미국이 빠진 NATO 해양전략을 구상해야 한다

[위종민]

미해군에서 20년 간 근무했던 폴 비스코비치 퇴역 중령이, 동맹국의 신뢰를 상실해가고 있는 미국이 빠진 NATO 해양전략을 구상해야한다고 CIMSEC에 기고했네요. 

미국 없이 나아가는 NATO 해군 전략…유럽 독자 방위 구상 부상

미국의 동맹국에 대한 신뢰성 저하와 러시아의 위협 증가로 인해, NATO는 미국의 지원 없이 독자적인 해군 전략을 수립해야 할 필요성이 대두되고 있습니다. 미 해군 예비역 폴 비스코비치 사령관은 CIMSEC 기고문에서, NATO가 미국의 군사력과 산업력에 의존하지 않고 자체적인 해양 전략을 개발해야 한다고 주장했습니다.​

그는 NATO가 독자적인 해군 전략을 수립하기 위해 다음과 같은 조치를 취해야 한다고 제안했습니다.​

명확한 전략 목표 설정: NATO는 자율적인 해군 전략을 수립하기 위해 명확한 전략 목표를 설정해야 합니다.​ 함정 및 항공기 확보 계획 수립: 전략 목표 달성을 위한 함정과 항공기 확보 계획을 수립해야 합니다.​ 작전 개념 수립 및 훈련: 효과적인 작전을 위해 작전 개념을 수립하고 이를 기반으로 훈련을 실시해야 합니다.​ 전장 준비 조치 시행: 전장 준비를 위한 즉각적인 조치를 취해야 합니다.​ 외교 및 경제 전략 지원: 해군 전략을 뒷받침할 수 있는 외교 및 경제 전략을 마련해야 합니다.​

비스코비치 사령관은 NATO 회원국들이 각자의 강점을 살려 역할을 분담함으로써, 미국의 지원 없이도 효과적인 해군력을 구축할 수 있다고 강조했습니다. 예를 들어, 프랑스, 이탈리아, 영국은 항공모함과 전략 핵잠수함을 제공하고, 독일과 노르웨이는 공격형 잠수함을 담당하며, 벨기에와 네덜란드는 기뢰 제거 임무를 수행할 수 있습니다.​

이러한 전략은 NATO가 미국의 지원 없이도 독자적인 방위 능력을 갖추는 데 중요한 역할을 할 것으로 기대됩니다.

https://cimsec.org/parting-ways-a-nato-naval-strategy-without-america

Parting Ways: A NATO Naval Strategy Without America | Center for International Maritime Security

Parting Ways: A NATO Naval Strategy Without America

April 21, 2025 Guest Author 2 Comments

NATO Naval Power Week

By CDR Paul Viscovich, USN (Ret.)

In this era of increasing danger, great power competition, and uncertain loyalties, the time has come for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to declare its independence. As at the time of its founding, NATO’s strategic adversary is Russia. But unlike during the Cold War, the Alliance can no longer count on the military and industrial might of the United States in confronting the threat.

America has become an unreliable ally. With the threat of a general war in Europe now greater than it has been since 1939, the American president is imposing crippling economic tariffs on allies while unilaterally bargaining with Moscow on matters affecting European security. Western intelligence officers believe a Russian attack on a NATO ally by 2030 is, “a distinct possibility.” Whether the U.S. outright withdraws from the Alliance or simply reneges on its obligations, the Europeans and Canada must accept full responsibility for their own defense and embrace the challenges this will demand.

One of these responsibilities is developing a NATO naval and maritime strategy that is independent of American participation and priorities. To be effective, this strategy must address clear objectives, plan for developing the naval forces required to achieve those objectives, establish and practice a concept of operations, take immediate measures to prepare the battlespace, and implement supporting diplomatic and economic strategies.

NATO Naval Force Structure

Shipbuilding plans in support of the naval strategy must emphasize speed and economy. To avoid costly duplication of effort, it makes sense to assign responsibility for different platform and warfare missions to specific nations to guide their acquisition programs. Of necessity, the initial order of battle will be those ships and aircraft in each nation’s inventory. Over time, each maritime member would sacrifice having a balanced national fleet in favor of providing specialized pieces to create a more powerful and balanced continental fleet, one capable of simultaneously defending both the North Atlantic, the High North, and the Mediterranean and Black Seas.

Responsibility for providing large deck aircraft carriers would go to France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Strategic ballistic missile submarines would logically remain with France and the UK. France, Germany, Norway, and the UK could provide attack submarines, both nuclear and conventional. Future construction of attack boats should focus on conventional propulsion since these are less expensive to build, quicker to complete, and they are lethally quiet when submerged.

Suffren, the first of France’s new Barracuda-class of nuclear-powered attack submarines. (French Navy photo)

The potential need for amphibious ships in both the Mediterranean and North Atlantic argues in favor of France and Spain specializing in this platform area. These two nations have major ports on both seas and extensive expertise in amphibious operations.

No fleet is complete without combat logistics support ships. France, Italy, and the UK each possess two such ships capable of providing fuel, refrigerated stores, and ammunition through underway replenishment. Germany and The Netherlands could pitch in with the units they possess, then take an increasing share of the future responsibility for this function with new construction. Logistical capabilities deserve to be a critical focus area if a continental fleet is to sustain peacetime patrols and wartime operations without U.S. support.

The smaller maritime nations could complete this combined fleet by providing the destroyers and corvettes to escort the aircraft carriers and amphibious assault groups, and for anti-submarine patrols in the North Atlantic. Belgium, The Netherlands, Turkey, and the Scandinavians are good choices to supply mine-countermeasures assets.

Due to its relative isolation, Canada is a special case. It has responsibility to maintain a balanced fleet guarding its coastlines on three oceans. But anticipating that Europe at war might rely on Canadian energy, foodstuffs, and munitions, Canada could help by building up its merchant fleet and convoy escorts.

A Concept of Operations 

NATO’s naval strategy should encompass three objectives: deny Russia’s European fleets from gaining access to the high seas, blockade Russian ports against all commerce, and protect Europe’s seaborne commerce and coastal flanks from attack. The Black Sea is one of these coastal flanks and within the context of overall NATO strategy, Ukraine’s survival and victory over the invader must be assured.

Preventing the Russian Navy’s ability to sortie from its ports and cutting its maritime commerce in Europe can both be addressed through control of chokepoints in the Barents and Baltic Seas, as well as the Bosporus Straits. Due to the great distance between Europe and Russia’s far eastern ports, blockading these is impractical and would require deployment of forces critical to defending NATO’s home theater.

The Barents Sea presents the greatest challenge due to its size and distance from the traditional centers of NATO naval strength. Transits through the Baltic and Black Seas are more easily controlled. An effective blockade of the Baltic Sea can be readily accomplished by German, Scandinavian, and Baltic state warships, attack aircraft, and anti-ship shore batteries. Due to the 85-foot mean depth of the Kattegat channel between Denmark and Sweden, submarines must transit on or near the surface. The Bosporus Straits into the Black Sea are also relatively shallow and are controlled and heavily defended by NATO ally Turkey.

A blockade of the Barents Sea would require an intensive deployment of maritime patrol aircraft, attack submarines, and destroyers, ideally under the protection of carrier-based aircraft. This force could be supplemented by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV). Drones are potent, relatively inexpensive, and can be manufactured en masse. The Ukrainians used these to great effect in neutralizing the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The Allies would be well-advised to study Ukrainian tactics while rushing these weapons to suitable sites along the Black Sea and in Norway for operational trials, especially under the harsh conditions of the Arctic winter.

Despite these precautions, the Russian Northern Fleet might still break out to challenge the NATO combined fleet and attack convoys from Canada. If a major fleet action fails to destroy this force or if the Allied fleet is itself destroyed, “Plan B” must cut the logistics lifeline between the deployed Northern Fleet and its White Sea homeport in Arkhangelsk. The Allies can take advantage of their interior lines of communication and proximity to resupply points to attack, re-arm, and re-attack. Simultaneously, Allied air and submarine forces’ piecemeal destruction of Russian logistic support ships shuttling through the Norwegian Sea would render the Russian attack unsustainable.

A more probable threat is posed by the Northern Fleet’s attack submarines whose operational forces can be conservatively estimated to number five guided missile nuclear submarines (SSGNs) of the Oscar II and Yasen Classes, and six nuclear attack boats (SSNs) of the Akula, Sierra II, and Victor III classes. If the United States declares neutrality, an additional five SSN/SSGNs might be detached from Russia’s Pacific Fleet for a transit beneath the polar ice cap to reinforce Northern Fleet assets in the Atlantic. Combined, these submarine forces could mount a serious threat to trans-Atlantic shipping and NATO’s coastal flanks.

Russian Navy Yasen-class submarine K-560 Severodvinsk. (Russian Ministry of Defense photo)

NATO should anticipate loss of access to acoustic intelligence from America’s Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) arrays. This will seriously complicate the Alliance’s ability to detect and target Russian submarines operating in the North Atlantic. To offset this handicap, NATO will have to dedicate a significant number of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) air and surface units to patrolling the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap. It can also consider deploying its own undersea sensor network to offer some relief to standing patrols and provide additional sources of intelligence. Maritime patrol aircraft can be deployed to suitable air stations along the GIUK Gap. Airfields in Keflavik, Iceland, and Nuuk, Greenland should be immediately equipped and provisioned to support these operations.

A permanent force of surface ASW assets will be needed in the Denmark Straits between Greenland and Iceland, and in the waters between Iceland and the UK to locate and attack Russian subs attempting to penetrate the North Atlantic. Along the relatively shallow (600-650-ft) Greenland-Iceland Rise, the most efficient use of assets would employ continuous active sonar searches above and below the thermal layer. USV equipped with variable depth sonar would be ideal in this capacity, especially as they are relatively expendable in the event of torpedo attack. French and Royal Navy SSNs should be employed in deeper waters, where their lengthy time on station and low acoustic signatures make them particularly effective at detecting and attacking adversary submarines. Canada can greatly support these efforts by building up the logistic support capabilities of its naval and air stations in Halifax to allow units in the Denmark Straits and western Atlantic to refuel and rearm with less time off station.

In addition to blockading Russian ports, the Allies might consider a commerce raiding strategy in the Arctic Ocean and Norwegian Sea. Where the threat of Russian anti-ship and tactical air strikes are low, maritime patrol aircraft could perform reconnaissance on behalf of surface ships and coast guard vessels and cue them to intercept potential blockade runners. Challenging merchant traffic transiting Russia’s Arctic Ocean littoral is probably too dangerous for manned Allied ships and aircraft. In this region, use of remotely piloted UAVs could locate suspect ships, warn the crews to turn back or abandon ship, and relay targeting data to attack submarines. 

Shape the Battlespace

There are tactical measures that can be taken now even before the creation of a combined NATO fleet. As far as possible, Alliance naval and military units deployed to Africa, the Indian Ocean, and east Asia should be recalled. As the Americans continue their pivot toward Asia, NATO should wish them well and concentrate its own forces to defend Europe.

Individual NATO members could schedule port visits to Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkish ports on the Black Sea and perhaps conduct combined exercises to exhibit resolve and practice international interoperability. Turkey could support this by relaxing provisions of the Montreux Convention that limit peacetime transits of the Bosporus Straits by warships.

An unannounced international naval exercise should be surged into the Barents Sea. This will serve two purposes. First, to demonstrate the Allies are capable of mobilizing such a show of force on the doorstep of Russia’s only European fleet that is not effectively land-locked, and to be able to do so without American assistance. Second, this should lead to permanent anti-submarine and anti-surface patrols by Allied destroyers, submarines, USVs, and UAVs working in mutual support.

March 11, 2015: Dutch warship HNLMS De Ruyter launches a Tomahawk missile off the coast of Norfolk, VA. (Photo via Dutch Ministry of Defence)

A tactic that adds an element of warning to these patrols could be surprise surfacings of Allied attack submarines near the Northern Fleet’s base in Arkhangelsk. Even an occasional nighttime visit to pop a red flare from just outside the territorial limit would inject an ingredient of caution into Kremlin strategic calculations.

Since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, there has been a disturbing increase of sabotage in western European shipyards, military facilities, and strategic industries. Counterintelligence, physical security, and cybersecurity efforts must be ramped up and coordinated across national boundaries in anticipation of fifth-column type offensives in the lead-up to general war. National security agencies and the NATO Counter Intelligence Center of Excellence should coordinate efforts to protect high ranking government, military, and diplomatic personnel against assassination. These efforts should be intensified at naval facilities to ensure clandestine Russian activity does not hamper the projection of NATO naval power in crisis.

Diplomacy

A naval strategy cannot stand alone, it will require supporting diplomatic and economic strategies. Diplomatically, the Alliance must shore up all members’ support for its new responsibilities. Part of NATO’s historic success has been its reliance on building consensus before taking any major action. But this also takes time, a commodity of increasingly limited supply. The potential for recalcitrant member nations attempting to obstruct a unified strategy should be anticipated and neutralized. The North Atlantic Council might even break with long-standing tradition and ask some nation other than the United States to nominate the next officer to serve as Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

An unfortunate but necessary step will require imposing strict limits on sharing intelligence with the United States. The careless attitude of senior American political leadership toward protecting highly sensitive information is a catastrophic operational security failure waiting to happen. The Alliance should also plan for how it will respond if the U.S. seizes Greenland by force, which could potentially trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Planning should begin now for incorporating Ukraine into the Alliance and working with that nation’s General Staff to identify where and which NATO forces can be deployed to best effect in the event Russia provokes war with the Alliance. Naval planning should investigate the feasibility of mounting a riverine campaign up the Dnipro River and into Russia. One possibility might employ disguised USVs carrying attack drones deeper into Russian territory to extend their tactical range and for possible use against supply lines supporting forces attacking the Baltic states. In order to buy themselves time, Europe, Canada, and other democracies threatened by the Kremlin’s expansionist designs must do everything possible to keep Ukraine in the fight. A consolidated naval and maritime strategy that supports this by threatening to restrict Russia’s wartime use of the seas will help.

Economically, the Alliance must insulate itself against the tariffs and embargoes threatened by the United States. Europe and Canada can reduce their dependence on American imports by finding new suppliers, such as by increasing energy purchases from OPEC and buying armaments from continental manufacturers. Western European arms manufacturers recorded about $146 billion in 2023 sales of military arms and equipment. Though this does not match the United States’ sales of $319 billion in 2024, it easily surpasses Russian production of $32 billion. And if the U.S. continues applying import duties to Canadian agricultural products, that nation will find a lucrative and strategically secure market for these products in Europe.

Conclusion

Dividing the U.S. from Europe is one of the Kremlin’s key strategies for reestablishing the hegemony that was once exercised by the Soviet Union. The European Allies and Canada missed the opportunity to work toward strategic independence from the United States by ignoring the now-obvious warning signs during President Trump’s first term. Yet in disengaging from American participation in the Alliance, NATO should still leave the door open to eventual reconciliation. Developing an effective continental navy in support of an untested naval strategy will take time and there will be missteps along the way. But it should be viewed as a core effort to secure Europe, one that will provide confidence regardless of the state of American reliability.

Paul Viscovich is a retired U.S. Navy commander and Surface Warfare Officer with 20 years of service. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1975 and earned a Master of Sciences degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1987.

Featured Image: Royal Navy Nuclear submarine HMS Vanguard arrives back at HM Naval Base Clyde, Faslane, Scotland following a patrol. (Ministry of Defence photo by CPOA(Phot) Tam McDonald)

[백선호]

이 글에서 convoy는 이제 미국이 아니라 카나다에서 오네요. ㅎㅎ

... the Russian Northern Fleet might still break out to challenge the NATO combined fleet and attack convoys from Canada.

마치 1940-1941년 프랑스 패망/미국 참전 이전의 대서양에서 영국과 카나다가 독일을 상대했던 것처럼요.

[위종민]

미국이 한 방 제대로 맞아야 정신차리고 세계에 개입하는 역사가 또 반복될 지도 모르겠네요.

[사처포(곽명기)]

이 문제는 NATO 만이 당면해야 할 사안일까요 ?
어지럽게 휘두르는 트럼프의 지휘봉에 우리 군은 ?