폭격기 Re: 호주엔 핵잠수함이 도입되기 전까지 B-21이 필요하다

[위종민]

https://news.usni.org/2022/10/21/bombers-could-help-australia-during-transition-to-nuclear-powered-submarines

Bombers Could Help Australia During Transition to Nuclear-Powered Submarines - USNI News

민간 차원의 의견개진이긴 한데, ASPI의 마커스 헬러가 허드슨 연구소의 행사에서 핵잠수함은 2040년에야 1번함이 인도되고 2050년이 돼야 4척 체제를 갖출 수 있으니 그 갭을 메우고 다양한 전투수단을 갖추기 위해 폭격기와 장거리 미사일 조합이 필요하며, 구처젝으로 B-21이 필요하다고 요구했네요. 사거리 JASSM-ER + 라이트닝II/슈퍼 호넷 조합으로는 능력이 부족하다고. 

마커스 헬러는 ASPI의 시니어 애널리스트로 The Strategist에 호주에 B-21이 필요하다는 https://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/515G/3616 이 글의 저자네요. 

Bombers Could Help Australia During Transition to Nuclear-Powered Submarines - USNI News

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4-5 minutes

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Bombers, long-range strike missiles and large undersea unmanned systems could help Canberra until it has nuclear-powered attack submarines, an Australian and American security expert agreed Wednesday.

“Bombers are a possibility,” said Marcus Hellyer of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, speaking at a Hudson Institute event.

Mark Gunzinger, of the Mitchell Institute of Aerospace Studies at the Air and Space Force Association, said “the B-21 is part of a family of systems for long-range strike” that includes missiles and unmanned systems. The Air Force has taken delivery of six of these bombers and some can be operational soon.

He added, “you really don’t want to put all your eggs in one basket” when it comes to deterring a competitor like China. The goal should be “to build a much more resilient capability.” Bombers, in addition to having the ability to fly multiple long-range strike sorties, can also keep sea lanes of communication open and perform sea-mining.

Building a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines is the centerpiece of the technology agreement – known as AUKUS – that Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States reached a little more than a year ago. Canberra is expected to make a decision early next year on whether to use an American or U.K. design for the submarine. But that is only the first step in the submarine program, which also must train Australian crews in nuclear operations and create a skilled shipyard workforce in South Australia to build, repair and maintain the nuclear attack boats.

“There’s no use getting SSNs unless you can maintain them,” said Hellyer, adding that the nuclear-powered submarines require about three times as much maintenance time as conventional boats.

It could be 2040 before Australia has the first submarine deliver, with the Royal Australian Navy projected to have four boats by 2050, Hellyer said. 

While in the transition period, Canberra needs to determine what operations it wants its defense forces to be able to do, Hellyer said. It also needs to figure out what it can get from its allies and what it can provide for itself.

Submarines are just one option to carry out a number of maritime missions, Gunzinger said.

Australia is “already embarked on two high-risk [naval] activities,” Hellyer said.

He was referring to Canberra’s plan to extend the service life of some of its six Collins-class conventional submarines to ease the transition, while also launching an ambitious modernization program for its surface fleet.

Both programs are long-term and costly. They also will fill Australian shipyards to capacity at a time when American and U.K. yards also are stretched to the limit, Hellyer said.

“Maybe the best interim capability we could have is the B-21 bomber,” he said.

Both agreed that using modified F-35A Lightning II Strike Fighters and F/A-18F Super Hornets armed with 1,000-kilometer range missiles would have limited reach in deterring China in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.

New systems like hypersonics are extremely costly and usable only once, Hellyer and Gunzinger said.

Unmanned systems, however, can play an increasingly important role in the transition. Hellyer noted that the Royal Australian Navy is also now partnering with Anduril to build and use extra large autonomous undersea unmanned vessels.

“It’s all about China,” Hellyer said in explaining Australia’s decision last year to break its contract with France to build extended range conventional submarines.

Australia’s relations with China “changed significantly” within a year, said Hellyer.

Factors included Beijing’s crackdown on democratic dissent in Hong Kong, its increasingly belligerent stance toward Taiwan and stiff tariffs and embargoes placed on Australian products after Canberra demanded an investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.

When it broke the contract last year and decided to pursue building a nuclear-powered submarine, Australia was looking for “a high-end conventional deterrent,” he said.

Hellyer added that AUKUS for Canberra also “is about keeping the U.S. engaged in the Western Pacific.”

[백선호]

SSN을 미사일 발사 플랫폼으로 생각하는 것일까요?

대지 공격 플랫폼으로 스텔스 폭격기와 SSN을 비교하면 스텔스 폭격기의 폭탄 투하량이 훨씬 크겠고,

대함 공격 플랫폼으로는 같은 일을 다른 방법으로 하는 셈이네요.

[위종민]

폭격기는 잠수함처럼 멀리 있는 곳에 은밀히 가서 오래 머무를 수는 없는 대신 잠수함보다 훨씬 지속적으로 대함공격능력을 발휘할 수 있고 대지공격 능력은 훨씬 좋네요. 잠수함보다 더 빨리 도입할 수 있고.

그나저나 2040년 도입 시작 - 2050년 도입 완료는 너무 늦은 타임테이블 같습니다. 2050년까지 중국이 강국으로 남아있기나 할런지 의문...