전투기 우크라이나에 그리펜을 공급하자는 제안

[위종민]

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/made-to-take-on-russia-swedish-gripen-fighter-jets-should-go-to-ukraine-report/

Made to take on Russia, Swedish Gripen fighter jets should go to Ukraine: Report - Breaking Defense

RUSI의 Justin Bronk와 Nick Reynolds, Jack Watling이 11월 7일 우크라이나-러시아 전쟁에서의 방공전에 대해 분석한 보고서를 발간했네요. 러시아 공군을 억제하기 위해선 서방 전투기와 미사일이 필요한데, 스웨덴 공군은 우크라이나 공군과 유사하게 분산된 기지에서의 운용을 강조했기 때문에 그리펜 역시 소규모 정비 지원 및 야지운용이 가능하게 설계됐으며, 이 때문에 우크라이나에 그리펜을 지원하는 게 좋은 방안일 수 있다고 제안합니다. 

우크라이나에 그리펜을 공급하기 위해선 개발국인 스웨덴과 헝가리, 체코의 승인이 필요할 텐데, 체코의 그리펜은 임대기간 만료 후 반납 예정이니 이게 실현된다면 체코의 그리펜이 대상일 듯 합니다. ( https://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/515G/3843 )

그 외 보고서 요약문을 보면 

1) 개전 초에 러시아 VKS가 우크라이나의 지상 방공체계를 억제하는 데 성공했으나 3월 초부터 분산된 SAM과 MANPADS를 억제/파괴하는 데 실패해 제공권을 상실. R-77을 장비한 Su-35S와 MiG-31BM은 매우 효과적이고 치명적. 
2) 우크라이나 전투기들은 개전 초 심각한 피해를 입었음. 

3) 러시아의 지상방공체계, 특히 장거리 감시 레이더의 지원을 받는 S-400이 위력적

4) 대부분의 공습은 무유도폭탄과 로켓을 사용해 기계획 표적에 대해 실시. 제공권을 상실한 뒤엔 값비싼 순항미사일과 탄도미사일로 전략적 공습을 실시했으나, 최근 이란이 공급한 값싼 샤헤드-136으로 전력망을 집중적으로 노리고 있음. 

5) 러시아가 시리아처럼 항공기를 이용한 대량의 공습을 실시하지 못한 건 이동식 SAM 체계를 제압하지 못했기 때문이며, 이 때문에 우크라이나 SAM의 미사일을 공급하지 않고 서방의 동등한 체계로 대체될 경우 VKS가 제공권을 장악할 수도 있음. ( 보고서 원문을 안 봤습니다만, 아마도 서방제 SAM은 야전기동능력이 떨어져서일까요?)

6) 또한 싸구려 이란제 무인기를 상대하기 위해 단기적으론 MANPADS와 레이더 유도 대공포가, 중기적으로 레이저 병기 등이 필요함. 

Made to take on Russia, Swedish Gripen fighter jets should go to Ukraine: Report

Tim Martin

4-5 minutes

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JAS 39 Gripen fighter jets escort a US B-52 Stratofortress from Bomber Task Force over Swedish airspace (Saab)

DUBLIN – A leading defense think tank has called on international policymakers to consider supplying the Ukrainian Air Force with Saab JAS 39 Gripen C/D fighter jets.

Authors from the UK-based Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) said in a report Monday that after looking at the Russian air war and requirements for Ukrainian air defense, the Swedish aircraft was “by far the most suitable candidate” of Western-manufactured combat jets that could meet operational needs.

Transfer of Gripens would advance Ukrainian short- to medium-term planning by minimizing the risk of sustaining Russian long-range missile strikes, according to the report.

The authors also warned that delivery of the aircraft, alongside SAM launchers, missile ammunition and self-propelled anti-aircraft guns are all critical to preventing a new Russian strike campaign, which, if not contested, could lead to a dramatic shift in the current momentum of the war.

“Conceptually, the Swedish Air Force has always emphasised low-level air superiority tactics from dispersed bases, in a similar manner to how the Ukrainian Air Force currently operates, and so the Gripen was designed with ground support equipment and maintenance requirements compatible with that approach,” stated the publication. “The electronic warfare suite on the Gripen C/D is also optimised specifically for countering Russian fighter and SAM radars.”

RELATED: The US military now seems open to gifting Ukraine new fighter jets, but what type?

Additionally, the authors cite Gripen’s anti-ship capability and integration of MBDA’s Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) and ramjet propulsion design being “less adversely affected” by counterthreats, compared to weapons with rocket-powered propulsion. Air launched weapons relying on rocket powered technology are widely considered to be more exposed to ground based threats because of their “low and slow” capability profiles.

“Since April, VKS [Russian Air Force] pilots have been extremely reluctant to aggressively fight their way into Ukrainian airspace due to the losses taken during early attempts,” note the RUSI authors. “The threat of Ukrainian SAM and MANPADS engagements has shaped the behaviour and constrained the effectiveness of Russian pilots significantly.

“Therefore, even a few modern Western fighters with long-range missiles able to meet the Russians on technically equal or even superior terms would likely have a disproportionate deterrent effect.”

Despite such analysis reopening debate over whether or not European or US decision makers should approve Western-made fighter jets being sent to Ukraine, tensions around the matter, often linked to fears of conflict escalation, permissions for sorties being flown from NATO territory and training difficulties, continue to hold up progress.

RELATED: US-made jets, air defense on Ukrainian fighter pilots’ wishlist, but not Gray Eagle

If the Gripen C/D variant was to be approved for transfer however, current European operators — Sweden, Hungary and the Czech Republic — would all be in line to execute deliveries to Ukraine.

“The [RUSI] report identified many of the excellent qualities of Gripen that make it a suitable candidate fighter for a country’s defences,” said a Saab spokesperson. “Ultimately the export of Gripen, including to Ukraine, is strictly regulated and needs approvals from the appropriate authorities. So any such decision will rest with them and further questions as to the feasibility are therefore best raised with them.”

Past requests from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to NATO members for Western fighter jets have been denied even though some US officials, including Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown, have publicly supported the idea.

In March, Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia — the only European countries capable of supplying aircraft common with Ukrainian MiG-29 and Su-25 fighter fleets — all ruled out any such transfers, after previously hinting otherwise. At the time, the Pentagon said the transfer of Polish jets to Ukraine, specifically, through US bases in Germany was “not tenable.”

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/russian-air-war-and-ukrainian-requirements-air-defence

https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air-War-Ukraine-web-final.pdf

The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence

5-6 minutes

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Dr Justin Bronk, Nick Reynolds and Dr Jack Watling

7 November 2022Long Read

Download PDF(7MB)

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Main Image Credit A Russian fighter jet flies above a railway junction on fire following recent shelling in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict in the town of Shakhtarsk (Shakhtyorsk) near Donetsk, October 2022. Courtesy of Reuters / Alamy Stock Photo

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Further Western support is needed to ensure that Kyiv can counter Moscow's updated approach to the air war in Ukraine.

Executive Summary

• Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted significantly more extensive fixed-wing strike operations during the first days of the invasion than has been previously documented, while Ukrainian ground-based air-defence (GBAD) capabilities were suppressed by initial attacks. 
• During this period, Ukrainian fighter aircraft inflicted some losses on VKS aircraft but also took serious casualties due to being totally technologically outmatched and badly outnumbered.
• Russian fighters have remained highly effective and lethal against Ukrainian aircraft near the frontlines throughout the war, especially the Su-35S with the R-77-1 long-range missile and, in recent months, the Mig-31BM with the R-37 very long-range missile.
• From early March, the VKS lost the ability to operate in Ukrainian-controlled airspace except at very low altitudes due to its inability to reliably suppress or destroy increasingly effective, well-dispersed and mobile Ukrainian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
• Russian GBAD has also been highly effective since March, especially the long-range S-400 SAM system supported by the 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude long-range surveillance radar system.
• Numerous MANPADS provided to Ukrainian troops and later mobile air-defence teams meant that low-altitude Russian fixed-wing and rotary penetrating sorties beyond the frontlines proved to be prohibitively costly during March, and ceased by April 2022.
• Throughout the war, most Russian airstrikes have been against pre-designated targets with unguided bombs and rockets. The Su-34 fleet has regularly also fired stand-off missiles such as the Kh-29 and Kh-59 against fixed targets, and Su-30SM and Su-35S fighters have regularly fired Kh-31P and Kh-58 anti-radiation missiles to suppress and target Ukrainian SAM radars.
• Without air superiority, Russia’s attempts at strategic air attack have been limited to expensive cruise and ballistic missile barrages at a much more limited scale. These failed to achieve strategically decisive damage during the first seven months of the invasion. However, the latest iteration is a more focused and sustainable bombardment of the Ukrainian electricity grid, blending hundreds of cheap Iranian-supplied Shahed-136 loitering munitions against substations with continued use of cruise and ballistic missiles against larger targets.
• The West must avoid complacency about the need to urgently bolster Ukrainian air-defence capacity. It is purely thanks to its failure to destroy Ukraine’s mobile SAM systems that Russia remains unable to effectively employ the potentially heavy and efficient aerial firepower of its fixed-wing bomber and multi-role fighter fleets to bombard Ukrainian strategic targets and frontline positions from medium altitude, as it did in Syria. 
• It follows that if Ukrainian SAMs are not resupplied with ammunition, and ultimately augmented and replaced with Western equivalents over time, the VKS will regain the ability to pose a major threat.
• In the short term, Ukraine also needs large numbers of additional man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) and radar-guided anti-aircraft guns, such as the Gepard, to sustain and increase its ability to intercept the Shahed-136s and protect its remaining power infrastructure and repairs to damaged facilities.
• In the medium term, Ukraine needs cost-effective ways to defend itself against the Shahed-136. One option could be compact radar and/or laser ranging and sighting systems to allow numerous existing anti-aircraft guns to be much more accurate and effective against them. 
• The Ukrainian Air Force fighter force needs modern Western fighters and missiles to sustainably counter the VKS. Russian pilots have been cautious throughout the war, so even a small number of Western fighters could have a major deterrent effect.
• Any Western fighter supplied in the short–medium term needs to be capable of dispersed operations using mobile maintenance equipment and small support teams, and flying from relatively rough runways, to avoid being neutralised by Russian long-range missile strikes. 

[Minowski(김유철)]

이제 친서방에서는 S-300나 SA-6는 더 긁어올 나라도 없는 것 같습니다만.....

[위종민]

우크라이나가 생산기술을 갖고 있다면 자체생산할 수 있게 공장을 만들어주는 게 어떨까 싶을 정도입니다. 야전방공 쪽은 서방 무기체계가 아무래도 약한 부문이네요.

[백선호]

RUSI 보고서에는 S-400이 높은 고도까지 올라간 다음 내려오면서 능동 탐색기로 저고도의 표적을 잡고 내리꽂혀 저고도 표적을 잡기도 했다고 나오네요.

The confident Ukrainian attribution of the loss of several aircraft to S-400 missile engagements while flying at very low altitude and at significant distances would, therefore, seem to suggest that longer-ranged missiles fired by these SAM systems do indeed possess a post-apex lock-on capability as previously theorised.

[위종민]

액티브 호밍이고, 지상에 반사되는 잡신호 제거능력을 잘 갖추고 있으면 가능하겠네요. 생각해보면 반능동인 SM-2도 높이 올라갔다가 내려꽂히면서 요격을 하니..