The Economist How much longer will America’s regional banks hold up?

[곽영어]

미국의 지역 은행은 얼마나 더 버틸 수 있을까?

Despite the danger, policymakers must not intervene prematurely

위험에도 불구하고 정책 입안자들은 조기에 개입해서는 안됩니다.

Mar 23rd 2023 | WASHINGTON, DC

2023년 3월 23일 | 워싱턴 DC

What kind of story is unfolding in the banking system? At first glance it would appear to be a tragic drama. In the past fortnight, four banks have met their end: two crypto lenders, the dominant bank in Silicon Valley and most recently a global systemically important bank. There have been 11th-hour interventions to protect customers, the creation of emergency-lending facilities and a marriage between two giant rival firms.

은행 시스템에는 어떤 이야기가 펼쳐지고 있을까요? 언뜻 보면 비극적인 드라마처럼 보일 수 있습니다. 지난 2주 동안 암호화폐 대출업체 두 곳, 실리콘밸리의 지배적인 은행, 그리고 가장 최근에는 글로벌 시스템적으로 중요한 은행까지 총 네 곳의 은행이 최후를 맞이했습니다. 고객 보호를 위한 11시간의 개입, 긴급 대출 시설의 설립, 두 거대 라이벌 기업 간의 합병 등이 있었습니다.

But look again and perhaps it is a science-fiction tale. Thomas Philippon, a professor of finance at New York University (nyu), is experiencing the vertigo of time travel. “It really feels like we are back in the 1980s,” he said at a recent talk. In that decade, high inflation prompted extreme monetary tightening, which was meted out with enthusiasm by Paul Volcker, chairman of the Federal Reserve. This undermined the health of “savings and loans” banks (s&ls), consumer-savings institutions also known as “thrifts”, which mostly lent long-term fixed-rate mortgages. They faced a cap on the rate they could pay on deposits, which led to flight. And they held fixed-rate assets. When interest rates rose, these mortgages lost a considerable amount of value—essentially wiping out the thrift industry’s net worth.

하지만 다시 보면 공상과학 소설에나 나올 법한 이야기일 수도 있습니다. 뉴욕대학교(NYU)의 금융학 교수인 토마스 필립슨은 시간 여행의 현기증을 경험하고 있습니다. 그는 최근 강연에서 "마치 1980년대로 돌아간 것 같은 느낌"이라고 말했습니다. 그 10년 동안 높은 인플레이션은 극심한 통화 긴축을 촉발했고, 연방준비제도이사회 의장인 폴 볼커는 이를 적극 지지했습니다. 이로 인해 주로 장기 고정금리 모기지를 빌려주는 '고리대금업자'로도 알려진 소비자 저축 기관인 '저축 및 대출' 은행(S&L)의 건전성이 약화되었습니다. 이들은 예금에 대해 지불할 수 있는 이자율에 상한선에 직면했고, 이는 도피로 이어졌습니다. 그리고 그들은 고정금리 자산을 보유했습니다. 금리가 상승하자 이러한 모기지는 상당한 가치를 잃었고, 결국 중고품 업계의 순자산이 사라졌습니다.

The dynamic will sound familiar to anyone who has paid attention to Silicon Valley Bank (svb), where a rate shock slashed the value of its fixed-rate assets, prompting deposit flight and the institution’s collapse. The question now is whether what happened over the past fortnight was a brutal crunch or the start of a long, drawn-out process, as in the 1980s. The answer depends on the extent to which svb’s problems are found elsewhere.

금리 충격으로 고정금리 자산의 가치가 급락하여 예금 이탈과 기관의 붕괴를 초래한 실리콘밸리은행(SVB)에 관심을 기울여 본 사람이라면 이 역학 관계가 익숙하게 들릴 것입니다. 이제 문제는 지난 2주 동안 일어난 일이 잔인한 위기인지, 아니면 1980년대처럼 길고 장기적인 과정의 시작인지입니다. 그 답은 SVB의 문제가 다른 곳에서 어느 정도 발견되느냐에 달려 있습니다.

Start with the value of financial institutions’ assets. Banks regularly publish data on the losses they face on fixed-rate assets, such as bond portfolios. If these assets had to be liquidated tomorrow the industry would lose nearly a third of its capital base. Worryingly, one in ten institutions looks more poorly capitalised than svb.

금융 기관의 자산 가치부터 시작하세요. 은행은 채권 포트폴리오와 같은 고정금리 자산에서 발생하는 손실에 대한 데이터를 정기적으로 발표합니다. 이러한 자산을 당장 청산해야 한다면 금융 업계는 자본의 거의 3분의 1을 잃게 될 것입니다. 걱정스럽게도 10곳 중 1곳은 SVB보다 자본이 더 취약한 것으로 보입니다.

However, that is a big “if”. Such paper losses remain hypothetical so long as depositors stick around. A recent paper by Itamar Drechsler of the University of Pennsylvania and co-authors points out that bank deposits, which tend to be stable and interest-rate insensitive, are a natural hedge for the sort of long-term, fixed-rate lending that banks favour. The paper argues “banks closely match the interest-rate sensitivities of their interest income and expense”, which produces remarkably stable net-interest margins. This explains why bank share prices do not collapse every time rates rise, instead falling just as much as the broader market does.

하지만 이는 큰 '가정'입니다. 예금자들이 계속 남아 있는 한 이러한 종이 손실은 가설에 불과합니다. 펜실베이니아 대학교의 이타마르 드레흐슬러(Itamar Drechsler)와 공동 저자들이 최근 발표한 논문은 안정적이고 이자율에 민감하지 않은 은행 예금이 은행이 선호하는 장기 고정금리 대출에 대한 자연스러운 헤지 수단이라고 지적합니다. 이 논문은 "은행은 이자 수익과 비용의 금리 민감도를 거의 일치시킨다"고 주장하며, 이는 매우 안정적인 순이자 마진을 창출합니다. 이는 금리가 오를 때마다 은행 주가가 폭락하지 않고 오히려 더 넓은 시장과 마찬가지로 하락하는 이유를 설명합니다.

The clearest evidence of flight is from two California-based banks. First Republic has reportedly lost $70bn in deposits—around 40% of its total as of the end of 2022—since svb failed. Lots of the lender’s clients are wealthy individuals, who appear to be quickest to pull deposits. On March 17th First Republic arranged for 11 major banks to park $30bn-worth of deposits with it. It is now reported to be seeking additional support from financial institutions and possibly the government, too. On March 21st PacWest, another Californian lender, reported it had lost a fifth of its deposits since the start of 2023.

가장 확실한 증거는 캘리포니아에 본사를 둔 두 은행에서 나온 것입니다. 퍼스트 리퍼블릭은 SVB가 실패한 이후 2022년 말 기준 총 예금의 약 40%에 해당하는 700억 달러의 예금을 잃은 것으로 알려졌습니다. 이 대출 기관의 고객 중 상당수는 부유한 개인으로, 예금을 가장 빨리 인출하는 것으로 보입니다. 3월 17일 퍼스트 리퍼블릭은 11개 주요 은행에 300억 달러 상당의 예금을 맡기기로 했습니다. 현재 금융 기관과 정부에도 추가 지원을 요청하고 있는 것으로 알려졌습니다. 3월 21일 캘리포니아의 또 다른 대출 기관인 PacWest는 2023년 초부터 예금의 5분의 1을 잃었다고 보고했습니다.

Banks suffering from deposit flight, such as First Republic and PacWest, can turn to other financial institutions for liquidity—or they can turn to the Fed’s newly expanded lending facilities. Official data indicate that American banks borrowed $300bn from various Fed programmes in the week to March 15th. There are some indications that most of the borrowing that was not done by already failed banks—namely, svb and Signature—was done by west-coast banks, including First Republic and PacWest. Indeed, some $233bn of the total was lent by the San Francisco Fed, which covers banks west of Colorado. On March 21st PacWest revealed that it had so far borrowed a total of $16bn from various Fed facilities to shore up its liquidity. There was at most around $2bn-worth of borrowing from any of the Fed banks that support other regions of the country, indicating that banks in other states have yet to face debilitating deposit flight.

퍼스트 리퍼블릭과 팩웨스트처럼 예금 이탈로 어려움을 겪고 있는 은행은 다른 금융 기관에 유동성을 요청하거나 연준이 새로 확대한 대출 시설을 이용할 수 있습니다. 공식 데이터에 따르면 3월 15일까지 한 주 동안 미국 은행들이 다양한 연준 프로그램에서 3,000억 달러를 빌린 것으로 나타났습니다. 이미 파산한 은행, 즉 SVB와 시그니처가 아닌 대부분의 대출은 퍼스트 리퍼블릭과 팩웨스트를 포함한 서부 해안 은행에서 이루어졌다는 일부 징후가 있습니다. 실제로 전체 대출금 중 약 2,330억 달러는 콜로라도 서쪽 은행을 대상으로 하는 샌프란시스코 연준에서 대출한 것입니다. 3월 21일 PacWest는 유동성을 확보하기 위해 지금까지 다양한 연준 시설에서 총 160억 달러를 빌렸다고 밝혔습니다. 다른 지역을 지원하는 연준 은행으로부터 차입한 금액은 최대 약 20억 달러로, 다른 주에 있는 은행들은 아직 예금 이탈에 직면하지 않았음을 나타냅니다.

Policymakers must now wait to see if more banks come forward. It will be an uncomfortable pause. Regional and community banks play an important role in the American economy, and do about half the country’s commercial lending. Smaller banks are particularly dominant in commercial property. They hold nearly 80% of commercial mortgages provided by banks. The temptation, which American officials have been vague about, is to ensure smaller banks do not lose their deposits by guaranteeing the lot of them.

정책 입안자들은 이제 더 많은 은행이 나설지 지켜봐야 합니다. 불편한 멈춤이 될 것입니다. 지역 및 커뮤니티 은행은 미국 경제에서 중요한 역할을 담당하고 있으며 미국 상업 대출의 약 절반을 담당합니다. 소규모 은행은 특히 상업용 부동산에서 우위를 점하고 있습니다. 이들은 은행이 제공하는 상업용 모기지의 거의 80%를 보유하고 있습니다. 미국 관리들이 애매모호한 태도를 취하고 있는 것은 소규모 은행들이 많은 예금을 보증함으로써 예금을 잃지 않도록 보장하려는 유혹입니다.

Aaaaarrggggghhhhh

아아아아악!

This could create a grim scenario: a zombie-horror flick. At least that is the argument made by Viral Acharya, also of nyu. Banks with flighty deposit bases and losses on their assets are exposed to real losses. The worst-possible outcome, reckons Mr Acharya, is that “you leave the banks undercapitalised but you say that all depositors of weak banks are safe”.

이것은 좀비 공포 영화와 같은 암울한 시나리오를 만들 수 있습니다. 적어도 nyu의 바이럴 아차리아가 제기한 주장입니다. 예금 기반이 불안정하고 자산에 손실이 있는 은행은 실제 손실에 노출됩니다. 아차리아는 최악의 결과는 "자본이 부족한 은행을 방치하면서 취약한 은행의 모든 예금자는 안전하다고 말하는 것"이라고 말합니다.

This kind of intervention, he says, is common historically and “whenever this has been done—it happened in Japan, happened in Europe, routinely happens in China and India—you get zombie banks”. These have no capital, are backstopped by governments and “tend to do a tonne of bad lending”. He points to the Bank of Cyprus, which was undercapitalised in 2012: “They bet the entire house on Greek debt even when Greece was actually blowing up. Why did they do that? Well, they had stable deposits, no one was folding them up, they had no equity left—and then soon after you had a spectacular bank failure.”

그는 이런 종류의 개입은 역사적으로 흔한 일이며 "일본에서도 일어났고, 유럽에서도 일어났으며, 중국과 인도에서도 일상적으로 일어나는 일"이라며 "이런 일이 일어날 때마다 좀비 은행이 생겨난다"고 말합니다. 좀비 은행은 자본이 없고, 정부의 지원을 받지 못하며, "부실 대출을 많이 하는 경향이 있습니다." 그는 2012년에 자본이 부족했던 키프로스 은행을 예로 들었습니다: "키프로스 은행은 그리스가 실제로 부도가 났을 때에도 그리스 부채에 전 재산을 걸었습니다. 왜 그랬을까요? 안정적인 예금이 있었고, 아무도 예금을 회수하지 않았으며, 자기자본이 전혀 남아있지 않았기 때문입니다."

The thrift crisis in America in the 1980s was ultimately so costly because the initial response—when the thrifts faced losses of around $25bn—was one of forbearance. Many insolvent thrifts were allowed to stay open as part of an attempt to allow them to grow out of their losses. But their problems only worsened. They, too, came to be known as “zombies”. Just like the Bank of Cyprus, these zombies went for broke by investing in riskier and riskier projects, hoping that they would pay off in higher returns. By the time the returns did materialise, the zombies were insolvent. The eventual bail-out cost taxpayers $125bn, five times what it would have done if regulators had bitten the bullet earlier. Allowing that kind of zombie flick to play out again would be a real tragedy. ■

1980년대 미국의 고리대금업 위기가 결국 막대한 비용을 초래한 이유는 고리대금업자들이 약 250억 달러의 손실에 직면했을 때 초기 대응이 인내로 일관했기 때문입니다. 많은 파산한 소매점들이 손실을 극복하고 성장할 수 있도록 영업을 계속하도록 허용했습니다. 하지만 문제는 더욱 악화되었습니다. 이들 역시 '좀비'로 불리게 되었습니다. 키프로스 은행과 마찬가지로 좀비 은행들도 더 높은 수익을 기대하며 더 위험하고 위험한 프로젝트에 투자하여 파산했습니다. 수익이 실현되었을 때 좀비들은 이미 파산한 상태였습니다. 결국 구제금융으로 인해 납세자들은 1,250억 달러의 손실을 입었는데, 이는 규제 당국이 좀 더 일찍 조치를 취했다면 입었을 손실의 5배에 달하는 금액입니다. 이런 좀비 영화 같은 일이 다시 벌어진다면 정말 비극이 될 것입니다. ■

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This article appeared in the Finance & economics section of the print edition under the headline "Don’t unleash the zombies"

이 기사는 인쇄판의 금융 및 경제 섹션에 "좀비를 풀어놓지 말라"는 제목으로 게재되었습니다.

출처: https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2023/03/23/how-much-longer-will-americas-regional-banks-hold-up?utm_content=ed-picks-article-link-1&etear=nl_special_1&utm_campaign=a.coronavirus-special-edition&utm_medium=email.internal-newsletter.np&utm_source=salesforce-marketing-cloud&utm_term=3/25/2023&utm_id=1537351