미국은 어디든 타격할 수 있지만, 어디든 머무를 수 있나?

[위종민]

베네수엘라 공격작전 Op. Absolute Resolve로 글로벌 작전 능력을 과시했지만 베네수엘라 정치 구도는 여전히 교착상태이듯이 미군이 군사적 승리를 지속적인 성과로 전환할 수 있는 장기적 주둔 능력은 점점 부족해지고 있다는 기사입니다. 무엇보다도, 국가전략이 아니라 트럼프의 전략이라 지속성이 모자란다는 점을 문제로 들었네요. 

GPT의 기사 전문 번역이 안정궤도에 오른 것 같아서, 이제는 기사 내용을 행위자-행동-표면적 설명 - 기사에 드러난 효과와 의미 순서로 구조화해서 정리해달라고 프롬프트를 추가했습니다. 

[행위자–행동–의도 정리]

| 행위자      | 한 행동                       | 표면적 명분/설명       | 기사에 드러난 효과 또는 의미        |
| -------- | -------------------------- | --------------- | ----------------------- |
| 미국 정부    | 베네수엘라에서 ‘앱솔루트 리졸브’ 작전 수행   | 군사력 투사          | 전술적 성공에도 전략적 교착 지속      |
| 미 국방부    | 2026년 국가방위전략(NDS) 발표       | 자원 제약 하 우선순위 설정 | 지속적 주둔·전략적 성과에 대한 의문 제기 |
| 미국       | 본토 방어·서반구 지배 우선            | 제한된 전력의 효율적 사용  | 동맹 지역 지원 축소 가능성         |
| 나토·한국    | 지역 방위의 1차 책임 가정            | 동맹 역량 강화        | 전환기 취약성 확대              |
| 미국       | 유럽·한국에 ‘중요하지만 더 제한된’ 지원 제공 | 부담 분담           | 억제 신뢰성 약화 우려            |
| 미국 전략 문서 | 트럼프 비전 명시적 연계              | 지도자 중심 전략       | 정책 지속성 취약               |
| 잠재적 적대국  | 전환기 취약성 활용 가능              | 전략적 기회 포착       | 도발·시험 가능성 증대            |

---

미국은 어디든 타격할 수 있다 — 하지만 어디든 머물 수 있는가?
리처드 베리
2026년 1월 29일 오후 11시 55분

2025년 12월 22일, 플로리다 팜비치의 마러라고에서 미 해군의 새로운 ‘골든 플릿’ 구상을 발표한 뒤 자리를 떠나는 도널드 트럼프 미국 대통령. (Andrew Caballero-Reynolds / AFP via Getty Images)

최근 ‘앱솔루트 리졸브(Operation Absolute Resolve)’ 작전은 베네수엘라 대통령 마두로를 생포하며 미국 군사력의 놀라운 과시를 보여줬다. 그러나 몇 주가 지난 지금도 친정부 세력은 여전히 카라카스를 장악하고 있으며, 국가는 “투자 불가” 상태로 남아 있다.

이처럼 전술적 탁월함과 전략적 교착 사이의 간극은, 펜타곤의 새로운 국가방위전략(NDS)의 핵심 결함을 드러낸다. 미국은 지구상의 어디든 압도적인 무력을 투사할 수 있지만, 군사적 승리를 지속적인 성과로 전환할 수 있는 장기적 주둔 능력은 점점 부족해지고 있다.

1월 24일 발표된 국가방위전략(NDS)은 냉혹한 현실을 직시한다. 현재의 전력 수준으로는 대만해협에서 중국을 억제하고, 파나마 운하를 방어하며, 유럽 안보를 보장하고, 한국에 대한 핵 억제를 동시에 제공할 수 없다는 것이다.

펜타곤의 해법은 본토 방어와 서반구 지배를 우선시하는 한편, 제1도련선 거부 전략을 유지하고 유럽과 한국에는 “중요하지만 더 제한적인” 지원을 제공하는 것이다.

문제는 진단이 아니라, 처방이 질병보다 더 해로울 수 있다는 점이다.

### 우선순위가 물리학과 충돌할 때

계산이 맞지 않는다. 대만 유사시 대비 계획만으로도 서반구나 유럽에 대한 공약을 고려하기 전에 가용 해군·방공 전력의 대부분이 소모된다. 서반구 방어는 공수 수송, 상륙 플랫폼, 정보 체계, 특수작전 부대, 수상 전투함 등 별도의 전력 패키지를 요구한다. 현재의 전력 구조는 지속적인 전 세계적 공약을 전제로 설계된 것이지, 동시에 반구 지배와 인도·태평양 거부를 달성하면서 다른 지역에서 신뢰할 만한 억제를 유지하도록 고안된 것이 아니다.

베네수엘라 작전은 이러한 제약을 입증한다. 미국은 어디든 타격할 수 있음을 보여줬지만, 새로운 전략이 우선 지역 외의 지속적 공약을 낮게 평가하기 때문에 전략적 성과는 여전히 미해결 상태로 남아 있다.

그러나 전력 구조의 공백은 문제의 절반에 불과하다. 동맹국들이 역량을 구축하는 전환 기간 자체가 또 다른 위험을 만든다.

### 전환기 공백의 문제

이 전략은 나토와 한국이 수용 가능한 시간 내에 지역 방위의 “1차적 책임”을 맡을 수 있다고 가정한다. 그러나 유럽은 만만치 않은 장벽에 직면해 있다. GDP 대비 90%에 달하는 총부채는 국방비 증액을 제한하고, 정밀 탄약과 첨단 방공체계의 자체 생산 부족은 역량 공백을 만든다. 여기에 검증되지 않은 사상자 감내 능력은 정치적 지속 가능성에 의문을 던진다. 이는 3~5년의 취약한 공백을 형성한다. 유럽은 미국의 지원이 줄어드는 동안 독자적으로 작동할 수 없다.

한국의 도전은 더 심각하다. 서울이 “중요하지만 더 제한적인 미국의 지원” 하에서 북한 억제의 “1차적 책임”을 질 수 있다는 주장은, 재래식 우위가 핵 보증을 대체할 수 있다는 가정에 기반한다. 그러나 이는 불가능하다. 북한의 증대하는 핵 전력은 재래식 전력으로 상쇄할 수 없는 이점을 제공한다. “중요하지만 더 제한적인” 지원은 근본적 질문에 대한 신뢰를 약화시킨다. 워싱턴이 로스앤젤레스를 서울과 맞바꿀 것인가? 이러한 모호성은 서울로 하여금 핵 입장을 재검토하게 만들 수 있으며, 이는 비확산 정책이 막고자 하는 바로 그 확산 연쇄를 촉발할 수 있다.

### 전략이 개인화될 때

더 우려스러운 점은, NDS가 그 틀을 명시적으로 “트럼프 대통령의 비전”에 연결하고, 24쪽에 걸쳐 그를 47차례 언급한다는 사실이다. 지속 가능한 전략은 개인의 지도력이 아니라, 지속적인 국가 이익을 중심으로 목표를 설정한다. 조지 케넌의 ‘롱 텔레그램’과 NSC-68로 구체화된 봉쇄 전략은, 미국의 이익에 대한 소련의 위협을 다뤘기 때문에 아홉 번의 행정부를 거쳐 거의 50년간 유지될 수 있었다.

전략이 단일 지도자와 동일시될 때, 그것은 뒤집힐 위험에 노출된다. 동맹과 적대국이 이 틀이 2029년이나 2033년에 만료된다고 믿는다면, 그에 맞춰 행동을 조정할 것이다. 동맹은 정책 전환을 기다리며 방위 투자를 지연시키고, 적대국은 단순히 시간을 끌 것이다.

### 적도 선택권을 가진다

이 전략의 실행 가능성은, 적대국들이 전환 기간 동안 취약성을 이용하기보다 미국의 재배치를 수용할 것이라는 가정에 달려 있다. 역사적 경험은 이를 낙관하게 하지 않는다. 영국의 1937년 제국 방위 백서는 명확한 우선순위를 제시했지만, 이는 독일이 연합국 재무장 이전의 전환기를 이용하는 것을 막지 못했다.

동맹 역량 구축 기간 동안 특정 전구를 낮은 우선순위로 지정함으로써, NDS는 적대국들이 결의를 시험할 수 있는 3~5년의 창을 만들어낸다.

2026년 NDS는 자원 제약을 진단하는 데 있어 늦었지만 필요한 전략적 명확성을 제공한다. 그러나 현재의 공약과 미래의 역량 사이의 간극을, 악용 가능한 취약성을 만들지 않으면서 어떻게 메울 것인지는 보여주지 못한다.

베네수엘라 작전은 이 딜레마를 응축해 보여준다. 압도적인 전술적 능력은 있지만, 전략적 지속력은 부족하다. 펜타곤이 전환기 동안 동맹을 어떻게 보호할 것인지 보여주거나, 혹은 동맹이 감수해야 할 위험을 솔직하게 인정하기 전까지, 이 전략은 해답보다 더 많은 질문을 던진다.

전략 문서는 의도를 설정한다. 결과는 적의 대응이 결정한다. 현재의 증거로 볼 때, 상당한 공백이 남아 있다.

리처드 베리는 2010년부터 2025년까지 미 인도·태평양사령부와 미 특수작전사령부에서 선임 고문으로 근무한 국가안보 전략가다.

America can strike anywhere — but can it stay anywhere?

America can strike anywhere — but can it stay anywhere?

By Richard Berry

 Jan 29, 2026, 11:55 PM

U.S. President Donald Trump leaves after announcing the U.S. Navy's new Golden Fleet initiative at Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach, Florida, on Dec. 22, 2025. (Andrew Caballero-Reynolds / AFP via Getty Images)

The recent Operation Absolute Resolve captured Venezuelan President Maduro in a stunning display of American military power. Yet weeks later, pro-government forces still control Caracas, and the country remains “uninvestable.”

This gap between tactical brilliance and strategic stalemate reveals the central flaw in the Pentagon’s new National Defense Strategy: America can project overwhelming force anywhere on Earth, but increasingly lacks the sustained presence to turn military victories into enduring outcomes.

The Jan. 24 National Defense Strategy, or NDS for short, confronts a hard reality: the United States cannot simultaneously deter China in the Taiwan Strait, defend the Panama Canal, guarantee European security, and extend nuclear deterrence over South Korea with current force levels.

The Pentagon’s answer is to prioritize homeland defense and Western Hemisphere dominance while maintaining First Island Chain denial and providing “critical but more limited” support to Europe and Korea.

The problem isn’t the diagnosis — it’s that the cure may be worse than the disease.

When priorities collide with physics

The math simply doesn’t work. Taiwan contingency planning alone would consume most available naval and air defense forces before accounting for Western Hemisphere or European commitments. Western Hemisphere defense requires separate force packages: airlift, amphibious platforms, intelligence systems, special operations units, and surface combatants. Current force levels were designed for sustained global commitments, not for simultaneous hemispheric dominance and Indo-Pacific denial while maintaining credible deterrence elsewhere.

The Venezuela operation proves this constraint. America demonstrated it can strike anywhere, but the strategic outcome remains unresolved precisely because the new strategy deprioritizes sustained commitments outside priority theaters.

But the force structure gap is only half the problem. The transition period while allies build capacity creates its own dangers.

The transition window problem

The strategy assumes NATO and South Korea can take “primary responsibility” for regional defense within acceptable timeframes. But Europe faces daunting barriers: aggregate debt at 90% of GDP limits defense spending increases, limited indigenous production of precision munitions and advanced air defense creates capability gaps, and untested casualty tolerance raises questions about political sustainability. This creates a 3-5-year vulnerability window. Europe cannot operate independently while U.S. support is reduced.

South Korea’s challenge is even more acute. The claim that Seoul can take “primary responsibility for deterring North Korea” with “critical but more limited U.S. support” assumes conventional superiority can replace a nuclear guarantee. It cannot. North Korea’s growing arsenal creates advantages in any escalation scenario that conventional forces cannot counter. “Critical but more limited” support undermines confidence in the fundamental question: Would Washington trade Los Angeles for Seoul? This ambiguity could prompt Seoul to reconsider its nuclear stance, triggering exactly the proliferation cascade nonproliferation policy seeks to prevent.

When strategy becomes personal

Perhaps most troubling, the NDS ties its framework explicitly to “President Trump’s vision,” mentioning him 47 times across 24 pages. Enduring strategies frame objectives around persistent national interests, not individual leadership. Containment — articulated in George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” and NSC-68, two pivotal documents of the early Cold War era —survived nearly 50 years across nine administrations because it addressed Soviet threats to American interests.

When strategy becomes synonymous with a single leader, it becomes vulnerable to reversal. If allies and adversaries believe this framework expires in 2029 or 2033, they adjust behavior accordingly: allies delay defense investments awaiting policy reversals; adversaries simply wait us out.

The adversary gets a vote

The strategy’s viability depends on adversaries accommodating American repositioning rather than exploiting vulnerabilities during the transition. History offers little comfort. Britain’s 1937 Imperial Defence White Paper articulated clear priorities, but this didn’t prevent Germany from exploiting the transition period before Allied rearmament.

By designating certain theaters as lower priorities during allied capacity-building, the NDS creates a 3-5-year window for adversaries to test resolve.

The 2026 NDS offers overdue strategic clarity in diagnosing resource constraints. But it fails to show how America bridges the gap between current commitments and future capabilities without creating exploitable vulnerabilities.

The Venezuela operation crystallizes the dilemma: overwhelming tactical capability without strategic staying power. Until the Pentagon shows how it protects allies during the transition — or candidly acknowledges the risks they must accept — this strategy raises more questions than it answers.

Strategy documents set intentions; adversary responses determine outcomes. On current evidence, significant gaps remain.

Richard Berry is a national security strategist who served as senior advisor to six U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and U.S. Special Operations Command (2010-2025).

[ssn688]

애초에 이라크전쟁부터가 '충분한' 병력이 오래 머물지 못해 도루묵(정도가 아니라 이란 좋은 일만 시켜준 결과!)이 된 걸 생각하면... 원래 제국의 패권은 제국만의 힘뿐 아니라 동맹국이나 (능력이 있는)현지세력의 포섭이 뒷받침되어야 했죠. ; >현재의 전력 수준으로는 대만해협에서 중국을 억제하고, 파나마 운하를 방어하며, 유럽 안보를 보장하고, 한국에 대한 핵 억제를 동시에 제공할 수 없다 → 그러니까 W76 1000개만 팔아주세요오... *_*

[위종민]

당장 베네수엘라도 전광석화같았던 군사작전에 비해 협력세력 세워서 제도 복구하는 후속조치가 아직도 제대로 이뤄져 있지 않죠. 뒷마당인 남미조차 제대로 패권을 장악할 능력이 없는 나라가 돼 버린 것 같습니다.

[백선호]

로마인들처럼 다 죽이고 평화가 왔다고 하는 방법을 쓰지 않는 한...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calgacus

"they make a desert and call it peace"