Re: 미국 핵무기의 폴란드 배치를 요구한 폴란드 대통령

[위종민]

안제이 두다 폴란드 대통령이, 파이낸셜 타임즈와의 인터뷰에서 "1999년 나토 경계선이 동쪽으로 옮겨졌기 때문에 나토 인프라도 동쪽으로 옮겨져야 하고, 미국 핵무기가 폴란드에 배치돼야 한다."고 주장해네요. 

이 기사에선 폴란드가 프랑스와 미국 핵무기 모두를 원한다고 해석합니다. 

Why Poland’s president wants US nuclear weapons - Atlantic Council

Why Poland’s president wants US nuclear weapons

Why Poland’s president wants US nuclear weapons

By Marek Magierowski

Earlier this week, Polish President Andrzej Duda overtly proposed that US nuclear warheads be deployed on Polish soil. “The borders of NATO moved east in 1999, so twenty-six years later there should also be a shift of the NATO infrastructure east,” Duda said in an interview with the Financial Times. “I think it’s not only that the time has come, but that it would be safer if [nuclear] weapons were already here.”

The following day, he repeated the assertion to the BBC: “Every strategic kind of infrastructure, American and NATO infrastructure, which we have on our soil is strengthening the inclination of the US and the North Atlantic Alliance to defend this territory.”

Duda’s remarks epitomize growing uncertainty, or even nervousness, among Central Europe’s political elites, in light of an abrupt shift (glass half empty) or at least ambiguity (glass half full) of US foreign policy under Donald Trump’s presidency.

The role of nuclear deterrence in the wider debate on Europe’s autonomous defense capabilities has become a hot topic in several capitals, especially after the recent cooling of transatlantic relations. European leaders have more or less openly expressed their concerns and misgivings about the United States’ reliability as a NATO ally.

However, in the Polish case, the ongoing discussion on the future of military cooperation with the United States has a strong domestic undercurrent.

For Duda and his fellow Polish right-wingers, European ‘autonomy’ remains a mirage.

The ruling liberal coalition, headed by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, has always been more inclined to reinforce ties with European Union (EU) partners, partially and implicitly at the expense of Poland’s bilateral bond with the United States.

Hence, for instance, the Polish government’s efforts to reinvigorate the Weimar Triangle (a diplomatic format comprising Poland, France, and Germany), as well as its more sympathetic approach to the intentions of Paris and Berlin to render Europe more autonomous—both politically and militarily—and less dependent on Washington.

Conversely, the previous Law and Justice party government under Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki maintained strained relations with Brussels and kept a critical attitude toward Germany. At the same time, it enjoyed a thriving relationship with both the Trump and Biden administrations in Washington.

Today, the right-wing opposition harshly chastises the coalition in power for its “excessively pro-European tilt,” accusing Tusk of deliberately trying to “push America out of Europe,” in tandem with his German and French colleagues. On the other hand, government officials and majority members of parliament lambast their political rivals for being “blindly Trumpian.” This divergence is one of the main themes of the upcoming presidential election in Poland, the first round of which is scheduled for May 18. In this election, the pro-European mayor of Warsaw, Rafał Trzaskowski, will compete with the pro-American conservative candidate, Karol Nawrocki. (My apologies for the rather simplistic definitions, but they largely reflect the two contenders’ foreign policy views.)

Therefore, the Polish president’s recent statements should be interpreted in a broader context of internal politics. Duda, elected ten years ago on a moderately conservative ticket and constitutionally barred from a third term, has been remarkably pro-American during his time in office. And since Trump’s second inauguration, he has been adamant about the necessity of upholding excellent relations with the United States.

In the above-mentioned interviews, Duda was subtle enough to simultaneously praise French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent suggestion of unfolding the French atomic umbrella over other European NATO members. Nevertheless, the Polish president’s message was straightforward: Nowadays, we need US military presence on NATO’s eastern flank more than ever—even in the extreme and apparently provocative form of nuclear warheads. It was a message aimed as well at the domestic audience and the government: You may dislike Trump’s policies, and in particular his animus toward the EU, but turning our back on the United States now would be preposterous and suicidal. For Duda and his fellow Polish right-wingers, European “autonomy” remains a mirage, an intriguing yet elusive ambition, at least for the time being.

In a nutshell: it’s not a choice between Trump’s nukes and Macron’s umbrella. Poles would be happiest having both.

---

Marek Magierowski is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He previously served as Poland’s ambassador to the United States and to Israel, among other diplomatic roles.

[백선호]

폴란드에 F-35A용 B61-12 핵폭탄하고, 프랑스공군의 ASMP-A 탑재 라팔을 배치하자는 것이겠네요.

https://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/515G/3491

[위종민]

프랑스가 유럽에 핵우산을 제공하려면 라팔-ASMP-A 패키지를 유럽 각국에 배치하는 수밖에 없겠네요. IRBM이 없으니..