이란, 러시아에 탄도미사일 수출

[위종민]

토니 블링컨 미 국무장관이 9월 10일 이란이 러시아에 근거리탄도미사일( CRBM )을 공급했다고 밝혔네요. 이와 함께 미국은 이란항공을 포함한 이란과 러시아의 개인 및 단체에 대한 추가제재를 발표했습니다. 

이란은 러시아에 S-400과 Su-35를 주문했지만 사우디와 UAE와의 관계 개선을 원하는 러시아가 이를 공급하지 않고 있는데, 이를 받을 수 있을지 모르겠네요. 아틀랜틱 카운슬에 실린 기사의 분석에 따르면 이란 또한 사우디가 유가의 가격을 높게 유지하는 것이 이익이고, 본인들이 직접 군사행동을 취하기보다는 헤즈볼라나 후티 반군, 각국의 시아파 민병대를 괴뢰로 부리는 것을 선호하기 때문에 반드시 저 무기들의 납품을 요구하진 않을 수도 있다고 보네요. 또한 이란은 러시아를 강대국이 아니라, 우크라이나에 미국과 서방의 지원 물량을 퍼붓게 만들어 이란에 대응할 여력을 줄이게 만드는 또다른 대리인으로 볼 수도 있다고 분석합니다. 

Iran sends new ballistic missiles to Russia – Blinken - Naval Technology (naval-technology.com)

Iran sends new ballistic missiles to Russia – Blinken

The US and Europe have imposed new sanctions on Iran for delivering close range ballistic missiles to Russia for use on Ukraine.

Alex BlairSeptember 11, 2024

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US Secretary of State Antony Blinken (left) announced Iran’s missiles shipment to Russia at a meeting in London with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer (centre) and UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy yesterday (10 September, 2024). Credit: Hollie Adams / Getty.

Iran has sent new close range ballistic missiles (CRBMs) to Russia in a bid to bolster its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said yesterday (10 September 2024).

Russian forces could use the Iranian CRBMs within a few weeks as the conflict in Ukraine enters a crucial winter period, ramping up pressure on the US and Europe to permit Kyiv to launch long-range missiles into Russia.

Iran’s provision of ballistic missiles in direct support of Russia’s war against Ukraine is a threat to European and global security. Today, @StateDept and @USTreasury are imposing sanctions on individuals and entities supporting such activities.

— Secretary Antony Blinken (@SecBlinken) September 11, 2024

The US State Department and Treasury have imposed fresh sanctions on Iran, joined by France, Germany and the UK.

London has restricted national carrier Iran Air, as well as placing travel bans and asset freezes on several Iranian military figures in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Could Ukraine be given free reign for long-range strikes on Russia?

The news comes ahead of a meeting in Kyiv between Blinken, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy today (11 September).

The trio will reportedly discuss lifting restrictions on Ukraine’s use of long-range weapons in Russia, namely the UK- and France-supplied Storm Shadow and Scalp-EG cruise missiles, which also use US technology.

When asked about permitting long-range missile strikes, President Biden said his administration is “working that out now”. Biden is due to host UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer in Washington on Friday (13 September).

Iran’s export and Russia’s procurement of Iranian ballistic missiles is a further escalation in support of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

With our international partners we have taken significant steps to respond to this direct threat to European security.…

— David Lammy (@DavidLammy) September 10, 2024

Lammy said “Iran must stop supporting Putin’s unprovoked, premeditated and barbaric attack against a sovereign democratic state”.

What does Iran get in return?

Tehran has long sought Su-35 fighter aircraft and S-400 air defence missile systems from Russia.

Moscow is yet to send them, according to most reports, as President Putin wants to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two of Iran’s main rivals.

Iran and Russia have held a long-term arms pact to trade drones and other weapons. Remnants of Iran’s Shahed-136 drones have been identified on the Ukrainian battlefield on multiple occasions, and Tehran sent Moscow a large number of powerful surface-to-surface ballistic missiles in February.

Russia is seeking to become less dependent on Iran as it aims to domestically build 6,000 Geran-2 drones by 2025 at a new factory in the Tatarstan region, albeit using Iranian designs.

What does Iran get for sending ballistic missiles to Russia? - Atlantic Council

What does Iran get for sending ballistic missiles to Russia?

What does Iran get for sending ballistic missiles to Russia?

By Mark N. Katz

Today, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken revealed that Iran has delivered close range ballistic missiles (CRBMs) to Russia, which he expects Russian forces will use against Ukraine within a matter of weeks.

At the same time, the US Department of the Treasury announced the imposition of additional sanctions on Iranian and Russian individuals and entities, including Iran Air. These moves can hardly come as a surprise to Moscow and Tehran and will not serve to get either to change course. The real question is how the Iranian transfer of CRBMs to Russia will affect the Russia-Iran relationship. Specifically: Does Russia’s dependence on Iran, first for armed drones and now for CRBMs, give Tehran a degree of leverage over Moscow? And what would Tehran want to get from Moscow with that leverage?

Iran has long sought Su-35 fighter aircraft and S-400 air defense missile systems from Russia, according to reports, but Moscow has not yet delivered them. As Hanna Notte and Jim Lamson noted in a study published in August, there are many other Russian weapons systems and technologies that Tehran would like to receive. If any of these turn up in Iran, this will be seen as evidence that the transfer of CRBMs to Moscow is indeed a sign of increased Iranian leverage over Russia.

Tehran, then, may see Russia not so much as a great power but as another proxy . . .

Moscow, though, will be loath to transfer weapons to Iran that would upset its ability to maintain good relations with Iran’s rivals, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which could in turn result in their turning closer to the United States and even Israel for support. Indeed, Iran itself might not want this to happen. Saudi-Russian cooperation in the OPEC+ format, which keeps world oil prices relatively higher, serves Iranian interests too. Both Russia and Iran have to sell their oil at a discount due to Western sanctions, but if the Saudis conclude that Russia has become Iran’s firm ally and so decide to increase oil production, the resulting lower oil prices would hurt both Moscow and Tehran. And they know that Riyadh has in the past been willing to flood the market and accept lower oil prices in order to hurt its rivals.

Further, while Tehran may want Moscow to transfer Su-35s, S-400s, and other weapons systems and technologies, receiving them immediately may not be the Iranian leadership’s primary goal. The Islamic Republic often does not take direct military action itself, but prefers to act through proxies, such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi and other Shia militia forces.

Tehran, then, may see Russia not so much as a great power but as another proxy, whose willingness to fight against a common enemy benefits Iran but allows it to avoid the costs of fighting that common enemy itself. Ukraine, of course, does not pose a threat to Iran. But to the extent that the United States and other Western countries devote attention and resources to supporting Ukraine, then they have less of these available for dealing with Iran.

Indeed, Tehran’s one great worry might be that Russia will lose its war with Ukraine, thus allowing the United States and its Western allies (as Tehran might fear) to concentrate on Iran. Transferring first armed drones and now CRBMs to Russia, then, may be seen as a good investment by Tehran whether it receives Russian weapons systems in return or not. This attitude would also be very much in keeping with how Iran prefers to support proxies that are fighting a common adversary rather than take on the fight itself.

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Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and professor emeritus of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government.

[Minowski(김유철)]

이란 대통령 선거 결과보고 기대감을 가진 사람들은 꽤 실망스러운 기사겠습니다. 어떻든 바이든 정권은 사실상 손 놓은 것 같고, 다음 정권은 어떻게 풀어갈건지.... 아직도 후티가 유조선 불태우는 것 보면 진짜 갑갑하고....

[백선호]

희한한 3각 관계네요.

Saudi-Russian cooperation in the OPEC+ format, which keeps world oil prices relatively higher, serves Iranian interests too. Both Russia and Iran have to sell their oil at a discount due to Western sanctions, but if the Saudis conclude that Russia has become Iran’s firm ally and so decide to increase oil production, the resulting lower oil prices would hurt both Moscow and Tehran.