국제경영론 : John Rawls의 정의이론

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Veil of ignorance

This article is about the philosophical concept. For the music album, see Veil of Ignorance (album).

The veil of ignorance and the original position are concepts introduced by John Harsanyi[1][2] and later appropriated by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice.[3][4] It is a method of determining the morality of a certain issue (e.g. slavery) based upon the following thought experiment: parties to the original position know nothing about their particular abilities, tastes, and position within the social order of society. The veil of ignorance blocks off this knowledge, such that one does not know what burdens and benefits of social cooperation might fall to him/her once the veil is lifted. With this knowledge blocked, parties to the original position must decide on principles for the distribution of rights, positions and resources in their society. As John Rawls put it ..."no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like." (Rawls, A Theory of Justice). The idea then, it to render moot those personal considerations that are morally irrelevant to the justice or injustice of principles meant to allocate the benefits of social cooperation.

For example, in the imaginary society, one might or might not be intelligent, rich, or born into a preferred class. Since one may occupy any position in the society once the veil is lifted, the device forces the parties to consider society from the perspective of the worst off members.

The veil of ignorance is part of the long tradition of thinking in terms of a social contract. See Immanuel Kant, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Thomas Jefferson for examples of this tradition.

See also science fiction writer David Barr Kirtley's examination of this concept in his short story, "Veil of Ignorance."

Beyond The Veil of Ignorance

John Rawls proposed a method, which he called the veil of ignorance, for determining which social customs were just and which were unjust. The veil of ignorance criterion is as follows: a rule is just if everyone would agree to it given that they were made ignorant of their position in society. That is, the just society would be chosen by people who had set aside considerations of their own gender, wealth, race, parentage, ect. Ideally this rule eliminates personal bias from the choice and thus guarantees the fairness of rules.

However, even behind the veil of ignorance there will not be consensus as to which rules are best, throwing into question the assumption that the veil of ignorance would reveal the unique best set of rules, which is one of the reasons Rawls seem to favor it. For example consider two possible societies, one in which the men are rich and the woman are poor, and another in which everyone is moderately wealthy. Even without knowing their gender some people would prefer the unequal society. This is because individuals have different tolerances to risk. Some would consider the chance to be rich worth the risk of being poor, while others would prefer the security of the society that makes everyone equally wealthy. Likewise preferences such as the health of the environment under such a society could interfere with the consensus.

One might suppose that we could fix this problem by asking that people behind the veil be ignorant of their preferences, which would include their tolerance for risk, as well as their social position. However once preferences are discarded it is meaningless to ask people to make a choice. For example consider two possible rules. Rule one is that people must walk to destinations within a mile, and rule two is that people must drive to all destinations. Rule one is safer and friendlier to the environment, while rule two is more efficient. Without preferences however those behind the veil have no reason to pick either of these rules, and so the idea of them being able to decide on any society seems impossible, after all we have even asked them to give up preferences such as “I want to be happy”.

There is a way to achieve the same basic result of the veil of ignorance without making people put aside their preferences. I call it the cut-first-choose-last rule, because it is based on the method for forcing children to divide dessert among each other fairly; the person who cuts the dessert into pieces gets to choose their piece last. When we apply this idea to picking societies we would say that a just society is one which a rational person would create even if they got to pick the position they were born into last. This implies that societies in which men are wealthy and women are poor are unjust, because no one would rationally choose such a society under the proposed rule, for if they did the first people to pick their roles in society would choose to be men, and by the time the designer was to pick their role they would be forced to be improvised.

From the veil of ignorance argument John Rawls concluded that just societies are those in which everyone has equal opportunities, except where unequal opportunities benefit everyone. This principle still holds under the cut-first-choose-last rule. For example consider a society of 4 people where the wealth is distributed in this fashion: $10, $10, $10, $10, and one in which the wealth is distributed in this fashion: $20, $11, $11, $11. The rational person would still choose the second society, which Rawls would consider just, because even though they know that they won’t receive the $20 role they would rather have $11 than $10.

There as still some oddities even with the cut-first-choose-last rule that arise because of different preferences, not towards risk, but towards what is valued. For example some might pick a society in which wealth is distributed as: $9, $9, $9, $9 if the environment was healthier, while others care less about the environment and would simply pick the society that made them richer. John Rawls conclusions are also impacted by this fact, because he argued that from the veil of ignorance that a just society is one in which there was maximal liberty. Because of the variation of preferences however the cut-first-choose-last rule does not yield this result, for the preference for liberty is not universal, some may very well prefer a society in which they are more secure.

I do not believe that this lack of a consensus is failure of the cut-first-choose-last rule; it simply shows that there are a wide variety of societies which are maximally just. One would have to choose among these societies using other criteria, not those of justice or fairness.

Straw man

This article is about the logical fallacy. For other uses, see Straw man (disambiguation).

"Man of straw" redirects here. For the novel by Heinrich Mann, see Der Untertan.

For the agricultural tool used to scare birds, see Scarecrow.

A straw man is a component of an argument and is an informal fallacy based on misrepresentation of an opponent's position.[1] To "attack a straw man" is to create the illusion of having refuted a proposition by replacing it with a superficially similar yet unequivalent proposition (the "straw man"), and refuting it, without ever having actually refuted the original position.[1][2]

Origin

The origins of the term are unclear. One common (folk) etymology given is that it originated with men who stood outside courthouses with a straw in their shoe in order to indicate their willingness to be a false witness, but it is unlikely that individuals would publicly declare their willingness to commit a crime outside a courthouse.[3][4] Another more popular origin is a human figure made of straw, such as practice dummies used in military training. Such a dummy is supposed to represent the enemy, but it is considerably easier to attack because naturally, it neither moves nor fights back.

In the UK, the adversary is sometimes called Aunt Sally, with reference to a traditional fairground game.

ReasoningThe straw man fallacy occurs in the following pattern of argument:

Person A has position X.

Person B disregards certain key points of X and instead presents the superficially similar position Y. Thus, Y is a resulting distorted version of X and can be set up in several ways, including:

Presenting a misrepresentation of the opponent's position.

Quoting an opponent's words out of context — i.e. choosing quotations that misrepresent the opponent's actual intentions (see fallacy of quoting out of context).[2]

Presenting someone who defends a position poorly as the defender, then refuting that person's arguments — thus giving the appearance that every upholder of that position (and thus the position itself) has been defeated.[1]

Inventing a fictitious persona with actions or beliefs which are then criticized, implying that the person represents a group of whom the speaker is critical.

Oversimplifying an opponent's argument, then attacking this oversimplified version.

Person B attacks position Y, concluding that X is false/incorrect/flawed.

This sort of "reasoning" is fallacious, because attacking a distorted version of a position fails to constitute an attack on the actual position.

ExamplesStraw man arguments often arise in public debates such as a (hypothetical) prohibition debate:

Person A: We should liberalize the laws on beer.

Person B: No, any society with unrestricted access to intoxicants loses its work ethic and goes only for immediate gratification.

The proposal was to relax laws on beer. Person B has exaggerated this to a position harder to defend, i.e., "unrestricted access to intoxicants".[1] It is a logical fallacy because Person A never made that claim. This example is also a slippery slope fallacy.

Another example:

Person A: Our society should spend more money helping the poor.

Person B: Studies show that handouts don't work; they just create more poverty and humiliate the recipients. That money could be better spent.

In this case, Person B has transformed Person A's position from "more money" to "more handouts", which is easier for Person B to defeat.

A Theory of Justice, by John Rawls

A Theory of Justice, by John Rawls, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.

This outline of an extended book review is based in large part on notes composed by Darrell Huwe. I have attempted with limited success to understand Rawls' book - please do not regard this as being in any sense an authoritative summary of Rawls' thought. I personally find this book particularly difficult to penetrate, perhaps because my training is in the physical sciences rather than philosophy, and I generalize quite beyond the evidence when I suspect that others also find it less than accessible. I hope that this review is helpful.

The Chronicle of Higher Education has published an article, "The Enduring Significance of John Rawls", by Martha Nussbaum.

John Rawls died at age 81 on November 24, 2002.

Dick Piccard

General Conception

All social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored.

Social Contract

John Locke: Free people need to agree on some ground rules in order to live together in harmony.

Utilitarianism

John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham: Act so as to maximize good (pleasure) in the aggregate.

Later twist: minimize pain. From either perspective, your actions are judged good or bad depending on the consequences they have for you and for others.

"The greatest good for the greatest number" can be abused, leading to the "tyranny of the majority" (e.g., Nazi Germany's mistreatment of the Jews and the United States' mistreatment of African Americans). Rawls' approach guards against this common source of injustice.

Intuitionism

Acknowledge a set of first principles to be subscribed to, but do not prescribe a priority ordering.

Good vs. Right

A person's good is that which is needed for the successful execution of a rational long-term plan of life given reasonably favorable circumstances.

Liberty

Opportunity

Income

Wealth

Self-respect

"The good is the satisfaction of rational desire." (Section 15)

Each person has his or her own plan of life - what is good may vary. Right is set down in the social contract, the same for everyone, influenced by the "veil of ignorance." Rawls specializes the concept of something's being right as it being fair. (Section 18)

Principles of Justice

(Section 11)

First Principle: Liberty

Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

Second Principle: Wealth

Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:

(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and

(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

Representative persons: prototypical members of any identifiable group (e.g., women, high school students, citizens of Haiti, etc.).

Efficiency: any re-arrangement in which every representative person gains is more efficient.

Difference principle: in order for any change to be accepted as an improvement, it must help the least advantaged representative person.

Priority Rules

Rawls explicitly addresses the fact that there will be situations where these two primary principles will be in conflict with each other. Rather than compromise between them in such cases, he takes the position that there is a specific priority.

The Priority of Liberty

The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty. There are two cases:

(a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all;

(b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the lesser liberty.

The Priority of Justice over Efficiency and Welfare

The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle. There are two cases:

(a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with the lesser opportunity;

(b) an excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the burden of those bearing this hardship.

Efficiency

Rawls adopts the concept of efficiency that is associated with the name Pareto in the field of economics. It is perhaps most easily described in the negative:

No system can be called efficient if there is an alternative arrangement that improves the situation of some people with no worsening of the situation of any of the other people.

In general, there are many arrangements that are efficient in this sense. Not all of them are equally just; other principles of justice must be invoked to select the most just arrangement.

The Difference Principle

"The difference principle is a strongly egalitarian conception in the sense that unless there is a distribution that makes both persons better off (limiting ourselves to the two-person case for simplicity), an equal distribution is to be preferred [page 76, emphasis added - RDP]."

In other words, there should be no differences except those that can be justified on grounds of efficiency.

The Veil of Ignorance

Rawls supposes that a (virtual) committee of rational but not envious persons will exhibit mutual disinterest in a situation of moderate scarcity as they consider the concept of right:

general in form

universal in application

publicly recognized

final authority

prioritizes conflicting claims

Rawls claims that rational people will unanimously adopt his principles of justice if their reasoning is based on general considerations, without knowing anything about their own personal situation. Such personal knowledge might tempt them to select principles of justice that gave them unfair advantage - rigging the rules of the game. This procedure of reasoning without personal biases Rawls refers to as "The Veil of Ignorance."

Pinker (2002), describes Rawls' Veil of Ignorance this way in the midst of presenting wide-ranging evidence that a significant fraction of the variability among human beings, including variations in mental abilities, must be attributed to genetic, rather than purely environmental, factors:

Can one really reconcile biological differences with a concept of social justice? Absolutely. In his famous theory of justice, the philosopher John Rawls asks us to imagine a social contract drawn up by self-interested agents negotiating under a veil of ignorance, unaware of the talents or status they will inherit at birth--ghosts ignorant of the machines they will haunt. He argues that a just society is one that these disembodied souls would agree to be born into, knowing that they might be dealt a lousy social or genetic hand. If you agree that this is a reasonable conception of justice, and that the agents would insist on a broad social safety net and redistributive taxation (short of eliminating incentives that make everyone better off), then you can justify compensatory social policies even if you think differences in social status are 100 percent genetic. The policies would be, quite literally, a matter of justice, not a consequence of the indistinguishability of individuals.

Indeed, the existence of innate differences in ability makes Rawls's conception of social justice especially acute and eternally relevant. If we were blank slates, and if a society ever did eliminate discrimination, the poorest could be said to deserve their station because they must have chosen to do less with their standard-issue talents. But if people differ in talents, people might find themselves in poverty in a nonprejudiced society even if they applied themselves to the fullest. That is an injustice that, a Rawlsian would argue, ought to be rectified, and it would be overlooked if we didn't recognize that people differ in their abilities.

Natural Duties and Obligations

Support just institutions

Mutual respect

Mutual aid

Do no harm

Do your fair share

Be faithful (keep your promises)

Civil Disobedience

Civil disobedience is by its nature an act responding to injustices internal to a given society, appealing to the public's conception of justice. (Section 57)

Civil disobedience can be justified if the following three conditions are all met:

If the injustice is substantial and clear, especially one that obstructs the path to removing other injustices (e.g., poll taxes and other burdens on the right to vote). This certainly includes serious infringements of the principle of liberty and blatant violations of the principle of fair equality of opportunity.

If the normal appeals to the political majority have already been made in good faith and have failed. Civil disobedience is a last resort.

If there are not too many other minority groups with similarly valid claims. The just constitution would be eroded if too many groups exercised the choice of civil disobedience. The resolution of this situation is a political alliance of these multiple minorities to form a working majority coalition.

Possible Problems

Stability

Envy

Priority of liberty depends on "progress."

Self-respect vs. material goods

Is justice a zero-sum game?

John Locke: Free people need to agree on some ground rules in order to live together in harmony.