전투기 SCAF 대신 Super Rafale?

[백선호]

프랑스와 독일의 SCAF(FCAS) 공동 개발 협상이 잘 되지 않자 프랑스에서는 Super Rafale을 만들고 무인 전투기와 같이 쓰자는 "Plan B" 얘기가 나오는 모양입니다.

아래는 20년 전 2002년 학회에서 발표한 Rafale Mid-Life Update입니다.

관련 링크

https://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/515G/3458

http://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/515G/1838

http://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/515G/1748

http://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/515G/1743

http://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/515G/1304

http://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/515G/1228

http://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/J85/29

https://meta-defense.fr/2022/07/19/scaf-ou-pas-le-couple-super-rafale-neuron-propose-par-dassault-devrait-etre-developpe/

SCAF ou pas, le couple Super-Rafale Neuron proposé par Dassault devrait être développé – Meta-Defense.fr

SCAF or not, the Super-Rafale Neuron couple proposed by Dassault should be developed

July 19, 2022

As is customary at the start of summer, arms fairs have multiplied in recent weeks, with Eurosatory in France dedicated to land armaments in mid-June, the ILA aeronautical fair in Berlin a week later, and this week, the British Airshow at Farnborough. What is less so is the extraordinary discretion of France, its authorities and its aeronautical industry during these shows, in particular regarding a program that is nevertheless major and sizeable, the Air Combat System of the Future, or SCAF. The fact is, since the beginning of the year , the program bringing together Germany, France and Spain has been stopped., against a background of disagreement between Dassault Aviation and Airbus D&S as to the industrial sharing around the design of the Next Generation Fighter or NGF, the main pillar of the program, and the only one that remains, to date, under French piloting. For several weeks, Dassault Aviation, through the voice of its CEO Eric Trappier, but also the entire Team Rafale, suggested that in the event of failure of the negotiations, the French manufacturers had a "Plan B". More recently, it appeared that this alternative would be based on a new and very promising couple, combining a redesigned Rafale and designated Super-Rafale, and a stealth combat drone from the NEUROn program.

For Team Rafale, this approach would constitute an economically sustainable alternative to SCAF for France and effective from an operational point of view. The new combat aircraft would indeed make it possible to extend the operational capabilities but above all the evolutionary potential of the Rafale to meet the requirements of air combat in the years and decades to come, like what the success of the Rafale in theaters of operation and on the export scene. The stealth combat drone, meanwhile, would provide the new device with widely extended surveillance, suppression and detection capabilities, including in highly contested environments, especially as it will probably be able to, like the Rafale and of the Super-Rafale, relying on Remote Carrier-type airborne drones to extend their capabilities.

However, it is appropriate to question the relevance of developing such a program, even if the SCAF program were to continue, and an acceptable agreement were to be found between French and German manufacturers. Indeed, there is now little doubt that the entry into service of the NGF from the SCAF in an operational and unrestricted version will probably not occur before 2050. However, despite its extraordinary evolution capacities, the current Rafale will struggle to impose itself in the sky in an assured way beyond a deadline that can be placed between 2035 and 2040. Indeed, the period that is coming will have nothing to do with the last 30 years in terms of technological tempo. Under the impetus of Sino-Chinese competition, a technological tempo that will be much more akin to the 50s and 60s than to the 90s and 2000s. Already today, China is officially developing 3 stealth fighter programs, the J-20 heavy fighter, the J-35 carrier-based medium fighter and the H-20 strategic bomber, to which should be added, although this is not officially recognized by Beijing, a fourth stealth JH-XX fighter-bomber program intended to replace the JH-7 by the end of the decade.

The United States, for their part, are still developing the F-35, which seems to be able to overcome its youthful defects, but also the NGAD in order to replace the US Air Force's F-22 by 2035, and the F/ A-XX to replace the US Navy's Super Hornets at the same time, while the B-21 strategic bomber should make its first runs by the end of this year. To this must be added the British Tempest, the Japanese F-X, the South Korean KF-21, and perhaps the Turkish TF-X, if it manages to solve its problems of access to certain critical technologies, as well as Russian Su-57s and possibly Su-75s. In other words, over the period 2025-2035, no less than 10 new major new generation combat aircraft should arrive in operational units.

If the Rafale will certainly be able to retain significant capabilities beyond 2030, there is little doubt that the device will gradually lose its technological and operational ascendancy essential to the French ambitions to enter first, deterrence and strategic autonomy. faced with the arrival of these new devices, but also faced with the likely evolution of anti-aircraft defense, electronic and cyber warfare systems. In fact, with an NGF/SCAF which would only effectively enter service from 2050, France would lose its military advantage in the air for at least fifteen years, a component that is nevertheless essential to the national operational mix, just as for air-land and naval air combat. In this context, the design of the Super-Rafale NEUROn couple would, in many respects, represent

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이렇게 되면, 세대 구분이 애매해져서.. 미국이 6세대 띄울 때, 프랑스는 4.7세대를 띄울 수 있겠네요! 얼마 전 폴란드에서 대박을 친 반도국도 경쟁해볼만 하겠는걸요?

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이 때의 문제는 엔지니어들이 새로운 유인 전투기를 설계하는 감을 잃을 수 있다는 것입니다.

http://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/515G/1951

[강준구]

보잉처럼, 고등훈련기를 만들면서 라팔의 형상 변형 기체를 계속 만들어야 유지 되겠네요.
잠수함도 그렇고, 설계 인력 유지가 쉬운 일이 아니네요.