유도탄 괌을 방어하기엔 이지스 어쇼어로도 부족하다

[위종민]

https://bityl.co/7mmX (Breaking Defense) 

해리 해리스 전 태평양사령부 사령관/주한 미국대사가 기고한 글입니다. 

괌을 방어하기 위해선 적의 극초음속 비행체와 최종돌입시 기동능력을 갖춘 미사일을 포함한 탄도미사일, 순항미사일의 공격을 360도에서 방어할 수 있는 미사일 방어능력이 필요합니다. 

현재 괌에는 패트리엇, THAAD, National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System, SM 계열 미사일들이 배치돼 있는데 이 시스템들은 육군의 IBCS, 공군의 ABMS, 미해군의 이지스 어쇼어 및 NIFC-CA 시스템 등 다른 C2 아키텍처에 속합니다. 

이 고정식 센서-슈터 일체형 비연계형 시스템은 신형 미사일과 첫 교전시 임무가 실패로 돌아갈 가능성이 높으며, 상기한 위협들에 적절히 대처하기 위해선 사이버 및 우주를 포함한 멀티 도메인 통합형 센서-무장 통합이 요구됩니다. 

필 데이비드슨 전임 인도-태평양사령부 사령관은 괌 방위를 위해 이지스 어쇼어를 요구했지만, 이지스 어쇼어는 루마니아와 폴란드에서 순항미사일 방어에 약점을 노출했고, 이를 개선하기 위해선 더 개선되고 통합된 C2 아키텍처를 통해 다른 플랫폼과의 합동전투 능력 도입이 필요합니다. 

결국 시스템간 통합을 통해 각 체계들간의 승수효과를 노리는 것이 중요하다고 강조합니다. 

C2 시스템 통합을 통해 육해공군간 방공자산들을 공유해 이지스 어쇼어로 탐지한 목표물을 패트리엇으로 요격하는 게 가능한 그런 미래를 계획중인가 봅니다. 

Aegis Ashore Too Limited For Guam: Former INDO-PACOM Head

Members of the U.S. military, Royal Australian Air Force, and Japan Air Self-Defense Force stand in formation to start Exercise Cope North 20 at Andersen AFB , Guam, February 2020.

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is reportedly finishing its study of command and control architecture options to best defend Guam, the farthest outpost of our homeland. This new C2 system must have three features: an open architecture, the ability to bring different services’ radars and interceptors together, and disaggregation.

Since leaving Indo-PACOM to pursue other adventures, I’ve watched as Adm. Phil Davidson, my successor, not only picked up where I left off, but has raised the bar in significant ways. He rightly characterized Guam as part of the homeland and the most important forward operating facility in the Pacific. He called for a $27 billion “Pacific Deterrence Initiative” to enable the “up-gunning” of missile defenses of Guam. Not only is Guam “where America’s day begins,” it could be the first target in an attack against the rest of the United States – from Hawaii to the West Coast to the Eastern Seaboard.

Then-Adm. Harry Harris in Sydney

The problem set is complex: build a persistent missile defense capability across a 360-degree threat axis against hypersonic glide vehicles, maneuvering and non-maneuvering ballistic missiles, and air-breathing cruise missiles.

Currently, the U.S. fields Patriot, THAAD, the National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System, and the family of Standard Missiles. They are driven by different command and control architectures in differing stages of development, including the Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS), the Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), and the Navy’s Aegis Ashore and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) systems.

Herein lies the problem: unlinked systems coupled with fixed sensor-to-shooter combinations promise mission failure at first contact with an enemy fielding advanced 21st Century missiles. The sheer numbers game demands enormous sensor-to-weapon integration across multiple domains, including cyber and space, to defeat hypersonic, ballistic and air-breathing threats.

Aegis Ashore command center

Davidson has advocated defending Guam with Aegis Ashore. However, an Aegis Ashore modeled after the ones in Romania and Poland would have limited capability against air-breathing cruise missiles. MDA Director Vice Adm. Jon Hill recently said as much. An advanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense Aegis Ashore could succeed, but it would need an advanced and joint command and control architecture to bring other platforms into the fight.

The breadth of today’s missile defense systems offers INDO-PACOM’s commander attributes and challenges. Integration of systems — leveraging the strengths of each — becomes critical. The essential attribute of this integration will be an open architecture to ensure interoperability of current and future radars and interceptors across the dservices.

While choosing the right system is challenging, it’s a nice problem to have. I am not advocating for any specific system, but I am emphasizing the need to get on with it and for Congress to allocate funds for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative.

Second, whatever the “it” is, ensure it is persistent, scalable, robust enough to tackle the full spectrum of incoming endo- to exo-atmospheric threats, able to discriminate incoming missiles early in their launch, networked across different service systems, disaggregated to get at the problem of scale, which in turn, increases resiliency, and — perhaps most compelling design it so it can be upgraded at the speed of “patch Tuesday” (i.e., IP-based, “pub/sub” open architecture).

After Pearl Harbor, the U.S. led the free nations to defeat the Axis in less than four years. In 1962, President Kennedy’s delivered his “we choose to go to the moon” speech and, less than seven years later, the U.S. put a man on the moon. The U.S. developed vaccines to defeat the coronavirus in less than one year — another “moonshot.”  We should easily be able to develop a robust system of systems to defend the outer reaches of our homeland in five years. And we must shed our proclivity for service-stovepiped approaches and opt for service-agnostic missile defenses. If we are successful, we will present considerable dilemmas to our enemies. If not, we will lose.

Just as the U.S. – no longer constrained by the self-imposed limitations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty – can now think outside the box, offensively, to place at risk our enemies in ways we could not before, we now must think beyond service stovepipes to protect our homeland against enemies who are relentlessly innovating to place us at risk. We must not be constrained by old think and self-limited by resources.

RecommendedDigital Design Revolution Key To All Domain Ops: Air & Space Officials Say

Digital “transformation” is “critical to being able to maintain our advantage over peer competitors,” Kristen Baldwin, Air Force deputy assistant secretary for science, technology & engineering, says.

By Theresa Hitchens

Harry Harris, former commander of Pacific Command and U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, is an advisor with Stellar Solutions, Inc.

[백선호]

해면에 붙어 날아 오는 순항 미사일에 대해서는 항상 하늘 위에 뭐든 띄워 두어야 조기경보가 가능하겠네요.

[위종민]

레이더 수평선 계산기( https://www.translatorscafe.com/unit-converter/en-US/calculator/radar-horizon/ )에 비행고도 5m, 높이는 괌의 최고봉인 406m를 넣고 계산해보니 Radar Horizon은 83.05km, Radar Target Visibility는 92.27km 입니다.

괌에 E-2건 E-3건 E-7이건 상시 배치가 필요하긴 할 것 같습니다.

[백선호]

순항 미사일 방어에 대해서 Carlo Kopp이 쓴 글입니다.

http://www.ausairpower.net/Analysis-Cruise-Missiles.html

참고로 구소련은 AGM-86 ALCM과 BGM-109 토마호크에 대응해서 저고도로 날아오는 순항 미사일을 잡기 위한 Clam Shell 레이다를 만들어 SA-10에서 썼습니다.

http://www.ausairpower.net/clamshell.html

[백선호]

https://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/515G/3170

CSBA가 생각한 2035-2040년 남중국해에서 중국 또는 리투아니아에서 러시아와 한판 붙는 시나리오에서는 F-16과 공대공 임무 무인기들이 미군의 기지들을 순항 미사일로부터 지키는데 쓰였습니다.

Table 22 also includes a significant number of Multi-Mission UAS and F-16 fighters. Wargame teams allocated the MM-UAS and the Air Force’s remaining F-16s toward defending U.S. airbases against air and missile attacks, not offensive operations.

http://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/51Tp/201

[백선호]

Flap Lid도 높이 올려 놓는 버전이 있지요.

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Engagement-Fire-Control.html#mozTocId158983