|
Are missile cruisers a better option than corvettes?
14 Feb 2024|James Garlick
SHARE
The navy is under-gunned for the strategic circumstances Australia faces. For years, commentators have criticised its existing and planned platforms for possessing too few missile cells. Many of them have suggested that the best remedy is to commission a significant number of small warships or corvettes. They argue that small, fast, manoeuvrable ships would be effective in the narrow straits and shallow waters on Australia’s northern approaches. Other experts question this assertion. Despite the unsettled nature of the debate, it is believed that the surface fleet review about to be released by the government endorses a fleet of corvettes. But, historically such ships have not delivered the potent strategic impact Australia needs.
This is evident if we compare Australia’s experience in the two world wars. In 1914, at the onset of World War I, the centrepiece of the Australian fleet was the battlecruiser HMAS Australia. It was essentially a lightly armoured dreadnought–the tier 1 combatant of the time. Its mere presence deterred German naval forces in the Pacific from carrying out their war orders—to raid Australian shipments to Britain of food, gold, and wool. The German commander, Vice-Admiral Von Spee knew that Australia alone outclassed his squadron which did not possess a comparable warship. If he encountered the battlecruiser, his ships would be quickly overwhelmed, and his men fruitlessly sacrificed. He chose to evacuate the theatre, charting a course across the Pacific in the hope of getting home. His squadron was eventually destroyed at the Battle of the Falkland Islands by the British battlecruisers Invincible and Inflexible—confirming that Spee’s fear of Australia had been very much warranted.
By contrast, Australia possessed no significant deterrent when war broke out in the Pacific in 1941. HMAS Australia had been scuttled as per the Washington Naval Treaty. The RAN was comprised of two heavy cruisers, some modern and some obsolete light cruisers, and some old destroyers. Most of which were assisting the British navy in the Mediterranean. At this stage, the air force was under-developed. So, the Imperial Japanese Navy could enter Australian waters with relative impunity. Its incursions into the South Pacific and north-east India Ocean are too numerous to recount. Ultimately, Australia relied upon American naval power to blunt Japan’s southern offensive at the Battle of the Coral Sea and at the Solomon Islands.
These examples demonstrate that a first-class navy, with an appropriate number of tier 1 combatants can deny the waters surrounding Australia to adversaries. A second-class navy cannot. Although technology has changed, I am convinced that this lesson of naval history still applies. Today, the key issue is the cost-effective deployment of lethal anti-ship missiles across Australia’s north to manifest the strategy of denial recommended by the defence strategic review (DSR). Here, corvettes fall down in terms of missile-carrying capacity. I believe Australia needs missile cruisers.
As warships grow in size, they become more efficient missile-carrying platforms. The table below compares the tonnage, crew numbers, and missile cells of leading corvette, destroyer, and cruiser designs. Probably the best armed corvette in service today is the Israeli Sa’ar 6—a derivative of the German K130 Braunschweig class. If the government chooses to commission corvettes for the RAN, they will have to be even more potent to achieve the missile-carrying efficiency of its existing air warfare destroyers (AWDs). However, the AWDs are only equivalent to America’s tier 2 combatant, the new Constellation class frigate. The gold standard is South Korea’s Sejong the Great class destroyer or America’s retiring Ticonderoga class cruiser which requires only 2.7 crew per-missile cell and just 78.7 tons per missile.
Class | Type | Missile Cells | Crew | Displacement (t) | Crew/ Missile | Tons/ Missile |
Braunschweig | Corvette | 4 | 65 | 1840 | 16.3 | 460 |
Sa’ar 6 | Corvette | 16 | 70 | 1900 | 4.4 | 118.8 |
Constellation | Frigate | 48 | 200 | 7291 | 4.2 | 151.9 |
AWD | Destroyer | 48 | 186 | 7700 | 3.9 | 160.4 |
Arleigh Burke | Destroyer | 96 | 300 | 9500 | 3.1 | 100 |
Sejong the Great | Destroyer | 128 | 300 | 10600 | 2.3 | 82.8 |
Ticonderoga | Cruiser | 122 | 330 | 9600 | 2.7 | 78.7 |
These metrics are important because naval personnel are a scarce resource, especially for a medium sized country like Australia. Cost is always a factor and tonnage gives a rough indication of price. Consider that the RAN would have to put three Sa’ar type corvettes to sea to equal the number of missiles deployed aboard one AWD. This would require 210 sailors–24 more than one AWD. For argument’s sake, consider that it would take eight Sa’ar types to match the missile capacity of a Ticonderoga, requiring 560 sailors—230 more than a Ticonderoga. This may be why countries like South Korea and Japan are contemplating ‘arsenal ships’ for ballistic missile defence and conventional deterrence. If armed with Block V Tomahawk missiles which have a range of 1500km and an anti-ship capability, a fleet of missile cruisers would cost-effectively provide Australia with missile dominance over its northern approaches.
Detractors will likely argue that large ships are too vulnerable in the age of space-based surveillance and missile warfare. This is far from certain. First, large warships are inherently more survivable because they have space for defensive systems whose effectiveness is currently being demonstrated in the Red Sea. The cruisers would be part of a ‘system-of-systems’ and a taskforce with smaller assets providing an outer layer of protection and helping to detect, identify, and target enemy combatants. Next to the AUKUS submarines, equipping the RAN with missile cruisers would be the best possible enhancement of Australia’s defences in the short to medium term.
AUTHOR
James Garlick is a PhD student at the University of Newcastle. Image: Kenneth Moll/US Navy/Getty Images.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAS_Australia_(1911)
https://naval-encyclopedia.com/ww2/ran-royal-australian-navy.php
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Royal_Australian_Navy#World_War_II
첫댓글 CCA처럼 수량을 뒷받침할 수상드론이 있다면 코르벳 소요는 줄지 않을까요? 호주공군에서는 래피드드래곤이나 B21이 답이라고 주장할것 같고...
대함미사일이랑 원격기관포탑 장비한 USV들 실용화되면 코르벳급 이하는 평시 순찰이나 도는 데 쓸 OPV로 대체되지 않을까 합니다. 그런 순찰임무도 USV나 UAV 조합으로 상당부분 대체 가능할 테고..
1920년대에 순양전함 없애고 대신 중순양함을 도입했을 때 생각한 위협은 일본 순양함의 통상파괴전이었다고 하네요.
https://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/5q3/437
싱가포르가 있으니 호주에 일본해군 주력이 쏟아질 일은 없을 거라 믿었지만 현실은 ㅜㅜ
어쨌건 강대한 가상적을 상대로 이등급 해군이나 가성비를 우선한 전력 구성은 안 통한다는 논지는 맞다고 봅니다.
1937년 신문 기사에 나온 '오스트렐리아공군은 일본 항모에 실려 올 함재기 숫자보다 많이 가지면 된다'는 논리는 일본해군 주력이 올 수도 있다는 가정을 한 것 같네요.
https://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/5q4/745