20250723 Atlantic Council: "사헬이 터키로 향하고 있다"

[정민섭]

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/the-sahel-is-pivoting-toward-turkey-heres-what-that-means-for-washington/
AfricaSource
July 23, 2025


The Sahel is pivoting toward Turkey. Here’s what that means for Washington.
By Jordanna Yochai


Since 2022, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger have received at least a dozen total shipments of Turkish defense articles. This is just one of several signs of the Sahel’s growing engagement with Turkey. High-level diplomatic exchanges, along with the rumored operation of Turkish private military companies in the region, hint at a broader relationship. Washington may consider partnering with Turkey when it advances US interests—but it must approach any cooperation with clear eyes.


A broadening partnership
Turkey’s engagement in the Sahel predates the region’s security crisis, though it has grown in recent years. Trade between Turkey and Mali increased 32,000 percent over the previous two decades, from $5 million in 2003 to $165 million in 2022. Turkish firms have also played a key role in infrastructure development, constructing both an airport and a five-star hotel in Niamey, Niger. These relationships provide a strong base for defense cooperation.


Sahel-Turkey defense cooperation has steadily increased since 2018. What began as a five-million-dollar Turkish pledge to the now-defunct G5 Sahel Joint Force has matured into a broader, deeper partnership. Additionally, coups d’état in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger prompted the United States to halt its defense assistance, impeding these states’ ability to maintain and procure US equipment. Turkey became a more attractive partner as regional security deteriorated and Western assistance stagnated.


Military equipment sales are the cornerstone of Sahel-Turkey defense cooperation. They began in earnest in 2022, when Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger each took delivery of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones. These drones rapidly proliferated across both the region and the continent, drawing comparisons to the AK-47 assault rifle because of their affordability, reliability, and ubiquity. These acquisitions heralded a shift in procurement, as Sahel states increasingly turned toward Ankara.


As time went on, drone sales continued apace. Chad obtained Anka-S drones in 2023 and Aksungur drones in 2024, while Mali expanded its TB2 fleet. Burkina Faso and Mali both procured Akıncı drones in 2024, signaling a shift toward more advanced systems. “Our defense capacity consists of the famous Bayraktar TB2s. We now have a new [drone] called Akıncı,” boasted Burkina Faso’s president, underscoring the centrality of Turkish equipment in Burkina Faso’s arsenal.


But it’s not just drones: Burkina Faso and Chad each acquired Turkish armored vehicles in 2022. Cooperation expanded further when Niger procured Turkish planes in late 2022, becoming the first export customer of an entirely Turkish-produced aircraft. Chad followed soon thereafter, acquiring the same aircraft in 2023.


Turkish equipment has addressed Sahel militaries’ acute security gaps and afforded them new capabilities. Turkish aircraft and drones offset ground mobility constraints by enabling militaries to surveil their territory and project force into contested areas. Turkish TB2 drones reportedly played a decisive role in Mali’s 2024 reconquest of Kidal, a rebel stronghold situated deep in the Sahara Desert.


Military equipment sales help grow Turkey’s relationships and influence. Partnering with Sahel states offers Turkey new avenues through which it can pursue its regional interests and bolster its image as a leader among Muslim-majority countries. A Turkish intelligence report from 2024 assessed that Niger was a “strategic partner,” capable of extending Ankara’s influence in Africa.


These relationships also enable Turkey to compete with rivals. Some analysts contend that Turkey’s outreach helps it outflank France and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, relations with Sahel states have helped Turkey constrain the Gülen movement, which the Turkish government labeled a terrorist organization and blames for the 2016 coup attempt. For example, Chad and Mali handed over control of Gülenist schools to a Turkish state-run organization in 2017.


Sahel states consider Ankara an important security partner. “We are taking a new course,” said the Malian minister of defense in November 2024. “[Turkish equipment] will help strengthen the territorial grid and neutralize threats wherever they are.” Burkina Faso awarded its highest state medal to the head of a Turkish defense company in 2023.


Defense cooperation may reach even further than equipment sales. In 2024, a report from Agence France-Presse indicated that SADAT International Defense Consultancy, a Turkish private military company, was deployed in the Sahel. It cited the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights as saying that one thousand Syrian personnel who had signed contracts with SADAT were deployed to Niger “to protect Turkish projects and interests.” (SADAT and the Turkish Ministry of National Defense denied these allegations). Africa Defense Forum, a magazine published by US Africa Command, reported that “Turkey said the fighters are in Niger to consult and guard Turkish interests, such as mines.” A deployment to Niger has not been confirmed.


Another report from Jeune Afrique suggested that SADAT had deployed to Mali and trained the country’s military in mid-2024. According to the report, SADAT personnel embedded with elite units loyal to the president and trained them to prevent coups d’état. This has not been verified, but, if accurate, would suggest that Turkey is employing new tools to deepen partnerships and address regimes’ desire for security.


There is also a small body of reporting indicating that Turkey is expanding its overt military presence. In February 2025, Military Africa reported that Chad granted Turkey control of a military base in the city of Abéché. If confirmed, this would be Turkey’s first base in the Sahel. It would also constitute a new element in defense partnerships that, to this point, have largely been driven by Turkish private industry and Sahel states’ demand for military hardware.


So what?
There are some conditions under which cooperating with Turkey could advance US regional objectives. Sahel states need defense assistance to fight a growing terrorist threat, which the United States often cannot provide. Turkish assistance does not face the same legal restrictions and thus fills urgent capability gaps. Turkish aircraft, armored vehicles, and drones improve force mobility and help militaries take the fight to terrorist strongholds. As terrorists expand operations, partnering with Turkey could help regional militaries manage the threat.


Turkey’s growing involvement in the region also presents opportunities to counter US adversaries. Turkish military equipment offers an affordable, high-quality alternative to Chinese or Russian products. In a similar fashion, SADAT could reduce states’ reliance on Russia’s Africa Corps, which has provided training and regime security to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. SADAT offers a suite of similar services, and its deployment to Mali, if confirmed, would suggest that Mali’s president may be looking to move beyond Russian assistance.


That said, there are also risks in working with Turkey, and Washington must approach any partnership with clear eyes. The United States requires recipients of advanced military equipment to submit to end-use monitoring, but Turkey does not enforce recipients’ compliance with the law of armed conflict in the same manner. Moreover, private military companies operate under different rules of engagement than conventional militaries, underscoring the risks associated with possible SADAT deployments in the Sahel. Turkish defense assistance often comes with fewer asks than US assistance, and the United States may incur reputational harm if it chooses to partner with Turkey.


Partnering with Turkey is not a panacea for declining Western influence either. Ankara oscillates between cooperation and competition with Russia, frustrating European leaders. Turkey has been accused of fueling anti-colonial sentiment in Africa; this once irritated the French president who, in late 2020, alleged that Ankara and Moscow had inflamed anti-French sentiment in Africa. The European Union has since expressed interest in partnering with Turkey to “generate a wide international coalition that can support [the Sahel].” Even so, Turkey’s foreign policy suggests that it may not share the West’s precise goals.


Any partnership with Turkey must be carefully calibrated and closely monitored. Partnership has the potential to advance some US objectives, but it alone cannot resolve the broader challenges posed by terrorism’s dramatic expansion and states’ pivot from the political West. The United States must be prepared to work with Turkey where objectives align, while preserving the capacity and flexibility to act independently in pursuit of its vital interests.


Jordanna Yochai is an analyst whose research examines West African security, with prior experience in the US Department of Defense.


The positions expressed in this article do not reflect the official position of the US Department of Defense. The US Department of Defense does not endorse the views expressed in hyperlinked articles or websites, including any information, products, or services contained therein.

사헬 지역의 지정학적 재편과 튀르키예의 '모순적 팽창' (2024-2026)

1. 사헬 지역의 안보 공백과 튀르키예의 전략적 침투
미국의 주요 싱크탱크인 Atlantic Council의 분석에 따르면, 프랑스를 비롯한 서방의 영향력이 급감하고 있는 서아프리카 사헬 지역(니제르, 말리, 부르키나파소, 차드 등)이 튀르키예를 새로운 핵심 안보 파트너로 채택하고 있습니다. 2003년 500만 달러에 불과했던 튀르키예-말리 간 무역 규모가 2022년 1억 6,500만 달러로 폭증(32,000% 증가)한 것은 이러한 밀착을 보여주는 단적인 예입니다.

• '드론 외교'와 방산 무기의 표준화: 2022년부터 사헬 국가들은 튀르키예의 Bayraktar TB2 드론을 비롯해 Akıncı, Anka-S, Aksungur 드론, Hürkuş 항공기 및 장갑차를 앞다투어 도입하고 있습니다. 특히 저렴하고 성능이 입증된 TB2 드론은 말리군의 반군 거점(키달) 탈환에 결정적 역할을 하며 사헬 군사 장비의 '표준(AK-47에 비유)'으로 자리 잡았습니다.
• 민간군사기업(PMC) 및 군사 거점 확대: 무기 수출을 넘어, 튀르키예의 용병 기업인 'SADAT'이 니제르의 터키 광산 보호나 말리 대통령 호위 부대 훈련 등에 투입되었다는 의혹이 지속 제기되고 있습니다. 나아가 2025년 2월, 과거 프랑스군이 주둔했던 차드 아베셰(Abéché)에 튀르키예의 첫 아프리카 정규 군사 기지가 들어서며 아프리카 대륙 내 물리적 거점까지 확보했습니다.

2. 미국 및 서방이 직면한 딜레마
Atlantic Council은 튀르키예의 사헬 진출이 미국 등 서방 안보 전략에 기회이자 동시에 중대한 위험 요인이라고 진단합니다.

• 전략적 기회 (대체재 역할): 미국이 법적 제약으로 지원할 수 없는 사헬 지역의 대테러 작전 공백을 튀르키예가 훌륭히 메우고 있습니다. 무엇보다 튀르키예산 무기와 SADAT의 개입은 중동, 아프리카 지역에서 급부상하던 러시아의 '아프리카 군단(구 바그너 그룹)'과 중국의 영향력을 차단하고 국가들의 의존도를 분산시키는 효과가 있습니다.
• 전략적 위험 (통제 불능 및 평판 리스크): 반면, 튀르키예는 무기 수출 시 서방처럼 엄격한 사후 감시(End-use monitoring)나 인권 침해 규제를 강제하지 않습니다. 튀르키예가 훈련한 군대나 수출된 무기가 민간인 탄압에 사용될 경우, 이를 묵인하는 서방에도 평판 하락의 불똥이 튈 수 있습니다. 또한, 터키 특유의 이슬람 중심주의와 반서방 담론은 장기적으로 아프리카 내 서구의 영향력을 더욱 위축시킬 우려가 있습니다.

3. 튀르키예의 역설: 취약한 체제 속의 막강한 군사력
사헬 지역에서 발휘되는 튀르키예의 강력한 투사력 이면에는, 극심한 내치(경제·정치)의 부실이라는 뚜렷한 모순이 자리 잡고 있습니다. 튀르키예는 현재 "경제적으로는 죽어가고 있으나, 군사적·지정학적 위상으로 생존하는 국가"로 정의됩니다.
경제 및 정치적 취약성 (약점)

• 초인플레이션과 경제 위기: 에르도안 정권의 비정통적 저금리 정책 실패로 2023년 물가상승률이 85%를 돌파했습니다. 2024년 이후 금리를 50%대까지 끌어올리는 극단적 긴축으로 선회하여 2026년 8월 현재 인플레이션을 32.6% 수준으로 낮췄으나, 막대한 무역적자와 경기 침체의 악순환은 지속되고 있습니다.
• 하이브리드 권위주의의 동요: 20년간 이어진 에르도안의 1인 집중 권력 체제는 2024년 3월 지방선거 참패로 금이 가기 시작했습니다. 선거가 치러지는 민주주의의 외형을 갖추면서도 언론과 사법부가 통제되는 불공정한 환경 속에서, 내부 정치적 피로도는 최고조에 달해 있습니다.

군사력 및 방위 산업의 폭발적 성장 (강점)

• 자급자족 방산 강국의 현실화: 내정의 실패를 덮는 것은 압도적인 군사력입니다. 튀르키예는 NATO 내 병력 규모 2위(54만 명)를 자랑하며, 국방비 지출 목표(GDP 2.3%)를 초과 달성했습니다. 전 세계 드론 시장의 65%를 장악한 것은 물론, 5세대 전투기(KAAN), 국산 주력 전차(Altay), 해상 드론 항모 배치 등 방산 무기 자급률 80% 달성을 향해 폭발적으로 성장하며 연간 100억 달러 이상의 수출 수익을 창출하고 있습니다.

4. 지정학적 가치와 다중 정렬(Multi-alignment) 전략
내부의 심각한 약점에도 불구하고 국제사회가 튀르키예를 압박하지 못하는 이유는, 강대국 모두에게 튀르키예가 '대체 불가능한 지정학적 허브'이기 때문입니다.
5. 결론 및 향후 전망
종합하자면, 2026년 현재의 튀르키예는 자신의 경제적 기초 체력보다 훨씬 더 거대한 지정학적 야망을 실현해 나가고 있는 역설적인 국가입니다. 서아프리카 사헬 지역에서의 성공적인 군사·경제적 침투는 이러한 튀르키예의 강점(무기 수출 능력, 정치적 무조건성, 이슬람 연대감)이 가장 잘 발휘된 결과입니다.
향후 튀르키예의 향방은 2028년 대선(또는 2027년 조기 선거)과 경제 위기의 극복 여부에 따라 판가름 날 것입니다. 미국을 위시한 서방 세계는 사헬 지역 등 제3세계에서 튀르키예가 서방의 자리를 대체하는 현실을 직시해야 합니다. 완벽한 해결책은 없으나, 인권 문제 등 리스크를 철저히 모니터링하면서도 러시아를 견제하고 테러리즘을 억제하기 위해 튀르키예의 군사·지정학적 자산을 전략적으로 활용하는 신중한 접근이 요구됩니다.