(서방에게) 배신당할 위기에 처한 우크라이나

[위종민]

RUSI의 평론인데, 우크라이나 지원에 적극적인 영국의 기관이라서 그런지 워딩이 좀 세네요. 

바이든 행정부의 지원은 항상 너무 적고, 너무 늦어서 우크라이나가 지지 않을 정도였지 승리하게 만들 정도는 아니었고, 해리스가 승리한다 하더라도 그 정책을 이어갈 뿐이며 트럼프가 승리한다면 미국이 푸틴과 직접 협상을 할 수도 있습니다. 만약 이 협상이 진행된다면 크림반도 및 돈바스의 회복이나 피해배상, 전쟁범죄 재판이나 나토가입등을 보장받지 못하고, 몇 년 간 쉰 푸틴이 전쟁을 재개하는 것을 막지 못할 것이라고 하네요. 

유럽은 발트 3국, 북구, 영국과 폴란드는 지원에 적극적이었으나 헝가리는 적대적이었고 오스트리아-슬로바키아가 이에 합류할 수 있으며, 독일은 무기는 많이 제공했지만 정치적으로는 신뢰할 수 없었습니다. 

이번 전쟁은 유럽이 감당해야 하지만 이에 실패함으로써 유럽은 미국의 선거 결과에 기대야만 한다고 논평하네요. 

The Impending Betrayal of Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org)

The Impending Betrayal of Ukraine

The Impending Betrayal of Ukraine

Tim Willasey-Wilsey CMG

14 October 20246 Minute Read

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Ukraine faces a precarious future amid waning Western support. The immediate peril comes from the 2024 US presidential election, but the fundamental problem has been the failure of Europe to commit to the defeat of Putin’s invasion.

The new NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, lost no time in visiting Kyiv after he assumed office, where he ‘pledged continued support for Ukraine in its war with Russia’. Doubtless his words were sincerely intended, but he knows there are serious political headwinds across Europe and the US.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky senses this too as he briefs his ‘Victory Plan’ around European capitals following a mixed reception in Washington.

The forthcoming presidential election in the US represents the point of maximum danger. A win by Donald Trump could see him placing a phone call to Russian President Vladimir Putin as early as 6 November. Any such call would set expectations of a negotiated settlement, with discussions possibly beginning in the early months of 2025. 

Nobody should want this war of ‘meat grinder’ savagery to continue a day longer than necessary. However, Zelensky would have much to fear from a deal negotiated by Trump. The 2020 Doha Accords with the Afghan Taliban have been described as the worst diplomatic agreement since Munich in 1938. Fortunately, Trump was prevented from reaching a similarly disastrous deal with Kim Jong-un of North Korea. 

In any such deal, Zelensky would be unlikely to secure the recovery of Crimea and the Donbas, reparations for the massive damage to his country, war crimes trials or membership of NATO. He might be able to bargain the Kursk salient in return for control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. But, without NATO membership and its Article 5 guarantee, there would be nothing to stop Putin from continuing the war after a couple of years of recovery and rearmament. 

Events since 7 October 2023 have done untold damage to Ukraine’s prospects and to the West’s much-vaunted rules-based international order

For Europe, too, there would be peril. Both Georgia and Moldova look particularly fragile and vulnerable to Russian active measures or hybrid warfare. Even the Baltics would be justifiably nervous, in spite of their NATO status.

However, it would be misleading to blame everything on Trump. There have been plenty of prior indications of trouble ahead.

US support has always been too little, too late. Given the sheer scale of Washington’s military support this might sound absurd, but President Joe Biden’s hesitancy in allowing Storm Shadow missiles to be used against targets inside Russia is indicative of a general trend. As the head of a global superpower, Biden has always had one eye on ensuring that the war does not get out of hand and become nuclear. The result has been that Ukraine feels it has been given enough not to lose but not enough to win. 

In Europe the support has been varied. Some countries, such as the Baltics, the Scandinavian states, the UK and Poland, have done better than others. Hungary has been hostile, and may soon be joined by Slovakia and Austria. Germany has provided the most weapons but has been politically unreliable. Its refusal to supply Taurus missiles and its public debate about reducing its defence budget have sent all the wrong messages. German companies continue to retain significant interests in Russia, and the advance of Alternative for Germany in elections in Thuringia, Saxony and Brandenburg reminded Chancellor Olaf Scholz that there is little support for the war in Eastern Germany. President Emmanuel Macron of France, having been mercurial about Ukraine from the outset, received a similar jolt from the far left and far right in legislative elections in July. 

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The most visible sign of a failure of collective determination to defeat Russia was the decision not to seize Russian financial assets frozen in Western banks, but instead to use them as collateral to raise a much smaller loan. Yes, there would have been a theoretical risk of undermining faith in the Western-dominated financial system, but few countries are yet ready to entrust their savings to Chinese or Indian banks. Furthermore, it would have sent a message to Putin not to invade other countries. 

Meanwhile, the crisis in the Middle East has diverted foreign policy and public attention. In Iraq and Afghanistan 20 years ago, the West demonstrated that it does not have the policy bandwidth to cope with two simultaneous campaigns. The events since 7 October 2023 have done untold damage to Ukraine’s prospects and to the West’s much-vaunted rules-based international order.

A newly elected President Trump would rightly claim that, once again, the US has shouldered the main burden of Western interests with inadequate support from its NATO allies. He would point (correctly again) to the mounting military pressure on Ukraine, its difficulties in replacing front-line soldiers, and the effects on global food and fuel prices. With the war raging in the Levant, he would refer to the US being over-extended once again in ‘forever wars’.

A newly elected President Kamala Harris could be expected to follow the path trodden by Biden. She would inherit his caution at unduly provoking Putin and his reticence about Ukraine joining NATO. Furthermore, her freedom to supply Ukraine with additional weaponry could be restricted by the make-up of the two houses of Congress. 

This should have been Europe’s war to manage. In spite of decades of discussion about European defence, it proved too convenient to rely on US largesse

There could be a third outcome to the election: a Harris victory that is contested by Trump. In such circumstances, we could see an absence of US foreign policy for a period of weeks or months. 

Barring a mutiny by Russian forces or a crisis in Moscow, the prospects for Ukraine (and therefore Europe) look grim. The irony is that Putin would claim victory in spite of his campaign having been a costly disaster.

What would a betrayed Ukraine look like? At least it would retain some 82% of its territory. A guilty West would doubtless provide aid to rebuild infrastructure. It might be given a pathway to eventual EU membership (unless that option had been bargained away at the negotiating table), but joining the Western club may have lost its appeal at that point. Ukraine’s corrupt oligarchs would re-emerge from hibernation. The old post-Soviet cynicism would replace the youthful enthusiasm of the Maidan generation. There would be antagonism towards those returning from abroad after avoiding the fight, and – of course – thousands of grieving families.

This should have been Europe’s war to manage. In spite of decades of discussion about European defence, it proved too convenient to rely on US largesse. This made Europe a prisoner of US electoral factors. It also caused Europe to shirk the difficult decisions that helping win the war entailed: the big increases in defence expenditure, the 24-hour working in ammunition factories, the hikes in food and energy costs and the political risks such as seizing frozen assets. What remains now for Europe is to secure a place at the negotiating table and to argue for NATO membership for Ukraine as part of any settlement.

Failing that, the West will have years to repent the betrayal of the courageous Ukrainians, whose only crime was their wish to join the Western democratic order.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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[Minowski(김유철)]

제가 러우전쟁 터지기 전에 우연히 읽고서 꽤 인상깊었던 반도전쟁에 대한 글을 소개합니다. https://m.blog.naver.com/sanghajwau/222201202704, https://m.blog.naver.com/sanghajwau/222204120779

이 글을 좀 요약하면, 반도전쟁이 발발하자 "스페인"이라는 나라에 대해 잘 몰랐던 영국인들은, 목가적이고 순박한 스페인이 침략자 나폴레옹에 맞서 저항하고 있다고 과도하게 낭만화시키고 영국의 개입을 신성한 사명으로 승화시켜갔고, 결국 나폴레옹이 패퇴한 후 페르디난트7세가 헌법을 폐지하는 등 퇴행적인 전제정으로 돌아갔을 때 맨붕했지만, 나폴레옹과 유럽의 전제군주들에게 교훈을 주었다고 스스로를 납득시켰다는 내용입니다. 그리고 "반도 전쟁을 통한 자유 의식과 민족주의의 발달은, 영국인들이 그리스 독립이나 크림 전쟁과 같은 비슷한 사건들에 대한 지지를 반복적으로 표명하면서 영국 사회에 굳건히 뿌리내렸다"고 정리하네요.

[Minowski(김유철)]

걱정되는 부분이 바로 서구언론과 우크라이나를 지지하는 여론 일부에서 나타나는 과도한 낭만화와 신성화라는 점인데, 이러한 경향은 전쟁을 마무리짓지 못하게 하는 가장 큰 걸림돌이 될 것이라 생각됩니다.

[백선호]

스페인, 크림 반도는 프랑스, 러시아를 막기 위해 했다고 이해는 되는데 그리스 독립은... 이미 맛이 간 터키를 더 약하게 만드는 것인데 다른 동기가 있었을까요??

[Minowski(김유철)]

저기 소개드린 논문을 당시 영국 대중의 정서변화(?)를 고찰한 내용이라고 보시면 되겠습니다. 즉 국정운영하는 엘리트 층은 반도에서 나폴레옹을 약화시키고, 오스만으로 부터 그리스를 뜯어내는데 관심있었다하더라도 언론과 지식인 그리고 그걸 접한 대중들이 초기 전쟁개입에 전폭적인 지지를 보낸 이유를 당시 낭만주의 기조와 함께 관찰한거라 보면 될것 같습니다.
스페인의 경우 여하튼 잘 모르는 나라지만 진짜 선량하고 순박한 농부들의 나라인 것 같은데 간악한 나폴레옹이 침략했으니, 스페인 민중의 지지를 받는 페리드난트를 도와 개입해야한다였다면, 그리스는 바이런 등으로 대표되는 낭만주의 사조의 예술가등이 직접 참전하는 등 "유럽문화의 원류"인 그리스를 "이교도 야만인들"로 부터 해방시킨다는 대의가 대중을 격동시킨거죠.
이러한 신성한 대의, 약하고 선량한 이를 돕는다는 낭만적인 사조가 이후 영국 대외개입에 대한 대중지지의 근간이 되었고, 좀 더 비약하자면 제국주의의 모토 "백인의 의무"의 배경이 되었다고도 볼 수 있겠습니다.

[백선호]

1989년 영화 7월 4일생에서 탐 크루즈가 해병대에 입대하는 것도 약간 위와 같은 생각을 갖고 한 것이 아닌가 싶습니다.