GAO, T-7은 아마 더 지연될 것이다

[위종민]

https://www.airandspaceforces.com/gao-t-7a-schedule-boeing

미 회계감사원은 이미 2년이나 지연된 T-7이 지연될 가능성이 있다고 평가했습니다. 보잉이 1월에 작성한 새로운 스케줄은 테스트 일정이 더 이상 개발이 지연되거나 문제 발생시 재시험 가능성을 고려하지 않는 등 낙관적인 예상에 기초했다고. 

미 공군에서도 지난 4월 2027년 초까지 IOC를 획득하지 못할 것이라고 의회에서 증언했다고 합니다. 이 경우엔 3년이 밀리는 거네요. 빨라도 1번기가 2025년 12월에야 인도될 예정입니다. 

따라서 이미 60년을 쓴 T-38의 수명을 연장해야 하는 상황입니다. 

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The first production Boeing T-7A Red Tail is pictured April 28, 2022. Boeing photo.

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GAO: Boeing Unlikely to Meet Revised T-7 Schedule

May 25, 2023 | By John A. Tirpak

The T-7A trainer, already two years behind schedule for production and initial operational capability, will probably see further delays, the Government Accountability Office said in a new report.

And even when the initial production airplanes arrive, they may not meet Air Force requirements because they’re being built before the service signs a contract with Boeing specifying what they should be.

Quoting Air Force officials, the GAO said a new T-7A program schedule developed by Boeing in January is “optimistic, relying on favorable outcomes not supported by past performance,” and that the relationship between the service and the company is “tenuous.”

Even if everything goes right from here on, the GAO said, USAF will have to extend the life of the 60-year-old T-38 trainer because of T-7A delays.

The agency recommended the Air Force conduct a schedule risk assessment to examine the concurrent development, testing, and production in the program, as well as “risks related to contractor management.”

The GAO also urged the service to figure out “under what conditions it would accept production work completed“ before signing a contract for the jets.

Again quoting Air Force officials, the GAO said friction between the service and Boeing is expected to continue to affect the program, especially given Boeing’s mounting losses on it—the Air Force and Boeing already have “differing interpretations” of contract requirements, which may multiply as construction proceeds.

Key problems with the T-7 involve its escape system—which has problems safely ejecting smaller pilots—as well as software and flight controls.

Air Force acquisition executive Andrew Hunter told Congress in April the T-7A won’t achieve IOC until early 2027—missing its initial target of 2024 and slipping beyond a subsequent goal of 2026, which the service and Boeing set late last year.

The delay is due to the Air Force delaying Milestone C—the full-rate production decision—until February 2026, to give more time to fix the escape system and other issues, and test those changes out in flight test, Hunter told Air & Space Forces Magazine in an email.

“We are pursuing risk-reduction activities to mitigate some of these schedule changes,” he said.

Yet even with the extra delays, the GAO report called Boeing’s test schedule is “optimistic,” given that it does not account for any more delays in development or possible re-testing if problems arise at that stage.

Hunter said the Air Force and Boeing “are confident improvements and recent testing are yielding a safe and effective escape system” for the T-7. But until that’s concluded, USAF won’t let test pilots fly the jets. Delays in testing affect other milestones, and the Air Force has previously said it cannot accelerate the T-7A’s test program.

The GAO said it was told the T-7A’s flight test software may have to undergo six or more iterations before it can be considered fully ready.

Boeing built two pre-production prototype T-7As during the T-X Advanced Pilot Training Aircraft competition and has largely completed the first five aircraft that will be used for test flights. But it is also starting to build the first production aircraft before the flight test program even begins.

Given that the escape system and other issues are not resolved—the report notes there have been thousands of changes made to the design since Boeing won the T-X competition in 2018—GAO said the Air Force could wind up paying for airplanes that don’t meet final requirements determined after testing.

Although the Defense Department “concurred” with GAO’s recommendations, the Air Force was not immediately able to comment on when the suggested schedule risk assessment will be completed, or how it will decide whether to accept jets built before requirements have been finalized.

The T-7A was billed from the outset as a revolutionary program, its digital design influencing everything from the aircraft shape and systems to the layout of the factory floor. Boeing brought its two prototype T-Xs from the drawing board to the flightline in under 36 months, and, relying on anticipated cost avoidance, bid as much as $10 billion below what the Air Force thought the trainer fleet and its associated simulators and coursework would cost.

However, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said May 22 the digital approach being taken on the T-7A—as well as on Northrop Grumman’s B-21 bomber, and the Next Generation Air Dominance fighter—can’t be expected to radically reduce the time and cost of development, as real-world testing still has to confirm‎ what digital models predict.

“The T-7 is a good example of that,” he said. Digital “doesn’t help you when you’re doing a design that’s different from anything you’ve ever done before. Having it digital doesn’t give you better knowledge of how it’s going to work. You end up having to do testing just as we always have.”

The GAO said the Air Force’s own last schedule risk assessment on the T-7A—conducted in January—didn’t adequately take into account the risk of “overlap between key program phases,” which “magnifies the cost and schedule impact of potential issues discovered during testing.”

Cascading delays, GAO said, increase reliances on the T-38 or fighter jets for training—both costly options. Delays also affect contractor decisions regarding manufacturing, which affects Air Force oversight.

While the Air Force hasn’t yet ordered any jets beyond the five test aircraft, Boeing began producing parts in March 2022 and plans to start building more aircraft in early 2024. But since it hasn’t signed a contract, the usual oversight of production isn’t taking place, the GAO said, noting in the absence of a contract, the Defense Contract Management Agency can’t exercise any oversight, either. There’s no way at this point for the Air Force to know that the parts being built for early production T-7As are of proper quality.

The Air Force “does not have a plan for determining under what conditions it would accept production work completed prior to contract delivery,” the GAO noted.

Boeing is also three years late in providing a complete “bill of materials,” necessary for the Air Force to begin planning its organic maintenance of the trainer, the GAO said. The service is also waiting on other sustainment data from Boeing.

The Air Force doesn’t expect the first production T-7A to be delivered until December 2025 at the earliest.

The T-7A program calls for 351 of the supersonic trainers to be built, along with 46 high-fidelity simulators. The Air Force’s new “Reforge” fighter pilot training overhaul may increase the number of T-7As the service could buy. The development contract calls for up to 475 aircraft.

[백선호]

보잉은 하는 것마다 다... ㅠ.ㅠ

MQ-25 무인 함재 급유기가 그나마 큰 문제를 일으키지 않고 개발 중에 있는 보잉 물건이네요.

[엽군]

엔지니어들을 쫓아내고 회계사들이 헤드를 차지한 항공기 제작업체의 현실인가봅니다. 우리한테는 다행스러운 일입니다만.

[ssn688]

그런데 보병 위주의 이라크/아프간전쟁에 오래 얽매인 미 육군보다는 처지가 나았을 미 공군이나 해군에서 오랫동안 현대화가 지연되어왔다는 건, 군정 기능의 쇠퇴부터 비판받아야 하겠네요. 그냥 밥값을 못한 거죠. F-35는 워낙 목표가 높았다는 변명이라도 하겠지만, 훈련기사업은 애초에 너무 늦게 시작했다는 게 문제 같네요.

[백선호]

T-38만큼 오래 써서 매우 낡은 KC-135, 그리고 E-3도 빨리 교체하지 않아서 골치아픈 사례들이네요.