[펌]Ain't No Sunshine (빛 없는 DJ의 햇볕정책)

[매스만봉]

Ain't No Sunshine(빛 없는 DJ의 햇볕정책)

Foreincy Policy, "위대한 지도자 김대중은 거짓 평화의 화신?"

조영환 편집인

미국의 유수한 외교정책전문잡지인 Foreincy Policy(FP)는 8월 24일 김대중의

'햇볕정책'을 다루는 Sung-Yoon Lee)(이승윤)씨가 쓴 

"Ain't No Sunshine(햇볕은 빛나지 않았다/햇볕정책은 기만)"

이라는 제목의 글을 실었다.

그 기사에는 "김대중은 하나의 민주투사였는지는 모르지만, 성자가 아니다.

아마 김대중의 가장 큰 업적은 그가 북한 김정일을 다루는 데에 완전한 실패했다

는 사실일 것이다" 라는 내용의 부제가 달렸다.

Foreincy Policy의 Sung-Yoon Lee는 김대중이 지금 일시적으로 언론과 정치권에 의해서

'위대한 지도자'로 미화되겠지만, 결국 김정일과 야합해서 노벨평화상까지 받게 한 그의

햇볕정책과 김정일의 인권탄압에 대한 그의 일관적인 외면으로 인해서,

장기적으로 김대중은 '희대의 이중인격자'로 역사적 평가를 받을 가능성을 제기했다.
 
햇볕정책을 통해서, 김대중이 원했던 바대로, 김정일은 남한이 북한에 구조적으로 굴종하게

만드는 상황을 지금도 한반도에 조성했다고  Foreincy Policy는 지적했다. 

Sung-Yoon Lee(텊스 대학)의 눈에 햇볕정책은 한국정치에 암초이고 함정이다.

'죽음의 정치공학'에 시달리는 한국정부는 김정일이 만든  치명적인 함정에 빠지지 않기 

위해서 남북관계에 특단의 방책을 강구하지 않으면 안 된다고 Sung-Yoon Lee는 지적했다.

김정일, 노무현, 김대중의 죽음에 쏟아져 나온 군중들의 광란적 슬픔은 이명박 정부에

대적하는 분위기였으며, 좌익지도자들의 죽음을 놓고 벌어지는 한국내부의 이런

반정부적 분위기는 결국 김정일에게 우호적인 정치사회적 변수로 활용되는 것이

한국정치의 현실이라고 Sung-Yoon Lee는 지적했다.
 
한국인들의 사망자(死亡者)에 대한 병적인 애도와 맹목적 숭배는,

망자를 공정하게 평가할 기회를 한국인들로부터 빼앗아간 고질적 병폐를 가지고 있는데,

이번 김대중 사망의 경우에도 그의 성취는 과대평가되었고

그의 실패는 은폐되었음을 Foreincy Policy는 지적했다.

하지만 '한 인간의 업적은 마지막 황혼기에 미화된 거짓말에 의해 오판되지 않는다'

고 지적한 FP는 '시간과 망각은 망자의 업적을 잊혀지게 만들겠지만, 

김대중에 대한 역사적 평가는 시간이 지날수록 더욱더 부정적으로 선명해질 것'이라고 주장했다.

김대중에 대한 평가는 그의 마지막 장례식에서 보여준 방송들의 과도한 미화나

군중들의 애도에 의해서 왜곡되지 못할 것이다.

'북한동포들을 굶겨 죽이고 남한에 핵무기 위협을 가한 김정일을 지원한 김대중의 업적은

시간이 지날수록 더 선명해지고 정확하게 평가받을 것'이라고 Foreincy Policy는 전망했다.
 
특히 김대중의 막대하고 무조건적인 대북퍼주기는 김대중의 실패한 업적으로 선명하게

평가될 것이라고 Foreincy Policy는 전망했다.

김대중이 남북한의 화해와 평화를 위해서 지불하는 '평화분담금'이라고 속이면서

김정일에게 갖다 바친 달러는 결국 전쟁지원금으로 판명될 것이라고 Foreincy Policy는 혹평했다.

국제적 거지인 김정일에게 엄청난 달러를 김대중이 지원한 것에 대한 역사적 평가는 

결코 김대중을 평화와 화해의 화신으로 우상화할 수 없게 만들 것이라고

지적한 Foreincy Policy는 '김정일은 지금도 김대중의 햇볕정책을 통해서

남한정부로부터 톡톡히 재미를 본 거짓 화해의 손길을 이명박 정부에 내밀고 있다'

는 내용의 경고를 했다.

김대중의 햇볕정책은 지금도 김정일의 對南사기극에 악용되는 김대중의 나쁜 유산

이라는 FP, Sung-Yoon Lee의 진단이다.
 
남북한의 좌익지도자들이 스스로 당대에 우상화하고, 방송들이 군중들을 동원해서

미화하지만, 역사의 심판은 그런 기만과 조작의 가면을 벗겨버릴 것이라는 철학이 

FP SUNG-YOON LEE씨의 기사에 묻어있다.

햇볕정책을 수립·실행한 김일성, 김정일, 노무현, 김대중은 공히 한국인들을 

거짓예언자들을 숭배하는 광신도들로 만들었다.

자신들이 장악한 언론을 통해서 좌익총수들을 우상화하는 전체주의적 선동이

한반도에서 망자를 놓고 벌어지고 있다.

전체주의적 선동가 김일성의 우상화가 남한의 좌익총수들이었던 노무현과

김대중의 우상화에도 부분적으로 나타났음을 FP는 지적했다.

 Foreincy Policy의 지적처럼, 시간의 심판(역사)은 김대중이 쓴 민주투사의 가면을 벗기고

햇볕정책의 숨은 위선성과 반역성을 선명하게 드러낼 것이다.
 
노무현-김대중의 장례식에 한국언론이 조성한 집단광기에서 국민들이 깨어나는 순간에, 

노무현-김대중 우상화는 그들에게 매우 부정적인 역사적 평가 자료로 남게 될 것이다.

노무현·김대중 추종자들이 그들의 우상이 사라진 뒤에 보여준 집단광기는 김대중-노무현의

나쁜 영적 기운을 정확하게 반영한 것이다.

진실로 좋은 지도자는 자신의 공덕을 자랑하거나 기념하지 않게 한다는 노자의 지적은

남북한 좌익총수들을 심판하는 명쾌한 심판기준이다.

김대중은 자기우상화에 광적이었던 김일성과 같은 부류로 역사적으로 평가될 것이다. 

Foreincy Policy와 같은 젊잖은 외교잡지에서 민주와 인권의 화신으로 노벨평화상을 받은

김대중이 북한동포의 인권을 무시하고 남한에 핵무기 위협을 조성한 인권·평화파괴자로

묘사된 것은 충격이다.
 
김대중에 대한 역사적 평가는, 장례식 기간의 절대적 미화가 사라지면서,

갈수록 부정적으로 변해갈 것이다.

남한 정부를 북한에 굴종시킨 김대중의 역할이 분명해지는만큼,

남한 국민들의 비판도 높아질 것이고, 김대중은 북한 동포들의 원망도 더 많이 살 것이다.

김대중의 국장이 방송의 대대적인 선동에 비해 국민들의 반응이 시원치 않았던 것은

김대중에 대한 역사적 평가에 중요한 징후가 될 것이다.

이 세상에서 악역의 통치자가 역사적 심판이 두려워서 자기우상화의 여론조작과

군중선동에 열심인 점을 고려하면, Sung-Yoon Lee의 김대중 평가는 의미심장하다. 

정치인의 역할은 시간이 지나면 잊혀지겠지만, 김대중의 악역은 시간이 지날 수록

더 명백해질 것이다.

누구도 역사의 심판을 피할 수는 없다.                                                [조영환 편집인: http://allinkorea.net/]
 
 
Foreincy Policy SUNG-YOON LEE의 기사 전문
 
Ain't No Sunshine(햇볕은 결코 비추지 않았다)

Kim Dae-jung may have been a democrat, but the late South Korean president was no saint. His true legacy will be one of utter failure in dealing with his northern neighbor/ by SUNG-YOON LEE 

 
Since  his death on Aug. 18, Kim Dae-jung has been celebrated as a "great leader." Delivering his eulogy at Kim's state funeral on Aug. 23, South Korean Prime Minister Han Seung-soo called the former president "a great leader of modern history," one whose "sacrifices, dedication, and devotion allowed freedom, human rights, and democracy to fully blossom in Korea." North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's appraisal was understandably more muted, but nonetheless laudatory. In his condolence message, the northern Kim said of the southern Kim that the "feats" the latter performed "will remain long with the nation." North Korea even sent a high-level mourning delegation to Seoul, the first of its kind in recognition of a South Korean leader.
 
Kim Dae-jung's death comes less than three months after the suicide of his successor, Roh Moo-hyun, and amid speculation about the condition of the ailing North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. These three men are joined to each other in history by the so-called Sunshine Policy, a failed, decade-long experiment geared toward improving relations with Kim Jong Il's North Korea that was initiated by Kim Dae-jung and carried on by Roh Moo-hyun. The three men represent an era, one that is more likely to be remembered for Seoul's misplaced aid to a totalitarian regime than for any meaningful advances in political, economic, or humanitarian issues in inter-Korean relations.

For four decades, Kim Dae-jung was a prominent figure on the South Korean political scene. In his younger days as the country's leading dissident, Kim was able to present to his compatriots a vision of what his country should strive to become. He was a powerful symbol of the country's struggle for democracy and human rights at a time when South Korea's rapidly rising material culture engendered greater calls for political freedom and civil rights. Then, as president from 1998 to 2003, Kim was able to restructure the country's powerful-but-overextended conglomerates and banks and pay back the $60 billion that the International Monetary Fund had loaned his country in the wake of the Asian financial crisis.

Kim will most likely be recorded in the annals of Korean history, however, not for his contributions to the economy or his efforts at advancing South Korea's political rights as a dissident, but for his failed North Korea policy as president.

Despite his pursuit of reconciliation with North Korea, when it came to the question of the fundamental rights of his fellow Koreans north of the border, Kim was unable to present any vision of hope. In fact, throughout his term in office, he assiduously downplayed the widespread human rights abuses in North Korea. Incredibly, Kim told an audience at a leading Washington think tank in March 2001 that the greatest human rights problem in the Korean peninsula was that of the separated families between the two Koreas and that his administration was making progress on that admittedly important issue. But on the far graver issue of the North Korean regime's systemic and widespread attack on its civilian population -- including the operation of vast political prisoner concentration camps where random beating, torture, public execution, hard labor, and starvation are brutal everyday realities -- Kim chose to remain silent.

Kim's presidency was capped by the first-ever inter-Korean summit in June 2000. His meeting with the North Korean leader in Pyongyang was hailed worldwide at the time as the dawn of an era of peace on the Korean peninsula. The man who had staked his presidency on mending relations with Pyongyang was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize later that year.
 
But the summit was later revealed to have been bought and paid for by the southern Kim with a secret transfer of $500 million to the northern Kim in the days leading up to the dramatic occasion. Facing public criticism and an investigation by a special prosecutor, Kim Dae-jung and his supporters argued that the payment was a "peace dividend," an investment in peace and reconciliation. Some insisted that it was a small price to pay for lasting inter-Korean reconciliation, a small burden that the South Korean economy -- the 12th largest in the world -- could easily bear.

What went unmentioned, however, was that the half a billion dollars in question was roughly equal to North Korea's export earnings at the time. It was an enormous cash infusion for North Korea, one of the smallest and most isolated economies in the world. Kim's cash gift to a hereditary totalitarian leadership that identifies as its highest state priorities regime preservation, advancement of its nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction programs, and existential competition against Seoul was an economic bonanza that carried serious strategic and moral implications.

The full effects on the South Korean people of such a dubious and dangerous financial transaction undertaken by their elected leader remain to be seen. But the prognosis does not augur well. Since 2000, Seoul has poured billions in cash and other blandishments into North Korea. In the meantime, Pyongyang has conducted two nuclear tests, two long-range ballistic missile tests, and multiple short-range missile tests, all while pursuing an alternate clandestine nuclear weapons program based on highly enriched uranium. Pyongyang has proliferated missiles, nuclear technology, counterfeit U.S. currency, and narcotics.
 
The regime has continued to brutalize its civilian population, trampling on their most basic human rights, while issuing periodic threats of nuclear annihilation at Seoul. Even in the heyday of sunshine, in June 2002, North Korea instigated a naval skirmish that resulted in the loss of six South Korean lives. The much anticipated "peace and reconciliation" conjured up in June 2000 seems today as elusive as ever. No wonder South Koreans, increasingly disillusioned with a policy of giving unconditional aid to the North, in 2007 opted to vote for the conservative candidate, Lee Myung-bak, who ran on a platform of growing the economy and demanding accountability and reciprocity from Pyongyang.

Kim Dae-jung until his last days struggled to snuff out such shimmers of doubt. Three days before he was admitted to the hospital in July, the former president told the BBC that his administration had never sent cash to Pyongyang but only 200,000 to 300,000 tons of food and fertilizer aid each year. Kim claimed that the cash transfer of $500 million was a risk undertaken by the South Korean conglomerate Hyundai alone to secure commercial rights in North Korea.

Such claims are inconsistent with the findings of the special prosecution that led to the imprisonment of one of Kim's key aides and the conviction of several others. Only time will show to what extent Seoul's gifts to Pyongyang supported the latter's stated "military-first politics." But what has been certain for some time now is that the generous and often unprincipled engagement of the North Korean regime by Kim and his successor, Roh, managed to deter neither that regime's dogged quest for nuclear weapons nor the barbaric oppression of its own people.

The news of Kim Dae-jung's death has engulfed South Korea over the past week. After a six-day mourning period, the Lee administration honored Kim with a state funeral in the National Assembly compound despite intense criticism from conservative groups. Hundreds of government officials, prominent politicians, and foreign dignitaries, as well as thousands of ordinary mourners, bade farewell to the iconic former president before he was finally laid to rest in the national cemetery later in the day.

The North Korean delegation, led by Kim Yang Gon, Pyongyang's spy master, and a senior secretary of the communist party, marks the first high-level meeting between Seoul and Pyongyang since Lee Myung-bak took office. The North Korean envoys visited Lee on the morning of the funeral and conveyed a message from Kim Jong Il calling for improved relations. Thus, as the world pontificated for the past year on what possible change and opportunity might come in the wake of the demise of the ailing North Korean leader, it was Kim Jong Il who deftly made the most of the change and opportunity created in the wake of the death of his favorite South Korean leader.
 
The northern Kim is making the most of South Korea's volatile situation to alter the atmospherics in the Korean peninsula to one that favors unilateral concessions from Seoul to Pyongyang, as Kim Dae-jung espoused. Awash as it is in the politics of death, the Seoul government will need to summon extraordinary resolve not to fall for Pyongyang's trap. As witnessed in May in the wake of Roh's death, or even 15 years earlier in the wake of the death of Kim Il Sung, the founding dictator of North Korea, the outpouring of grief upon Kim Dae-jung's death has once again been powerful and pervasive. As in the past, the emotions expressed upon the death of a Korean leader have been raw, reactive, and real. And, as in the past, dissenting voices at an emotional and politically sensitive time like this have been shunned by South Korea's mainstream media. In effect, the death of the former South Korean leader has turned the inter-Korean tide in Pyongyang's favor.

All men are mortal, and each culture has its own mourning ritual. Koreans choose to wail over and decry the death of loved ones, as if mortality itself is unjust and the life of each dead person is one unfulfilled. The conventions of centuries-old Korean funerary rites leave little room for a sober assessment of the legacy that the dead leaves behind. Kim Dae-jung's achievements are rightfully being remembered. His failings, in the current climate, are not.

Yet, history judges leaders for their acts, not for the poignant glimpses of their twilight years or the mournful moment of their demise. Time and temperament may erase the taint that ordinary men leave behind. But Kim Dae-jung's presidential legacy, abetting a growing nuclear threat toward South Koreans and ignoring the continued systematic abuse of millions of North Koreans, is a mark that -- despite his decades-long devotion to advancing democracy in South Korea -- no amount of time or tears is likely to wash away. 
 Sung-Yoon Lee is adjunct assistant professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

[박찬수]

역사가 심판할것임을 믿어 의심치 않습니다...

[참숯]

지금당장은 어렵겠지만 세월이 지나면 모든것은 꼭 밝혀지리라 봅니다