역사 1955년 - 18대의 M-4 폭격기를 28대처럼 보이게 한 소련

[위종민]

미야시체프 M-4 폭격기는 등장 당시 대륙간 폭격이 가능할 것으로 추정돼 구소련판 B-52로 평가받았고 1954년 노동절 퍼레이드를 시작으로 각종 행사에 동원됐는데, 1955년 7월 투시노 비행장에서는 10대의 M-4가 먼저 비행을 실시한 후 사라졌다가 후속하는 8대의 M-4와 합류해 또다시 비행을 했다고 합니다. 이로 인해 한 행사에서 동시에 28대의 M-4가 동원된 것처럼 보이게 할 수 있었고, 서방 분석가들은 이를 보고 1960년까지 소련의 M-4 800기를 운용할 것이라고 분석했다고 하네요. 

그러나 M-4는 기술적으로 신뢰도가 떨어졌고 크기가 큰 핵무기를 탑재하기 어려웠으며, 공중급유 없이는 항속거리가 미국까지 도달하기 어려워서 대량생산되지는 않았고 미국도 U-2의 정찰로 이 사실을 알고 있었지만 전략폭격기 대량생산의 명분을 잃지 않기 위해 비밀로 숨겼다고 하네요. 이런 조작된 '폭격기 격차' 때문에 B-47 2,032대, B-52 744대와 803대 KC-135 급유기 등이 생산됐습니다. 또한 NORAD도 창설돼 북미대륙 방공을 책임지게 됐지요.  

M-4는 125기가 생산됐고 상당수가 공중급유기로 개조됐다고 하네요. 3대는 대형 화물 수송기인 VM-T로 개조됐네요. 

https://theaviationgeekclub.com/when-soviets-faked-a-flyby-of-28-myasishchev-m-4s-to-pretend-they-had-a-credible-fleet-of-bombers-the-us-built-thousands-of-b-47-and-b-52-strategic-bombers-and-hundreds-of-kc-135-stratotankers-for-re/

When Soviets faked a flyby of 28 Myasishchev M-4s to pretend they had a credible fleet of bombers, the US built thousands of B-4

• Aviation History
• Cold War Era
• Military Aviation

When Soviets faked a flyby of 28 Myasishchev M-4s to pretend they had a credible fleet of bombers, the US built thousands of B-47 and B-52 strategic bombers and hundreds of KC-135 Stratotankers for real

By Dario Leone

Jun 19 2023

Sponsored by: Helion & Company

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During this event 10 M-4s were flown in view of the public: the formation then flew out of sight and joined up with eight additional bombers before turning around and then making another pass.

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The first post-Second World War modern Soviet heavy bomber was a ‘clone’ of the American B-29 which was designated Tu-4. Several hundred were built, of which a number were configured for nuclear bomb delivery. Yet already by the mid-1950s the Tu-4 was obsolete.

That seemed not to be a particularly serious problem as new heavy bombers were either entering service or getting close to it.

As explained by Krzysztof Dabrowski in his book Tsar Bomba: Live testing of Soviet Nuclear Bombs, 1949-1962, the Tupolev design bureau could pride itself with two new creations: the Tu-16 jet bomber and the Tu-95 turboprop one. If longevity is anything to go by the latter proved most successful. In addition, a new design bureau headed by Vladimir Mikhaylovich Myasishchev presented its creation; the M-4 bomber; soon followed by an improved variant the 3M. Myasishchev’s aircraft were designed to have intercontinental range and thus to be truly ‘strategic,’ for it meant they would possess the capability to reach targets in continental North America.

Rather unsurprisingly, these developments were closely followed in the US. When eval‎uating Soviet bombers US analysts compared the Tu-16 to the B-47 Stratojet and the M-4 to the B-52 Stratofortress. The Myasishchev bomber in particular caused much alarm. It was first revealed during a flypast at the annual May Day parade (International Worker’s Day – lavishly celebrated in the Soviet Union for ideological reasons) in 1954. Subsequently it was displayed at a number of other flypasts and parades. In particular the flypast during the Soviet Aviation Day at the Tushino Airfield in July 1955 was to have far reaching consequences. During this event 10 M-4s were flown in view of the public: the formation then flew out of sight and joined up with eight additional bombers before turning around and then making another pass. This resulted in the illusion that the Soviets had shown no less than 28 bombers in a single fly-by – the initial formation of 10 and a second of 18. Seeing 28 Myasishchev bombers, Western analysts came to the conclusion that by 1960 the Soviets would have 800 of these in operational service.

Reality proved different to the analytic estimates. It was not known in the West at that time that Myasishchev bombers were difficult to fly, were unreliable al they were technically troublesome, could not be armed with some of the bulkier pieces of nuclear ordnance due to their bicycle undercarriage, and – most importantly- their unrefuelled range was actually insufficient to reach the US. For these reasons – and in particular the latter – it was decided not to pursue their large-scale production. Certainly enough, and together with Tu-95s, they did represent the first Soviet delivery systems capable of reaching US territory, and, from the moment they entered service in 1956, until the early 1960s, they were the only Soviet intercontinental delivery systems. Meanwhile, aerial reconnaissance by U-2 aircraft, which penetrated deep over the Soviet Union, showed that only a limited number of Myasishchev bombers were deployed at operational air bases, and there were no signs of large-scale production. However, the results of these early U-2 missions were kept ‘top secret.’ Moreover, some of those who had access to the reconnaissance material gathered, in particular the senior leadership of the USAF, had a vested interest in maintaining the image of a Soviet bomber threat as it provided them with a convenient justification for demanding a substantial build-up of their own bomber force.

As things stood – without a realistic picture of Soviet bomber capabilities being widely available – a Soviet ‘superiority’ in bombers vis-à-vis the US became known as the ‘bomber gap.’ This was to have far reaching consequences as it resulted in a number of American offensive and defensive countermeasures. The US Air Force’s Strategic Air Command would be substantially built up, receiving thousands of Boeing B-47 Stratojet (2,032 aircraft built) and Boeing B-52 Stratofortress (744 aircraft built) strategic bombers, supported by hundreds of Boeing KC-135 Stratotankers (803 aircraft built).

This print is available in multiple sizes from AircraftProfilePrints.com – CLICK HERE TO GET YOURS. KC-135R Stratotanker 100th ARW, 351st ARS, 62-3551

With this the US for some time gained a decisive edge in the number of strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems over the Soviet Union. This advantage would only be overcome by the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile arsenal, but its development and build-up were still many years away. Meanwhile, in the defensive realm the feared Soviet bomber threat led to the creation of the North American Air Defense Command and its massive machinery, including hundreds of manned interceptors, surface-to-air missiles and related bases, large early warning radar stations, and the development of early warning aircraft.

One could endlessly argue on how justified and necessary of the American response was, however, it should be taken into consideration that in view of publicly available information at that time a substantially different reaction would have hardly been possible. Moreover, even though the Soviets were in fact able to carry out only very limited attacks against North America, one could ask: how much would have been acceptable? One, two or three thermonuclear bombs? Hundreds of thousands, a million or more casualties? Even a very few thermonuclear bombs on major urban centres could result in such numbers of killed and wounded. Thus, building up a retaliatory – as well as a defensive – capability was not completely out of place even if the ‘bomber gap’ never existed.

Tsar Bomba: Live testing of Soviet Nuclear Bombs, 1949-1962, is published by Helion & Company and is available to order here.

Photo credit: U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, Unknown and Senior Airman Tessa B. Corrick / U.S. Air Force

This model is available from AirModels – CLICK HERE TO GET YOURS.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myasishchev_M-4

Myasishchev M-4 - Wikipedia

[백선호]

F-4B 개발할 때 요 Bison이 가상 적기 노릇을 한 것 같습니다. 이런 폭격기를 상대할 전투기였으니 기총 대신 미사일만 다는 것이 바른 선택이었지요.

https://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/515G/3544

[위종민]

베어가 아니라 왜 바이슨이 가상적이었는지 갸우뚱했었는데, 50년대엔 바이슨이 주력 폭격기가 될 거라고 추정했나 봅니다.

[백선호]

1950년에는 터보프롭 폭격기는 제트 폭격기가 나오기 전까지 임시 땜빵하는 존재라고 생각했겠죠. 미국에서도 터보프롭은 아니지만 프로펠러 돌리는 B-36이 B-52 나오자마자 사라졌습니다.

[사처포(곽명기)]

예산 많이 배정 받기 위해 어느 나라나 국방부의 행태는 거의 닮은 듯.
그리고 군종별 행태도 거기에서 벗어나지 않을 듯...

[마로]

벤 리치가 쓴 스컹크웍스에서도 짧게 등장하는 내용이죠. U-2 개발의 필요성을 강변하면서 예시로 드는...

[위종민]

작년에 개정판이 출간됐었네요. 찾아봐야겠습니다.