'팔레즈 포켓'의 순간에 직면한 미얀마 군부정권

[위종민]

네피도의 미얀마 군부정권이 지난 2주 동안 샨 주 북부를 휩쓸고 있는 반군의 공세로 위기에 직면해 있다고 합니다. 10월 27일, '작전 1027'로 명명된 이 공세는 미얀마민족민주동맹군이 샨 주 북동쪽 코캉 주변에서, 팔라웅-따앙 민족해방군이 북서쪽 고지를 장악하고 만달레이-뮤즈 고속도로를 따라 작전을 진행중이고 미얀마 서부 라카인주의 라카인-아라칸 군이 1,500명을 북부로 1,500명을 파견하는 등  3개 반군이 연합해 작전을 진행하고 있다고 하네요. 

미얀마 군부는 최근 육군 참모총장을 부패 혐의로 해임하는 등 혼란한 상황이라고 합니다. 

https://asiatimes.com/2023/11/no-good-options-for-myanmars-mortally-wounded-regime/

No good options for Myanmar’s mortally wounded regime

Military likely lacks the manpower, morale or leadership to launch an effective counteroffensive to Brotherhood Alliance’s crippling blow

By ANTHONY DAVISNOVEMBER 15, 2023

• Click to share on WhatsApp (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Pocket (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Tumblr (Opens in new window)
• Click to email a link to a friend (Opens in new window)
• Click to print (Opens in new window)

Myanmar's military has suffered a humiliating defeat to Brotherhood Alliance forces in the country's Shan state. Image: Facebook Screengrab / Amnesty International / Steve Tickner

If the echoes of World War II have any resonance in 21st century Myanmar then events have not yet reached the point in April 1945 when the delusional commander-in-chief of a defeated German army directed non-existent divisions from an underground bunker amid the ruins of the national capital.

They are, though, plausibly at a similar point to August 1944 when two months after the D-Day landings German forces had just suffered a crippling defeat in Normandy’s “Falaise Pocket” and the Nazi high command confronted the prospect of an overwhelming Allied advance on the German homeland.

The Myanmar military’s commander-in-chief Senior General Min Aung and his generals in Naypyidaw’s war room are now facing their own “Falaise Pocket” moment in the shape of an insurgent offensive that has swept across the north of Shan state over the last two weeks.

Dubbed “Operation 1027” for its October 27 launch date, the coordinated onslaught brought together forces of the so-called Brotherhood Alliance composed of three insurgent factions which have operated together since at least 2014.

The trio includes the mainly ethnic Chinese Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which is spearheading operations in and around Kokang in the far northeast of the state; the ethnic Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), which dominates the northwestern hills and operates along the Mandalay-Muse highway; and the ethnic Rakhine Arakan Army (AA), which is based in Rakhine state on Myanmar’s western seaboard but which fields a contingent of around 1,500 troops alongside its allies in the north of Myanmar.

MNDAA, TNLA and AA ethnic armed organizations have combined in a potent insurgent front. Image: Facebook

Within the first two weeks of hostilities, Brotherhood forces had seized several towns along the Chinese border, including importantly Chin Shwe Haw and Namkhan, and overrun scores of military bases and posts capturing huge stocks of munitions.

How Myanmar’s military leadership will respond to this debacle in the coming days and weeks remains strikingly unclear and is certainly not made easier by significant dysfunction following the recent sacking of army chief-of-staff Lieutenant General Moe Myint Tun on charges of massive corruption.

But in strategic terms, the armed forces command faces three broad options, none of them attractive or likely to deflect the ultimate trajectory of a war it is now clearly losing.

One option would involve the launching of a major counteroffensive aimed at retaking the economically vital trade artery that runs from Mandalay in central Myanmar to the trade hub of Muse on the northeastern border with China which remains under regime control.

Another would be to attempt to retain strongholds in northern Shan state anchored on the regional capital and headquarters of the Northeastern Regional Military Command (RMC) in Lashio city and fight for time.

A third would entail a bold decision to undertake a strategic withdrawal from the north Shan region and possibly also eastern Shan state, pulling out troops and where possible hardware while there is time to bolster defensive lines around the heartland centers of Mandalay and the fortress capital of Naypyidaw.

All three options have pros and cons. Anchored on the garrison city of Pyin Oo Lwin in the hills overlooking Mandalay, a big push counteroffensive backed by air power and armored forces that to date have been little deployed in the conflict would serve to restore the flow of trade with China.

Already have an account? Sign in

Join the Asia Times Community

Readers can comment on stories with free registration. Or sign up for our newsletters

• The Daily ReportStart your day right with Asia Times' top stories
• AT Weekly ReportA weekly roundup of Asia Times' most-read stories

OR

Sign in with Google

LATEST STORIES

Fusion Diary: from submarines to fusion reactors

Xi: China won’t fight hot war with anyone

US-China relations at a turning point?

That would also impress on Beijing that Naypyidaw is still capable of controlling points on the border and that banking on the Brotherhood Alliance is necessarily a bad bet. It would also act to salve military honor and restore severely shaken morale.

These arguments, doubtless reinforced by the Myanmar Army’s congenitally aggressive instincts, are offset by other factors, however.

First, any such counterpunch would necessarily be channeled along only one dangerously narrow primary line of advance: the highway leading from Pyin Oo Lwin through the towns of Naungcho, Kyaukme and Hsipaw to Lashio; and then from Lashio through Hsenwi and Kutkai north to Muse on the border.

Spearheaded by elements from Naypyidaw’s Light Infantry Division (LID) assault units – Myanmar’s equivalent of the Nazis’ Waffen SS – and backed by a concentrated commitment of armor and air power, an initial advance should break through mainly TNLA forces scattered across the hill country along the highway relatively easily.

Map: ISP Myanmar / ISP Insight Email No. 27. Link to full report here.

But holding open the highway that stretches over nearly 400 kilometers in the face of aggressive insurgent harassment would prove a constant, debilitating drain on vehicles and manpower that would ultimately throw into question the value of the entire enterprise.

The counteroffensive would also require assembling a divisional-size task force of at least 2,000-3,000 troops in an army that is already severely overstretched, inevitably weakening the defenses around other key positions.

And importantly, the success of such a campaign would hinge critically on leadership in the person of a “fighting general” capable of commanding from the front and inspiring already demoralized troops.

In a military bureaucracy riddled with corruption where officers beyond colonel level rarely lead combat forces in the field, theater-level commanders of this caliber have been conspicuous by their absence for decades.

Today such a general would need to emerge from somewhere in the ranks between Myanmar Army commander and regime strongman Vice Senior General Soe Winn – who has a reputation as a “soldiers’ soldier” but now shoulders daunting countrywide responsibilities – and the commanders of any of the army’s ten LIDs whose duties are specific to their own divisional commands.

With a background in military education, current Northeastern RMC commander Brigadier General Naing Naing Oo is probably not that man and if there is any other candidate for the role he has yet to step forward.

Finally, the offensive would involve advancing through towns like Hsenwi (where a key bridge on the highway was blown in the opening hours of Operation 1027) with the prospect that the ultimate objective of Muse might already have fallen to the Brotherhood before it could be secured – implying the need for a far larger and inevitably costly urban battle immediately on China’s border to retake it.

All these factors militate powerfully against risking a strategic counteroffensive into northern Shan state.

The second option – defending key strongpoints in the region – has the advantage of reinforcing a response that has been in play since Operation 1027 began.

This involves flying reinforcements into the Lashio bridgehead from secure zones, such as Yangon, Meiktila and Mandalay, and then using helicopters to stage airmobile insertions into smaller bases and towns, buying time and possibly setting the stage for smaller offensive operations when the 1027 wave has exhausted its potential.

Myanmar’s military is overstretched fighting a multi-front war. Image: Twitter

But by deploying crucially needed resources into a fight that has arguably already been strategically lost, the dangers here are also stark. There is already virtually zero prospect of retaking Kokang in the far northeast corner of Shan state and the fall of the regional capital of Laukkai is now almost certainly just a matter of time.

If insurgent forces succeed in tightening their grip along the highway north and south of Lashio, that city too could be surrounded and slowly squeezed, trapping forces flown in to relieve it. And were its airport to be shut down by artillery fire, the ghosts of Dien Bien Phu would hover over Shan state.

Finally, there is the radically alternative strategy of withdrawing from rather than reinforcing northern Shan state. This option makes real sense in terms of husbanding exposed manpower and materiel, especially if that withdrawal were to be broadened to include the two RMCs in the east of the state, the Triangle Command in Kengtung and the East-Central Command in Koilam on the Kengtung-Taunggyi highway.

A withdrawal to the strongpoints of Pyin Oo Lwin defending Mandalay and the Shan state capital of Taunggyi screening the Naypyidaw Capital Region would free up several thousand troops whose utility in the defense of those key cities would be crucial.

The downsides are also striking though. At one level, strategic withdrawal would imply a psychologically near-impossible abandonment of the army’s deeply ingrained sense of institutional mission as an “all-of-Myanmar” force sworn to the “perpetuation of national sovereignty” and “non-disintegration of the union.”  

Practically speaking, it would also effectively mean surrendering Shan state east of the Salween River to the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which would emerge from behind the wall of its ceasefire with Naypyidaw and in a matter of days join up Wa territory along the Chinese border with the separate swath of territory it already controls along Shan state’s southern border with Thailand.

The upshot of these unpalatable considerations is likely to be a compromise strategy which in reality is less a strategy than the reaction of the proverbial deer frozen in the headlights.

Sign up for one of our free newsletters

• The Daily ReportStart your day right with Asia Times' top stories
• AT Weekly ReportA weekly roundup of Asia Times' most-read stories

Northern Shan state will be reinforced where possible to attempt a protracted defense of Lashio and Muse while assets under the two RMCs in Keng Tung and Koilam will be left in place to be overtaken by events in Myanmar’s national heartland – and then very probably face the ignominious prospect of having anyway to surrender to the UWSA.

Compounding the dilemmas confronting Myanmar’s generals is the fact that the battle for Shan state in the coming weeks will not be happening in isolation.

The November 13 return to hostilities of the powerful insurgent Arakan Army (AA) in Rakhine will undoubtedly tie down the several thousand troops including important LID elements already committed to the defense of the western seaboard state.

Back in action: Arakan Army soldiers on the march at an undisclosed location in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Image: Facebook

Equally, the current push by resistance forces in Kayah state led by the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) to seize the state capital of Loikaw is also demanding attention and resources.

At the same time, the battle for the Sagaing region town of Tigyaing on the Ayeyarwady River near the border with Kachin state could have a potentially decisive impact on the future of the war in northern Myanmar and by extension the national situation.

Were Tigyaing and its strategic bridge across the river to fall to a local alliance of Kachin Independence Army (KIA), AA and local anti-military peoples defense forces (PDFs) already reportedly fighting inside the town, the logistics lifeline linking the military in central Myanmar to Kachin state would effectively be cut.

Resupply of the northern RMC based in the Kachin state capital of Myitkyina would then depend on air transport, which over even the medium term is not sustainable.

The now real possibility that the debacle in Shan state will in the coming dry season months – or possibly even sooner – be paralleled by the loss of Rakhine, Kayah and Kachin states essentially presents military planners in Naypyidaw with a potential checkmate situation and the end of the war as a rational military undertaking.

At that point, it is reasonable to expect that either on the watch of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing or, more likely, after his departure, a proposal for a cessation of hostilities and negotiations will emerge from Naypyidaw. 

How Myanmar’s still fragmented opposition responds to such an initiative that will almost certainly not involve a white flag of unconditional surrender will be critical to the country’s post-conflict future.  

Like this:

'작전 1027'에 대해 성과에 대해 다룬 기사입니다. 

https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/conflicts-in-numbers/operation-1027-in-visualizations.html

[Minowski(김유철)]

이 동네도보면, 바이든정권 들어서고 당장 군부정권 물러나고 민정회복하라고 떠들다 조용히 입닫고, 결국 양쪽에 영향력이 있던 중국이 군부를 버리고 반군에 힘을 실어주니 정리되는 수순 같습니다.

[위종민]

중국 접경지역에서 성과가 있는 걸 보면 아무래도 중국이 반군 손을 들어준 것 같긴 합니다. JF-17 유지보수 문제도 제기됐었고..

역시 독재국가 상대할 땐 말보다는 주먹이 쓸모있긴 하죠. 1970년대~1980년대까진 미국도 주먹을 쓸 줄 아는 국가였는데 1990년대 클린턴 이후부턴 국내외 여론을 의식해선지 예전같진 않네요.

[백선호]

지금 벌어지는 교전의 규모가 어느 정도이죠? 중대급?

[위종민]

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_1027

위키를 보거나 전초기지 함락 등을 강조하는 뉴스를 보면 교전 양상이 야전이 아니라 기지상에 고립된 정부군을 분산된 반군들이 습격하거나 포위하는 것 같습니다. 마을 9개 통제권을 상실했는데 정부군 사망자가 298명인 걸 보면 교전 규모는 크지 않은 듯 한데, 그런 데 비해선 공수부대도 투입되는 등 정부군이 상황을 허투루 보는 건 아닌 것 같네요.

[ssn688]

군부정권이 무너지면 미얀마라는 나라가 쪼개지는 수순이 아닐지 모르겠습니다... 뭐, 역사적으로 보면야, 미얀마는 세로로 3분할 지대였고, 가운데의 평야를 차지한 버마족이 좌/우의 산악지대를 정복하거나, 위축되어 잃어버리거나의 반복이었습니다만... 중국 입장에선 쪼개져도 손해볼 게 없을지 모르겠네요.

[위종민]

천하대세 분구필합 합구필분이라 ㅎㅎ 나눠지면 중국이 영향력을 발휘하기는 더 좋을 것 같습니다.