러시아는 자국(=철도망) 밖으로 공세를 취할 능력이 제한된다

[ssn688]

Feeding the Bear: A Closer Look at Russian Army Logistics and the Fait Accompli

미 육군 예비역 중령이 작년 11월에 기고한 예언적인 글이네요... 나토 방위라는 입장에서 주로 상정하는 영역은 발트나 폴란드였습니다만. 러시아는 각 제대별 수송능력이 미국과 비교해 부족하고, 더욱이 포병화력이 강한 만큼모나라도 자주포 깔아놓고 기름과 탄약은 뭘로?? 보급소요가 더 늘어난다는 점을 지적하고 있습니다. 그렇기 때문에 철도에서 짐을 내린 집적소(적의 포/폭격으로부터 확실히 안전한 후방이어야 하는...)로부터 전선이 멀어질수록 가뜩이나 충분치 않은 트럭수송력에 많은 부하가 걸립니다.

이런 관점에서도 봐도, 제일 쫄리는 나라는 리투아니아이지 않을까 싶습니다. 여긴 수도가 해안 쪽에 있지 않고 국경에 가까워서;;;; 수도는 내준다 치면, 러시아의 진출거리 한계가 90마일(≒148km)일 경우에는 반 정도 점령하고 공세종말이 가까워지는 셈입니다.

저자는 러시아의 능력을 감안하면, 나토에 대한 공세는 90마일 정도만 먹고 굳히기...에 들어갈 것이라고 보았는데, 우크라이나에선 이게 무시되고 있죠. 우크라이나의 경우는 나라 전체를 먹어야 한다는 정치적 목적이 있음과 동시에 우크라이나정부의 취약성을 과대평가했기 때문에 강행되었던 듯합니다.

NATO planners should develop plans focusing on exploiting Russian logistic challenges rather than trying to address the disparity in combat power. This involves drawing the Russian army deep into NATO territory and stretching Russian supply lines to the maximum while targeting logistics and transportation infrastructure such as trucks, railroad bridges, and pipelines. Committing to a decisive battle at the frontier would play directly into Russian hands, allowing a shorter supply to compensate for their logistic shortfalls.

Russian army logistics forces are not designed for a large-scale ground offensive far from their railroads. Inside maneuver units, Russian sustainment units are a size lower than their Western counterparts. Only brigades have an equivalent logistics capability, but it’s not an exact comparison. Russian formations have only three-quarters the number of combat vehicles as their U.S. counterparts but almost three times as much artillery. On paper (not all brigades have a full number of battalions), Russian brigades have two artillery battalions, a rocket battalion, and two air defense battalions per brigade as opposed to one artillery battalion and an attached air defense company per U.S. brigade. As a result of extra artillery and air defense battalions, the Russian logistics requirements are much larger than their U.S. counterparts.

Maneuver formation  U.S. sustainment formation  Russian sustainment formation
Battalion  Company  Platoon
Regiment  Battalion/Squadron  Company
Brigade  Battalion  Battalion
Division  Brigade  Battalion
Corps  Brigade  None
Combined Arms Army  N/A  Brigade

Russia’s truck logistic support, which would be crucial in an invasion of Eastern Europe, is limited by the number of trucks and range of operations. It is possible to calculate how far trucks can operate using simple beer math. Assuming the existing road network can support 45 mph speeds, a single truck can make three trips a day at up to a 45-mile(≒74km) range: One hours to load, one hour to drive to the supported unit, one hours to unload, and another hour to return to base. Repeating this cycle three times equals 12 hours total. The rest of the day is dedicated to truck maintenance, meals, refueling, weapons cleaning, and sleeping. Increase the distance to 90 miles(≒148km), and the truck can make two trips daily. At 180 miles(≒295km), the same truck is down to one trip a day. These assumptions won’t work in rough terrain or where there is limited/damaged infrastructure. If an army has just enough trucks to sustain itself at a 45-mile distance, then at 90 miles, the throughput will be 33 percent lower. At 180 miles, it will be down by 66 percent. The further you push from supply dumps, the fewer supplies you can replace in a single day.

The Russian army does not have enough trucks to meet its logistic requirement more than 90 miles beyond supply dumps. To reach a 180-mile range, the Russian army would have to double truck allocation to 400 trucks for each of the material-technical support brigades. To gain familiarity with Russian logistic requirements and lift resources, a useful starting point is the Russian combined arms army. They all have different force structures, but on paper, each combined army is assigned a material-technical support brigade. Each material-technical support brigade has two truck battalions with a total of 150 general cargo trucks with 50 trailers and 260 specialized trucks per brigade. The Russian army makes heavy use of tube and rocket artillery fire, and rocket ammunition is very bulky. Although each army is different, there are usually 56 to 90 multiple launch rocket system launchers in an army. Replenishing each launcher takes up the entire bed of the truck. If the combined arms army fired a single volley, it would require 56 to 90 trucks just to replenish rocket ammunition. That is about a half of a dry cargo truck force in the material-technical support brigade just to replace one volley of rockets. There is also between six to nine tube artillery battalions, nine air defense artillery battalions, 12 mechanized and recon battalions, three to five tank battalions, mortars, anti-tank missiles, and small arms ammunition — not to mention, food, engineering, medical supplies, and so on. Those requirements are harder to estimate, but the potential resupply requirements are substantial. The Russian army force needs a lot of trucks just for ammunition and dry cargo replenishment.

For fuel and water sustainment, each material-technical support brigade has a tactical pipeline battalion. These have lower throughput than their Western equivalents but can be emplaced within three to four days of occupying new terrain. Until then, fuel trucks are required for operational resupply. One might argue that the Russian army has the range to reach its objectives on their original tank of fuel, especially with auxiliary fuel drums they are designed to carry. That is not entirely correct. Tanks and armored vehicles burn through fuel when maneuvering in combat or just idling while stationary. This is the reason why the U.S. Army uses “days of supply” to plan fuel consumption, not range. If a Russian army operation lasts 36 to 72 hours as the RAND study estimates, then the Russian army would have to refuel at least once before tactical pipelines are established to support operations.

The Russian army will be hard-pressed to conduct a ground offensive of more than 90 miles beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union without a logistics pause. For NATO, it means it can worry less about a major Russian invasion of the Baltic states or Poland and a greater focus on exploiting Russian logistic challenges by drawing Russian forces further away from their supply depots and targeting chokepoints in the Russian logistic infrastructure and logistic force in general. It also means that Russia is more likely to seize small parts of enemy territory under its logistically sustainable range of 90 miles rather than a major invasion as part of a fait accompli strategy.

From the Russian perspective, it does not appear that they are building their logistic forces with fait accompli or blitzkrieg across Poland in mind. Instead, the Russian government has built an ideal army for their strategy of “Active Defense.” The Russian government has built armed forces highly capable of fighting on home soil or near its frontier and striking deep with long-range fires. However, they are not capable of a sustained ground offensive far beyond Russian railroads without a major logistical halt or a massive mobilization of reserves.

Deciphering Russia’s intentions right now is increasingly difficult. Its military buildup on the border with Ukraine could be preparation for an invasion or it could be yet another round of coercive diplomacy. Nevertheless, thinking through Russia’s military logistics capabilities could give NATO some insights into what Moscow might be planning to do next — and what the Western alliance might do to protect its interests.

[백선호]

전략적 기동력을 철도에 의존하는 것은 1/2차대전 때 얘기인 줄 알았는데요...@.@

[ssn688]

솔직히 붉은군대도 렌드 리스 아니었으면... (먼 산) ; https://twitter.com/LatestAnonPress/status/1502763321463869441?s=20&t=cY9LKCdMEcKgPDm8cqRuRQ
Anonymous 카더라(?)로는 침공명령은 18일에 내려졌고 2월 20일 개시(실제로는 24일)해서 3월 6일에 끝낼 계획이었다고도 하네요. 우크라이나는 약체라서 보급소요는 별로 없고 신속하게 먹을 수 있었다고 여겼나 봅니다. ; 7기동군단이 만주를 석권할 수 있다...는 구라도, 나가면 보급은 제대로 되니?를 간과한 무식의 소치라 하겠습니다. 사르후전투에 명을 도와 참전한 강홍립 휘하 조선군도 밥을 못먹어서 탈진했는데... (먼 산)

[하데베]

러시아 BTG 지원중대 기준으로 트럭이 고작14대 밖에 안되기 때문에 여단급에 필적하는 군수 소요를 감당하기 힘들어 보입니다.

[하데베]

포병 기준으로 아군은 1개 포대당 보급차량 X대에 유류수송차량이 편제 되는데, 러시아군은 유류차량은 부재하고 트럭1대로 모든 수송 수요를 담당하기 때문에 작전지속지원 측면에서 ROKA가 좀더 낫지 않을까 싶습니다.

[엽군]

그래서 K-10... ㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋ.