(전문자료) HRW 성명서 : 크메르루주 국제재판 수사판사들 사임 요구

[울트라-노마드]

본 게시물은 국제 인권기구인 '휴먼라이츠워치'(HRW)가 2011년 10월 3일에 배포한 보도자료 형식의 성명서이다. '크메르의 세계'는 해당 보도자료 전체를 공개하면서, 세부내용 이전의 서론 부분만 한국어로 완역했다.

[출처] Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2011-10-3

캄보디아 국제법원 수사판사들은 사임해야만 한다

Cambodia: Judges Investigating Khmer Rouge Crimes Should Resign

사법적 과오들이 있음에도 불구하고, 유엔 사무처 법무국은 대처에 실패했다.

(뉴욕) – 크메르루즈(Khmer Rouge) 정권이 저지른 '대량 학살'을 심판하고 캄보디아 국민들에게 정의를 안겨다 주기 위해 설치된, 국제 및 국내 혼성의 '캄보디아 크메르루즈 국제법정'(ECCC)에서, 2명의 공동수사판사들이 법률적 및 사법적 의무를 악명높게 위반해온 바, 그들이 사임해야만 한다고, 국제 인권기구인 '휴먼 라이츠 워치'(Human Rights Watch: HRW)가 오늘(10.3) 촉구했다.

HRW는 공동 수사판사들인 요우 분렝(You Bunleng: 캄보디아인) 판사와 유엔(UN)이 지명한 지그프리트 블룬크(Siegfried Blunk: 독일인) 판사가 ECCC의 '제003호' 사건 및 '제004호' 사건에 대한 참다웁고 불편부당하며 효과적인 수사에 실패했다고 말했다. HRW는 이 두 사건들이 심도있는 수사도 하지 않은 채 폐기될 것으로 보인다고 말했다. 

(사진: ECCC) 캄보디아인인 요우 분렝 공동 수사판사(좌)와 지그프리트 블룬크 국제[사회 임명] 공동수사판사(우).

이 두 사건들은 5명의 용의자들을 대상으로 하고 있으며, [국제임명] 공동검사실에서 지난 2009년에 '공동수사판사실'로 이첩한 것이다.

금년 4월, 공동 수사판사들은 '제003호' 사건에 대한 자신들의 수사를 종결한다고 선언했다. 해당 사건의 용의자들에 대해 공식적인 '수사종결 명령서'(closing order)도 곧 송부될 것으로 예측되고 있다. 게다가 ECCC의 전·현직 직원들은 이들 공동 수사판사들이 '제004호' 사건에 대해서도 참다웁고 불편부당하며 효과적인 수사를 하지 않은 채 사건을 기각할 것으로 보인다고 증언하고 있다. HRW의 브래드 아담스(Brad Adams) 아시아 지부장은 다음과 같이 말했다.

"수사판사들은 용의자를 공고하거나 증인들을 인터뷰하지도 않았고, 법죄현장들에 대한 현장조사도 하지 않은 채 '제003호' 사건을 종결했다. 이런 방식이 일반적인 범죄에 대해서 취해졌다면 쇼킹한 일이 될 것이다. 하물며 20세기 최학의 만행의 일부에 대해 이런 조치가 취해졌다는 것은 믿기 어려운 일이다. 캄보디아 국민들은 이들 수사판사들이 재판과정에 참여하는 한 정의를 보게 될 희망이 없는 것이다."

ECCC는 설치된 이후 집권 '캄보디아 인민당'(CPP)에 의해 정치적 동기에 의한 개입으로 인해 종종 시달리곤 했다. 캄보디아 현 정부의 지도자들 중 상당수는 전직 크메르루주 당원 출신이다. 캄보디아의 모든 사법제도를 통제하고 있는 훈센(Hun Sen) 총리는 '제003호' 사건과 '제004호' 사건에 대한 재판을 반대한다는 뜻을 반복적으로 밝힌 바 있다. ECCC 내부의 소식통들은 HRW에 밝히기를, 이러한 정치적 개입이 바로 수사판사들이 해당 사건을 적절하게 다루는 데 실패하게 만든 원인이라면서, 그 결과 [이에 반발한] '공동수사판사실' 직원들의 [항의] 사직으로 이어졌다고 말했다. HRW의 브래드 아담스 지부장은 다음과 같이 말했다.

"우리는 오랜 동안 ECCC의 캄보디아인 판사들이 선택의 여지 없이 훈센 총리나 여타 고위 관리들이 바라는대로 행동할 것에 대해 우려해왔다. ECCC는 오직 국제적 연결고리의 강도에 따른 정도로만 일할 수 있는데, 국제적 연결고리가 가장 취약한 선택이 되고 말았다. 그 연결고리가 바로 지그프리트 블룬크 판사인 것이다."

만일 공동 수사판사들이 이 두 사건들에 대한 수사종결을 결정할 것이 확실하다면, '국제 공동검사'가 '예비법정'(1심 재판부)에 이의를 제기할 수도 있다. 하지만 ECCC가 정치화되어 있다는 본성을 감안하면, 이 사건들은 거의 확실하게 기각될 가능성이 높은 상태이다.

<ECCC 설치법>에 따르면, 국제법원의 설치 목적을 다음과 같이 규정하고 있다.

"[재판소는] '민주 캄푸치아'(Democratic Kampuchea: 크메르루주 정권의 국가명) 고위 지도자들 및 1975년 4월 17일부터 1975년 1월 6일 사이에 발생한 사건으로서, 캄보디아의 형법과 국제적인 인도주의 관련법 및 관행, 그리고 캄보디아가 인정하는 국제조약을 심각하게 위반한 범죄에 가장 책임이 있는 이들을 재판에 회부하기 위해 [설치한다]."

크메르루주가 정권을 잡고 있던 이 시기에는, 최대 200만명에 이르는 사람들이 살해되거나, 혹은 질병이나 기아로 숨졌다.

현재까지 ECCC가 재판을 한 사람으로는, '돗 동지'(Comrade Duch)란 별명으로 유명한 고문센터 '뚜올슬렝 교도소'(Tuol Sleng prison: S-21) 소장 깡 껙 이우(Kaing Guek Eav) 피고인이 유일하다. 그는 '제001호' 사건 재판을 통해 반-인도주의 범죄 및 전쟁범죄 혐의에 대해 징역 35년형을 선고받았지만, 징역 19년형으로 감형됐다. 이 사건은 현재 '대법정'(3심 재판부)에 항소한 상태이다.

'제002호' 사건은 크메르루주 정권의 고위 지도자들이었던 ['브라더 넘버 투'(Brother No 2)로 불렸던] 누온 찌어(Nuon Chea), 외무부장관을 역임한 이엥 사리(Ieng Sary), 국가주석을 지낸 키우 삼판(Khieu Samphan), 이엥 사리의 부인으로 사회부장관을 지낸 이엥 티릿(Ieng Thirith) 등 피고인 4명의 학살 및 반-인도주의 범죄, 그리고 전쟁범죄 혐의에 대해 재판하게 되는데, 본 심리는 내년(2012)에나 시작될 예정이다.

HRW는 요우 분렝 판사 및 지그프리트 블룬크 판사가 적절하고 신뢰할만한 수사에 실패한 것은 불편부당하게 행동해야 한다는 자신들의 책임을 위반한 것이라고 지적했다. <ECCC 설치법>과 <ECCC 내규>, 그리고 국제법에 따르면, 공동 수사판사들은 검사가 제기한 사건들에서 고발된 사실들에 대해 조사할 의무를 갖고 있다. 여타 요구조건들과 국제적인 법률체계는 이들 수사들이 독립적이고 신속하며 효과적으로 수행될 것을 요구하고 있고, 그리하여 여기에 책임있는 이들을 특정하여 처벌할 수 있어야만 하며, 공개적인 조사에도 열려 있어야만 한다.

ECCC는 코피 아난(Kofi Annan) 전 유엔 사무총장 재임 당시에 설치됐다. 그리고 ECCC가 크메르루주의 대량 범죄들을 성공적으로 기소하는 일을 보장하기 위해, 유엔의 핵심적인 감시기능을 인정했다. 하지만 현재의 유엔 관리들은 그러한 책임을 다하는 데 실패했다. 유엔 사무처 법무국(OLA)은 공동 수사판사들의 활동에 대해 독립적인 조사를 실시해야만 하며, ECCC에 대한 감독활동을 통해 이제까지의 경험에서 교훈을 얻을 수 있도록 해야만 할 것이다.

HRW는 유엔과 캄보디아 정부의 합의문에 나타난 크메르루주 범죄에 "가장 책임이 큰" 이들을 기소를 촉구한 문구가, '제003호' 및 '제004호' 사건의 용의자들에 대해서도 정확하게 들어맞는 것이라고 말했다.

만일 ECCC가 크메르루주 지도부가 연루된 사건들만 수사한다면, 크메르루주의 하위직 학살 가해자들은 계속해서 자유를 누리게 될 것이며, 심지어는 가해자와 피해자의 가정이 한 마을에 거주하는 경우도 종종 존재한다. HRW의 브래드 아담스 지부장은 다음과 같이 말했다.

"유엔은 수사판사들의 과오에 대한 신뢰할만한 증언들이 무수히 나오고 있음에도, 그에 대한 대응에 실패함으로써 그 머리를 모래에 파묻고 있다. 만일 유엔이 이 사건들이 완전하게 수사될 수 있도록 보장하는 데 신속하게 나서지 않는다면, ECCC가 지닌 신뢰도의 마지막 파편마져도 그 행동들에 대한 매우 강고한 의문에 답하도록 강요받게 될 것이다."

'제003호' 및 '제004호' 사건의 적절한 수사에 실패

Failure to Investigate Cases 003 and 004 Properly

ECCC cases 003 and 004 are aimed not at the Khmer Rouge’s very top leadership, who are charged in case 002, but at other leaders also most responsible for serious crimes during the Khmer Rouge period. In 2008, the international co-prosecutor accused the Khmer Rouge air force commander, Sou Met, and navy commander, Meas Muth, of committing crimes against humanity and war crimes in case 003. The international co-prosecutor accused three Khmer Rouge regional officials – Aom An, Yim Tith, and Im Chem – of committing genocide and crimes against humanity in case 004. Documents filed in the two cases allege a total of 40 distinct crime bases. (See below summaries of the allegations against the five suspects.)

Hun Sen has made many statements opposing cases 003 and 004. In 1999, before the tribunal was even established, he stated that he did not want any more than four or five Khmer Rouge suspects put on trial. After an October 2010 meeting in Cambodia between Hun Sen and United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Foreign Minister Hor Namhong announced that the prime minister “clearly affirmed” that no further cases would be allowed. The prime minister has no legal authority to make such a decision for the court, but that has not stopped Hun Sen and other officials from giving instructions to Cambodian personnel at the ECCC, Human Rights Watch said.

The decision to investigate cases 003 and 004 has been mired in controversy from the outset. The first international co-prosecutor, Robert Petit, conducted an investigation and decided there was sufficient evidence to submit the cases to the co-investigating judges. In a politically motivated decision reflecting Hun Sen’s views, the Cambodian co-prosecutor, Chea Leang, tried to block the filing of charges, claiming that the suspects did not fit the definition of “most responsible” under the ECCC law. However, in the Duch case, the trial chamber concluded that although Duch was not a senior leader, he was “oneof those most responsible” – meaning those at lower levels who were directly implicated in the most serious atrocities – for Khmer Rouge crimes.

The ECCC’s pretrial chamber, made up of three Cambodian and two international judges, ruled that there was sufficient evidence to proceed. While all three Cambodian judges voted to block the case, both international judges voted in favor of referring the case to the co-investigating judges. The votes of four of the five judges in the pretrial chamber are required to block a case at this stage under the ECCC’s supermajority formula. The formula was created out of concerns from the Cambodian public, the UN and international donors that the government would give political instructions to Cambodian judges.  Because only the three Cambodian judges voted to block the case, it was therefore allowed to proceed and was sent to the co-investigating judges.

The international co-prosecutor on September 7, 2009, submitted the five suspects’ cases to the co-investigating judges. The UN prosecutor’s “Introductory Submissions,” which outlined the evidence against the five, ran to more than 200 pages, with thousands of pages of supporting information. No serious investigative action took place before the co-investigating judges filed their notice on April 29, 2011, that they had closed their investigation into case 003. The co-investigating judges offered no explanation and claimed that they did not need to provide any.

A week later, Stephen Heder, a leading expert on the Khmer Rouge, wrote to Blunk saying that he was resigning as a consultant from the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, in part because of “the judges’ decision to close the investigation into case file 003, effectively without investigating it, which I, like others, believe was unreasonable.” The investigating judges’ entire UN legal team and many of their other UN staff have also quit.

On May 9, the international co-prosecutor, Andrew Cayley, challenged the co-investigating judges’ decision and made a formal request for further investigation. Cayley laid out a road map for a serious and effective investigation, asking Bunleng and Blunk to:

1. Summon and question the suspects named in the Case File 003 Introductory Submission, and notify them that they are under investigation;
2. Interview additional individuals who have been identified as potential witnesses thus far;
3. Interview or re-interview witnesses identified in Case File 002, focusing on the specific allegations contained in the Case File 003 Introductory Submission;
4. Examine further the crime sites (including by searching for mass grave locations);
5. Place additional evidence on the Case File, including by transferring further evidence from Case File 002 to Case File 003; and
6. Further investigate the involvement of the Case 003 suspects in the crimes, including the transfer of prisoners under their control to S-21, their receipt of “confessions” taken from prisoners murdered at S-21, and their involvement in further arrests.

Referring to the original submission to the investigating judges, Cayley identified possible crime sites and episodes, including the S-21 torture center presided over by Duch; the Kampong Chhnang airport construction site, where forced labor reportedly occurred on a mass and deadly scale; purges of Khmer Rouge cadres; and Khmer Rouge incursions into Vietnam. Cayley specifically suggested investigating other crime sites and episodes, including:

1. S-22 Security Center in the Phnom Penh area;
2. Wat Eng Tea Nhien Security Center in Kampong Somprovince;
3. Stung Hav rock quarry forced labor site in Kampong Som;
4. The capture of foreign nationals off the coast of Cambodia and their unlawful imprisonment, transfer to S-21 or murder; and
5. Security centers operated in Rattanakiri Province.

Cayley explained his request, saying:

The International Co-Prosecutor will request these actions as he is of the view that the crimes alleged in the Introductory Submission have not been fully investigated. He [Cayley] has a legal obligation under the Internal Rules and the Law of the ECCC to identify and request all reasonable investigative actions which should be taken by the Co-Investigating Judges before a decision is made as to the whether or not any individuals should be indicted and sent for trial.

Blunk and Bunleng did not act on this information, but instead, on June 7, refused Cayley’s request. They demanded that he retract his request and, in an extraordinary step, suggested that he could be held in contempt of court on the specious grounds that by outlining the steps necessary to conduct a serious investigation he had breached judicial confidentiality. Cayley refused.

Blunk and Bunleng’s attempts to censor the prosecutor and threaten him with legal action show the lengths to which they are prepared to go to prevent cases from being investigated, Human Rights Watch said.

Government-appointed court officials have made it clear both publicly and privately that cases 003 and 004 will not be allowed to proceed. On March 17, Chan Dararasmey, deputy national co-prosecutor at the ECCC, told a conference on victim participation in the ECCC that there would be no further prosecutions. “There will be no case 003 and 004,” he said.

On August 8, Blunk and Bunleng publicly announced that they had “serious doubts” about whether any 004 suspects would be sent for trial, claiming that none would fall under the court’s jurisdiction as “most responsible.” The basis for these doubts is unclear, given that the ECCC in the verdict against Duch, who was not a high-ranking Khmer Rouge official, indicated that those “most responsible” includes those at lower levels who are directly implicated in the most serious atrocities. A final closing order dismissing case 003 is expected soon on the same basis. But as the case summaries below show, the available evidence against all the suspects in cases 003 and 004 suggests involvement in genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity involving the deaths of very large numbers of people.

Although Cayley can appeal to the pretrial chamber if the co-investigating judges file a closing order in either case, the cases will almost certainly be dismissed, given the political nature of the ECCC. On this appeal the supermajority rule does not apply, meaning that the decision of the Cambodian judges, who have a three-to-two majority in the chamber, would stand on its own. Since the ECCC was established, the Cambodian judges in the five member pretrial chamber have consistently toed the government’s line.

시민사회 이해당사자들 및 피해자에 대한 잘못된 처우

Mistreatment of Civil Parties and Victims

Human Rights Watch is also concerned about the co-investigating judges’ outrageous treatment of civil parties. The ECCC law broke new ground by allowing victims of Khmer Rouge crimes and their families to participate in cases to present evidence, request investigative acts, and seek compensation. But in a blatant effort to ensure closure and dismissal of the cases by excluding evidence generated through victim participation, the co-investigating judges have rejected civil party applications on flimsy grounds, contrary to Cambodian law and international jurisprudence, including that of the ECCC itself in cases 001 and 002.

From everything that Human Rights Watch has been able to ascertain, none of the hundreds of civil party applications in cases 003 and 004 have been accepted by the co-investigating judges, effectively denying victim participation rights and obstructing investigations. The judges have rejected the petitions of at least three people seeking to participate as victims. One is a Cambodian woman whose husband was made to engage in forced labor and was later killed by the Khmer Rouge. The judges said her claimed psychological harm was “highly unlikely to be true.” They also defined the requirement of “direct” harm so narrowly as to exclude anyone other than the actual victim, which means no surviving family members could file a case.

유엔의 대응 실패

UN Failure to Respond

While the UN has sent two fact-finding teams to Phnom Penh, it has taken no meaningful action in response to the failure of the co-investigating judges in cases 003 and 004, Human Rights Watch said. This is particularly troubling in that the involvement of the UN with the ECCC was intended to be the foundation for the tribunal’s success in prosecuting mass crimes during Khmer Rouge rule. In 2002, then-Secretary-General Annan and Hans Corell, the chief of the UN Office of Legal Affairs, withdrew from negotiations with Cambodia to set up a court to try Khmer Rouge atrocities, citing fears about a lack of judicial independence, competence, and corruption. UN officials insisted on the need for an independent, international prosecutor instead of co-prosecutors, and a majority of international judges to insulate the court from interference by the Cambodian government.

However, the UN General Assembly, at the behest of Japan, Australia, France, and the United States, subsequently adopted a resolution calling on the secretary-general to conclude an agreement with the Cambodian government. This led to the ECCC in its current form with co-prosecutors, a majority of Cambodian judges, and the supermajority formula to resolve some legal disputes. Annan complied, but he also issued a scathing indictment of the court’s structure and the role of donor countries in undermining international standards. In a March 31, 2003 report to the General Assembly, Annan stated:

I cannot but recall the reports of my Special Representative for human rights in Cambodia, who has consistently found there to be little respect on the part of Cambodian courts for the most elementary features of the right to a fair trial. I consequently remain concerned that these important provisions of the draft agreement might not be fully respected by the Extraordinary Chambers and that established international standards of justice, fairness and due process might therefore not be ensured. Furthermore, in view of the clear finding of the General Assembly ... that there are continued problems related to the rule of law and the functioning of the judiciary in Cambodia resulting from interference by the executive with the independence of the judiciary, I would very much have preferred that the draft agreement provide for both of the extraordinary Chambers to be composed of a majority of international judges.

UN participation and oversight has been seen as essential to making the ECCC a fair and competent tribunal because of the UN’s ability to bring professionalism and impartiality to the process. This assumption is now in question.

Recognizing the difficulty the tribunal would have ensuring fair justice, Annan in his 2003 report suggested the UN might one day have to withdraw from the ECCC:

Any deviation by the Government from the obligations undertaken could

lead to the United Nations withdrawing its cooperation and assistance from the process.

Unlike their predecessors, the current secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon, and the Office of Legal Affairs have shown little inclination to ensure that the ECCC fulfills its responsibilities under Cambodian and international law. UN officials have been unwilling to undertake a serious investigation to ensure proper judicial conduct by Blunk, the UN nominee, although the matter has been raised repeatedly by ECCC officials, Human Rights Watch, and other nongovernmental organizations.

Instead of taking action to safeguard the ECCC, the secretary-general on June 14 issued a statementclaiming that the UN has no responsibility to address the scandal engulfing the ECCC and made the claim that the ECCC is an “independent judicial process.” The statement said:

The announcement made by the Co-Investigating Judges on 29 April 2011 that they have decided to conclude their investigation in Case 003, is an interim procedural step. Issues related to that decision will be the subject of further consideration by the Co-Investigating judges, the Co-Prosecutors, and the Pretrial Chamber. Any other proceedings that may be initiated by the Co-Investigating Judges will also be subject to the independent judicial process.

The secretary-general’s statement ignores longstanding and blatant Cambodian government interference in the ECCC and the acquiescence of the co-investigating judges in that interference, Human Rights Watch said.

'제003호' 및 '제004호' 사건의 요약

Summaries of Cases 003 and 004

The information in this section is primarily from now publicly available files in cases 003 and 004, with additional material from other public and private sources, including Human Rights Watch research. The allegations in these summaries make it clear that the suspects in these cases fall into the “most responsible” category of the ECCC statute.

(1) '제003호' 사건의 용의자 소우 멧 (일명: 소우 사멧)

Sou Met, alias Sou Samet, Suspect in Case 003

The international co-prosecutor has accused Sou Met of crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Met, the son of a Khmer Rouge senior leader who died in the late 1960s, is a longtime veteran of the movement. During the 1970-75 war between the Khmer Rouge and the Khmer Republic, Met was a leading cadre of Southwest Zone Division 1, which fought in the Kampong Chhnang and Kampong Speu areas. Elements of the division or other units under its authority were involved in the seizure of Phnom Penh and the provincial town of Kampong Chhnang on April 17, 1975, the forced relocation of urban residents to the countryside, and the mass extrajudicial executions of defeated Khmer Republic officers and officials.

After April 17, 1975, Met became secretary of one of the Khmer Rouge’s Center (main force) Divisions, designated 502, which incorporated a newly established air force and related specialized units. It was headquartered at Pochentong, Phnom Penh’s airport. He also became an assistant to the Central Committee. Division 502 reported to the Khmer Rouge General Staff and Military Committee, headed respectively by a Standing Committee member, Son Sen, and the party secretary, Pol Pot (both deceased). It comprised multiple regiments and other subordinate units totaling 5,000 to 6,000 combatants, with contingents deployed at various times throughout the country, including to the Northwest, North, West, Southwest, East, and Northeast Zones. Met underwent political training at the Central Committee level.

Met frequently attended gatherings under General Staff auspices with other center division and center military unit secretaries, at which they reported on their units’ activities, received party instructions and endorsed party policies. These meetings dealt in particular with Khmer Rouge policies and practices regarding the elimination of the Khmer Rouge’s purported internal and external enemies, which was characterized as “national defense work” and included the execution of internal enemies and cross-border attacks on villages in Vietnam.

Met remained in direct charge of Division 502 until late 1978, when he was promoted and given additional duties. He became a member of the General Staff, reportedly becoming a deputy to its chief, Son Sen, is believed to have been elevated to de jure Central Committee membership, and was given at least part-time responsibility over a major field command on the Cambodian border with Vietnam.

Like other military units at all levels throughout the country, Division 502 had responsibility at least for security around the perimeters of its places of deployment and conducted arrests of ordinary people deemed suspicious, such as in the vicinity of Pochentong, either detaining them for interrogation and possibly for execution, or turning them over to the S-21 interrogation center for disposition. It also had primary responsibility for identifying alleged “enemies” in its own ranks, either sending them to its own S-22 Security Office for Pochentong-Phnom Penh, elsewhere for interrogation, or to S-21. As a Center military unit, Division 502 further cooperated closely with S-21 in arresting division cadre and combatants identified as “enemies” by S-21. Such arrests started in 1975 and continued through 1978, implicating Met in the massive torture and killings committed at S-21.

From at least 1976, Division 502 was in charge of overseeing the forced labor site in Kampong Chhnang province for the construction of a strategic back-up military airfield, which was increasingly used as a re-education site for detaining and punishing military and other people purged from their units for allegedly being “no-good elements” or otherwise being supposedly problematic politically. The largest numbers were sent to the Kampong Chhnang worksite in 1978 in connection with a massive purge of the Khmer Rouge and its armed forces in the East Zone. While some of those arbitrarily consigned to punitive hard labor under extremely inhumane conditions there were eventually deemed rehabilitated enough to be reassigned to their units, many others died from the conditions to which they were exposed, were executed locally by Division 502 or at its behest at nearby civilian security offices for various supposed transgressions, or were sent to S-21, either at the division’s initiative or at the request of S-21. Local executions escalated dramatically in late 1978-early 1979.

Finally, in late 1978, the newly promoted Met was dispatched to the Sector 505 battlefield on the border with Vietnam, where he was allegedly involved in a new wave of purges affecting Center military and local administrative cadre in the area, some of whom were sent to S-21 for allegedly allowing Vietnamese penetration of Cambodian territory.

(2) '제003호' 사건의 용의자 미어 뭇 (일명: 아짜 넨)

Meas Muth, alias Achar Nen, Suspect in Case 003

The international co-prosecutor has accused Meas Muth of crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Muth was involved in the Cambodian Communist movement from at least the 1960s, when he was part of a revolutionary network of Buddhist monks in pagodas in Phnom Penh, most of them originating from the Southwest Zone and linked to the late Chhit Choeun, known as Ta Mok. Mok had been a monk in Phnom Penh before joining the Communist movement in the 1940s. Mok became secretary of the Southwest Zone in the late 1960s. He was also a member of the Khmer Rouge’s highest leadership body, the Standing Committee, and eventually became a deputy secretary of the Khmer Rouge Central Committee, ranking third in the party hierarchy.

After the civil war between the Khmer Rouge and the Khmer Republic began in 1970, Muth became deputy secretary of Southwest Zone Sector 13, which included Mok’s home province of Takeo. By this time Muth had married one of Mok’s daughters, Khom, who was a party cadre in Tram Kak district, where Mok was born. In 1973, Muth was made secretary of Southwest Zone Division 3, which fought Khmer Republic forces in Takeo, Kampot, and Kampong Speu provinces. On April 17, 1975, some detachments of the division entered Phnom Penh, while others advanced on the port town of Kampong Som. Division 3 was involved in the forced relocation of urban residents of both towns to the countryside and mass extrajudicial executions of defeated Khmer Republic officers and officials.

After April 17, 1975, Muth became secretary of Center Division 164, which incorporated newly established maritime navy and related specialized units. It was headquartered in the Kampong Saom area, with bases in several ports along the sea coast and on islands in the Gulf of Siam. Muth had command over its 8,000 to 10,000 forces. He also became secretary of Kampong Saom municipality, which after the forced removal of its previous urban dwellers was partly repopulated by several thousand civilian port workers and other civilian workers assigned to industries in and around the town. Muth reportedly shared authority over this new worker population with various national ministries, but had primary responsibility for Kampong Saom security. He also allegedly had responsibility over some parts of the neighboring Sector 37 of the post-war West Zone, into which many previous Kampong Saom residents had been transferred as “new people” under inhumane conditions that were among the harshest in Cambodia. Like Sou Met, Muth was an assistant to the Central Committee.

Division 164 reported to the General Staff and Military Committee, headed by Standing Committee Member Son Sen and Party Secretary Pol Pot respectively. Muth underwent political training at the Central Committee level. He frequently attended gatherings under General Staff auspices with other center division and center military unit secretaries, at which they reported on their units’ activities, received party instructions and endorsed party policies. These meetings dealt in particular with Khmer Rouge policies and practices regarding the elimination of the Khmer Rouge’s purported internal and external enemies, characterized as “national defense work.” This included the execution of internal enemies and cross-border attacks on villages in Vietnam.

Muth remained in direct charge of Division 164 until late 1978, when he was promoted and given new duties. He became a member of the General Staff, is believed to have been elevated to de jure Central Committee membership, and was given full political and military authority over part of the Cambodian border (Sector 505) with Vietnam and command of Center units deployed there.

Like other Khmer Rouge military units at all levels throughout the country, Division 164 had responsibility at least for security around the perimeters of its places of deployment in the Kampong Saom area. It arrested workers accused of being “enemies” in or around the town and also, allegedly, ordinary people deemed suspicious in nearby areas of Sector 37, either detaining them for interrogation and execution itself or turning them over to local security offices for disposition. The division reportedly took more direct charge of security vis-à-vis the civilian population of Kampong Saom in 1977 following a purge of non-Division 164 Khmer Rouge, which Muth assisted. It also had primary responsibility for identifying alleged “enemies” in its own ranks, either sending them to its own Security Office at Wat Entanhean in Kampong Saom, to its forced labor re-education site at Stung Hav, to other punitive locations under the division’s own authority, or to S-21.

Muth or his immediate subordinates allegedly ordered local executions of both division personnel and ordinary people, without reference to higher levels of authority. The inhumane conditions enforced at sites like Stung Hav also led to deaths from starvation and disease among the laborers. Division 164 cooperated closely with S-21 in arresting division cadre and combatants identified as “enemies” by S-21. Such arrests started as early as 1976 and continued through 1978. Many of the early purge victims sent to S-21 were Division 164 cadre and combatants originating in the East Zone. Starting in 1976, cadre of Division 164 were transferred to other Center units to assist in purging them or to replace cadre already purged. Muth attended meetings at the General Staff in which the purge processes in other parts of Cambodia were discussed.

As the senior-most Khmer Rouge military authority involved in maritime operations after April 17, 1975, Muth was directly in charge of Division 164 detachments patrolling large parts of the Gulf of Siam, where they occasionally engaged Vietnamese or Thai Navy vessels and more often attacked civilian Thai and Vietnamese fishing boats and boats carrying Vietnamese civilians trying to flee abroad. Thai and Vietnamese civilians were killed during these attacks. Vietnamese military personnel and civilians seized were sent to S-21 for execution, notably after the Khmer Rouge carried out attacks against Vietnam. Some captured Thai and a small number of Westerners intercepted by Division 164 off the coast were also killed at S-21.

In late 1978, Muth exercised Central Committee and General Staff authority to conduct a purge of the Khmer Rouge and local population there, with some victims sent to S-21 and others reportedly executed locally, while he appointed a new corps of cadre to posts in Sector 505 and to Center divisions deployed in areas of operation under his command.

(3) '제004호' 사건의 용의자 아옴 안 (일명: 토 안) 

Aom An, alias Tho An, Suspect in Case 004

The international co-prosecutor has accused Aom An of crimes against humanity and genocide.

An joined the Khmer Rouge after being a Buddhist monk in a pagoda under the movement’s influence in the Khmer Rouge Southwest Zone. After the Khmer Rouge victory on April 17, 1975, An was appointed secretary of Kandal Steung district of Sector 25 of the Southwest Zone, under the authority of Zone Secretary Mok. Sector 25 comprised territories south and east of Phnom Penh, the population of which was forcibly transferred to previously Khmer Rouge-controlled zones after April 17.

A large proportion of the Phnom Penh population was initially transferred as “new people” to Kandal Steung and other districts of Sector 25, where many accused of being Khmer Republic officers or officials were soon executed in local security offices. Many others were subjected to forced labor and inhumane conditions, as a result of which they began to die of starvation and disease. Much of this “new people” population and other residents of Sector 25 were then subjected to a second wave of forced transfer in late 1975, sent in large numbers in an inhumane manner to distant parts of Cambodia, with considerable numbers dying on the way or soon after arrival.

By 1976, An was transferred to Sector 35, where he was a member of the Sector Committee. In this capacity, he oversaw forced labor, including construction of irrigation and other water-control works at the sector level and in its districts, where the inhumane working conditions imposed brought about many deaths from starvation and disease. He is also believed to have shared authority with other Sector 35 officials over the Sector Security Office and its many district security offices and lower-level detention facilities, which, like those elsewhere in Cambodia, were responsible for large-scale extrajudicial executions, torture and other inhumane treatment of people arbitrarily detained as “traitors,” “enemies” or “no-good elements.”

Although most of those so accused in Sector 35 in this period were allegedly linked politically, socially or through family ties with the defeated Khmer Republic, from 1976 on they included people from within the ranks of the Khmer Rouge, its local administration and armed forces. They were arrested on district, sector or zone authority, on account of their supposed associations with the Khmer Republic, for purported connections to Vietnam, or because of other unsubstantiated “traitorous tendencies.” They also included members of the local Cham community, an Islamic ethnic minority targeted for repression, especially after the Cham reacted to the persecution with outbreaks of insurrection.

Sometime between March and May 1977, An was transferred and given a major promotion. He became secretary of Sector 41 in what had previously been the Khmer Rouge’s North Zone and was soon re-designated the Central Zone, of which he was made deputy secretary under Ke Pork, a member of the Khmer Rouge Central Committee. As zone deputy secretary, An is believed to have joined Zone Secretary Pork on the Central Committee, the Khmer Rouge’s second-highest leadership body, with nationwide authority and subordinate only to the Standing Committee. It normally gathered in Phnom Penh at least once every six months to report to the Standing Committee and receive its instructions.

An arrived in Sector 41 in the middle of a large-scale purge within the local Khmer Rouge ranks and an upsurge in cleansing of both “new people” relocated from former Khmer Republic areas and long-resident “veteran people.” All of this was pursuant to instructions from the Standing Committee and presided over by Pork, while An played a major role, and witnesses allege he personally gave instructions to seek out alleged “enemies” and other such elements.

Many victims of the intra-party purges in the North/Central Zone were sent to S-21 in Phnom Penh, where they were interrogated under torture and then executed. Lower-level Khmer Rouge cadre, “new people” and other members of the ordinary local population were extrajudicially executed or detained indefinitely under extremely inhumane conditions locally, mostly in district or lower-level and sector security offices in Sector 41 and elsewhere. As Sector 41 secretary, An had direct authority over that sector’s subordinate districts and lower administrative levels, ruling over territories in which increasingly inhumane practices were imposed on the population as a whole, while as zone deputy secretary, he had at least some authority in parts of its territory beyond Sector 41.

An presided over Kang Meas district, where alleged genocide was committed against the Cham from the second half of 1977, which spread nationwide in 1978. An is also implicated in a general escalation during 1978 of alleged crimes against humanity in the Central Zone and in Sector 41 in particular, with victims among all segments of the population, including members of the Khmer Rouge. As zone deputy secretary, he was present as an authority at the major zone forced labor site to construct the “1 January Dam” and related irrigation works, a water-control project in for Sectors 42 and 43 started before his arrival but only completed once he was in place, and where many workers were extrajudicially executed or died from starvation or disease.

(4) '제004호' 사건의 용의자 유임 띳

Yim Tith, Suspect in Case 004

The international co-prosecutor has accused Yim Tith of crimes against humanity.

Tith is a native of Tram Kak district, Takeo province. Tith was active in the Communist movement since at least the 1960s, having been a Buddhist monk first in Takeo and then in Phnom Penh. He eventually married a sister of Mok. During the 1970-75 civil war between the Khmer Rouge and the Khmer Republic, Tith became a leading cadre of Kirivong district in Southwest Zone Sector 13, Mok’s power base. By April 17, 1975, Tith was party secretary for Kirivong district, which bordered Vietnam. At some point, Tith also reportedly became at least a member of the Sector 13 Committee, which is believed to have given him at least some authority over the entire sector.

As Kirivong party secretary, Tith exercised direct authority over the district’s population, which from April 1975 included “new people” forcibly transferred from areas previously under Khmer Republic administration. He also had authority over a district security office, eventually located at Wat Pratheat, and lower-level security operations, which were responsible for identifying and ensuring the extrajudicial execution of alleged former Khmer Republic officers and officials and others, including long-term local residents accused of being “traitors” or “enemies.” Other people, “new people” and longer-term residents accused of being “no-good elements” or having supposedly untoward political “tendencies,” were arrested and held in security or detention offices throughout the district for hard labor re-education. Many died. Tith also oversaw a Kirivong administration that imposed inhumane living conditions leading to many deaths.

In mid-1978, Tith was reassigned with a significant promotion to the Northwest Zone, where he became secretary of Sector 1. He also became an important member of the Zone Committee, of which Mok had become secretary, concurrently with many other leadership posts, after a long series of murderous purges had virtually eliminated the original leading cadre corps of the Northwest Zone. Tith directly controlled at least Sector 1 and its subordinate districts and units and is believed to have had authority over at least some other parts of the Northwest. As such, he allegedly presided over the completion of the purge of veteran cadre at the local level and an escalated “cleansing” of the population as a whole, during which many were sent for extrajudicial execution at sector and district security offices or killed in other locations.

Certain groups, notably the ethnic Khmer Krom community and the last remnants of Cambodia’s resident Vietnamese and those deemed Vietnamese, were evidently targeted for total elimination, while large numbers of people forcibly transferred from the East Zone in connection with the mid-1978 purges there were also killed. Conditions of life in the Northwest became even worse, resulting in upsurges in deaths from starvation and disease.

(5) '제004호' 사건의 용의자 임 쩸 (일명: 스라이 쩸)

Im Chem, alias Srei Chem, Suspect in Case 004

The international co-prosecutor has accused Im Chem of crimes against humanity.

Chem is a native of Mok’s home district of Tram Kak in what the Khmer Rouge designated Sector 13 of its Southwest Zone. Her family became involved in the Cambodian Communist movement from at least the 1960s, and she was active as a cadre in the movement from the outbreak of the civil war in 1970.

In 1976, Chem became a representative of Southwest Zone peasants in the Khmer Rouge-appointed People’s Assembly, while her husband, Nop Nhen, was a district secretary in the zone. In mid-1977, she and Nhen were sent to Sector 5 in the Northwest Zone, where she became secretary of Preah Net Preah district and her husband secretary of Sisophon district. She remained in this post through the end of 1978.

The transfer of Chem and her husband to the Northwest Zone coincided with the beginning of one of the escalating waves of purges of the original Khmer Rouge cadre there and also with the arrival in the Northwest of many new Khmer Rouge officials from other zones to replace those purged. Chem and the other new cadre allegedly participated in further purges through early 1979.

Some of those purged in Preah Net Preah district and neighboring parts of Sector 5 after Chem was put into a position of authority were sent for extrajudicial execution at S-21, while others were killed or detained for punitive forced-labor and re-education locally, including at a number of sites in Preah Net Preah over which Chem directly presided or at least had some influence, such as Phnom Trayoung. The scope of the purges greatly intensified in mid-1978 and escalated by year’s end amid violent infighting among rival Khmer Rouge power networks.

Chem also allegedly presided over forced labor for the construction of auxiliary water-control works linked to the Sector 5 Trapeang Thmar dam and irrigation project. Building began before she arrived but was only completed after she was put in charge of Preah Net Preah.  The very harsh conditions imposed on the laborers allegedly under her control resulted in many deaths. Some laborers were executed at the water-control work site for complaining about conditions or being unable to cope with the demands. Moreover, the general conditions imposed on the overall population of Preah Net Preah were extraordinarily difficult and worsened in many parts of the district during Chem’s rule, with large numbers of deaths from starvation and disease. Those who complained or were deemed “lazy” for failing to do the required work were subject to execution or detention at punitive forced labor and re-education sites throughout the district.

Chem allegedly presided over a wave of killings of people suspected of harboring anti-regime sentiments as Khmer Rouge rule disintegrated in late 1978-early 1979 in the face of Vietnamese military advances, such as at Phnom Trayoung. Throughout Chem’s tenure as Preah Net Preah district secretary, executions and punitive forced labor particularly targeted people purportedly associated with the defeated Khmer Republic, those linked to purged local cadre, and those deemed to be “Vietnamese.”

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