Will Trump reverse America’s pivot to Asia?

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(World Today Wednesday 9 November 2016)

Will Trump reverse America’s pivot to Asia?

President-elect Donald Trump pumps his fist after giving his acceptance speech in New York. Photo: AP

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By Prashanth Parameswaran -

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Published: 10:05 PM, November 9, 2016

Mr Donald Trump has scored a stunning electoral victory over Mrs Hillary Clinton in what is the biggest upset in the United States presidential elections since 1948. There is deep uncertainty about what this means for America’s role in the world in general and for US’ Asia policy in particular, given the fact that the so-called pivot or rebalance was such a big part of outgoing President Barack Obama’s legacy.

The knee-jerk reaction would be to cast Mr Trump’s victory as the final nail in the coffin of the rebalance and to prepare for a radical break with the decades-old bipartisan consensus that has underpinned US policy on Asia for decades, with deep and potentially lasting damage to American credibility in the region.

And to be sure, the rhetoric that has been coming out of the Trump campaign to date has not offered much evidence to the contrary.

But given the fact that Mr Trump has no foreign policy experience whatsoever and is prone to flip-flopping on some issues, it is far from certain how much he will translate his rhetoric into reality.

Mr Donald Trump’s worldview is a rather dark one based on a narrow interpretation of US interests and designed to reverse course from America’s post-Cold War foreign policy approach which he said has been wasteful, rudderless, undependable and unsustainable.

His “America First” foreign policy, Mr Trump has said, would focus on rebuilding the US military and economy at home, renegotiating trade deals and alliances and working with adversaries who may not share American ideals but can help it in confronting vital threats to its national interests, principally radical Islam.

In Asia, this means that he could pair some proposals already advanced previously with drastic changes such as revising the terms of American treaty alliances and withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Apart from his policies, the sheer fact that he has been elected in spite of his xenophobic, misogynistic and bigoted rhetoric on the campaign trail as well as his all-too-cosy relationship with authoritarian regimes, undercuts America’s role as a global beacon of effective democracy including in the Asia-Pacific.

When pressed, Mr Trump’s advisers have said that this portrait is exaggerated. They contend, for instance, that he would still respect existing alliances once they are renegotiated, and that he is not averse to trade deals that are worth doing.

But if he moves to implement his vision, he will damage the credibility of US commitments, alienate some long-standing friends and embolden American rivals like China who will be more than happy to exploit any perceived doubts about Washington’s continued presence in Asia.

However, given Mr Trump’s foreign policy inexperience and the malleability of some of his views, taking Mr Trump at his word could also prove to be a mistake.

It is too early to tell whether he will actually move forward on this foreign policy vision in general and in Asia in particular.

Indeed, if Mr Trump himself ends up showing little interest in the details of Asia policy and appoints some mainstream Republican foreign policy experts to implement it, there is a chance that they will moderate his positions to some degree.

Even then, his almost schizophrenic relationship with his advisers during the campaign suggests that this process will be far from coherent.

Mr Trump may also face constraints in trying to put some of his policies into practice, both in the form of other actors domestically as well as regional and global challenges.

The last US President that tried to implement such a radical departure in foreign policy was Mr Jimmy Carter, who issued a Trumpian call (during his 1976 presidential election campaign) to withdraw US troops from the Philippines and South Korea following the Vietnam War.

Though it took some time, Mr Carter was eventually forced to reverse course due to stiff bureaucratic resistance as well as rising regional and global threats, including Soviet aggression. We could see some form of this repeating itself in the coming years.

Irrespective of the initial Asia policy of any American President, he or she must eventually adjust to the fact that the region is both a centre of global economic opportunity and the source of key security challenges, be it an increasingly capable and confident China or a nuclear North Korea.

Getting the United States’ Asia policy right will require a bipartisan consensus at home involving a wide range of actors as well as robust relationships with allies and partners abroad.

Mr Donald Trump is not immune to these realities. How quickly he recognises that, if at all, however, remains to be seen. And the answer to that question, more than anything else, could shape the course of his Asia policy more than any other.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Prashanth Parameswaran is Associate Editor at The Diplomat Magazine based in Washington, DC, where he writes extensively about US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific, Asian security affairs, and South-east Asia. He is also a doctoral candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.