인도-파키스탄 공중전 중국측 전문가(?)가 분석한 내용

[degg.]

https://xcancel.com/KELMAND1/status/1922164103516454996

ChatGPT Translation:

From the air combat details obtained from the May 9th press conference of PAF Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Aurangzeb, we can draw the following information:

1. Contrary to the Western media's view that the Indian Air Force (IAF) pilots' low quality led to the air combat failure, the IAF's frontline commanders and pilots made basically no tactical errors. Moreover, they demonstrated great initiative and combat courage. The failure of the May 7th air battle was entirely caused by flaws in the IAF's equipment system development and its technological backwardness.

   Firstly, the IAF fully absorbed the lessons from the April 29th aerial standoff, recognizing the J-10C's significant technological advantage in avionics systems. Their tactic targeted the PAF's numerical inferiority in frontline J-10Cs. (The PAF has a total of 20 J-10Cs, with about 12 from the 15th "Cobra" Squadron deployed on the Kashmir front. The IAF, estimating a 75% equipment operational readiness rate, predicted a maximum of 2-4 dual-aircraft formations could be kept airborne. Of course, post-battle analysis revealed the IAF's readiness estimate was too conservative; the PAF announced that 11 J-10Cs actually participated). By organizing four large strike packages in different directions—comprising strike groups, cover groups, support groups, and accompanying groups totaling 72 aircraft—they aimed to use numerical superiority to disperse PAF forces, creating situations of numerical advantage in various local engagements and applying Lanchester's Square Law to offset the opponent's qualitative advantage. Furthermore, according to the PAF press conference, the strike directions of all four groups were carefully chosen in mountainous Pakistani radar blind zones, forcing the PAF to scramble Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft to fill the gaps.

   Secondly, on the main strike axis, they concentrated their only Rafale units in the northern theater (17th "Golden Arrows" Squadron, with a full complement of 18 aircraft, 14 Rafales actually participated – basically all flyable Rafales were scrambled). This was a case of "using good steel for the blade's edge," forming a fist to strive for local superiority.

   Thirdly, their campaign objectives were limited, with no cross-border attacks. The strike groups maintained a distance of over 20km from the Line of Control (LoC), using standoff Scalp cruise missiles to strike undefended civilian targets. The political statement far outweighed any military significance, aiming to avoid air combat with the PAF as much as possible.

   Fourthly, judging from the wreckage of the downed aircraft displayed by the Pakistani side, the shoot-downs occurred at ultra-low altitudes of 160-300 feet. This indicates that IAF pilots, following previous tactics for countering Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles, believed they could use ground clutter to interfere with the radar seekers of Air-to-Air Missiles (AAMs). Even when they lost situational awareness due to electronic jamming, they did not abandon their mission. Instead, they maintained high-speed, terrain-hugging, large-maneuver, ultra-low altitude penetration at night. Even when friendly aircraft were shot down, a majority of aircraft persisted to their weapon release points. Such flying skills and courage fulfilled their duties as soldiers and were worthy of their sense of military honor.

   In summary, the IAF's frontline commanders and pilots performed without major flaws within their cognitive limits and fulfilled their duties. They should not be baselessly blamed and slandered by Western media from a perspective of white racial superiority. Before the May 7th air battle, air-to-air kills beyond 35km were extremely rare, basically considered chance events. The IAF failed to realize the revolutionary changes brought by the new air combat system represented by sixth-generation AAMs. Like the thousands of Zulu warriors who bravely charged Maxim gun positions in 1899 and were ruthlessly cut down, it was merely due to ignorance and weakness. And as Liu Cixin (Da Liu) said, weakness and ignorance alone are not obstacles to survival; arrogance is. If they can genuinely learn from this lesson, the IAF might be able to rise from the blood in the future. Conversely, the arrogant Anglo-Saxons are likely to be bled again by the new generation of Chinese industrial/war machines.

2. From intercepted communications of IAF pilots, it appears the PAF can comprehensively suppress and jam the datalink (US-made Link-16) of IAF Rafale fighters. This meant that even Rafale wingmen could not see their flight leader's position on their in-cockpit Multi-Function Displays (MFDs). They were forced to repeatedly call their flight lead in plain language on single-sideband radio until they visually witnessed their leader's aircraft exploding in mid-air. We know that aircraft at ultra-low altitude, over 100km from the Line of Actual Control, are below the horizon of Pakistani ground-based jamming stations. Therefore, such communication jamming could only come from an airborne system. In the PLAAF (People's Liberation Army Air Force), such long-range communication jamming is performed by the Y-8G (Gāoxīn-3) communications jamming aircraft. Moreover, the Y-8G has participated in all Sino-Pakistani joint exercises since the "Shaheen-IV" exercise in 2015. However, Pakistan itself is not equipped with the Y-8G. The Pakistani briefing also did not mention the participation of electronic warfare aircraft (though the combat position of AEW aircraft was reported). So, who was the unsung hero of this electromagnetic battlefield?

A simple review of the May 7th Indo-Pak air battle based on publicly available information:

On May 7th, at 1:05 AM local time, the Indian Air Force launched "Operation Sindoor," dispatching Su-30MKIs carrying BrahMos missiles and Rafales carrying Storm Shadow (Scalp) missiles to conduct standoff strikes against targets in Pakistan-Administered Kashmir. Rafales provided cover. Israeli Heron drones were deployed for battle damage assessment. The first wave of Indian aircraft was estimated at around 30-40 sorties.

A PAF J-10CE Combat Air Patrol (CAP) duo, guided by an AEW aircraft, intercepted the strike package. A PL-15E shot down one aircraft, judged to be a Rafale (wreckage found in Pulwama, Indian-Administered Kashmir, 58km from the LoC). Another account suggests it was identified as a Mirage 2000 based on the radar radome wreckage. Pakistani air defense missile forces intercepted incoming cruise missiles, shooting down at least one. The HQ-9 long-range SAM may have shot down a carrier aircraft, but this cannot be confirmed; it was judged to be one Rafale (this aircraft kill is doubtful).

After the airstrike, PAF J-10CEs on ground alert scrambled quickly (estimated 4-5 J-10CE dual-aircraft formations, several JF-17 dual-aircraft formations, totaling approximately 20-30 sorties). Supported by AEW, they acquired target information and pursued the Su-30MKIs and Rafales returning to base, firing several PL-15s. At least one Su-30MKI was shot down (wreckage found within a school 10km from Pathankot Air Force Base, about 150km from the LoC; wreckage showed the aircraft's landing gear was down, on its fifth leg of the approach pattern). One Rafale was also shot down (wreckage in Akliyan Kalan village, Punjab, 72km from the LoC, and the crash site was only 20km from the IAF's forward operating base, Bathinda Air Force Base; it was likely also shot down on its final approach, confirmed as the IAF's first Rafale, BS-001).

With a large number of their aircraft shot down, the IAF judged that a large group of Pakistani fighters had entered their airspace (in fact, they had not; the IAF could not comprehend the kill effectiveness of Very Long-Range Air-to-Air Missiles - VLRAAMs). They quickly scrambled Su-30s, MiG-29s, Rafales, and MiG-21s from different bases to intercept the Pakistani aircraft.

The first wave of Indian aircraft was estimated at around 40-50 sorties. The PAF's second wave of scrambled formations, supported by AEW, acquired target information and fired another long-range volley of PL-15s at the newly airborne IAF patrol aircraft, downing two more. The IAF may have blindly fired a few medium-range AAMs in response. Among these, one confirmed MiG-29 was shot down (wreckage in Akhnoor village, less than 30km from the LoC), and one Rafale or Mirage 2000 was shot down (wreckage in a school less than 15km from Srinagar Air Force Base). Additionally, a large French-made external fuel tank was found in Pampore, 13km northeast of Srinagar base, possibly jettisoned by fleeing IAF aircraft.

By 1:30 AM, the IAF was stunned and had lost the will to fight. They abandoned further engagement, returned to base, and landed. The PAF did not pursue further across the border. The engagement ended.

Lessons from the Air Battle

1. This was the first large-scale air campaign between jet fighter formations aimed at achieving air superiority since the Bekaa Valley air battle. (In the Gulf War, Kosovo War, Iraq War, and the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, one side largely abandoned efforts to contest air superiority, and no large-scale formation confrontations occurred). It was a typical systemic confrontation between third-generation fighters, coordinated with AEW aircraft and ground-based missile forces. Therefore, it holds greater academic significance.

2. The lopsided outcome of the air battle demonstrates that the side supported by AEW, possessing high-performance avionics and high-performance BVR AAMs, even with slightly weaker platform flight performance, holds a crushing advantage over an avionically inferior side with stronger platform flight performance (even among same-generation fighter platforms). No Within Visual Range (WVR) combat occurred throughout the entire engagement. This further validates the correctness of Yang Xianzhi's theory of "avionics supremacy + dogfighting uselessness."

3. The combination of VLRAAMs + AESA radar, enhanced by AEW's Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) functions, provides aircraft with unprecedented Situational Awareness (SA) and look-down/shoot-down capabilities. The tactic of low-altitude approach relying solely on ground clutter for cover has likely become ineffective. (Most of the IAF aircraft lost were hit during their airport approach phase by missiles fired from 150km+ away by friendly forces – an unprecedented situation). This implies that all enemy airfields in shallow operational depths (Taiwan, South Korea, Ryukyu Islands, Honshu) lack basic wartime survivability, even if our side does not commit firepower to strike the airfields themselves. Simply under our side's air patrols and sweeps, enemy aircraft taking off from these airfields will be shot down immediately by our CAP fighters. The so-called "Agile Combat Employment" (Rapid Raptor) of the US military, involving F-35B short takeoffs from unprepared strips, is performance art with no practical wartime significance. Only aircraft with long range, capable of taking off from airfields deep in the rear, possess the survivability for high-intensity confrontations.

4. Dual-pulse rocket motor technology significantly improves a missile's energy characteristics, expanding the no-escape zone manifold. New-generation AAMs using AESA seekers have greatly expanded Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) characteristics and detection ranges. The combination of these two features renders previously effective BVR missile countermeasures, like the 3/9 o'clock high-G maneuvers, largely ineffective. (1. LPI characteristics mean the Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) does not respond, so the target aircraft cannot determine the timing for defensive maneuvers. 2. AESA has a large field of view and Track-While-Scan (TWS) function, and is not afraid of temporary Pulse-Doppler lock loss, making the 3/9 maneuver meaningless. 3. The dual-pulse motor means the missile does not lose energy rapidly, and is not susceptible to the target's energy-depletion tactics like S-turns or dive-and-climb maneuvers). The IAF pilots' tactics, trained against AIM-120/R-77/MICA/Meteor, were completely unsuited to the new-generation PL-15E and they were easily shot down like turkeys.

5. Synthesizing points 2-4 above, it can be understood that the ideal future air combat platform is one with high-performance radar/electro-optical sensors, enormous range and endurance, capable of high-speed cruise, possessing powerful all-aspect stealth, able to carry a large number of VLRAAMs (referred to as "telephone poles"), and does not need to particularly emphasize energy maneuverability. These combined points describe the "Ginkgo Leaf" and "Shrike" (or "Butcherbird") expected to be revealed by the end of 2024. (J-36, J-50 오역된거)

Finally, once again, thanks to Yang Xianzhi and the outstanding group of Chinese industrial workers he represents. Thanks to them for allowing power, this time, to be grasped by civilization.

일부 검증안된 내용도 있을것이기 때문에 해석의 유의가 필요해 보입니다. 하지만 흥미로운 내용들이 많은건 부정할 수 없습니다.

[백선호]

160-300 피트에서 격추되었다는 얘기는 어디서 나왔을까요??

the shoot-downs occurred at ultra-low altitudes of 160-300 feet. This indicates that IAF pilots, following previous tactics for countering Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles, believed they could use ground clutter to interfere with the radar seekers of Air-to-Air Missiles (AAMs)

[degg.]

카더라일 가능성이 높아보입니다 그런데 어쨌든 큰 틀에서는 맞을 확률이 높아보여서 퍼왔습니다. 라팔에는 스펙트라가 있는데 단순 rwr뿐만 아니라 광학 maws도 있는데도 불구하고 저렇게 당한거보면 말이죠

[백선호]

프랑스해군 라팔 조종사였던 사람이 생각하기에는 300이 300 노트였을 것이라고 하네요. 아래 비디오 28분 30초입니다.

https://youtu.be/Y_qY6y-ZT18?si=JbGw0-X7VWUrAWXN&t=1710