08/14: Alasdair MacIntyre's Disquieting Suggestion(For Reference)

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Alasdair MacIntyre and the Disquieting Suggestion

Alasdair MacIntyre, born this day (January 12) in 1929, opens his most famous work, After Virtue, with the following disturbing scenario (he titles it "A Disquieting Suggestion"):

Imagine that the natural sciences were to suffer the effects of a catastrophe. A series of environmental disasters are blamed by the general public on scientists. Widespread riots occur, laboratories are burnt down, physicists are lynched, books and instruments are destroyed. Finally a Know-Nothing political movement takes power and successfully abolishes science teaching in schools and universities, imprisoning and executing the remaining scientists. Later still there is a reaction against this destructive movement and enlightened people seek to revive science, although they have largely forgotten what it was. But all that they possess are fragments: a knowledge of experiments detached from any knowledge of the theoretical context which gave them significance; parts of theories unrelated either to the other bits and pieces of theory which they possess or to experiment; instruments whose use has been forgotten; half-chapters from books, single pages from articles, not always fully legible because torn and charred. 1.

Professor MacIntyre raises this discomfiting hypothetical history to illustrate the way in which the language of science would be used by those trying to put it together, although the context or more accurately the overarching paradigm or structure which gave that language its meaning would be lost. He then proposes that something of the sort has actually taken place, but in the field of morality rather than of technology, saying:

The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in the actual world which we inhabit the language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder as the language of natural science in the imaginary world which I described. What we possess, if this view is true, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived. 2.

Without trying to analyze or even summarize the celebrated philosophical insights that Professor MacIntyre then goes on draw from his assessment of this bleak moral scenario (an area in which I am certainly not an expert), it is worth noting a few points that are at least tangentially related to the subject matter of this blog.

First, it is probably accurate to state that he sees the choices faced by those living in the aftermath of the "disorder" he describes as two: "Nietzsche or Aristotle?" I have heard this choice explained as "making oneself a work of art" in a meaningless universe (Nietzsche), or seeing meaning in the universe and seeing the universe as "a work of art" and trying to live in accordance with that very different view.

Interestingly enough, we have encountered Aristotle in this blog before, seemingly making a very important observation about what he called "our ancestors and our earliest predecessors." In his Metaphysics, he opines:

while probably each art and each science has often been developed as far as possible and has again perished, these opinions, with others, have been preserved until the present like relics of the ancient treasure.

In other words, Aristotle himself seems to be talking about a scenario not unlike that which initiates MacIntyre's signature work: a time when "each art and each science" was developed as far as possible but then "perished." However, it does not seem that Aristotle is posing this statement as a hypothetical scenario or an analogy -- he seems to really mean it. One reason to conclude this is that he then says that certain important opinions from that distant past had survived "like relics of the ancient treasure." What opinions does he mean?

The antecedent of "these opinions" (in the fuller quotation cited in the post linked above) are two different but apparently related ideas, which Aristotle describes as "a tradition, in the form of a myth, that these bodies are gods, and that the divine encloses the whole of nature."

In other words, the idea that "these bodies" (that is, the celestial bodies of the planets, including the sun and the moon) "are gods" is an idea that somehow preserves the "ancient treasure" of an ancient lost science! No wonder that this line from Aristotle is quoted in Hamlet's Mill, since they pursue the extensive evidence from around the world that the myths of the gods are exactly what Aristotle says they are -- an ancient treasure preserving a lost science.

That is startling, but no more so than the next concept that Aristotle introduces, the idea that "the divine encloses the whole of nature." In other words, it appears that the "whole of nature" being "enclosed in the divine" is related to, or at least perceived in conjunction with, the idea of the motions of the heavenly bodies (perhaps this is taking Aristotle's sentence too far, but I don't think so). This is clearly related to the hasty summary of the "Nietzsche vs. Aristotle" choice found in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre.

However, it also seems to indicate that the "disquieting suggestion" that opens his book is not just an analogy for the state of moral perception in the wake of the Enlightenment (as he says it is) but that something like that horrible scenario may have in fact taken place in the distant past long before Aristotle! Whether MacIntyre believes this or not (and I am not trying to suggest that he introduced his "disquieting" scenario as anything but a useful analogy, nor am I suggesting that he subscribes to any of the hypotheses about geology or ancient human history discussed in this blog or the Mathisen Corollary book), there appears to be evidence that such a collapse in knowledge took place. Some of the evidence even seems to come from Aristotle (although there is much evidence quite independent of that philosopher).

Professor MacIntyre suggests that it is quite plausible to believe that we are completely ignorant of the deliberate dismantling of moral context that took place in a previous century. Likewise, it appears that we can be blind to the fact that humanity also experienced a dismantling of scientific understanding in the far more distant past.

Nor is this a dry and academic debate: as we have explored in previous posts such as this one and this one, the question of how such a loss could have happened, and how some knowledge could have been (as Aristotle thinks it was) preserved and passed on like an "ancient treasure," is vitally important to everyone, if it indeed took place. However, we will never know the answers to those questions if we do not even start to see the signs that such a loss did once take place.

We wish Professor MacIntyre many happy returns on his birthday!

Posted by David Warner Mathisen at 12:01 AM

http://mathisencorollary.blogspot.kr/2012/01/alasdair-macintyre-and-disquieting.html

Alasdair MacIntyre's Disquieting Suggestion

(idea)

by Teo-lohi

Sat Apr 15 2006 at 19:01:44

Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue is one of the most thorough-going critiques of liberal democratic culture there is. If MacIntyre's thesis is correct, then the last three hundred years of Western moral and political philosophy from the Enlightenment onwards has been a mistake. Furthermore, if MacIntyre is right, then modern liberal democracies are essentially devoid of morality. In this writeup, I discuss MacIntyre's main thesis - the 'disquieting suggestion'.

After Virtue begins with a dramatic analogy. MacIntyre asks us to imagine a world wherein natural science experiences a tremendous crisis. Scientists are blamed for environmental disasters, and the public at large turns against them. An anti-science political party gets into power, and abolishes the practice and teaching of science. Later, however, a pro-science movement emerges, and attempts to pick up the pieces. But all that remains is fragments. People do have debates about various bits of scientific theories, but these debates are essentially pointless. The debates cannot be resolved rationally, since the proper context for scientific enquiry has been lost.

The above sketch is an analogy with the state of morality in modern societies. MacIntyre's disquieting suggestion is that morality in Western liberal societies has gone through exactly such a crisis. Moral language is still used, but it has lost its meaning, since the proper context for morality has been lost.

Modern moral debate

MacIntyre admits that his suggestion seems wildly implausible. It does not correspond with the way we understand morality. Indeed, MacIntyre concedes that we continue to use moral language as though it made sense. We do feel we say something meaningful when asserting 'murder is wrong' or 'the death penalty is unjust.' But MacIntyre argues that our moral language betrays us.

Consider modern moral debates, on issues such as abortion, nuclear deterrence, or the justification of making war in certain circumstances. Both the proponents of the woman's right to choose and pro-life groups present their arguments in terms of morality. Pro-abortion groups, then, argue that the woman has an inviolable right to choose what to do with her own body; banning abortion would be an illegitimate violation of this right. Anti-abortionists retort that human life is sacred and inviolable, that the fetus is a distinct human individual, and that the killing of the fetus is thus a violation of that individual's fundamental right to live. MacIntyre notes that on both sides of the debate, the conclusions are logical. They follow from the premises. But once the debate reaches the basic premises, it necessarily ends. It is no longer debate, but merely the assertion of different, incommensurable points of view. Because the basic premises are incommensurable, the debate is necessarily interminable.

This observation is MacIntyre's most important piece of evidence for the crisis in modern morality that he diagnoses. Moral debates in modern liberal democracies, especially the United States, which is divided by the culture wars, is interminable. Even though we can always argue back to our basic premises, there is nothing left to do when we reach them. What we are left with is the assertion of personal preference. In the end, debates about abortion or nuclear deterrence or just war in modern societies boil down to the assertion of individual preferences. One believes war is justified in some instances because one prefers the basic premises which lead to this conclusion; conversely, pacifism stems from preferring an opposed set of premises.

What, then, is left of morality? According to MacIntyre, virtually nothing. Morality becomes nothing but the assertion of individual whims, and this is no morality at all. Moral language is still used, however, because fragments remain from earlier periods of history when morality did have a proper context. But we no longer use the language of morality to express moral claims at all, but merely our preferences.

Emotivism

MacIntyre anticipates one obvious objection to the above account: the reason why moral debate in modern societies is only a matter of personal preference and hence interminable is that all moral debate throughout history has been, and always will be a matter of preference. Morality as such is nothing but the expression‎ of individual preferences. 'Murder is wrong' means nothing more than 'I don't like murder' or 'Boo for murder!' And the same is true of all sentences expressing moral claims, in all societies, all cultures, and all periods of history.

The theory outlined above is called emotivism, and has been defended by philosophers such as Stevenson and Ayer. MacIntyre argues that emotivism is philosophically indefensible. His argument is partly historical, partly purely philosophical. The philosophical argument is not important. Let it suffice to say that MacIntyre dismisses emotivism as a general theory about the meaning of moral utterances. Those interested to pursue this should turn to After Virtue, and to the numerous discussions of emotivism in the philosophical literature.

The historical argument is important. MacIntyre argues that emotivism as a philosophy arose in a very particular historical context - the University of Cambridge, roughly between 1903 and 1939. Before emotivism, the dominant moral theory at Cambridge was the intuitionism of G.E. Moore. According to Moore's Principia Ethica, 'good' is a simple, indefinable quality, analogous to a colour. To discern more clearly the colour of some object, superior perception must be applied; in the same way, to know whether something is good or not, it must be observed by someone with a superior moral sense. This had the obvious consequence that moral debate in the circle inspired by Moore descended into nothing but assertion of individual will. It is, of course, impossible to demonstrate that someone has a superior moral sense to another. So, in debates in the Cambridge circle, this was 'demonstrated' by use of rhetorical eloquence or force of will.

The theory of emotivism was a reaction to the state of moral debate in Cambridge in the first part of the twentieth century. The emotivists correctly perceived that moral debate in Cambridge was nothing but the assertion of personal preference. They invalidly universalized this observation into the assertion that any and all moral debate is of this character. As we have seen, MacIntyre dismisses emotivism as a philosophy. But, emotivism is true of the use to which moral language is put in certain historical contexts. The crux of the disquieting suggestion is that what was true of Cambridge in the early twentieth century is true of liberal democratic culture in general. The Cambridge example is important also because it helps us understand MacIntyre's historical argument as to why modern societies are in this predicament, an argument focusing on the failure of the enlightenment project.

The enlightenment project

The enlightenment is conventionally lauded as the period which gave us ideals such as 'liberty, equality, fraternity' and 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' The enlightenment is seen as a liberation from the stifling grip of centuries of tradition. MacIntyre disagrees. The enlightenment was a mistake.

MacIntyre takes issue specifically with what he calls the 'enlightenment project of justifying morality.' MacIntyre argues that the philosophers of the enlightenment - he uses Hume, Kant and Diderot as representative examples - attempted to rationally ground morality in a conception of human nature, whilst doing away with any Aristotelian teleology. The Aristotelian tradition in its classical and Thomistic variants based moral enquiry in a belief in an essential telos, or purpose for man. The role of morality was to let man advance from the way he actually is towards realizing this purpose. Moral claims were thus ultimately grounded in a conception of teleology.

Now the philosophers of the enlightenment attempted to do away with all teleology. Because natural science had discredited Aristotelian teleology in the realms of biology and physics, the enlightenment thinkers believed they could ignore it in moral theory as well. What they were left with was, on the one hand a certain Christian, bourgeois morality which they wanted to justify, and on the other hand a certain understanding of human nature as it is. MacIntyre argues that the rejection of teleology made the equation impossible, since by themselves, the two remaining elements were incompatible. The enlightenment project could not succeed, and it didn't.

Because the secularization of society has led to the rejection of a morality based on theology, and the enlightenment project failed in its attempt to provide a rational grounding for morality without reference to teleology, what we are left with are the fragments of the theological and teleological schemes, but these lack any proper context in the modern world. As we saw, people in modern liberal democracies still have moral debates about abortion or nuclear deterrence, but they lack any rational way of making sense of morality. The rival premises of moral debate derive from the fragments of the older scheme. But because of the rejection of theology and teleology, there is no overall framework for morality. For moral debate to make sense, a society must have a set of shared basic principles, but our societies lack them. The failure of the enlightenment project led to the triumph of emotivism in modern culture - and conversely, to the decline of morality.

Conclusion

What are we to make of all this? MacIntyre's claims are extremely radical, and they encompass hundreds of years of philosophy. Claims of this magnitude do not tend to go uncriticized in philosophy, and MacIntyre has certainly received his share of critical attention. I will not attempt any refutation or vindication here, but will merely point out where I think the weaknesses of MacIntyre's disquieting suggestion lie.

Firstly, MacIntyre's history is presented purely in terms of philosophy. The failure of modernity is essentially the failure of the philosophy that preceded it. Even if we grant MacIntyre's assertion that in the culture of the enlightenment philosophy had a much more central role than in modernity, this is an extraordinary claim to make. Surely the emotivism of modern culture (assuming it is emotivist) stems to a large part from the socioeconomic conditions of modern liberal democracies. It is curious that MacIntyre has no place whatsoever for economic or sociological analysis, given that he once used to be a Marxist. To me at least it seems implausible that the predicament of modern morality is to be primarily understood in the light of the history of philosophy.

Secondly, surely the decline of Christianity is the truly significant event, with the rejection of Aristotelianism secondary? I think Nietzsche is much closer to the mark. Surely the emotivism of modernity is a consequence of widespread scepticism in the most fundamental belief that people in the West held for centuries. Because God is dead, it seems that nothing is left of Christian morality but incoherent fragments, which we can adhere to out of personal preference. Furthermore, perhaps the decline of Christianity has led to scepticism about any moral scheme. Maybe the failure of the enlightenment project lies not in the philosophical failure of its arguments, but rather in the fact that people are too sceptical to accept its conclusions in the modern world.

Thirdly, because MacIntyre's argument is presented in terms of the history of philosophy, his interpretations of philosophers are crucially important for the validity of his conclusions. But MacIntyre makes some obvious mistakes. The clearest is the case of Kant, who is presented as a typical enlightenment thinker who rejects teleology. In fact, Kant does espouse a teleological doctrine, expressed most clearly in his writings on universal history. Furthermore, Kant has a conception of the telos for an individual. If MacIntyre's characterization of such a central figure as Kant is faulty, what hope of plausibility does his overall argument have?

I personally do not find MacIntyre convincing. I intend to do further writeups on some of the other central themes of After Virtue, in which I will offer more criticism. But I would certainly recommend After Virtue to anyone interested in moral philosophy, or the state of modern society. Even if one is not convinced by the arguments, it is worth engaging with a text that is radically different from the approach taken by mainstream liberal theorists.

Bibliography
MacIntyre, A. (1985) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London, Duckworth).
Horton, J. and Mendus, S. (1994) After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre (Cambridge, Polity Press).
Matravers, M. (2006) Seminars on After Virtue (York, University of York).
Mendus, S. (2006) Lectures on After Virtue (York, University of York). 

http://everything2.com/title/Alasdair+MacIntyre%2527s+Disquieting+Suggestion

Alasdair MacIntyre, “A Disquieting Suggestion”

in After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984)

A catastrophe befalls the natural sciences. An anti-science movement results in the elimination of laboratories, scientists, books, instruments and the abolition of science teaching in schools and universities.
Later efforts are made to revive science. But only fragments remain – experiments with no explanatory theoretical framework, bits of theories, instruments who use has been forgotten, portions from books and articles. These vestiges are dubbed physics, chemistry and biology. Partially informed arguments ensue about relativity theory, evolutionary theory and phlogiston theory. Children rote-learn surviving portions of the periodic table and some of Euclid’s theorems. Everything done and said conforms to certain canons of consistency and coherence. So almost nobody realizes the contexts needed to make sense of all this are missing. They continue to use the language of natural science, or parts of it, not sensing it is in a grave state of disorder. But analytical philosophy will not perceive this disorder, because its techniques essentially describe language of the present. Nor would the phenomenology of existentialism since the structures of intentionality remain the same.
MacIntyre’s hypothesis is “that in the actual world which we inhabit the language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder as the language of natural science in [this] imaginary world.” All we now have are “the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived” (2). We continue to use many key moral expressions but have lost, perhaps entirely, our comprehension of morality, both theoretically and practically.
How can this hypothesis be tested? Analytical or phenomenological philosophical analysis will not help. One possible way of understanding the present disorder is by understanding its history. Some critics might insist that “history lies open to view… and no record of any such catastrophe survives” (3). MacIntyre’s hypothesis will only stand if it can be shown that the catastrophe was of a kind “that it was not and has not been – except perhaps by a very few – recognized as a catastrophe” (3).
But “history” means academic history in our culture and this is less than two centuries old. So academic history may have derived its moral and eval‎uative presuppositions from the resultant disorder, if the catastrophe largely occurred before its advent. Academic history sees one morality succeeding another but does not possess the language of order and disorder so in its value-neutral viewpoint moral disorder may be invisible. Indeed, the very forms of academic curriculum would then be symptomatic of a disaster which the curriculum itself does not recognize.
MacIntyre’s elaboration of his hypothesis necessarily deprives himself of nearly all possible argumentative allies. For if his hypothesis is true then it will necessarily seem implausible. Unlike MacIntyre the modern radical assumes the language of morality is in order when he uses it to denounce everything in modern culture he sees as being in disorder. MacIntyre’s aim in his book is to suggest to radicals, liberals and conservatives that they are betrayed by the very moral language they use. But if we are in such a drastic state then there is no place for pessimism.

Michael K. Wilson www.facetofaceintercultural.com.au December 2007

http://www.facetofaceintercultural.com.au/wp-content/uploads/MacIntyre-Chapter-1.pdf