전투기 Re: 중국은 스텔스 연구를 기술적인 면에만 주목한다

[위종민]

중국은 미국의 스텔스 연구의 방향을 따라서 스텔스기 및 스텔스 대응 방공체계 개발에도 적극적으로 투자하고 있지만 첨단기술이 스텔스 능력의 핵심 기반이라고 판단하는 오류를 저질렀다고 미 공군대학에서 출간된 보고서가 분석했습니다. 

중국은 스텔스 기술이 미국 스텔스 전력의 핵심이라 믿고, 스텔스를 무력화하는 가장 좋은 방법도 기술이라 믿으며 스텔스 탐지센서 개발에 막대한 자원을 투입했지만 이런 기술은 아직 입증되지 않았거나 정확도나 클러터 제거, 전자전 취약성 등 여러 한계를 갖고 있고, 스텔스항공기 개발 역시 하드웨어 성능 지표를 우선하고 소프트웨어 적응성과 전술, 기법, 절차 현대화 등은 등한시했다고 하네요. 이런 기술 중심 사고는 엔진뿐만 아니라 스텔스 기술 역시 아직 취약한 자체 스텔스기의 문제점을 미국도 마찬가지일 것이라고 투영하는 데서 기인했을 수 있다고 합니다. 

보고서 PDF는 번역글 아래 첨부했습니다. 

중국은 미국의 스텔스기를 연구했지만 잘못된 교훈을 얻었다

Michael Peck

2026년 6월 25일

미 공군의 스텔스 프로그램에는 다목적 스텔스 전투기인 F-35 Lightning II가 포함된다. (Airman 1st Class Michael Sanders/미 공군)

모방이 최고의 찬사라면, 중국이 스텔스 항공기 기술을 적극 도입한 것은 미국의 독창성에 대한 찬사라고 할 수 있다.

미국의 스텔스 능력에 경외심과 경계심을 동시에 느낀 중국은 스텔스 항공기 개발은 물론 스텔스 대응 방공체계 개발에도 막대한 투자를 해왔다.

그러나 이달 공개된 미 공군의 분석에 따르면 중국은 미국의 스텔스 프로그램에서 잘못된 교훈을 얻었다. 중국은 첨단 기술이 미국 스텔스 능력의 핵심 기반이라고 믿고 있다.

하지만 실제로 미국의 성공 요인은 스텔스를 통합 공중전의 여러 요소 가운데 하나로 활용해 왔다는 데 있다고 보고서는 설명했다.

미 공군 장교이자 공군 중국항공우주연구소(China Aerospace Studies Institute) 연구원인 Derek Ecklebe 소령은 "중국의 미국 스텔스 능력에 대한 평가는 기술적 현실과 실제 운용 방식에서 종종 벗어나 있다"고 말했다.

그는 실제로 미국은 스텔스를 "공중 우세를 유지하기 위해 기술과 운용 전술을 통합한 다면적인 능력"으로 취급한다고 설명했다.

그는 "스텔스 기술은 비용이 많이 들고 복잡하며 중요한 요소이지만, 그것은 전체 방정식의 일부일 뿐입니다."라고 말했다.

중국은 미국의 스텔스 전력에 대해 두려움과 자신감을 동시에 보이며 대응하고 있다.

Ecklebe는 "중국은 스텔스를 미국의 비대칭적이지만 대응 가능한 우위로 인식하고 있으며, 이에 따라 다층 방공망에 대한 대규모 투자와 자체 개발 저피탐(Low Observability) 항공기를 신속하게 전력화하는 이원화 전략을 추진하고 있다."고 말했다.

아이러니하게도 미국 군과 정보기관은 종종 전략과 전술보다 기술에 지나치게 집착한다는 평가를 받는다. 그러나 Ecklebe는 오히려 중국이 기술을 과도하게 중시하고 있다고 본다.

중국 전문가들은 기술이 미국 스텔스 전력의 핵심이라고 믿기 때문에 스텔스를 무력화하는 가장 좋은 방법도 기술이라고 판단한다. 이에 따라 중국은 스텔스 탐지 센서 개발에 막대한 자원을 투입해 왔다.

중국 언론과 군사 전문지들은 저주파 레이더와 같은 향상된 탐지 센서가 스텔스에 대응하는 가장 효과적인 수단이라고 주장하고 있다.

Ecklebe는 "이들 자료는 스텔스를 새로운 탐지 장비로 해결할 수 있는 기술적 문제로 다루고 있습니다. 저주파 레이더, 수동형 센서, 테라헤르츠 센서를 가까운 시일 내 미국의 우위를 상쇄할 수 있는 잠재적 해법으로 제시하고 있습니다."라고 말했다.

그러나 이러한 스텔스 탐지 기술은 아직 충분히 입증되지 않았거나, 탐지 정확도와 잡음 제거 능력, 전자전에 대한 취약성 등 여러 한계를 안고 있다.

Ecklebe는 "실제로 이러한 체계는 상당한 물리적·운용적 제약에 직면해 있습니다."라고 말했다.

그럼에도 불구하고 F-35나 B-2 같은 스텔스 항공기를 상대로도 중국의 방공망을 과소평가해서는 안 된다.

Ecklebe는 "중국 방공망이 강력한 이유는 특정 레이더나 미사일 하나 때문이 아니라, 그것들이 통합방공체계(IADS)로 결합되어 있기 때문입니다."라고 경고했다. "인민해방군(PLA)은 저주파 조기경보체계, 수동형 탐지기, 심지어 위성에서 수집한 데이터를 군단급 공동 지휘통제센터로 통합하는 다영역 통합작전을 우선시해 왔습니다."

2026년 4월 25일 중국 저장성 항저우에서 열린 '2026 국방 군사기술 카니발'에서 관람객들이 중국의 J-35A 스텔스 전투기 모형을 살펴보고 있다. (Costfoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

이처럼 기술에 대한 집착은 중국 자체의 스텔스 항공기 개발에도 그대로 나타난다.

Ecklebe는 "미국의 F-35와 매우 유사한 외형을 가진 중국의 J-35는 F-35의 특징을 모방했지만, 미국식 소프트웨어 중심의 적응성과 전술·기법·절차(TTP)의 현대화보다는 하드웨어 성능 지표를 우선시하고 있다."고 말했다.

Ecklebe는 중국이 미국 스텔스기의 성능과 취약성을 바라보는 시각이 중국 자체 스텔스기의 문제점에서 영향을 받았을 가능성이 있다고 분석했다. 중국 스텔스기는 신뢰성이 낮은 엔진과 같은 문제를 안고 있다는 것이다.

그는 "인민해방군 계획 입안자들이 WS-10과 AL-31F 엔진의 신뢰성 문제, 그리고 J-10과 J-20의 출격률을 제한하는 현대화 문제와 같은 자국의 제약을 미국 체계에도 그대로 투영하는 '거울상 사고(Mirror-imaging)'가 이러한 왜곡을 더욱 심화시키고 있을 수 있습니다."라고 말했다.

한 가지 우려는 중국이 미국 스텔스기에 대해 잘못된 인식을 갖고 있을 경우 전쟁 가능성이 높아질 수 있다는 점이다. 만약 중국 지도부가 향상된 탐지 센서만으로 미국의 스텔스 공군력을 무력화할 수 있다고 확신한다면, 대만 침공에 더욱 자신감을 가질 수도 있다.

Ecklebe는 "중국 전략가들은 스텔스를 극복할 수 없는 장벽이 아니라 압도적인 물량과 통합 네트워크를 통해 관리할 수 있는 요소로 보고 있는 것으로 보입니다. 이에 따라 미국의 개입을 제한하기 위해 신속하고 결정적인 행동을 강조하는 억제 태세를 취하고 있습니다."라고 말했다.

Michael Peck 소개

Michael Peck은 *Defense News*의 특파원이자 *Center for European Policy Analysis*의 칼럼니스트이다. 그는 Rutgers University에서 정치학 석사 학위를 취득했다. 그는 theuncommondefense.com에서 활동하고 있으며, 이메일 주소는 [mikedefense1@gmail.com](mailto:mikedefense1@gmail.com)이다.

2026-06-08 Chinese Perceptions of Stealth.pdf

1.68MB

China studied US stealth aircraft — and learned the wrong lessons

China studied US stealth aircraft — and learned the wrong lessons

By Michael Peck

 Thursday, Jun 25, 2026

The U.S. Air Force's stealth program includes the F-35 Lightening II, a multi-role stealth fighter. (Airman 1st Class Michael Sanders/Air Force)

If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then China’s embrace of stealth aircraft technology is a compliment to American ingenuity.

Both awed by — and apprehensive about — U.S. stealth capabilities, China has invested heavily in developing stealth aircraft, as well as anti-stealth air defenses.

But China has learned the wrong lessons from America’s stealth program, according to U.S. Air Force analysis released this month. China is convinced that advanced technology is the foundation of U.S. stealth capabilities.

But in reality, the key to American success has been treating stealth as just one component of integrated aerial warfare, the report said.

China’s “assessments of U.S. stealth often diverge from technical reality and operational practice,” said Maj. Derek Ecklebe, a U.S. Air Force officer and a fellow at the Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute.

The reality is that the U.S. treats stealth “as a multifaceted capability that integrates technology with operational tactics to maintain air superiority,” he said. “Stealth technology, while expensive, complex, and important, is only part of the equation.”

China is responding to U.S. stealth warfare with a mixture of fear and confidence.

“Chinese views of stealth as an asymmetric yet counterable U.S. advantage have driven a bifurcated strategy: robust investments in layered air defenses and a rapid program to field domestically developed [low observability] aircraft,” Ecklebe said.

Ironically, the U.S. military and intelligence agencies are often depicted as being fixated on technology at the expense of strategy and tactics. But in Ecklebe’s view, it is China that is overemphasizing tech.

Because Chinese experts believe that technology is at the heart of American stealth warfare, then it follows that the best defense against stealth is also technological. Thus, China has poured resources into developing anti-stealth sensors.

Chinese media and military journals suggest that better sensors, such as low-frequency radar, are the best countermeasure against stealth.

“These sources treat stealth as a technical problem to solve with new detection tools,” Ecklebe said. “They present low-frequency radars, passive sensors, and terahertz sensors as potential solutions that could soon counter U.S. advantages.”

But these stealth-busting technologies are either unproven or have limitations, such as accuracy, filtering out clutter or vulnerability to electronic warfare.

“In practice, these systems face significant physical and operational constraints,” said Ecklebe.

Nonetheless, Chinese air defenses should not be underestimated, even against stealth aircraft like the F-35 and B-2.

“What makes China’s defenses formidable is not any single radar or missile, but rather their integration into a unified IADS [integrated air defense system],” Ecklebe warned. “The PLA [People’s Liberation Army] has prioritized multi-domain integrated operations, pulling data from low-frequency early-warning systems, passive detectors, and even satellites into shared command centers at the corps level.”

Viewers observe China's J-35A stealth fighter model at the 2026 National Defense Military Technology Carnival in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, China, on April 25, 2026. (Costfoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

This same enchantment with technology applies to China’s own stealth aircraft.

China’s J-35 — which looks remarkably like the U.S. F-35 — “replicates features of the U.S. F-35 platform but prioritizes hardware metrics over U.S.-style software-defined adaptability coupled with [tactics, techniques and procedures] modernization,” said Ecklebe.

Ecklebe suggests that China’s perceptions of U.S. stealth aircraft — and their vulnerabilities — may be influenced by problems with Chinese stealth planes, which suffer from issues, such as unreliable engines.

“Mirror-imaging may further contribute to these distortions, as PLA planners project domestic constraints, such as WS-10 and AL-31F engine reliability and modernization issues that limit J-10 and J-20 sortie rates, onto U.S. systems,” he said.

One question is whether Chinese misconceptions of U.S. stealth could increase the chance of war. If Chinese leaders are convinced that better sensors can neutralize American stealth airpower, then they may feel more emboldened to invade Taiwan.

“Chinese strategists appear to view stealth not as an insurmountable barrier but as a factor that can be managed through overwhelming volume and integrated networks, leading to a deterrence posture that emphasizes rapid, decisive action to limit U.S. involvement,” Ecklebe said.

About Michael Peck

Michael Peck is a correspondent for Defense News and a columnist for the Center for European Policy Analysis. He holds an M.A. in political science from Rutgers University. Find him at theuncommondefense.com. His email is mikedefense1@gmail.com.

Chinese Perceptions of Stealth: Shaping Defense Against U.S. Capabilities and Indigenous Developments > Air University (AU) > China Aerospace Studies Institute

Chinese Perceptions of Stealth: Shaping Defense Against U.S. Capabilities and Indigenous Developments

• Published June 8, 2026
• China Aerospace Studies Institute

Stealth technology has transformed modern air warfare, providing the United States with a sustained operational advantage for over four decades. From its Cold War beginnings to its development in platforms like the F-117, B-2, F-22, and F-35, stealth has evolved into a system-of-systems capability that combines advanced engineering, mission planning, and operational expertise. As the U.S. improved both the technology and its deployment, other countries, particularly China, closely watched its progress and combat application, aiming to understand, counter, and replicate its advantages.  These observations have not happened in isolation; they have been influenced by unique institutional viewpoints, technological limitations, and strategic goals that continue to shape China’s approach to stealth and counter-stealth systems.

Open-source PLA military writings and observations suggest Chinese views of U.S. stealth have been shaped by a mix of empirical observation, cognitive biases, and technological ambitions. This has led to a dual strategy focused on both countering U.S. low-observability capabilities and developing indigenous stealth platforms. However, these perceptions are often incomplete or skewed, leading to an overreliance on hardware solutions, an underestimation of U.S. operational adaptability, and a framing of stealth as a technical rather than an operational problem. Analyzing how these perceptions affect China’s integrated air defense systems, radar technology, and next-generation aircraft programs reveals both the strengths and vulnerabilities in the PLA’s approach, providing insights into the shifting balance of airpower in the Indo-Pacific. Open-source PLA analyses and commentary give limited attention to the intangibles of conflict, areas in which the United States has accumulated decades of operational experience.

Click here for the full report

[김유철]

이건 아무래도 실전경험의 부족에 기인한 사항같아 보이네요. 만일 의도적으로 은근히 착시를 유도한 것이라면 미국입장에서는 중국에 불필요한 지출을 강요한 셈이 되겠고...

[위종민]

스텔스의 기술적인 면에만 주목하는 건 다분히 아마추어 군사 매니아적인 사고인 것 같긴 한데, 말씀대로 실전경험이 모자라다 보니 스텔스와 그 대응기술 모두 기술적인 면에만 주목하는 게 아닐까 싶습니다.

이런 내용을 오픈하는 건 이미 중국의 기술발전 방향이 꽤나 어긋났다는 걸 확인했다는 뜻이 아닌가 싶기도 하구요.