[REAL PROPERTY] 18. JOHN GIANNINI V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF DES PLAINES

Facts. Plaintiff John Giannini entered into a contract to purchase a condominium unit that was to be constructed. The developer of this project was Frank R. Stape Builders, Inc. (Stape), who was also the signer of Giannini’s purchase agreement and agent of a beneficiary of the land in trust, and First National Bank (Bank) was the record title holder of the complex which is pursuant to a land trust agreement. When the construction was completed, 3 of the 5 buildings including Giannini’s unit were not designated as a condo. Stape was later dissolved for failure to pay franchise taxes. Giannini filed suit against Unity Savings Association, the mortgage holder on the condo complex seeking delivery of the condo, however the trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the condo “did not exist”. Issue. Whether the plaintiff can claim specific performance regarding the agreement for the sale of property. Rule. Hayes v. Disque A buyer of real property is entitled to a specific performance of a valid contract for the sale of real property as a matter of right, absent circumstances of oppression and fraud. Application. ■ While Unity first argues that dismissal of specific performance was warranted since the condo was not in existence, and that the condo did not exist because the building was not declared a condo per se, this argument is rejected. The condo unit in question does exist in a literal, physical sense and the only “non-existence” is in the legal sense.■ A condominium is real property and in valid contracts involving sales of real property, specific performance of the contract is a matter of right and is enforced by equity, absent circumstances of oppression and fraud. Even if Unity argues that there are other condominiums available to Plaintiff such as Units D and E (Plaintiff’s Unit is B), this is insufficient grounds for not applying the rule, since Unity has not attempted to claim that a condominium unit is not a type of real estate.■ Under Geist v. Lehmann, a court using its equitable powers may refuse to grant specific performance where the remedy would cause a “peculiar hardship or an inequitable result” (as seen in the Chevy Chase case). However, there is no hardship in this case; no hardship can exist in compelling a seller to do what he agrees to do in the first place when he thought it was to his advantage. Therefore, the fact that the contract cannot be performed without great or unanticipated expense is not a factor that can excuse specific performance. Conclusion. YES; Reversed and remanded.