호주의 국방정책 발표; 장갑차 도입 축소, K-9 & K-10 2차분 도입 취소, B-21 도입은 무리

[위종민]

https://breakingdefense.com/2023/04/in-chinas-shadow-new-australian-defense-review-focuses-on-denial-long-range-weapons/

다양한 임무를 수행할 수 있는 균형잡힌 전력 모델과 호주 방어 교리 대신, 적 행동의 자유를 거부하는 거부전략이 핵심이 됐네요. 

SSN AUKUS 도입이 최우선이며, 수상함전력 구성과 관련 추가검토가 있을 듯 합니다. 

육군은 L400 페이즈3 도입물량이 450대에서 129대로 줄 예정이고, K-9과 K-10 2차분 도입은 취소됩니다. 대신 연안전 능력을 확보하기 위한 육상발사 장거리 미사일과 상륙정을 도입할 예정이라고.

B-21 획득 여부도 조사했지만 B-21이 획득을 고려하기 적합한 옵션이 아니라고 결론내렸다고 하네요. 

이런 분석은 지난 몇 년 간의 지정학적 변화로 미국은 더 이상 인도-태평양의 지배적 강대국이 아니며, 이 지역에 강대국의 전략적 경쟁이 돌아왔다는 정세판단 하에 이뤄졌습니다. 

호주군의 획득 프로세스에 대해 이는 목적에 적합하지 않으며 비열하다(scathing)고 비판한 뒤, 조달체계는 완벽한 해결책이나 절차를 추구하는 대신 적절한 시간과 적절한 성능을 제공하는 데 집중해야 한다고 분석했네요. 

In China’s shadow, new Australian defense review focuses on denial, long-range weapons

The review also takes Australia's acquisition strategy to task, saying it's too slow to get capabilities into the hands of the armed forces.

By   MAX BLENKINon April 24, 2023 at 11:18 AM

HMAS Melbourne fires a Standard Missile 2 from its Guided Missile Launching System during RIMPAC 18. (ADF)

CANBERRA — Australia will adopt a defense strategy of denial, developing anti-access and area denial capabilities including longer range missiles to prevent an adversary from entering an operational area, according to a new Defence Strategic Review.

This doesn’t point the finger specifically at China, but it comes in the shadow of what the review says is a Chinese military buildup that is now the largest and most ambitious of any country since the end of World War II.

“This build up is occurring without transparency or reassurance to the Indo-Pacific region of China’s strategic intent. China’s assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea threatens the global rules based order in the Indo-Pacific in a way that adversely impacts Australia’s national interests,” the report says.

The long-awaited review says the current Australian Defence Force (ADF) force structure was based on a balanced force model capable of performing multiple different mission and the “Defence of Australia” doctrine — but that approach was no longer fit for purpose.

“The development of a strategy of denial for the ADF is key in our ability to deny an adversary freedom of action to militarily coerce Australia and to operate against Australia without being held at risk,” it says.

As such, the review makes major recommendations about force structure and capabilities. Acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, the centerpiece of the AUKUS security arrangement with the United States and United Kingdom, takes number one priority. As already foreshadowed, the ADF will acquire long-range strike capabilities, both air- and land- launched.

RELATED: How the US and UK plan to get nuclear-powered subs to Australia

Significantly, there will be an additional, short independent review, reporting third quarter, of the Navy surface combatant fleet to ensure its size, structure and composition complement capabilities provided by the new nuclear submarines.

That would appear to potentially impact the proposed fleet of nine Hunter-class anti-submarine warfare frigates, regarded as providing limited capabilities with just 32 vertical launch missile cells against 48 on each of the three Hobart-class air warfare destroyers.

The Army, however, appears to be a significant loser in the review. It’s planned acquisition of new infantry fighting vehicles will be reduced from 450 to 129. Planned acquisition of a second block of Hanwha self-propelled howitzers and resupply vehicles will be cancelled.

“The  systems do not provide the required range or lethality,” the review says. However Army will acquire a land-launched long range missile capability and landing craft to enhance its littoral warfare capability.

The review team also examined whether Australia could acquire the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider stealth bomber as a long range strike platform, but said the team does “not consider the B-21 to be a suitable option for consideration for acquisition.”

The Defence Structure Review was commissioned by the new Labor government and conducted by former Defence force chief Angus Houston and former Labor Defence Minister Stephen Smith.

This review is the first major one since the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, and notes geopolitical changes in the last few years. The US is no longer the unipolar leader of the Indo-Pacific, it says, and the region has seen the return of major power strategic competition “the intensity of which should be seen as the defining feature of our region and time.”

The 110-page document is scathing of the ADF’s current acquisition processes, declaring them not fit for purpose.

“The system needs to abandon its pursuit of the perfect solution or process and focus on delivering timely and relevant capability,” it says.

Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles told journalists the procurement process needed to be streamlined to make it more nimble and able to deliver equipment faster into service.

“It means we have got to have a greater appetite for risk,” he said. “The way in which we built an aircraft in this country in World War II and the way in which the American industrial economy geared up in a matter of a year to produce what it did during World War II was to assume risk… This is not 1941 and we are not [in] 1939. We are not trying to paint that picture. But we are not in a benign environment either. We are in an environment where we need to have a changed relationship to risk.”

The Review devotes a chapter to climate change, saying it holds a number of significant implications for defense.

But it stops well short of some outside proposals for substantial elements of the ADF be devoted to humanitarian and disaster relief.

The Review says acceleration of major climate events risks overwhelming the government’s capacity to respond effectively and detracts from the ADF’s primary mission of defending Australia.

“Defence must be the force of last resort for domestic aid to the civil community. This is critical given the urgent geostrategic risks that the nation faces and the need for the ADF to be in a position to respond to regional contingencies,” it says.

Funding of DSR priorities will require additional funding. Minister Richard Marles said the defense funding trajectory would remain as it is over the next four years but after that additional funding will be required.

[백선호]

옳은 방향이지만 여전히 3군 나눠먹기의 흔적이 있고 공군력 강화하는 내용이 별로 없다고 하네요.

https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/8170592/army-not-changing-enough-navy-not-better-off-and-air-force-ignored/

[위종민]

B-21 도입을 검토했다가 포기했으면 뭔가 다른 강화책이 나왔어야 될 것 같은데요.

[백선호]

B-21에 대해서는 이렇게 추측하네요. 저 비싼 물건을 몇 대 도입하는 것은 너무 돈이 많이 들고, 차라리 PrSM같은 지대지/지대함 미사일을 사는 것이 낫다고.

The review rejects the idea of buying Northrop Grumman B-21 Raiders, stealth bombers that are not yet in service with the US Air Force. Reasons are not given, but the poor economics of running a small fleet of enormously costly aircraft would be the big one. It's probably cheaper just to buy more strike missiles, such as PrSMs.

[Minowski(김유철)]

결국 호주는 핵잠에 거의 모든 것이 걸린 형국이 아닌가 싶습니다. F35나 FA18에 LRASM을 인티하고 무인드론에 투자한다고는 하지만 핵잠 획득계획이 예상보다 비용이 치솟는다고 하면 이런 사업들도 칼질당할 확률이 높아지고..... 거기다 해군력 확충에서 호주 방산업체가 보여준 이전투구는 그 불안을 더욱 가중시키고.. 그리니 보고서에 획득 프로세스를 콕 짚어 지적한 거겠고..... 그나저나 정권이 바뀌더니 미국에 대한 평가가 보다 냉정 혹은 신랄해졌달까요....

[위종민]

콜린스급 관련돼 당시 국방장관인가가 호주 국영조선업체는 카누도 제대로 못 만들 거라고 했었는데 이번엔 과연..

[강준구]

한화는 여러모로 씁쓸하겠네요

[위종민]

예상됐던 건인지 주가가 폭락하거나 그렇진 않았더군요.