11/06: A Treatise of Human Nature

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A Treatise of Human Nature
Author(s)	David Hume
Publication date	1739
Pages	368

A Treatise of Human Nature is a book by Scottish philosopher David Hume, first published in 1739–1740.

The full title of the Treatise is 'A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects'. It contains the following sections:

• Book 1: "Of the Understanding" – An investigation into human cognition. Important statements of Skepticism.
• Book 2: "Of the Passions" – A treatment of emotions and free will.
• Book 3: "Of Morals" – A treatment of moral ideas, justice, obligations, benevolence.

Contents

 [hide] 

• 1 Background
• 2 Content
  • 2.1 Of the Understanding
    • 2.1.1 The Nature of Ideas
    • 2.1.2 The Ideas of Space and Time
  • 2.2 Of the Passions
  • 2.3 Of Morals
    • 2.3.1 Part I: On Virtue and Vice
    • 2.3.2 Part II: On Justice
• 3 See also
• 4 References
• 5 External links

[edit] Background

Hume began writing A Treatise of Human Nature at the age of sixteen, finishing the work ten years later. Although many scholars today consider the Treatise to be Hume's most important work and one of the most important books in the history of philosophy, the public in Britain did not at first agree. Hume himself described the (lack of) public reaction to the publication of the Treatise by writing that the book "fell dead-born from the press."^[1]

Hume intended to see whether the Treatise met with success and, if so, to complete it with books devoted to morals, politics, and criticism.^[2] It did not meet with success, and so was not completed.

After deciding that the Treatise had problems of style rather than of content, he reworked some of the material for more popular consumption in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748). It did not prove extremely successful either, but was somewhat more so than the Treatise. He later also "cast anew" Book 3 of the Treatise as An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), which Hume wrote is "of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best."^[3]

The Treatise is now in the public domain. Books 1 and 2 were originally published in 1739, while Book 3 was published in 1740.^[4]

[edit] Content

[edit] Of the Understanding

This book is a treatment of human cognition. It includes important statements of Skepticism and Hume's experimental method. Part 1 deals with the nature of ideas. Part 2 deals with the ideas of space and time. Part 3 deals with knowledge and probability. Part 4 deals with skeptical and other systems of philosophy, including a discussion of the soul and personal identity.

[edit] The Nature of Ideas

In this part, first David Hume divides all perception into ideas and impressions. He then argues that the simple impressions cause simple ideas, and from simple ideas form complex ideas, either restricted to the same order of the corresponding complex impressions (which are memories) or re-arranged in a new form (which is imagination). Descartes claimed that the only cause to the idea of God must be God himself, but according to Hume, God is a complex idea formed from simple ideas caused by simple impressions. Therefore, the idea of God neither requires God nor proves his existence.

Then Hume argues that general ideas are nothing but particular ideas attached to a certain word that gives it a wider application and makes it recall other individuals that are similar to it, for example we first see a particular man, then have an idea of this particular man, attach a word to this idea and then recall it when we see something similar (another man). Hume defends this view by 3 arguments - one of them is that the mind cannot think of a certain quality without the degree of that quality, such as a line without a length attached to it. Hence all ideas must have their particular degrees of qualities that therefore must be particular.

According to Hume it is through thinking of the resemblance of something with something else different in other aspects, for example we can consider the color of something only by thinking of the resemblance it has with something else of a different shape. Hume gives the example of a white marble globe and a black marble globe, one can think of the distinct shape by thinking of the resemblance between these two marble globes.

[edit] The Ideas of Space and Time

In this section, Hume first argues that our ideas and impressions of space and time aren't infinitely divisible, one of the arguments is that the capacity of the mind is limited therefore it cannot perceive an object with an infinite number of parts, so it cannot be infinitely divisible, the same for impressions and the proof is that if someone moves a piece of paper with a spot of ink on it until it disappears, the moment before it does, it represents the smallest indivisible impression.

Then Hume argues that space and time themselves aren't infinitely divisible, and the argument is that if time was infinitely divisible there could be two moments coexisting which is against the definition of time, there must be an indivisible part of time, and from the concept of motion the same can be said of space.

As Hume showed before, no simple idea can come before a simple impression, and applying this to space, what impression can cause the idea of space? It must be an external idea according to Hume (unlike Kant who says the idea of space is a priori), but the senses convey to us only colored points and rays of light, so the idea of extension is nothing but the copy of these colored points and the manner of their appearances. The idea of time is derived from the succession of the two forms of perception, ideas and impressions (again unlike Kant who considered space and time conditions of experience and not derived from experience but are a priori), the argument for that is that we feel time flowing differently if our ideas and impressions flow in the mind differently. Another argument for this is that the parts of time can never coexist so an unchanging object, since it contains only coexistent impressions, can never give us the notion of time, therefore time must be derived from changing objects, and can never be separated from the succession of them.

Hume then argues that if time cannot be derived from an unchanging object therefore it cannot be applied to such an object, the rest of this part is the answer to objections to Hume's views about space and time.

[edit] Of the Passions

This section requires expansion. (June 2008)

This book is a treatment of emotions and free will. Part 1 deals with pride and humility. Part 2 deals with love and hatred. Part 3 deals with the will and direct passions.

[edit] Of Morals

This book is a treatment of moral ideas, justice, obligations, benevolence. Part 1 deals with virtue and vice in general. Part 2 deals with justice. Part 3 deals with other virtues, such as benevolence.

[edit] Part I: On Virtue and Vice

According to Hume, vice and virtue could not be explained in terms of conformity and unconformity to reason, as the classical tradition claimed. Reason, in fact, is an inactive principle in itself and is not responsible for final ends. On the other hand, through reason, men can discover what is true and false and not what is right and wrong. Therefore, the distinction between moral good and evil cannot be made by reason. Morality, according to Hume, is not susceptible of demonstration, as it depends on men's perceptions and appetites, that are subjective. What distinguishes a virtue from a vice is the impression that it generates. If the impression is agreeable, then it will be virtue; if it is uneasy, then it will be a vice. It follows that, in Hume's moral philosophy, there is no room for eternal and immutable standards in morality.

[edit] Part II: On Justice

Section I: Is Justice Natural or Artificial?

Being natural and unnatural applies both for vices and virtues. In fact, not all kinds of virtues are natural. Justice, for example, is not a natural virtue. Justice emerges from the circumstances and from the necessity of mankind. Rules of justice are artificial and are made up by education and human convention. By providing conjunction of forces, partition of employment, mutual succour, society turns out to be advantageous. Men become aware of the advantages of the society also in relation to the preservation of their goods and stipulate a convention. Once this convention has taken force, the concepts of justice/injustice - property/rights/obligation start taking consistency.

Section II: Of the Origin of Justice and Property

The origin of justice is strictly connected with property. It follows that justice does not derive from public interest, as it is not an immediate concern for human beings; justice is not founded on reason, but on the impressions of men, caused by artifice. In fact, a single act of justice is contrary to public and private interest, if taken singularly, but the scheme is overall beneficial both for the society and for the individual. The idea of virtue is often associated with justice and the idea of vice with injustice (Plato, Aristotle etc.). At the beginning, men are induced to follow justice for a matter of private interest. Sympathy with public interest is the source of moral approbation. Public esteem for justice increases our own esteem towards it.

Section III: On the Rule of Property

Why are particular goods assigned to particular persons? The criterion stability-utility is not good enough, as it could be claimed for more than one person at the same time. Such principle grounds on the belief that everyone continues to enjoy what he is at present possessor of. But, in the long run, every injustice would be authorized and rewarded. This criterion can work well for a society to get settled, but after that, other circumstances should be taken under consideration: 1. Occupation coincides with first possession and, as it has been shown, is quite controversional at the longer term 2. Long Possession, when time gives title of property of an object 3. Accession, when objects are linked in an intimate manner with other objects that are already in somebody's property and are inferior to them (such as: fruits of the tree, but not fishes-sea) 4. Succession, which is a natural right: men's possession should pass to those that are dearest to them.

Section IV: Transference of Property by Consent

Sometimes, the above-mentioned rules do not sort out all the inconveniences that derives from possession. Possession and property should always remain stable except when the possessor agrees to transfer part of his/her property to another person. The exchange and commerce of goods is based on this assumption.

Section V: Of the Obligations of Promises

The rule of morality is not natural. In fact, a promise would not be intelligible and would not have moral obligation before human convention had not established it. A promise does not generate naturally an obligation. The obligation is there only when it is established by convention (same as justice). Promises are human inventions that are founded on the necessity and interest of the society. Self-interest is the first motive behind the performance of the promise.

Section VI: Some more Reflections on Justice and Injustice

There are three fundamental laws of justice: 1. stability of possession 2. transference by consent 3. performance of promises

Society is absolutely necessary for men and these three laws are necessary for the support of the society, but they are artificial and created by men.

There are some arguments that can support this statement.

- Justice is defined as the constant and perpetual will of giving everybody his/her due. This presupposes the right of property to be antecedent to justice, but it is a fallace opinion. As a matter of fact, property is not a quality of the object, but it is the relation of the object with a rational human being. It is the external relation of the object that causes property. The concept of justice is linked with the concept of property.

- Rights, obligations and property do not admit gradation (either all or nothing). Justice and injustice are not susceptible of degree, therefore they are not naturally virtuous or vicious.

- Mind is most often determined by present motives, not by general rules.

Moreover, the distinction between justice and injustice lies on two different foundation: self-interest, as it is impossible to live in society without rules; morality, the interest is common to all mankind and all men receive a pleasure from things going in accordance to justice. The sense of honor and duty are other artifices that derive from this relation.

Section VII: On the Origin of Government

Men are governed by their own interest and they tend to give advantage to their particular interest over common good. The remedy to this situation should proceed from the consent of men. But, since men cannot change their nature, the solution should be sought in the circumstances. Justice should become the nearest interest at least for few people, who would have a direct interest in the execution of justice. Kings, civil magistrates, governors, in a word, government is the remedy. Thanks to government, men can taste the mutual assistance that society provides. Bridges, harbours, streets are built. Even if they are beyond the immediate interest of any man, taken singularly, they are for the common good.

Section VIII: On the Source of Allegiance

Government is a very advantageous invention, as it overlooks on the implementation of the three laws. When men understand the advantage of having a government, they would convene together, choose their magistrates and promise them obedience. However, the act of promising obedience is something that has happened at the beginning and is the original source of the first obligation towards the government. But after that, the obligation towards the government is based on self-interest, in particular: a)to preserve peace and order in the society and b) to preserve mutual trust and confidence in the offices of life. Civil duties detach from promises and acquire an independent authority. The moral obligation to submit to the government is not based on consent. As a matter of fact, the government has authority also on those who never consented to it. It follows that the moral obligation derives from the fact that everyone submit to its authority. Promise can definitely reinforce the obligation to obedience, but it is not the source of authority.

Section IX: Of the Measures of Allegiance

The social contract theory wanted to establish a noble principle: the submission to the government admits exceptions and tyranny - that is against consent - is sufficient to free the subject from all kinds of allegiance. According to this theory, men are in origin in a state of liberty and decide to give up their liberties in exchange of protection and security and when this condition is not fulfilled, they are at liberty to break their contract. The concept is that whoever has taken authority over people should produce some advantages for them, otherwise he/she should be expected that the obedience would be sooner than later withdrawn. Hume argues that the conclusion is right, but the principle in itself is erroneous. By employing different premises, Hume will try to reach the same conclusions and provide an alternative to the traditional social contract theory. Based on his assumptions, the obligation does not derive from the promise, but from the motive that spurred men to conclude the agreement, that is, their self-interest in security and protection. The obligation towards the government ceases when the interest ceases. Therefore, the obedience to the authority should not be passive: government is a man's invention for his self-interest and the interest of the society. When the governor removes the interest, he also removes the natural obligation of obedience. It follows that men may lawfully resist the government without committing injustice.

Section X: Of the Object of Allegiance

The doctrine of resistance should only be applied in very few cases and when the advantages of subverting a government outweight the disadvantages. This must be an exception to the common rule, which bids that government are owed obedience. What makes a governor lawful depends on the source of the authority: - long possession, which gives authority to almost all government of the world; - present possession, as long as it preserves peace and public interest; - conquest, see above; - succession, when the monarch dies and his heirs comes to the throne; - positive laws, when the authority holder is determined by positive law (fundamental law)

Section XI: Laws of Nations

Once civil governments have been established, there arises a new set of duties among neighbouring countries, that is, the laws of nations. The three fundamental rules of justice (stability of possession, performance of promises and transfer of possession by consent) are valid for every man, including for kings and governors, but their system of morals is freer than for the individual. It has the same extent, but not the same force. In fact, it could be broken in case this would result into a benefit for the kingdom. The interest in keeping the laws of justice is not so strong as for individuals, therefore the moral obligation will be weaker, too.

Section XII: On Chastity and Modesty

The difference in force but not in extent between the obligation of kings and individual is explained by the following example: chastity and modesty are agreeable characteristics both for men and women, but they are more expedient for women, as their interest is greater than men's. The moral obligation of women is greater than men's.

[edit] See also

• Hume's Law
• Science of man

[edit] References

1. ^ Hume, David (1776) My Own Life, Appendix A of Ernest Campbell Mossner, The Life of David Hume, University of Texas Press, 1954, p. 612.
2. ^ Before the Introduction, Hume inserted an "Advertisement," or warning. It read as follows:

   My design in the present work is sufficiently explain'd in the introduction. The reader must only observe, that all the subjects I have there plann'd out to myself, are not treated of in these two volumes. The subjects of the understanding and passions make a compleat chain of reasoning by themselves; and I was willing to take advantage of this natural division, in order to try the taste of the public. If I have the good fortune to meet with success, I shall proceed to the examination of morals, politics, and criticism; which will compleat this Treatise of human nature.

3. ^ Hume, David (1776) My Own Life, URL = <http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hume/humelife.>
4. ^ Norton, David Fate (2000) "Editor's Introduction," A Treatise of Human Nature, D.F. and M.J. Norton (eds.), p. 19.

[edit] External links

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• A Treatise of Human Nature Jonathan Bennett's reformatted and annotated version, for easier reading. Pdf from EarlyModernTexts.com

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Treatise_of_Human_Nature

A Treatise of Human Nature

Summary, Book I: “Of the Understanding”

Hume begins by arguing for the validity of empiricism, the premise that all of our knowledge is based on our experiences, and using this method to examine several philosophical concepts. First, he demonstrates that all of our complex ideas are formed out of simpler ideas, which were themselves formed on the basis of impressions we received through our senses. Therefore, ideas are not fundamentally different from experiences. Second, Hume defines “matters of fact” as matters that must be experienced, not reasoned out or arrived at instinctually. Based on these two claims, Hume attacks metaphysical systems used to prove the existence of God, the soul, divine creation, and other such ideas. Since we have no experience of any of these things and cannot receive a direct impression of them, we have no real reason to believe that they are true.

Hume systematically applies the idea that ideas and facts come from experience in order to analyze the concepts of space, time, and mathematics. If we have no experience of a concept, such as the size of the universe, that concept cannot be meaningful. Hume insists that neither our ideas nor our impressions are infinitely divisible. If we continued to try to break them down ad infinitum, we would eventually arrive at a level too small for us to perceive or grasp conceptually. Since we have no experience of infinite divisibility, the idea that things or ideas are infinitely divisible is meaningless. Mathematics, however, is a system of pure relations of ideas, and so it retains its value even though we cannot directly experience its phenomena. Many of its principles do not hold in matters of fact, but it is the only realm of knowledge in which perfect certainty is possible anyway.

Hume introduces two of his three tools of philosophical inquiry, the “microscope” and the “razor.” The microscope is the principle that to understand an idea we must first break it down into the various simple ideas that make it up. If any of these simple ideas is still difficult to understand, we must isolate it and reenact the impression that gave rise to it. The razor is the principle that if any term cannot be proven to arise from an idea that can be broken into simpler ideas ready for analysis, then that term has no meaning. Hume uses his razor principle to deval‎ue abstract concepts pertaining to religion and metaphysics.

Despite his apparent hostility to abstract ideas of a metaphysical nature, Hume does not deem all abstract ideas worthless. Hume argues that the mind naturally forms associations between ideas from impressions that are similar in space and time. In the mind, a general term becomes associated with further specific instances of those similar impressions and comes to stand for all of them. This process explains why we can visualize particular events that we may not have actually experienced, based on their association with those events that we have experienced.

Hume’s third philosophical tool is the “fork,” the principle that truths can be divided into two kinds. The first kind of truth deals with relations of ideas, such as true statements in mathematics—for example, that the sum of the angles in a triangle equals 180 degrees. These kinds of truth are necessary—once they’ve been proven, they stay proven. The second kind of truth deals is in matters of fact, which concerns things that exist in the world.

Analysis

The theories Hume develops in the Treatise have their foundations in the writings of John Locke and George Berkeley, and Hume is associated with these two men as the third in the series of great British empiricists. Like Hume, Locke denied the existence of innate ideas, dividing the sources of our ideas into two categories: those derived from sensation through the use of our sense organs and those derived from reflection through our own mental processes. Hume makes use of Locke’s distinction in his own theory of ideas, though he alters the terminology. For Hume, sensations and reflections both fall under the term impressions, while he reserves the term ideas for the results of mental processes such as imagination and memory. Hume’s discussion of abstract ideas rests on his acceptance of Berkeley’s claim that the idea we have of a general term always springs from a specific experience, though used in a general way. Hume praised this explanation but further clarified how a general term could stand for several similar, but specific, experiences.

Before Hume, many philosophers made exceptions for metaphysics or held it to different standards than other areas of inquiry. Hume insisted that metaphysical issues, such as the existence of God, the possibility of miracles, and immortality of the soul, be held up to the same process of inquiry as investigations in the realm of ethics or physical science. For example, we can logically say that we can’t conceive of what life might be like on a planet with no oxygen because our experience involves only forms of life that utilize oxygen. Why, then, should we allow for the existence of a being such as God, which is supposed to be the only example of his kind? We have no experience of anything even remotely like what we suppose God to be. We cannot assume that the existence of the universe automatically proves the existence of a creator because we have no experience that tells us that this has been proven. By this reasoning, the concept of God has no real meaning, and we cannot rationally accept it as certain.

A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II: “Of the Passions”

Summary

Hume sets out to classify the passions in much the same way he classifies impressions and ideas in book I. First, he distinguishes between original impressions and secondary impressions. We receive original impressions through the senses. They are internal, in the form of physical pleasures or pain, and original because they come from outside of us, from physical sources, and are in that sense new to us. Secondary impressions are always preceded by either an original impression or ideas, which arise from original impressions. The passions, according to Hume, are properly found in the realm of secondary impressions. Hume describes both direct passions, such as desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, and fear, and indirect passions, such as pride, humility, love, and hatred. Hume then distinguishes between the cause and the object of the passions.

Hume notes that since moral decisions affect actions, while decisions of reason do not, morality must not be based on reason. For Hume, beliefs about cause and effect are beliefs about connections between objects we experience. Our belief in such relations can affect our actions only if the objects being related are of some particular interest to us, and objects are of interest to us only if they cause us pleasure or pain. Hume concludes that reasoning regarding supposedly connected objects is not what makes us act. Instead, pleasure and pain, which give rise to passions, motivate us. Hume also says we cannot claim that actions are the result of passions that are reasonable or unreasonable, because passions themselves have nothing to do with reason. They are feelings that instigate actions. They may themselves be informed by reasoning, but reason is and should be the “slave” of passions.

Analysis

Hume’s discussion of passions and reason sets the stage for book III and his discussion of morality. Passions, since they don’t represent anything real and are not arguments in and of themselves, cannot be contrary to experience and cannot cause contradictions. Since these are two of Hume’s most important measures, we can conclude that, following his argument, passions are completely different from reason and cannot be categorized as reasonable or unreasonable. This conclusion presents a dilemma for rationalists who view morality as the result of God-given reason. In fact, reason influences our actions in only two ways: by directing passions to focus on proper objects and by discovering connections between events that will create passions. The judgments a person makes about relations of ideas or about ideas themselves may be reasonable or unreasonable, but the judgments do not result in anything except opinions. For the moral process to complete itself, the judgments must incite passions, or feelings, which then lead us to act.

A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III: “Of Morals”

Summary

Hume stresses that his theory of morals follows naturally from the philosophy he elaborates in the first two books. Hume attempts to distinguish between vice and virtue, arguing that such moral distinctions are in fact impressions rather than ideas. He then describes how to distinguish these impressions from other common impressions, such as sounds and colors. First, the impression of vice is pain, while that of virtue is pleasure. Second, moral impressions are caused only by human actions, not the actions of animals or inanimate objects. Third, moral impressions are worth considering only from a social point of view because our actions are considered moral or immoral only with regard to how they affect others, not how they affect ourselves. This concept leads Hume to classify sympathy, feeling for fellow human beings, as the foundation of moral obligation.

For Hume, morality is not a matter of fact derived from experience. To prove his point, he suggests we examine ourselves with regard to any supposed moral misdeed, such as murder. If we examine the act of murder, we can discover no idea of that quality of immorality, or “vice.” Rather, we will discover only the strong feeling of dislike we have for murder. This supports the idea that morality resides in passions, or “sentiment,” not in reason. Although reason does help us explain those feelings, it is not their origin.

Analysis

Hume makes the point that though we may not like it when one person kills another, there is nothing contradictory or illogical about the act of murder. This does not mean that Hume condones murder, merely that immoral actions are not immoral because they are irrational. Within Hume’s system, murder would be banned on the grounds that it is not an action that can be universally justified as good for everyone. Hume also proposes the example of the man who would rather see the whole world destroyed rather than injure his own fingers. Hume claims this man is not in contradiction to himself or following illogical inferences, but this man also falls afoul of Hume’s dictum that methods of justification and rationality must be universal. Other people in the same situation must be able to justify their actions in the same way. No one but the man will approve of his reasons for forsaking the world to save his own fingers. It is unlikely that this man would approve or desire that another person make the same decision.

Hume ascribes moral decisions to the passions for several reasons. First, passion appears to be the only viable alternative to reason, which he has already ruled out. Second, Hume’s examination of his own feelings about conventionally transgressive acts such as murder reveals that while he can isolate his own feelings about such behavior, he cannot isolate clear and distinct ideas about it. Therefore, moral decisions must arise from or in some way be congruent with passions. Hume’s connection of moral decisions to feelings, which leads him to the separation of morality from reason, put him at odds with religious leaders and philosophers of his time. Hume effectively dethroned reason, removed God from a place of necessity, and robbed religious theorists of an undisputed foundation for religious belief

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

Summary

Hume begins by noting the difference between impressions and ideas. Impressions come through our senses, emotions, and other mental phenomena, whereas ideas are thoughts, beliefs, or memories that we connect to our impressions. We construct ideas from simple impressions in three ways: resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect.

Next, Hume distinguishes between relations of ideas and matters of fact. Relations of ideas are usually mathematical truths, so we cannot negate them without creating a contradiction. Matters of fact are the more common truths we learn through our experiences. We understand matters of fact according to causation, or cause and effect, such that our experience of one event leads us to assume an unobserved cause. But Hume argues that assumptions of cause and effect between two events are not necessarily real or true. It is possible to deny causal connections without contradiction because causal connections are assumptions not subject to reason.

We cannot justify our assumptions about the future based on past experience unless there is a law that the future will always resemble the past. No such law exists. We can deny the relationship without contradiction and we cannot justify it with experience. Therefore, we have no rational support for believing in causation. Hume suggests that our assumptions are based on habit, not reason, and that, ultimately, our assumptions about matters of fact are based in probability. If experience teaches us that two events occur together repeatedly, we will assume a link between them. So, Hume explains, we must be able to reduce all meaningful concepts to the simple impressions on which they are built. Since no simple impression of causation or necessary connection exists, these concepts might appear meaningless. Rather than dismiss these assumed connections entirely, however, Hume acknowledges their usefulness and limits them to being nothing more than simple observations of repeated conjunction between two events. Further, he concludes that if there is no cause and effect, then our actions are not predetermined, and we enjoy true free will.

At the end of the Enquiry, Hume pursues a number of tangential discussions. He argues that humans and animals possess similar capacities and methods for reason. He denies that any rational justification exists for belief in either miracles or most forms of religious and metaphysical philosophy. Although we can rationally justify our skepticism regarding the existence of an external world, that doubt destroys our ability to act or judge. The instinctual beliefs formed by custom help us get along in the world. As long as we restrict our thinking to relations of ideas and matters of fact, we are acting within the limits of reason, but we should abandon all metaphysical speculations as useless, impossible to resolve, and nonsensical.

Analysis

Hume seeks to explain our understanding of the world rather than try to justify our beliefs or prove anything. Here, he does not address the existence of necessary connections between events but states merely that we cannot know what those connections are. Ultimately, Hume argues for a mitigated skepticism. We have no good reason to believe much of what we believe about the world, but human nature helps us function in all the ways that reason cannot. However, we must limit ourselves by accepting that matters of fact are our sole source of true information. If past experience cannot teach us about the future, it becomes difficult to function on a practical level. The elimination of causation would make it impossible for us to function, if it meant that we began to act as if causation didn’t exist. Whether or not we can know of a necessary connection between two events is not worth arguing about. Similarly, Hume does not think we should spend time and energy on questions such as whether God exists, what the soul is, or whether the soul is immortal. He claims that because the mind is not meant to help us discover and define truths, we will never be able to come to any definite and rational conclusions about abstract matters.

Hume is skeptical about his own explanation of why we cannot rationally make necessary connections between two events. He stops short of saying that it is impossible to predict future events based on past experience and explains only that we lack any solid reason to believe this is the case. Hume admits that, if we observe that one event repeatedly follows another, it is natural that we assume the two events will always occur together in this pattern. He also admits that we must necessarily make such assumptions to live our lives. Such assumptions are practical and useful but not completely reliable or passable as proof. We are wrong to justify these beliefs by claiming that reason supports them or that we can absolutely know that one event causes the other

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals

Summary

The subject of the Enquiry is the contributions that moral sense and reason make in our moral judgments. Hume claims that moral sense makes the ultimate distinction between vice and virtue, though both moral sense and reason play a role in our formation of moral judgments. Reason is important when we have to make a judgment about what is useful, for reason alone can determine how and why something is useful to us or to others. Hume briefly addresses what moral judges usually include in their lists of virtues, what they leave out, and how they make these lists. He then returns to the classification of virtues he proposed first in the Treatise.

Hume first distinguishes between artificial and natural virtues. Artificial virtues depend on social structures and include justice and fidelity to promises; allegiance; chastity and modesty; and duties of sovereign states to keep treaties, to respect boundaries, to protect ambassadors, and to otherwise subject themselves to the law of nations. Hume defines each of these virtues and explains how each manifests itself in the world. He notes that artificial virtues vary from society to society.

Natural virtues, on the other hand, originate in nature and are more universal. They include compassion, generosity, gratitude, friendship, fidelity, charity, beneficence, clemency, equity, prudence, temperance, frugality, industry, courage, ambition, pride, modesty, self-assertiveness, good sense, wit and humor, perseverance, patience, parental devotion, good nature, cleanliness, articulateness, sensitivity to poetry, decorum, and an elusive quality that makes a person lovely or valuable. Some of these virtues are voluntary, such as pride, while others are involuntary, such as good sense.

As in the Treatise, Hume explains that reason does not cause our actions. Instead, moral sentiments, or passions, motivate us to act. In the Enquiry, however, Hume goes further to state that our actions are caused by a combination of utility and sentiment. In other words, we must care about the outcome if we are to care about the means by which it is achieved. Several sections of the Enquiry are devoted to utility, the first and most important of the four kinds of virtue, which Hume calls “virtuous because useful.” He also addresses benevolence and its role in the moral process. Specifically, Hume says that benevolent acts are virtuous because they are useful to many others.

Analysis

Because he locates the basis of virtue in utility rather than in God-given reason, Hume’s list of virtues implicitly forms a rejection of Christian morality. Items such as ambition are vices under the old model, so Hume’s acceptance of them into his catalog is an insult to religious theorists. However, Hume is consistent in his theory that these traits are virtues because they fulfill his two requirements for moral sentiments: they must be useful to ourselves or others, or they must be pleasing to ourselves or others. Furthermore, Hume rejects the concept of morality as strictly voluntary. Instead, he divides his list into voluntary and involuntary virtues, claiming that separating them is necessary only when devising a system of reward and punishment. He is not interested in creating or endorsing such a system, so he makes no such distinctions in his moral philosophy.

Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

Summary

The Dialogues are a series of discussions about the rationality of religious belief between the fictional characters Cleanthes, Philo, and Demea. Demea represents religious dogmatism and insists that we cannot come to know the nature of God through reason. Philo, the philosophical skeptic, agrees with Demea that God is incomprehensible but insists that he might be morally corrupt. Cleanthes argues that we can know about God by reasoning from the evidence we find in nature.

Demea argues that although God clearly exists, we cannot know his nature, because God’s nature is beyond the capacity of human understanding. Philo seems to agree with him. Demea goes on to explain that God is the First Cause, meaning that the world operates on a system of cause and effect, so there must be an original cause to have started the world in motion, and that First Cause is God. But this still tells us nothing about God’s nature, which Cleanthes insists we can learn by examining nature. Cleanthes states that the only rational argument for God’s existence is one based on experience. The design and order of nature reveal that there must be an intelligent designer, or creator, whose intelligence resembles our own. Cleanthes also states that things that are very familiar and present to us need no reason to establish their truth, such as the knowledge that food nourishes the body.

Philo disagrees with Cleanthes and argues that just because the world is ordered, there is no reason to believe that this order is a result of intelligent design. He explains that the example of the design of the universe supposes an acceptance of cause and effect, which in turn supposes that the future will resemble the past. However, since there is nothing with which to compare our situation, we cannot assume the necessary connection based on past experience or other examples. Philo goes further, claiming that even if God is an intelligent designer, this fact does not explain why nature has order. Finally, even if the argument from design were valid, nature does not provide us with any knowledge about God other than that he designed it.

Philo next turns his attention to God’s possible moral attributes and whether we can discover these by examining nature. Together, Demea and Philo explain that the world is filled with evil. Philo says that if there is so much evil, there cannot be a God who is completely beneficent, or else he would have eliminated evil. If he cannot eliminate evil, he cannot be all-powerful. If he is unaware of the evil, he cannot be all-knowing. If nature itself provides evidence of God’s nature, then we must conclude that he doesn’t care about us at all and is therefore morally ambiguous. Demea leaves the room, upset by these claims.

Although Philo has successfully torn down Cleanthes’ argument from design, Philo finishes the dialogue by declaring that the ordered world obviously has some intelligence behind it and that this intelligence does in fact resemble human intelligence. His real disagreement, he claims, concerns how strong this resemblance really is. He then attacks religious dogma as both morally and psychologically harmful. The most rational position, he says, is a philosophical belief in some unknowable higher power. Finally, Philo tells Cleanthes that philosophical skepticism is the only proper route to true Christianity because it forces us to rely on faith instead of the false connection between reason and theism.

Analysis

Hume clearly intends to point out that the question of God’s existence and the supposed religious origin of morals are in fact two different issues and that a positive stance on the first issue does not necessarily confirm‎ the second. The true question is whether enough evidence exists in the world to prove that there is an infinitely good, wise, and powerful God from which morality naturally springs. Philo argues that there is not, and his explanation that the existence of evil poses a problem for this view of God is worth considering seriously. It seems impossible that an all-good, all-powerful, and all-knowing God could exist in a world as painful as ours. However, Cleanthes’ position also seems cogent. We don’t need to justify the existence of things that are universal truths. For example, we cannot prove that motion exists without referring to an example of motion itself. If both man and the universe exhibit form and order, we may logically consider that a similar intelligence lies behind both. However, from that claim we could argue that this intelligence, or God, possesses both good and evil, as man does.

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• Editor’s Preface.
• Book I: Of the Understanding
• Introduction.
• Part I.: Of Ideas, Their Origin, Composition, Connexion, Abstraction, &c.
• Section I.: Of the Origin of Our Ideas.
• Section II.: Division of the Subject.
• Section III.: Of the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination.
• Section IV.: Of the Connexion Or Association of Ideas.
• Section V.: Of Relations.
• Section VI.: Of Modes and Substances.
• Section VII.: Of Abstract Ideas.
• Part II.: Of the Ideas of Space and Time.
• Section I.: Of the Infinite Divisibility of Our Ideas of Space and Time.
• Section II.: Of the Infinite Divisibility of Space and Time.
• Section III.: Of the Other Qualities of Our Ideas of Space and Time.
• Section IV.: Objections Answer’d.
• Section V.: The Same Subject Continu’d.
• Section VI.: Of the Idea of Existence, and of External Existence.
• Part III.: Of Knowledge and Probability.
• Section I.: Of Knowledge.
• Section II.: Of Probability; and of the Idea of Cause and Effect.
• Section III.: Why a Cause Is Always Necessary.
• Section IV.: Of the Component Parts of Our Reasonings Concerning Cause and Effect.
• Section. V.: Of the Impressions of the Senses and Memory.
• Section VI.: Of the Inference From the Impression to the Idea.
• Section VII.: Of the Nature of the Idea Or Belief.
• Section VIII.: Of the Causes of Belief.
• Section IX.: Of the Effects of Other Relations and Other Habits.
• Section X.: Of the Influence of Belief.
• Section XI.: Of the Probability of Chances.
• Section XII.: Of the Probability of Causes.
• Section XIII.: Of Unphilosophical Probability.
• Section XIV.: Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion.
• Section XV.: Rules By Which to Judge of Causes and Effects.
• Section XVI.: Of the Reason of Animals.
• Part IV.: Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy.
• Section I.: Of Scepticism With Regard to Reason.
• Section II.: Of Scepticism With Regard to the Senses.
• Section III.: Of the Antient Philosophy.
• Section IV.: Of the Modern Philosophy.
• Section V.: Of the Immateriality of the Soul.
• Section VI.: Of Personal Identity.
• Section VII.: Conclusion of This Book.
• Book II: Of the Passions
• Part I.: Of Pride and Humility.
• Section I.: Division of the Subject.
• Section II.: Of Pride and Humility; Their Objects and Causes.
• Section III.: Whence These Objects and Causes Are Deriv’d.
• Section IV.: Of the Relations of Impressions and Ideas.
• Section V.: Of the Influence of These Relations On Pride and Humility.
• Section VI.: Limitations of This System.
• Section VII.: Of Vice and Virtue.
• Section VIII.: Of Beauty and Deformity.
• Section IX.: Of External Advantages and Disadvantages.
• Section X.: Of Property and Riches.
• Section XI.: Of the Love of Fame.
• Section XII.: Of the Pride and Humility of Animals.
• Part II.: Of Love and Hatred.
• Section I.: Of the Objects and Causes of Love and Hatred.
• Section II.: Experiments to Confirm‎ This System.
• Section III.: Difficulties Solv’d.
• Section IV.: Of the Love of Relations.
• Section V.: Of Our Esteem For the Rich and Powerful.
• Section VI.: Of Benevolence and Anger.
• Section VII.: Of Compassion.
• Section VIII.: Of Malice and Envy.
• Section IX.: Of the Mixture of Benevolence and Anger With Compassion and Malice.
• Section X.: Of Respect and Contempt.
• Section XI.: Of the Amorous Passion, Or Love Betwixt the Sexes.
• Section XII.: Of the Love and Hatred of Animals.
• Part III.: Of the Will and Direct Passions.
• Section I.: Of Liberty and Necessity.
• Section II.: The Same Subject Continu’d.
• Section III.: Of the Influencing Motives of the Will.
• Section IV.: Of the Causes of the Violent Passions.
• Section V.: Of the Effects of Custom.
• Section VI.: Of the Influence of the Imagination On the Passions.
• Section VII.: Of Contiguity, and Distance In Space and Time.
• Section VIII.: The Same Subject Continu’d.
• Section IX.: Of the Direct Passions.
• Section X.: Of Curiosity, Or the Love of Truth.
• Book III: Of Morals
• Part I.: Of Virtue and Vice In General.
• Section I.: Moral Distinctions Not Deriv’d From Reason.
• Section II.: Moral Distinctions Deriv’d From a Moral Sense.
• Part II.: Of Justice and Injustice.
• Section I.: Justice, Whether a Natural Or Artificial Virtue?
• Section II.: Of the Origin of Justice and Property.
• Section III.: Of the Rules, Which Determine Property.
• Section IV.: Of the Transference of Property By Consent.
• Section V.: Of the Obligation of Promises.
• Section VI.: Some Farther Reflexions Concerning Justice and Injustice.
• Section VII.: Of the Origin of Government.
• Section VIII.: Of the Source of Allegiance.
• Section IX.: Of the Measures of Allegiance.
• Section X.: Of the Objects of Allegiance.
• Section XI.: Of the Laws of Nations.
• Section XII.: Of Chastity and Modesty.
• Part III.: Of the Other Virtues and Vices.
• Section I.: Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues and Vices.
• Section II.: Of Greatness of Mind.
• Section III.: Of Goodness and Benevolence.
• Section IV.: Of Natural Abilities.
• Section V.: Some Farther Reflexions Concerning the Natural Virtues.
• Section VI.: Conclusion of This Book.
• Appendix.

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