Re: 미얀마 군부정권의 위기에 대한 분석기사

[위종민]

그간 미얀마군이 반군 세력 분열을 유도하고 중국 정부의 지원을 얻어냈으며, 포병과 공군 우세를 활용하고 있음에도 최근 작전 1027에서 크게 밀리고 있다는 내용입니다. 

반군 세력이 통합을 이뤄내고, 포병과 공군 우세에도 불구하고 병력이 과신장돼 반군이 지역 거점을 점령하는 데 성공하고 있으며, 중국 정부의 군사정부 지원도 크게 성과를 내지 못했고 최근에는 반군도 중국의 지원을 요청하고 있으며, 중국도 휴전을 중재하는 등의 대안을 고려하는 중이라고 하네요. 

저는 중국이 미얀마 군부를 손절하고 반군을 지원한 게 아닌가 싶었는데, 이 기사의 분석에 따르면 아직 그 정도는 아니라고 합니다. 그 부분만 딥엘 번역본을 올려놓겠습니다. 

" 중국 미얀마 정책의 심각한 결함

미얀마 정권은 최근 중국으로부터 외교적 지원을 받고 있으며, 중국은 지난해 네피도 군사 정권과 조심스럽게 재연결했습니다. 이는 미얀마의 국제적 위상을 회복하고 군부 정권에 외교적, 경제적 지원을 제공할 것으로 기대됩니다.

쿠데타 초기에 중국은 베팅을 회피하며 실용적인 입장을 취했습니다. 공개적으로 군부에 관여했지만, 축출된 민주주의민족동맹과 국경을 따라 우호적인 민족 무장 단체와의 관계를 유지하면서 거리를 유지했습니다.

그러나 냉전적 시각으로 민주화 운동에 대한 미국의 지원을 잘못 인식한 중국은 지난 1년간 미얀마 군부 쪽으로 완전히 돌아서지는 않았지만, 미얀마 군부에 손을 들어주었다. 중국은 미얀마에 외교부 장관을 파견하고, 양국 방문을 활발히 진행했으며, 일대일로 이니셔티브 프로젝트를 강화하는 한편, 비공개로 미얀마 저항세력에 미국에 너무 가까이 가지 말라고 경고했습니다. 또한 특사를 파견하여 미얀마 군부와 국경의 소수민족 무장 단체 간의 협상을 시도했습니다.

중국의 중재 노력은 특히 오랫동안 공개적으로나 사적으로 지지해 온 삼형제 동맹을 겨냥했습니다. 실제로 미얀마민족민주동맹군은 민족적으로 코캉족이며 중국 및 윈난성 당국과 밀접한 관계를 맺고 있습니다. 중국은 역사적으로 국경 소수민족 무장 단체를 지원해 왔으며, 가장 규모가 크고 최고의 장비를 갖춘 연합군을 통해 이들을 무장시켰습니다. 중국은 종종 평화 회담에서 브로커 역할을 하려고 합니다.

그러나 삼형제동맹에 대한 중국의 영향력은 예전보다 줄어든 것으로 보입니다. 미얀마 군부는 고위 관리들을 포기하는 등 국경에서 증가하는 인신매매와 사이버 범죄를 공개적으로 단속하는 데 중국과 협력했지만, 삼형제동맹은 미얀마 군부가 떠나야 한다는 결정을 내린 것이 분명합니다. 중국에게 이는 분명한 좌절이자 이들 단체에 대한 영향력이 약화되었다는 신호입니다. 미얀마에 대한 중국의 전략적 이해관계와 난민들이 윈난성으로 넘어올 위험을 고려할 때 국경의 불안정성은 문제입니다. 실제로 중국은 최근 전투에서 중국인이 사망했다고 확인했으며, 군부 포탄이 국경의 중국 쪽을 강타했습니다.

삼형제 동맹의 성명은 중국의 지원을 확보하기를 희망하고 있음을 나타냅니다. 세 민족 무장 단체는 "우리의 노력은 미얀마, 특히 중국-미얀마 국경을 따라 미얀마를 괴롭히는 만연한 온라인 도박 사기에 맞서 싸우는 데까지 확장된다"고 발표했습니다. 삼형제동맹은 명시적으로 범죄에 반대하는 입장을 취하고 범죄 네트워크를 급습함으로써 중국의 이익에 직접적으로 호소하고 있습니다. 미얀마 민족민주동맹군은 많은 범죄 조직이 활동하는 국경 도시 라욱카이 외곽에서 전투를 벌이는 동안 미얀마 군부가 중국의 단속으로부터 현지 범죄 지도부를 보호하고 있다고 주장하며 조심스러운 태도를 취했습니다. 삼형제 동맹은 수익성이 높은 불법 자금원을 단속하는 데 소극적인 미얀마 군사 정권과 대조를 이루기를 희망하고 있습니다. 작전 1027은 또한 범죄 네트워크와의 연계로 악명 높은 군부와 연계된 민병대인 코캉 국경수비대를 표적으로 삼고 있습니다.

지난 몇 주간의 전투에 대한 중국의 반응은 모호하지만, 내전에서 중립을 계속하겠다고 약속 한 가장 가까운 대리인 인 연합군과 마찬가지로 휴전을 촉구함으로써 정권 측에 기울어지는 것으로 보입니다. 중국 외교부 대변인은 "관련 당사자들이 조속히 총격을 중단하고 대화와 협의를 통해 평화적인 방식으로 분쟁을 해결하고 상황의 확대를 피하며 중국-미얀마 국경 지역의 안보와 안정을 보장하기 위한 효과적인 조치를 취해야 한다"고 촉구했습니다. 일주일 후 중국 당국은 "무력 충돌이 확대되고 중국군이 사상자가 발생한 데 대해 강한 불만"을 표명하며 "관련 당사자들에게 엄숙히 항의"했습니다. 전투와 동시에 정권 국방부 장관은 이전에 예정된 베이징 방문을 위해 중국 중앙군사위원회 부위원장을 만났으며, 이 자리에서 국경에 대해 논의한 것으로 알려졌습니다. 왕샤오훙 중국 공안부 장관은 네피도를 방문해 민 아웅 흘라잉과의 회담에서 최근 전투에 대한 문제를 제기한 것으로 알려졌다. 11월 3일부터 5일까지 농 룽 외무부 차관은 랑캉-메콩 협력 회의에 참석하기 위해 미얀마의 수도를 방문하여 미얀마 정권에 국경 안보에 협력할 것을 촉구했습니다.

이러한 공개적인 움직임은 자신감을 보여줌으로써 군부 정권에 도움이 될 것으로 보이지만, 중국은 또한 삼형제 동맹의 노력에 대해 사적으로 무게를 두는 것을 피한 것으로 보입니다. 분석가들은 중국이 작전 1027을 승인했을 가능성에 대해 논쟁을 벌였지만, 작년에 중국이 북한 정권을 공개적으로 지지한 지 얼마 지나지 않아 정권 세력의 급격한 붕괴와 그에 따른 불안정으로 인해 가능성은 희박해 보입니다. 따라서 중국이 장기적으로 어떻게 대응할지는 지켜봐야 합니다. 중국은 조용히 더 균형 잡힌 입장으로 돌아설 수도 있고, 군부만이 미얀마를 하나로 묶을 수 있다는 잘못된 믿음 때문에 군부 정권을 두 배로 압박할 수도 있습니다. 어떤 경우든 중국은 미얀마의 다양한 행위자들에 대한 영향력을 계속 유지할 것입니다."

https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/the-myanmar-military-is-facing-death-by-a-thousand-cuts/

THE MYANMAR MILITARY IS FACING DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS 

LUCAS MYERS

NOVEMBER 17, 2023

COMMENTARY

Events in Myanmar’s renewed civil war took a dramatic turn these past three weeks, reminding us not to forget about the world’s longest running conflict. Just prior to the break of dawn on Oct. 27, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance of the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army launched a surprise assault — called Operation 1027 — on junta forces in northern Shan State. Within a couple of weeks, the three ethnic armed organizations have reportedly seized over 150 military outposts and several key towns astride a strategic road to the Chinese border, as well as highways crisscrossing Shan State. With operations continuing to expand, this marks a significant battlefield defeat for the increasingly overstretched military junta.

While the fog of war demands analytical caution, Operation 1027 carries important implications for the future of Myanmar. First, the Myanmar military is increasingly overstretched despite its airpower and artillery advantages. Second, the Three Brotherhood Alliance potentially aligning itself more openly with the pro-democracy movement — at least militarily — highlights the resistance’s determination and coalition-building efforts. Third, China’s turn toward the junta has proven a poor bet. Considered together, the Myanmar military is more vulnerable than at any time in the past half century. Now is the moment for Myanmar’s pro-democracy resistance to push hard and for their international supporters to crank up the pressure on the junta. The resistance should continue to build momentum with operations across the country, while international backers like the United States should increase the tempo of sanctions and redouble their diplomatic efforts to convince the junta that it cannot prevail. 

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The Junta Is Bleeding

Since overthrowing the democratically elected government of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi on Feb. 1, 2021, the Myanmar military has fought an expanding coalition of longstanding ethnic armed organizations, the pro-democracy parallel National Unity Government, and a variety of People’s Defense Forces. Facing a fluid and complex battlefield situation, the Myanmar military junta has largely held onto the cities and towns while suffering substantial losses to guerrilla fighters operating in rural areas. 

Deeply unpopular, brutal to civilians, and performing poorly at the tactical level, the Myanmar military relies upon airpower and heavy artillery to prevent the resistance from taking and consolidating its hold over populated areas. For example, the Karen National Union and several local People’s Defense Forces units launched an offensive in October 2022 to take Kawkareik near the Thai border. Initially successful, the military pulled back before junta forces retaliated with airstrikes and heavy artillery, ultimately dispersing resistance units into the countryside.

However, Operation 1027 represents perhaps the most significant battlefield victory thus far in the renewed civil war. Taking the town of Hsenwi in particular cuts the primary road to China through the border at Chinshwehaw, which the Three Brotherhood Alliance also captured. Almost $300 million in trade passed through it from April to July 2023, according to a junta mouthpiece. Resistance forces are now attempting to surround other strategic towns such as Laukkai and Nawngkhio and seize other locations along the border On a strategic level, the loss of these routes cuts off the junta from one of the larger border crossings to its most important international backer, Beijing. Spurred by the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s success in Shan State, People’s Defense Forces units assaulted and seized Kawlin, a district-level town in Sagaing Region in a first for them, as well as Khampat near the Indian border. Fighting this past week in Chin, Kayah, and Rakhine States further herald that the junta is increasingly tottering. 

The junta is closer to military-economic collapse than is often understood. As analyst Ye Myo Hein has demonstrated, the Myanmar military is badly undermanned, likely marshalling only about 70,000 combat-capable forces to pacify a population of 53 million. Due to the scarcity of manpower, the military relies upon rapid redeployments of its elite light infantry divisions to strategic flashpoints, such as recent fighting in Kachin, and retaliatory airstrikes to disperse resistance units and punish its opponents.

Importantly, this is becoming increasingly difficult. Junta convoys and supply lines are increasingly subject to ambushes. Its sudden loss of control of outposts throughout Shan State exposes the critical weakness inherent to the military’s overstretch: The military redeployed 3,000 troops out of Shan State to other parts of Myanmar earlier this year. It appears unlikely that they have the reserves to launch a concerted counter-offensive, and their air force is increasingly overtasked. Combined with the National Unity Government’s revenue denial strategy, Myanmar’s continued economic tailspin, and the increasingly tight U.S., U.K., and E.U. sanctions, the junta bleeds from a thousand cuts. The junta itself admitted earlier this year that it lacks control over almost half of the country.

The Junta’s Divide-and-Conquer Strategy Is Failing

The reason that the junta felt it could safely redeploy 3,000 soldiers from Shan State despite periodic skirmishes with the Three Brotherhood Alliance is its confidence in a divide-and-conquer strategy. The two key elements of this approach are the junta’s air force and China’s growing economic and political support.

Myanmar is home to hundreds of armed actors, and a pan-ethnic coalition was always the military’s greatest post-coup threat. However, forging such an alliance is an immense task given the deep divides existing between the Bamar majority and the numerous historically oppressed ethnic minority groups. Initiatives like the National Unity Consultative Council aim to address these challenges by bringing a diverse range of actors together to talk, but it remains slow going. This is particularly so as a result of deep wounds stemming from the Aung San Suu Kyi government’s failure to incorporate ethnic voices or advance federalism. While the movement’s explicit goal is to create an inclusive, federal democracy, getting everyone on board and actually doing so are easier said than done. For instance, a unified command and control system is still a work in progress. 

The Myanmar military’s strategy therefore aims to force a wedge between the National Unity Government and the minority ethnic armed groups, particularly those that are formally allied with the pro-democracy movement such as the Chin National Front, Kachin Independence Army, Karen National Union, Karenni Army, and a few others. This is possible because the ethnic armed organizations historically pursued autonomy or de facto independence in their conflicts with the military, while the National Unity Government and the pro-democracy forces seek to seize the central state apparatus and reform the national-level government. The junta again believes it can coerce or placate the ethnic armed organizations to give it the breathing room to crush the People’s Defense Forces and the National Unity Government piecemeal.

Buying off or isolating rival factions and groups is the military’s historical playbook in dealing with opponents to its authority. For example, the military convinced a faction within the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army to revolt in 2009, which proceeded to split and form the now regime-aligned Kokang Border Guards Force. More recently, the Arakan Army agreed to an informal ceasefire with the junta in Rakhine State in 2022, allowing the junta to focus elsewhere. In the current fighting, the Myanmar military employs an airpower compellence strategy against opposing ethnic armed organizations and “Four Cuts” operations targeting civilians and villages with indiscriminate violence to intimidate the population. The junta’s objective is to drag out the war, exhaust the population, split the ethnic minorities along the periphery from the Bamar of the interior, and then pick them off one by one over time. 

However, the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s entrance into the war coupled with stronger strategic coordination between the diverse actors making up the anti-regime movement signal that the junta’s strategy has failed to close the resistance’s window of opportunity. In particular, the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army had until now sought to support the anti-junta resistance from a distance. They trained and armed some of the People’s Defense Forces while occasionally clashing with the junta. But they also resisted moving too far beyond their territory or joining the fight outright. That they are now launching an all-out offensive against the junta in Shan State, and likely now in Rakhine, demonstrates greater strategic cooperation between resistance forces. It is likely that the Three Brotherhood Alliance sees the hated military’s weakness as an opportunity to secure their long-desired autonomy and that painstaking efforts to build trust across anti-regime factions are finally bearing fruit. 

A recent statement from the Three Brotherhood Alliance declared: “The moment has arrived for all ethnic revolutionary organizations, the forces of the Spring Revolution, and the people to fully engage in the elimination of the military dictatorship and wholeheartedly commit to the establishment of a Federal Democratic Union.” Shortly after Operation 1027 began, the National Unity Government’s ministry of defense issued its own statement announcing it will “join forces with the Brotherhood Alliance in Operation 1027. We will actively engage in the required operations to collaborate effectively in their endeavors.” The surge in fighting in Shan State comes amidst intense and continued warfare between the junta and the Kachin Independence Army farther to the north. A variety of People’s Defense Forces units are cooperating with the Three Brotherhood Alliance, and the Karen National Union and Karenni forces in the southeast launched strikes against Kawkareik and Loikaw respectively, reportedly seizing several facilities in both towns. Fighting has also reportedly surged in the Chin State, Magwe, and Sagaing Regions. The capture of Kawlin represents a serious advance in the People’s Defense Forces’ ability to take towns. If Loikaw falls to resistance forces, it will be the first state capital taken. 

The anti-regime coalition looks stronger than ever, and the odds of the junta buying off or coercing some of the ethnic armed organizations are diminishing. Unlike past instances, the military is visibly weakened in a manner unseen since the mid-20th century, with battalion-sized formations now surrendering to resistance forces. Crucially, the Bamar majority now largely opposes the military even in the historically pro-military heartland of Sagaing and Magwe, which are now two hotbeds of armed revolt. Although coalition-building efforts between the National Unity Government, the ethnic armed organizations, and other actors within the resistance have a long way to go and distrust remains high, the ethnic armed groups fighting the regime appear convinced that the current moment is a real opportunity to make gains against their military foe.

Deep Flaws in China’s Myanmar Policy

The junta has recently received a diplomatic boost from China, which cautiously reengaged the military regime in Naypyidaw over the past year. This threatens to rehabilitate it internationally and give the junta diplomatic and economic succor.

During the coup’s early days, China adopted a pragmatic stance by hedging its bets. It engaged the junta publicly but kept its distance, maintaining ties to the ousted National League for Democracy party as well as friendly ethnic armed organizations along the border. 

However, because it misperceived U.S. support for the pro-democracy movement through a Cold War lens, Beijing has swung toward the Myanmar military over the past year, albeit not completely. China sent its foreign minister to Myanmar, conducted a high rate of bilateral visits, ramped up Belt and Road Initiative projects, and warned the resistance behind closed doors to not get too close to the United States. It has also deployed a special envoy to attempt negotiations between the junta and the ethnic armed groups on the border.

China’s mediation efforts specifically targeted the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which it has long backed publicly and privately. Indeed, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army are ethnically Kokang Chinese and closely tied to China and authorities in Yunnan Province. Beijing has historically supported the border ethnic armed organizations and armed them via the United Wa State Army, the largest and best-equipped group. China often tries to play broker in peace talks. 

However, China’s influence on the Three Brotherhood Alliance is apparently less than it once seemed. Although the United Wa State Army has cooperated with China in publicly cracking down on growing human trafficking and cybercrimes along the border, including by giving up high-ranking officials, the Three Brotherhood Alliance has evidently decided that the military in Myanmar has to go. For China, this is a clear setback and sign of diminished sway over these groups. Instability along the border is a problem given China’s strategic interests in Myanmar and the risk of refugees crossing into Yunnan. Indeed, Beijing confirmed Chinese nationals have been killed in the recent fighting, and a junta artillery shell struck the Chinese side of the border.

The Three Brotherhood Alliance’s statement indicates that it is hoping to secure Beijing’s backing. The three ethnic armed organizations announced that “our commitment extends to combatting the widespread online gambling fraud that has plagued Myanmar, particularly along the China-Myanmar border.” By taking an explicitly anti-crime stance and reportedly raiding criminal networks, the Three Brotherhood Alliance is directly appealing to Beijing’s interests. During fighting outside the border town of Laukkai, where many criminal networks operate, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army was careful to argue that the Myanmar junta was protecting local criminal leadership from China’s crackdowns. The Three Brotherhood Alliance hopes to draw a contrast with the Myanmar military junta, which has dragged its feet on cracking down on such a lucrative illicit funding source. Operation 1027 is also targeting the Kokang Border Guards Force, a militia aligned with the junta that is notorious for its ties to criminal networks.

China’s response to the past weeks’ fighting is ambiguous, but it appears to lean toward the junta by calling for a ceasefire, as has its closest proxy, the United Wa State Army, which vowed to continue its neutrality in the civil war. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson called for “relevant parties to cease fire as soon as possible, settle disputes in a peaceful manner through dialogue and consultation, avoid escalation of the situation, and take effective measures to ensure the security and stability of China-Myanmar border areas.” A week later, Chinese authorities expressed “strong dissatisfaction with the escalation of the armed conflict and the casualties caused to Chinese personnel,” lodging “solemn protest with relevant parties.” Concurrent to the fighting, the junta defense minister met with a Chinese Central Military Commission vice chairman for a previously scheduled visit to Beijing, during which they reportedly discussed the border. China’s Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong reportedly traveled to Naypyidaw and also raised the issue of the recent fighting during a meeting with Min Aung Hlaing. From Nov. 3–5, Assistant Foreign Minister Nong Rong visited Myanmar’s capital for the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation meeting, urging the junta to cooperate on border security.

These public moves would seem to benefit the junta with shows of confidence, but Beijing also appears to have avoided weighing in privately against the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s efforts. Although analysts debated the possibility that China greenlit Operation 1027, the rapid collapse of junta forces and ensuing instability, coming so soon after Beijing’s public support for the regime this past year make it seem unlikely. As such, it remains to be seen how China will respond in the long term. It could quietly shift back toward a more balanced position or double down on the junta due to its misguided belief that only the military can keep Myanmar together. In either case, it will continue to maintain its leverage over Myanmar’s diverse range of actors.

Finishing Off the Myanmar Junta

Many of Myanmar’s neighboring countries hold the view that the renewed civil war is simply the latest outbreak of chronic post-independence fighting — that it is nothing new and unlikely to topple the junta, which remains the only force holding the country together. The past weeks’ fighting should dispel the misplaced notion that the military in Myanmar can prevail or hold the country together. 

With the junta on its back foot, now is the time for the international community to pressure the military and convince it that victory is impossible. Only then will the junta contemplate coming to the negotiating table. China, India, and Thailand should cease their efforts to rehabilitate the faltering junta. Meanwhile, the Association for Southeast Asian Nations member states that are opposed to the military coup, particularly the organization’s outgoing chair Indonesia, should move beyond quiet diplomacy and meet publicly with the National Unity Government and other pro-democracy actors and ethnic armed organizations. 

The United States can help push for negotiations by burying the junta in economic sanctions, hampering its access to international markets, arms, and revenue, and preventing it from attaining diplomatic recognition. On Oct. 31, the United States issued sanctions on Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, the junta’s most important remaining revenue source. This follows sanctions this past summer that severely restrict the military’s access to foreign reserves and jet fuel. 

However, U.S. sanctions have remained cautious and highly targeted to avoid alienating regional allies and partners like Thailand. More vigorous efforts, coupled with fulfilling the provisions of the BURMA Act, would put further pressure on the junta. Backdoor U.S. diplomacy can also play a key role in convincing Beijing and others in the region that supporting the junta is the wrong move and a return to democracy will benefit their interests. The United States should emphasize privately and publicly that reversing the coup in Myanmar is not solely about democracy but also regional stability: the military has served as the primary destabilizing force throughout Myanmar’s post-independence history and has shown little willingness to address Myanmar’s growing cross-border crime problem. Finally, U.S. diplomatic efforts should also include facilitating and supporting political cooperation within the resistance coalition. 

Inside Myanmar, political cooperation across the resistance coalition still faces serious challenges, specifically on what the “day after” will look like. Indeed, it remains to be seen to what extent the Three Brotherhood Alliance cooperates politically with the National Unity Government and other pro-democracy actors following Operation 1027, and whether it shares their vision for federalism. Importantly, many in the People’s Defense Forces and civil society are increasingly frustrated with the National Unity Government and the political old guard. As the Sagaing Forum shows, the anti-military popular resistance is a bottom-up movement with real revolutionary goals and a genuine desire to move beyond the old ways of doing things, particularly Bamar-dominated centralized hierarchies. A framework that incorporates and satisfies ethnic minority, youth, and civil society demands for and differing visions of an inclusive and federal democracy is crucial for creating the stability that has eluded Myanmar since independence. This is particularly true for the National Unity Government, which needs to persuade the ethnic armed organizations and many younger citizens that they will not repeat the disappointments of the previous democratic transition. A “day after” political framework in Myanmar is an extremely difficult task but a necessary one given the resistance’s rapidly snowballing successes.

Although the war is far from over and it remains unclear what a future Myanmar will look like, events are moving fast, and we are likely facing a turning point in the conflict. The resistance’s limited strategic cooperation during the first two years appears to have been replaced by a series of well-planned, country-wide offensives that caught the junta on its back foot. The resistance is doubtlessly planning further offensives, targeting isolated outposts, strategic border roads, and small towns with the goal of expanding their territory. With the junta bleeding from a thousand cuts, now is the time to ramp up pressure both inside and outside Myanmar.

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Lucas Myers is the senior associate for Southeast Asia at the Wilson Center’s Asia Program.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government or the Wilson Center. 

Image: Wikimedia Commons