필리핀과 베트남; 각기 다르지만 모두 실패한 남중국해 전략

[위종민]

니케이에 실린 RAND 연구원 데릭 그로스먼의 글입니다.

필리핀은 남중국해(제2토마스 환초)에 대한 중국의 공격적인 행동을 외부에 공개해 중국에 대한 비난을 불러일으키게 만드는 전략을 채택했고, 반대로 베트남은 2020년 이후 중국과의 충돌을 비공개하고 불필요한 긴장을 고조시키는 것을 피하는 길을  택했지만 모두 다 실패했다는 주장입니다. 

중국은 필리핀의 행동 및 국제사회의 비난에는 신경쓰지 않고 필리핀에 대한 압박을 꾸준히 강화하고 있으며, 베트남에서는 중국의 남중국해 섬들에 대한 영토 기정사실화를 막기 위해 베트남도 자국이 통제하는 구역에 인공섬을 축조하고 있으며 적어도 일부는 군사화할 것이라고 예상하네요. 

강택민이나 호금도 시절과는 달리 현 습근평 지도부는 국제관계에서 책임있는 이해당사자로 행동하는 대신 더 권위적이고 국제법과 행동규범을 무시하는 것이 중국의 이익에 부합한다면 그러는 쪽을 택하고 있습니다. 필리핀은 호주나 일본같은 주변국의 협력을 받는 데에는 성공했지만 이미 나쁜 놈이 되기로 결정한 중국의 행동을 바꿀 순 없었고, 베트남은 중국이 자국의 폭력적인 행동이 공개된다면 받게 될 평판 훼손에 신경쓸 거라 믿었지만 이는 잘못된 가정이었다고 합니다. 2014년 중국이 베트남 관할 파라셀 제도의 EEZ 안에 석유 시추공을 설치했다가 철수한 적이 있었지만 이게 아세안과 미국의 규탄성명 때문인지, 단순히 시추작업이 끝났기 때문인지도 불확실했다고 하고요. 

양국은 모두 투명성이나 불투명성 전략에 신경쓰기보다는 필리핀의 경우, 미국과의 안보조약 활성화나 제2토마스 환초에 대한 보급에 미해안 경비대나 미해군의 호위를 요청하고, 베트남의 경우 미국에 지원을 요청하거나 미국-베트남 합동훈련 등 보다 실질적이고 포괄적인 전략이 필요하다고 주장합니다. 

Philippines and Vietnam's South China Sea strategies have failed - Nikkei Asia

Philippines and Vietnam's South China Sea strategies have failed

Manila's 'transparency' and Hanoi's 'opacity' are outdated approaches to deter China

Derek Grossman

July 15, 2024 05:05 JST

Members of the China Coast Guard approach Philippine troops on a resupply mission in the Second Thomas Shoal in the disputed South China Sea on June 17.   © Armed Forces Of The Philippines

Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at the think tank RAND Corp. in Santa Monica, California, and an adjunct professor in the practice of political science and international relations at the University of Southern California. He formerly served as an intelligence adviser at the Pentagon.

In the words of the Philippine Navy spokesperson, the events of June 17 represented "the most aggressive action ever conducted by agents of aggression of [the] Chinese communist party in the South China Sea." Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad wasn't exaggerating.

On that day, the Philippines conducted a routine resupply mission of its sailors stationed aboard the World War II-era Sierra Madre naval ship, which was intentionally grounded in 1999 at Second Thomas Shoal. Although the shoal is well within the Philippines' internationally accepted exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles from its shores, China claims such a wide swath of the South China Sea that it encroaches into the area around Second Thomas Shoal. Chinese forces responded to the resupply by ramming the Philippine boats and confiscating their weapons. Several sailors were injured in the incident, including one who lost a finger.

Much is known about the incident because it was caught on video -- intentionally. For the past few years, Manila has implemented what has become known as its "transparency initiative," or "assertive transparency," to expose bad Chinese behavior in the South China Sea. Talk of the strategy dominated all of my discussions on a recent visit to the Philippines.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the South China Sea, Vietnam also has sprawling sovereignty disputes with China, but interestingly, since at least 2020, Hanoi has adopted the exact opposite strategy. In what I term the "opacity initiative," Vietnam has clearly reached a quiet agreement with China not to publicize any of their clashes in the region, and to handle disagreements and tensions strictly behind closed doors to avoid unnecessary escalation.

Neither approach has thus far succeeded. Beijing has steadily ramped up pressure against the Philippines using gray zone tactics to include ramming, shadowing, blocking, encircling, firing water cannons and using military-grade lasers against both civilian and military ships. Indeed, the June 17 incident was so severe that some in both Manila and Washington believe it was sufficient to trigger the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of the U.S.-Philippine security alliance.

On the Vietnamese side, my conversations in recent weeks with multiple experts affiliated with the government underscored that the same kind of escalation is taking place: China continues to push the envelope throughout the South China Sea to elbow Vietnamese forces out or prevent them from ever getting into disputed areas. In a rare glimpse of Hanoi's response, a recent report showed that Vietnam was frantically building artificial islands on features it controls to rival Chinese island construction of the past decade. Presumably, Vietnam will eventually militarize at least some of these islands.

Chinese and Vietnamese leaders attend a bilateral meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on June 26.   © Reuters

Why has neither a transparency nor opacity strategy been effective? The answer lies in the nature of the current Chinese regime itself.

Under past Chinese leaders like Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, Beijing had fully bought into the George W. Bush administration's mantra that China must act as a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system. Chinese officials actively promoted their "peaceful rise" narrative to dispel any notions that Beijing sought conflict with its neighbors or the U.S.

Current leader Xi Jinping, however, is cut from a different cloth. His China, beginning in 2012, has been more authoritarian and suspicious of the West. It also cares far less about its international reputation and is content flouting international law and norms of behavior if doing so suits Beijing's interests.

Within the South China Sea context, this means ignoring and undermining the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), even though Beijing signed up to the agreement. Early in Xi's tenure, a think tank expert affiliated with China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs candidly told me that Beijing should try to revise UNCLOS tailored for a new, more powerful China. I think this is a widely shared sentiment among the Chinese strategic elite today.

The unfortunate reality is that the Philippines' and Vietnam's reputation-focused strategies are outdated, designed for a China that no longer exists.

For Manila, shaming Beijing in front of the world has been effective at convincing neighbors like Australia and Japan to work more closely with the Philippines on the problem. But it has been entirely ineffective at changing Chinese behavior because Xi has already embraced the bad guy role. Or, from his perspective, Xi must uphold Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea, no matter the reputational cost.

For Hanoi, quiet diplomacy also fails because it once again, wrongly, presumes Beijing cares that if video or word gets out about its assertiveness, then that would somehow harm Chinese interests. Hanoi's thinking on this matter seems to be derived from the May 2014 experience in which Beijing placed an oil rig within Vietnam's EEZ off the Paracel Islands and only removed it after a monthslong standoff and publicizing China's breach of UNCLOS. But again, this was a different time, when Xi was still a relatively new leader, and besides, the causation is unclear -- did condemnatory statements from ASEAN and the U.S. convince Beijing to remove the rig, or had its extraction work there simply ended?

Regardless, Hanoi seems convinced that keeping incidents quiet is the way to go unless or until it needs to punish Beijing by releasing the details of incidents in the region. Yet there is simply no evidence that this approach works.

Rather than focusing on transparency or opacity, the Philippines and Vietnam should come up with more substantive and comprehensive strategies. The Philippines, for example, should consider floating activation of the U.S.-Philippines MDT, at least Article III, which calls for bilateral negotiations on a challenge. It could also seek to rewrite the MDT to encompass necessary responses to Chinese gray zone tactics. Manila could further ask the U.S. to clarify that territories within Manila's EEZ are legitimately part of the Philippines and request armed U.S. Coast Guard or Navy escorts to resupply Second Thomas Shoal.

Although Vietnam does not have a security alliance with the U.S., it could similarly request the U.S. to do more and thus signal collective resolve. This could include the U.S. Coast Guard or Navy participating in joint patrols as well as joint U.S.-Vietnam exercises. Hanoi's strict defense policy tends to forbid these activities, but if the situation appreciably worsens, then it also reserves the right to bend or break its own rules. The U.S. could similarly make a statement clarifying the territorial integrity of features that fall within Vietnam's EEZ.

Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet to resolving China's rising assertiveness throughout the South China Sea. But what is obvious at this point is neither transparency nor opacity is working -- and updated strategies should and must be considered.

[백선호]

지금의 베트남은 리콴유 회고록에 나온 모습은 없는 듯 하네요.

https://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/5q4/187

1978년와 1990년에 베트남의 팜반동 총리를 만났던 리콴유 회고록 407~408쪽 내용입니다.

베트남 지도자들은 참기 힘든 사람들이었다. 그들은 거들먹거리면서 스스로를 동남아시아의 프러시아인이라고 (19세기 유럽의 군사강국 프로이센에 빗댄 표현) 생각하는 것 같았다. 미국이 기술과 물량으로 대적했던 베트남 전쟁에서 그들이 큰 희생을 감수한 것은 사실이다. 하지만 엄청난 인내력과 미국 매체에 영향을 줄 정도로 고도의 선전선동 능력을 동원했던 베트남인들은 결국 전쟁에 승리할 수 있었다. 그 결과 지도자들은 전세계의 어떤 나라, 어떤 세력도 무찌를 수 있다는 자신에 차 있었다. 내정에 개입하려는 나라가 있으면 상대가 중국 같은 대국이라도 용서하지 않았다. 또 우리같이 왜소한 동남아시아 약소국가들은 상대할 가치도 없다고 생각하고 있었다.

[Minowski(김유철)]

74년 파라셀군도 침탈에 제대로 저항하지 못했던 시점에서 이미 지고 들어간거지 싶습니다. 뭐 베트남 입장에서는 그럴만한 상황은 아니었겠습니다만..
좀 아이러니한게 크게 한 판 붙었던 육상에서는 서로 협력이 원활한 편인데, 해상은 아직 분쟁이 계속되는 상황..
뭔가 3차 중동전 전.후의 이스라엘-이집트관계가 해상과 육상에서 나타나는 모양새랄까요.

[백선호]

아직 망하지 않고 있던 남베트남이 점령하고 있던 섬을 쳐서 빼앗았으니 북베트남은 남베트남과 싸우며 아직 중국의 도움이 필요한 상황에서 중국과 싸우기가 좀 그랬을 것 같네요.

[위종민]

잃을 게 없었던 시절엔 막 나가다가 잃을 게 생기면 몸 사리는 건 조폭이나 국가나... ㅎㅎㅎㅎ

[위종민]

https://warontherocks.com/2024/07/countering-chinese-aggression-in-the-south-china-sea/

이 글에선 2016~2022년 사이 로드리고 두테르테 정부 시기 대중국 유화책이 중국을 달래는 데 실패했고, 그렇다고 미국이 남중국해의 자그마한 섬을 이유로 중국과 전쟁을 벌이지도 않을 것이기 때문에 미-필리핀 동맹은 중국이 분노할 만큼 도발적이지만, 중국을 저지하기엔 너무 약한 최악의 입장에 서 있다고 평가하네요.

"Currently, the U.S.-Philippine alliance is in the worst of all positions: provocative enough to arouse China’s ire, but too weak to deter China’s rampant use of maritime coercion."

[사처포(곽명기)]

거 참 ~ ~
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