic, i.e. law of contradiction. In comparison with Hegel’s Understanding, his notion of Reason transcends the law of formal logic, that of contradiction.
Maybe Hegel suggests Kant’s criticism of the dogmatic metaphysics which the Pure Reason seeks
to construct : According to Kant human reason has the propensity to find “for the conditioned knowledge given through the understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion” (KdrV A308/B364).
Contrary to Kant’s criticism of Pure Reason and its metaphysical instinct, Hegel ascribes the formation of contemporary metaphysics to the human understanding, viz. the formal-logical thinking. Therefore Hegel contains the metaphysics of Leibniz and Spinoza in the section of “The Metaphysics of the Understanding” in his “Lectures on the History of Philosophy”.
As above mentioned Hegel gave a special importance to the One-Substance philosophy of Spinoza : Either Spinozism or no Philosophy.
footnote
Title: The History of Philosophy: Volume Three (of 3)
p.258
Author: Georg Wilhelm Hegel
Translator: E. S. Haldane, Frances H. Simson
Release Date: October 26, 2018 [EBook #58169]
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/58169/58169-h/58169-h.htm#c252
The “Being-philosophy” is usually called “ontology”.
Even if Hegel interpreted Spinozism suitably as philosophy of Western culture he in other respect counted the
Spinozism as the legacy of Eastern countries, i.e. morning lands. However in this case it matters that the identity of thought and extension is not conceptualized but intuited by Spinoza’s philosophy. Thought and extension are two fundamental attributes of One Substance in Spinozism.
Encyclopedia.com, he article “essence and existence”
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND
G. W. F. HEGEL
Translated by J. B. Baillie
This page copyright © 2001 Blackmask Online.
http://www.naturalthinker.net/trl/texts/Hegel,G.W.F/Hegel,_G.W.F._-_The_Phenomenology_Of_Mind.pdf p.44
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