https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FtwSdQQx3w4 (08:26~12:46)
ECB Forum on Central Banking 2023 - Opening Speech by Gita Gopinath
본 연설은 국제통화기금의 기타 고피나스 수석부총재가 유럽 중앙은행 포럼에서 거시경제에 대해 기조 연설을 하는 내용임.
Glossary
1. core inflation: 근원 물가지수; 핵심 물가지수
2. downside risks: 하방 리스크
3. credit spreads: 대변스프레드
(옵션 거래에서 등가격에 가까운 권리 행사 가격의 옵션을 팔아넘기고, 동시에 시장과 만기일이 같으면서 등가격과 차가 큰 권리 행사 가격의 옵션을 사들이는 전략.)
4. variable rate mortgages: 변동 (주택담보대출) 금리
5. discount window lending: 재할인창구
(은행 시스템이 단기 자금을 조달할 수 있도록 하는 미국 연방준비제도(Federal Reserve System)의 여러 도구 중 하나)
분량: 480단어, 5분 43초 (내용이 난이도가 있어 천천히 읽었습니다.)
Ultimately, it is up to central banks to deliver price stability irrespective of fiscal stance. With underlying inflation high and upside inflation risks substantial, risk management considerations in the euro area suggest that monetary policy should continue to tighten and then remain in restrictive territory until core inflation is on a downward path. The European Central bank and other banks should be prepared to react forcefully to further upside inflation pressures, or to evidence that inflation is more persistent, even if it means much more cooling of the labor market. The costs of fighting inflation will be significantly larger if a protracted period of high inflation boosts inflation expectations and changes inflation dynamics.
There are indeed some downside risks to inflation that could arise, for instance, from the recent unwinding of supply chain disruptions and fall in energy prices. The effect of the recent tightening in monetary policy is still working through the system. Now while central banks must be vigilant about not easing prematurely, they should be prepared to adjust course if a chorus of indicators suggest that these downside inflation risks are materializing.
If inflation persists and central banks need to tighten much more than markets expect, today’s modestly tight financial conditions could give way to a rapid repricing of assets and a sharp rise in credit spreads. We’ve seen this during the past year how policy tightening can come with significant financial stresses, including in Korea and the UK.
For the euro area, tighter monetary policy may also have diverse regional effects, with spreads rising much more in some high-debt economies. Higher rates can also amplify other vulnerabilities arising from household indebtedness and a large share of variable rate mortgages in some countries.
This brings me to the second uncomfortable truth:, Financial stresses could generate tensions between central banks’ price and financial stability objectives. This is because, while central banks can extend liquidity support to solvent banks, they are ill-equipped to deal with the problems of insolvent borrowers.
If financial stresses remain modest, central banks shouldn’t face too much of a challenge in achieving both price and financial stability objectives. If households and firms face a rise in borrowing costs, central banks can lower policy rates to keep output and inflation on roughly the same path. Other relatively standard central bank tools—such as discount window lending and other forms of liquidity support—can also help.
Of course, lowering policy rates may be misinterpreted as waning resolve to fight inflation, so effective communication is important.
The situation becomes much more difficult if financial stresses threaten to turn into a systemic crisis. Critically, preventing a crisis may go beyond what central banks can do alone. While they can extend broad-based liquidity support to solvent banks, they cannot support insolvent banks, firms, or households. These must be addressed by governments and may require sizeable fiscal resources.