전투기 왜 보잉에 계란을 다 담았나? 노스롭 그루먼에 대한 미해군의 불만이 원인일지도?

[위종민]

The Strategist에 실린 Bill Sweetman의 글입니다. 

KC-46과 T-7의 만족스럽지 못한 실적에도 불구하고, 보잉은 미해군 사업에서는 크게 사고를 치지 않았고 노스롭 그루먼은 핵잠용 증기터빈을 생산하는 캘리포니아주 서니베일 공장의 문제로 USS 컬럼비아의 준공이 미뤄진 적이 있었네요. 

F-47은 많아야 300대정도 뽑는데, F/A-XX는 매년 30대 넘게 뽑아야되서 기술적으로 공통된 요소는 있을 수 있어도 F-47 해상형은 아닐 거라고 봅니다. 

F/A-XX: 미국은 왜 전투기의 모든 달걀을 보잉 바구니에 담고 있나

2026년 10월 2일 | 빌 스위트먼

화요일 오후 5시 1분, 불과 여섯 문단짜리 보도자료 하나가 21세기 미 해군 최대 사업 가운데 하나의 출발을 알렸다. 해군은 200억 달러 규모 계약을 통해 미래 F/A-XX 전투항공기를 개발할 업체로 노스럽그러먼 대신 보잉을 선택했다. 2030년대 중반부터 F/A-XX는 F/A-18 호넷 전투기와 EA-18 그라울러 전자공격기를 대체하게 된다.

대중의 주된 반응은 이해할 만하게도 “정말?”에 가까웠다. F/A-XX 경쟁이 보잉과 노스럽그러먼의 대결로 압축됐다는 사실은 알려져 있었다. 게다가 보잉은 2025년 3월 미 공군의 F-47 차세대 공중우세(NGAD) 항공기 개발 경쟁에서 록히드마틴을 꺾은 바 있다. 따라서 F/A-XX까지 보잉에 맡긴다는 것은, 달갑지 않게도 미 국방부가 미래 전투기 개발이라는 ‘달걀’을 사실상 한 바구니에 모두 담는 셈이다.

그래서 첫 번째 질문은 이것이다. 국방부는 왜 이런 선택을 했을까? 록히드마틴은 덩치 큰 뻐꾸기 새끼 같은 F-35 라이트닝이 마지막 경쟁자였던 보잉 F/A-18E/F 슈퍼호넷을 둥지 밖으로 밀어낸 이후 사실상 독점에 가까운 지위를 누려왔다. 그런데도 오랫동안 문제를 겪어온 F-35 사업은 여전히 컴퓨터 문제에 시달리고 있으며, 그 탓에 2023년 이후 새로 생산된 항공기들은 완전한 능력을 갖추지 못한 상태다.

두 번째 질문은 더 단순하다. 하필 보잉이라고? 보잉의 군수부문인 Boeing Defense and Space는 최근 들어 눈에 띄는 성공을 많이 거둔 곳은 아니다. KC-46 페가수스 공중급유기 사업은 고생이 많았고, T-7 레드호크 훈련기도 적어도 현재로서는 순탄한 길을 가고 있다고 보기 어렵다. 여기에 2030년대 이후를 위한 E-7 웨지테일 공중감시항공기 재생산은 차라리 신형 기종을 하나 새로 개발하는 편이 쉬워 보일 정도다.

그렇다면 해군은 Boeing Defense and Space의 이런 실적에 대한 우려를 어떻게 제쳐두었을까? 대체로 말하자면 이 사업부는 해군 사업에서는 크게 사고를 치지 않았기 때문이다. 슈퍼호넷과 그라울러는 F-35C의 지연과 결함에도 불구하고 해군 항공단의 전투력을 신뢰할 만한 수준으로 유지해왔고, 보잉 P-8 포세이돈 해상초계기 사업도 순조롭게 진행됐다. 해군 입장에서는 미 공군 항공기 사업의 사정은 우선순위가 아니며, 역사적으로 해군 사업 경험이 많은 주계약업체와 일하는 것을 선호해왔다. 그리고 미안하지만, 전투기 분야에서 ‘그루먼’이라는 이름은 이제 과거의 이야기가 됐다.

하지만 캘리포니아 사우스베이 교외에는 해군이 아주 신경 쓰는 무언가가 있다. 미국 핵잠수함용 증기터빈을 생산하는 노스럽그러먼의 서니베일 공장이다. 2024년 해군은 서니베일에서 발생한 문제 때문에 신형 탄도미사일잠수함급 1번함 USS 컬럼비아의 완공이 12~16개월 지연됐다고 공개했다. 워싱턴의 소식통들에 따르면 해군은 공군 사업에 더 익숙한 이 주계약업체의 대응에 만족하지 못했다.

보잉이 F-47을 수주한 사실은 부정적인 요인만은 아니었을 것이다. 오히려 긍정적으로 작용한 측면도 있었을 가능성이 크다.

기밀로 분류돼 있음에도 지금까지 나온 정보만으로도 F/A-XX가 F-47의 파생형은 아니라는 점은 충분히 알 수 있다. 앞서 The Strategist에 쓴 글에서 논의했듯 F-47은 크고 비싼 항공기이며, 미 공군은 이 기종을 200~300대 정도 도입할 가능성이 있다. 해군은 항공단 전력을 채우려면 매년 30대가 넘는 전투기를 생산해야 한다. 이 점과 두 항공기가 별도 사업이라는 사실을 고려하면, 다행스럽게도 F-35처럼 또 하나의 다군종 공동사업을 보고 있는 것은 아니다.

하지만 버락 오바마 대통령 시절 국방부 획득 책임자였던 프랭크 켄들이 2015년 시작한 항공우주혁신구상(AII)은 두 군종 모두를 지원하는 것을 목표로 했으며, F-47과 F/A-XX가 상당한 공통기술을 사용하는 것으로 추정하는 것은 무리가 아니다.

계약업체 선정 사이에는 18개월의 간격이 있었기 때문에 보잉은 해군에 최종 제안서를 내기 전에 이미 F-47 사업을 확보한 상태였다. 따라서 보잉은 특히 체계통합과 소프트웨어 분야에서 F-47 사업을 이용해 F/A-XX의 기반을 닦고 위험을 줄일 수 있다는 이점을 제시할 수 있었다.

보잉은 세인트루이스의 완전히 새로운 단지에서 F-47을 개발하고 있으며, 이곳의 시설과 인력을 F/A-XX와 공유할 수 있다. 여기에는 고성능 시뮬레이션 시설도 포함된다. 게다가 중서부 지역은 인건비와 토지, 건설비용도 상대적으로 낮다. 노스럽그러먼 입장에서 이 조건을 상대로 경쟁력 있는 제안서를 짜야 했다면 정말 골치 아팠을 것이다.

보잉의 두 차례 승리에 모두 적용되는 또 다른 요인도 있다. 보잉은 노스럽그러먼보다 규모가 두 배 크며 미국 최대 수출기업이다. 해군 입장에서는 이런 ‘800파운드 고릴라’를 자기 편에 두는 것이 든든하다. 특히 초대형 항공모함을 드론으로 대체하자는 논쟁 속에서 사업예산을 계속 지켜내야 한다면 더 그렇다.

그리고 우리가 볼 수 없는 가장 큰 요인이 있다. 보잉과 노스럽그러먼 설계안의 상대적인 성능과 위험이다. 어쩌면 보잉이 그냥 훨씬 더 나은 전투기를 제안했을 수도 있다.

F/A-XX와 F-47의 위험 가운데 하나는 정부, 즉 정치와 행정 체계가 이 두 개의 대형 전투기 개발사업을 F-35 때보다 더 잘 통제하지 못할 수 있다는 점이다. 강력하고 전문적인 사업관리조직이 필요하다. 이상적으로는 그곳에서 일하는 사람들이 퇴직 후 방산업계로 갈 생각을 하지 않을 만큼 충분한 보상을 받아야 한다. 지금 국방부 지도부 가운데 이 점을 이해하는 사람이 있을까?

또 하나 국방부 지도부가 충분히 생각하고 있는지 의문인 것이 있다. 미국 전투기 수출이다. F-47과 F/A-XX가 정말 지금처럼 기밀을 유지해야 할 정도라면 수출하기 어렵고, 현재 미국의 주력 수출형 전투기인 F-35를 대체할 기종도 없다. 국방부 지도부가 “그건 2050년쯤 고민할 문제”라며 웃어넘긴다면, 그건 너무 안이한 생각이다. 해외 F-35 운용국들은 그보다 훨씬 전에 대체기를 찾기 시작할 것이다.

마지막으로, 한때 후기 제품 대부분인 호넷, 해리어, 고쇼크가 다른 회사에서 뿌리를 가져왔다는 이유로 악명이 높았던 세인트루이스의 보잉 전투기 조직이 부활한 데에는 아주 특별한 이야기가 하나 있다. 나는 그 이야기의 일부를 다른 The Strategist 글에서 다룬 바 있다. 어떻게 했는지는 몰라도 고 앨런 위크먼, 당신이 한 번도 들어본 적 없을지도 모르는 가장 중요한 항공우주 엔지니어 가운데 한 명은 자신의 팀과 사업을 끝까지 지켜냈다. 1996년 합동타격전투기 경쟁 패배, 2000년대 초기 무인전투항공기 사업의 부상과 몰락, 노스럽그러먼의 B-21 폭격기 수주까지 모두 견뎌내며 결국 이들을 승리의 길로 이끌었다.

저자

빌 스위트먼은 오랜 경력과 수상 경력을 가진 언론인이자 항공우주산업 임원이다.

항공모함 비행갑판 위 F/A-XX 일러스트 이미지: 보잉.

이 기사에는 AI가 어떠한 아이디어도 제공하지 않았다 — 빌 스위트먼.

F/A-XX: why the US is putting all its fighter eggs in the Boeing basket | The Strategist

F/A-XX: why the US is putting all its fighter eggs in the Boeing basket | The Strategist

F/A-XX: why the US is putting all its fighter eggs in the Boeing basket

2 Oct 2026|Bill Sweetman

SHARE

Print This Post

A six-paragraph news release at 5:01 pm on Tuesday was all that marked the launch of one of the biggest US Navy projects of the 21st century: the service had picked Boeing, over Northrop Grumman, to develop its future F/A-XX combat aircraft under a $20 billion contract. From the mid-2030s, the F/A-XX will replace F/A-18 Hornet fighters and EA-18 Growler electronic attack aircraft.

Incredulity was the main public reaction, for understandable reasons. It was known that the F/A-XX competition was down to Boeing and Northrop Grumman. And Boeing had beaten Lockheed Martin in March 2025 in the contest to build the Air Force’s F-47 Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft, so giving it the F/A-XX program would mean, most unattractively, putting all the Pentagon’s fighter-development eggs in one basket.

So the first question is: why would the Defense Department do this? Lockheed Martin has enjoyed a near-monopoly position since its plump cuckoo-chick, the F-35 Lightning, tossed its last rival, the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, out of the nest. Even now, the long-troubled F-35 program is suffering computer problems that have left new aircraft only partially capable since 2023.

The second question: Boeing?! The company’s military division, Boeing Defense and Space, hasn’t exactly been hitting a lot of home runs lately. Its KC-46 Pegasus tanker program has been a sad story, and its T-7 Red Hawk trainer is following a pathway that looks rocky, at least. Next, its revival of the E-7 Wedgetail air-surveillance aircraft for the 2030s and beyond seems to be harder than developing a new type.

So how has the navy set aside concerns about the performance of Boeing Defense and Space? Well, for the most part, the division has not gooned up navy programs. The Super Hornet and Growler have kept the navy’s air wings credible despite the delays and deficiencies of the F-35C, while the Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft has gone smoothly. The navy does not give a hoot about US Air Force aircraft, and historically it has liked working with navy-experienced primes (and, sorry, the Grumman name, for fighters, is history).

But tucked away in California’s South Bay suburbs is something the navy does care about: Northrop Grumman’s Sunnyvale plant, which makes the steam turbines for America’s nuclear submarines. In 2024, the navy disclosed that Sunnyvale issues were responsible for a 12 to 16 month delay in the completion of USS Columbia, first boat of a new ballistic-missile submarine class. Washington sources say that the navy wasn’t happy with the USAF-focused prime’s response.

Boeing’s F-47 win will have been a positive, as well as negative, factor.

Despite classification, enough has been said to tell us that F/A-XX is not a derivative of the F-47. As I discussed in an earlier Strategist article, the F-47 is large and expensive, and the USAF may acquire between 200 and 300 aircraft of the type. The navy needs to build 30-plus fighters a year to keep its air wings filled. This, and the fact that the two aircraft are separate programs, mean that, thankfully, we’re not looking at another multi-service program like F-35.

But the Aerospace Innovation Initiative (AII) started in 2015 by Frank Kendall, president Barack Obama’s Pentagon acquisition boss, was aimed at supporting both services, and it’s a fair guess that the F-47 and F/A-XX use a lot of common technology.

Since there was an 18-month gap between the choice of contractors, Boeing had the F-47 in the bag before making its final navy bid. So it could offer the advantage of using the F-47 program to break ground and reduce risk for the F/A-XX, particularly with regard to systems integration and software.

Boeing is developing the F-47 on a brand-new campus at St Louis with facilities and workforce that it could share with the F/A-XX. This includes high-end simulation. And it has Midwest costs for labour, land and construction. I would have absolutely hated to have been the Northrop Grumman exec who tried to shape a competitive bid against that.

Another factor applies to both Boeing wins: the company is twice Northrop Grumman’s size and is the largest US exporter. For the navy, the 800-pound gorilla is nice to have on your side, especially if you want to keep your program funded amid debate over replacing your supercarriers with drones.

Then there’s the big factor we can’t see: the relative performance and risk of the Boeing and Northrop Grumman designs. Boeing may simply have proposed a much better fighter.

One risk for the F/A-XX and F-47 is that the government – political and administrative – will be no more able to control this double-headed monster of a fighter development effort than it has been for the F-35. You want a powerful, professional project office. Ideally, you want people well compensated enough that they’re not thinking of going to industry when they retire. Does anyone in DoD leadership today understand this?

Another thing that I’m not sure that DoD leadership understands: US fighter exports. If the F-47 and F/A-XX really need to be as secret as they are, they’re not exportable, and there’s no replacement for the main current exportable US type, the F-35. And if DoD leadership chuckles and says that’s a 2050 matter, I have a bridge to sell them. Foreign F-35 operators will be looking for replacements well before then.

Finally, there is one extraordinary story to be told about the revival of Boeing’s fighter organisation in St Louis, which was once notorious because most of its later products – the Hornet, Harrier and Goshawk – had their roots in other companies. I told part of that story in another Strategist article. Somehow, the late Alan Wiechman – the most important aerospace engineer you’ve never heard of – kept his team and his projects together – through the loss of the Joint Strike Fighter competition in 1996, the rise and demise of the early uncrewed combat aircraft projects in the 2000s, and Northrop Grumman’s B-21 bomber win, to set them on a path to victory.

Author

Bill Sweetman is a veteran, award-winning journalist and aerospace industry executive.

Image of an illustrated F/A-XX on an aircraft carrier flight deck: Boeing.

AI contributed no ideas to this article – Bill Sweetman.

[김유철]

모두가 다 "진상 을"들...... 그러니까 내 분야에서 사고 안친 놈을 고른다는 피 토하는 심정........

[백선호]

ㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋ