상륙전단을 보호하기 위한 대잠전 전술

[위종민]

https://cimsec.org/antisubmarine-warfare-for-the-amphibious-warfare-team/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=antisubmarine-warfare-for-the-amphibious-warfare-team 

Antisubmarine Warfare for the Amphibious Warfare Team | Center for International Maritime Security

현재 미해군 상륙전단엔 대잠전을 담당하는 전문기체가 없고 P-8과 수상전투함에 대잠전을 의존하고 있는데 P-8은 숫자가 얼마 없고, 수상전투함의 숫자도 충분하지 않습니다. 

이에 대처하기 위해 ARG에도 대잠헬기를 배치해야 한다고 주장하네요. 또한 위드비 아일랜드 및 하퍼스 페리급 LSD들이 퇴역하며 상륙전단 구성이 LHD 1척/LPD 2척으로 바뀌면서 상륙전단의 항공전력이 강화됩니다. LPD 1척은 MV-22 1기나 MH-60 2기를 지원 가능한 행거를 갖추고 있습니다. 

또한 미해병대는 MEU Air Combat Element (MEU ACE) 조합을 현재 실험중이며, 이에 따르면 LHD에 배치되는 항공기가 현재 F-35/AV-8 6~8기, MV-22 12기에서 F-35 10기/MV-22 10기로 바뀌게 됩니다. 이렇게 된다면 남는 MV-22 2기를 LPD 2척에 배정해 대잠플랫폼으로 쓸 수 있습니다. 

MV-22에 MH-60에 쓰이는 레이더와 전자전 장치들, 소노부이, 디핑소나와 데이터 링크 시스템을 이식해 대잠전용 오스프리를 만들자는 제안도 하네요. 

MH-60R 5~8기와 MV-22 2기로 구성된 대잠전 팀이 24시간 대잠방어망을 제공할 수 없다는 이야기를 하면서 파일럿들의 휴식과 관련된 이야기도 하는군요. 항모전단은 순양함과 구축함에서 승조원들의 야간 휴식공간을 제공해 24시간 커버리지가 가능하지만, ARG에선 통상 24시간 항공작전을 하지 때문이라고 하며, 24시간 대잠초계 유지를 위해선 ARG에 배속된 군함들이 항공요원들 및 비행갑판 요원들의 휴식 시간을 분배할 필요가 있다고 합니다. 

대잠전 요원 구성과 관련해선 24시간 대잠전 수행을 위한 ARG의 대잠전 참모진(ASW Staff Element)은 대잠전 훈련을 받은 장교로 이뤄진 planner 3명, watch stander 8명, Operations Specialists, Sonar Technicians, Navy Oceanographic ASW Team (NOAT)이 필요하다고 합니다. 

Antisubmarine Warfare for the Amphibious Warfare Team

11-14 minutes

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Transforming the Marine Corps Topic Week

By The Good Sailor Svejk

The US Navy has an ASW problem. The carrier strike group (CSG) has a medium range ASW aircraft coverage gap, and the amphibious ready group (ARG) has no organic ASW coverage at all.1 The current concept of operation is for surface combatants and P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol planes to serve as ARG escorts. In LCDR Jason Lancaster’s article, “Close the Gaps!” the author stated that P-8s work for the theater ASW commander but are a limited resource.2 Surface combatants are also a limited and dwindling resource. Despite the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 355 ship requirement, the cold-hard reality reflects a continuous decline of available surface combatants. The 2022 Navy budget proposal includes decommissioning 22 cruisers (CGs) and nine littoral combat ships (LCSs) by 2027 along with the elimination of the LCS ASW mission package.3 Fleet shrinkage requires out of the box thinking to increase the protection of the ARG. 

In contrast to the decreasing US Navy surface forces, Russia and China continue to produce and deploy capable and quiet submarines; many are equipped with long range anti-ship cruise missiles with ranges up to 200NM. Without changes to ARG-Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) composition, hostile submarines continue to hold the ARG-MEU at risk which is why the Navy and Marine Corps must design a new ASW concept for ARG protection.

An integrated Navy and Marine Corps team could develop a composite ASW element for the ARG. This element should include Navy and Marine Corps aircraft outfitted for ASW, Navy personnel to support the Amphibious Squadron Composite Warfare Commander, and Command, Control, Computers, Communications, and Intelligence (C4I) systems to provide protection for the ARG in the ASW fight. Many of these systems already exist and only need to be adapted for the ships and aircraft of the ARG. 

ASW Aircraft

The best way to eliminate the organic ASW coverage gap in the ARG is to incorporate existing Navy helicopters into the ARG. ARGs have deployed with MH-60Rs aboard and in 2020, the USS Wasp participated in Exercise Black Widow, a high end ASW exercise as an airborne command and control (C2) platform despite the helicopter’s limited range and endurance. To overcome long range submarine threats, the Navy operates long range ASW aircraft such as the P-8. However, the Navy has been plagued by a medium range ASW aircraft gap since the S-3 Viking retired from the fleet. Even worse, the Marine Corps operates no ASW capable aircraft despite a history of integrated operation from naval ships. The radical departure of the Marine Corps current force demonstrated through General Berger’s guidance “Force 2030” along with his written and vocalized concern on ASW means that now is the perfect time to experiment with different ways for the Navy-Marine Corps team to provide organic ASW capability.

Over the next few years, the Whidbey Island and Harpers Ferry class ships are scheduled to be decommissioned, changing the current ARG comprised of a Landing Helicopter Dock/Assault ship (LHD/A), a Landing Port Docking ships (LPD), and a Dock Landing ship (LSD). Instead, ARGs will deploy with an LHD/A and two LPDs. This change drastically increases the air capability of the ARG. An LPD has a hangar designed to support one MV-22 or two MH-60s along with an air department that enables the simultaneous operation of well deck and flight deck. Furthermore, the introduction of USS America (LHA 6) and USS Tripoli (LHA 7) increases the flight deck capabilities of the ARG, demonstrated by the Lightning Carrier Concept demonstration in April where the USS Tripoli embarked 20 F-35Bs.

In addition, the Marine Corps is experimenting with different MEU Air Combat Element (ACE) compositions. Future LHD/A concepts could embark as many as ten F-35s and ten MV-22s aboard the LHD/LHA, nearly a twofold increase of fixed wing over the six to eight F-35/AV-8 and twelve MV-22 the ACE currently utilized. This composition would free up MV-22s for a new ASW variant. The removal of two MV-22s from the LHD would enable the Marine Corps to outfit those two as ASW platforms for operation from an LPD.

General Berger insisted that “The undersea fight will be so critical in the High North and in the western Pacific that the Marine Corps must be part of it,” but the Marine Corps has no ASW capability. However, the Marine Corps has aviation assets that could fill the bit quite nicely.4 An MV-22 has the internal payload capacity and range to augment the MH-60R ASW workhorse of the Navy. Since the MV-22 is a tilt-rotor, the aircraft offers far more range and payload capacity than its helicopter counterpart.5,6 The Navy and Marine Corps could reduce acquisition risk by employing the radar, electronic warfare suite, sonobuoy systems, dipping sonar, and Link systems used by MH-60R. The MV-22s payload capacity would enable it to carry more sonobuoys and torpedoes than an MH-60R. MV-22s could also employ the Multi-static Active Coherent (MAC) buoy systems found in the P-8. If those systems fit into the MV-22, it would enable the ARG to employ the most capable sonobuoys in service today. Reusing existing systems would research and development, simplify logistics, and streamline training. Additionally, the Navy and Marine Corps could integrate schools and spare parts. Marine Corps ASW could also augment future Navy ASW operating concepts as the Navy continues to acquire carrier borne variants of the V-22s which could close the Carrier Strike Groups’ (CSG) medium range ASW gap.

An Air ASW Element comprised of five to eight MH-60Rs and two MV-22 ASW variants could provide limited around the clock and robust coverage. Unlike carrier strike groups, 24-hour flight operations are not typical in a typical ARG. A CSG can provide sustained 24-hour coverage by designating cruisers (CGs) and destroyers (DDGs) attached to the CSG to provide night coverage. This allows the air crews to consistently fly at night and not violate Naval Aviation Training Operation and Standardization (NATOPS) crew rest or flight deck operation limitations. To enable the continuous ASW coverage, the ASW air element would need to be distributed amongst the ships of the ARG to allow air crew and flight deck personnel time to rest. 

With two LPDs in the future envisioned ARG, there should still be sufficient flight deck space to embark an organic ASW element. An LPD has two spots large enough for landing an MV-22 and 4 expanded spots. Aside from the large flight deck, the hangar is also large enough to support one MV-22 or two MH-60Rs. 

ASW Staff Element

Beyond just a lack of organic assets, the ARG also lacks an ASW staff element. The Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) conducts surface warfare (ASuW) and ASW to protect the carrier. Currently, the Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) works with the MEU and conduct amphibious operations and in the CSG composite warfare construct, DESRON serves as the sea combat commander, protecting the force from surface and subsurface threats. In the ARG composite warfare construct, an LPD typically performs the role as the sea combat commander. To augment ASW support, amphibious surface warfare officers (SWOs) the PHIBRON often request DESRON support during ASW exercises. During workups such as Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPUTEX), destroyers from the DESRON have performed ASW command and control functions by tasking external P-8s and helicopters working with the ARG. To properly staff the ASW Staff Element on the ARG, the proposed element would consist of three planners and eight watch standers composed of ASW trained officers, Operations Specialists, and Sonar Technicians, and a Navy Oceanographic ASW Team (NOAT) to provide sustained 24-hour ASW command and control for the Sea Combat Commander.

ASW C4I Systems

Because current amphibious ships do not have any systems optimized for ASW C2, the staff element would require a command-and-control system that incorporates ASW. This system would need installation aboard the Sea Combat Commander ship in the ARG. The DESRON module on an aircraft carrier has several systems integrated into Ship’s Self Defense System (SSDS) to provide C2 of ASW forces for the Sea Combat Commander. The AN/UYQ 100 Undersea Warfare Decision Support System (USW-DSS) is designed for use by ships, destroyer squadrons, and shore nodes like the theater undersea warfare commander to collaboratively plan and execute ASW missions. This system enables a common tactical picture that can include environmental data, sensor tracks, and sensor metrics.7 AN/SQQ-34 Aircraft Carrier Tactical Support System (CV-TSC) which is designed to integrate ASW systems from across the carrier strike group and P-8 maritime patrol planes.8 In addition to systems like these surface combatants carry antennas designed to receive information from sonobuoys. Other systems enable the ship to monitor any sonobuoys in the pattern and to observe the forward looking infrared (FLIR) camera. Since the Navy already has many of these systems on aircraft carriers, there should be minimal friction for integrating them into SSDS, the LPD’s combat system. Although, LPDs have controlled ASW without these systems, these systems will make command and control significantly easier for the sea combat commander. 

Conclusion

ASW is a team sport. These proposals are not intended to replace P-8s or other antisubmarine warfare combatants. They are designed to improve the capability of the ARG to defend itself in the face of submarine threats. The addition of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft with a dedicated ASW staff element and appropriate C4I systems to plan and execute the fight will improve the lethality and self-defense capabilities of the ARG. This resulting improved survivability would ensure the Amphibious Ready Group’s main battery, the Marine Expeditionary Unit arrives in the amphibious objective area unharmed and ready for battle.

The Good Sailor Svejk is a U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer with experience in operational plans, amphibious ships, destroyers, and destroyer squadrons and has a master’s in history.

References

1. LCDR Jason Lancaster, U. (2021, June 5). Close the Gaps! Airborne ASW Yesterday and Tomorrow. Center for International Maritime Security

2. Ibid.

3. Eckstein, M. (2022, March 28). US Navy wants to cut nine LCSs, eliminate their anti-submarine mission.

4. General David Berger, U. M. (2020, November). Marines will help fight submarines. Proceedings.

5. US Navy. MV-22 Fact Sheet. Retrieved from Naval Air Systems Command: https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/MV-22B-Osprey

6. US Navy. MH-60R Fact Sheet. Retrieved from Naval Air Systems Command: https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/MH-60R-Seahawk

7. US Navy. US Navy Fact File AN/UYQ-100 Undersea Warfare Decision Support System (USW-DSS). Retrieved from https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2166791/anuyq-

[백선호]

대잠전만 하던 대잠 항모 CVS-11 Intrepid에 A-1, A-4 공격기를 싣고 1966년 베트남으로 보냈을 때는 공격 항모 출신자를 작전 장교로 보내는 등으로 해서 새로운 임무에 적응하는데 꽤 시간이 걸렸다고 합니다.

새로 온 작전 장교가 "(공격할 표적 고르고 어떤 기체가 어떤 무장으로 언제 어떻게 공격할 것인지 계획을 짜는 곳인) strike center 좀 봅시다"고 말하니 "The what? (그게 뭡니까?)"이라고 대답...

http://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/51Tv/1093

[위종민]

해당 임무를 안 하던 조직에 새 임무를 맡기려면 장비만 갖다줘선 안되긴 하겠네요. 새 조직, 새 공간, 새로운 사람들까지..

[서수원]

문제는 그걸 윗선에선 모르거나 알아도 중요하게 생각하지 못하는게 아닐까요^^ 회사나 그 어떠한 조직에서도 그런 경우를 쉽게 찾을 수 있을 것 같습니다.

[백선호]

1989년 책 Alpha Strike Vietnam의 해당 부분입니다.

On a Saturday morning in January 1966, I came aboard the Intrepid docked in Norfolk.

I went down to the wardroom, found the command duty officer, and he had a stateroom assigned [for me]. I said, "Since I'm here, I'd like to see the strike center." He said, "The what?" and I knew there was a problem.

They had a full complement of officers with ASW [antisubmarine warfare] experience on board, filling in with two exceptions, and I was the third.

[백선호]

The commanding officer, Gus Macri, had carrier attack-fighter experience, and the other was the operations officer, Al Thompson, who had just come aboard.

Everybody else was ASW oriented, and the ship was configured that way. I got started with virtually nothing but a notebook under my arm, and a desk in the air intelligence office.