터키와 소말리아의 협력, 그리고 홍해를 둘러싼 각축전

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When Computers Went To Sea | 소말리아와 터키 간의 방위협정 - Daum 카페

소말리아와 터키 간의 방위협정

When Computers Went To Sea | 이집트, 에티오피아와의 갈등으로 소말리아와 연계를 강화 - Daum 카페

이집트, 에티오피아와의 갈등으로 소말리아와 연계를 강화

When Computers Went To Sea | 소말리아, 터키에서 T129 ATAK 공격헬기 도입 예정 - Daum 카페 When Computers Went To Sea | 

소말리아, 터키에서 T129 ATAK 공격헬기 도입 예정

UAE, 소말리아 푼틀란드에 레이다시스템 배치 - Daum 카페

UAE, 소말리아 푼틀란드에 레이다시스템 배치

When Computers Went To Sea | Re: 시리아에서 소말릴란드까지; 터키-이스라엘의 경쟁 - Daum 카페

Re: 시리아에서 소말릴란드까지; 터키-이스라엘의 경쟁

터키는 소말리아의 석유 자원에 접근하고자 소말리아 정부와 협력을 강화하고 있고, 반면 이스라엘과 에티오피아, UAE는 소말리아내 반자치 지역인 푼틀란드나 소말릴란드와 협력하고 있습니다. 아프리카의 뿔 지역에서 터키는 UAE와 경쟁하고 있네요. 이 지역도 참 복잡합니다. 

그런데 소말리아 몫은 석유 수입의 5%밖에 안 되는 불공정한 계약이네요 ㄷㄷㄷ

새로운 쟁탈전: 터키, 소말리아, 그리고 홍해를 둘러싼 전투
Matthew Chandler de Waal
2026년 5월 7일
10분 읽기

터키 대통령 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan과 소말리아 대통령 Hassan Sheikh Mohamud가 터키 앙카라에서 공동 기자회견에 참석하고 있다.

소말리아의 풍부한 석유 매장량은 터키의 관심을 끌었으며, 이는 모가디슈와 앙카라 간 관계를 더욱 심화시키고 있다.

2011년 8월, 터키 대통령 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan과 그의 가족은 극심한 기근이 한창이던 시기 모가디슈를 방문했으며, 이는 거의 20년 만에 소말리아를 방문한 최초의 비아프리카 국가 원수 방문이었다. 

인도주의 지원을 결집시킨 Erdoğan의 방문은 터키에 대한 엄청난 호감을 불러일으켰고, 이후 붉은 바탕의 흰 초승달과 별은 소말리아 곳곳을 장식하게 되었다. 일부 소말리아 아이들은 터키 지도자의 이름을 따서 명명되기까지 했다. 거의 15년이 지난 지금, 지역 및 세계 정치 지형의 상당 부분은 거의 알아볼 수 없을 정도로 변화했으며, 소말리아에서 터키의 지정학적 이해관계 역시 마찬가지다. 이후 상황은 군사기지와 심해 시추선에 이르기까지 규모와 성격 모두에서 변화를 겪었으며, 이는 아덴만과 홍해를 둘러싼 보다 광범위한 지정학적 경쟁 속에 자리하고 있다.

앙카라의 개입은 수년에 걸쳐 여러 단계를 거쳤으며, 소프트파워와 인도주의 외교에서 시작해 인프라 관리로, 그리고 오늘날에는 모가디슈의 가장 중요한 해외 동맹으로 발전했다. Erdoğan 방문 이후 터키의 소프트파워는 급속히 확산되었다. 수천 명의 소말리아 학생들이 이스탄불이나 앙카라에서 공부하고 있으며, 모가디슈 엘리트층은 터키에서 휴가를 보내고, Enza Home 같은 터키 브랜드는 수도 중산층의 선망 대상으로 자리잡았다. 동시에 터키 기업들은 모가디슈 항구와 공항 운영권을 확보했고, 앙카라 최대 해외 군사기지인 Camp TURKSOM은 2017년 이후 수천 명의 Gorgor 특수부대 훈련을 지원해왔다.

그동안 터키는 모든 지원을 모가디슈 연방정부를 통해서만 제공해왔다. 이는 Puntland, Jubaland, Somaliland 같은 소말리아 반자치 지역 행정부와 관계를 구축해온 UAE와 에티오피아와 구별되는 태도다. UAE는 아프리카의 뿔 지역에서 앙카라의 지정학적 경쟁자이기도 하다. 오늘날에는 리야드와 아부다비가 홍해에서 주도권 경쟁을 벌이고 있지만, 2017년에는 걸프협력회의(GCC) 내부 긴장이 공개적으로 폭발하면서 사우디-에미리트 주도 연합이 카타르 봉쇄를 시도했다. 카타르는 터키와 연계되어 있었으며, 이란 및 여러 이슬람주의 운동과의 관계 의혹을 받았다. 공개적으로는 중립을 표방했지만, 모가디슈는 그 여파 속에서 카타르와 터키 편에 섰고, 이에 격분한 UAE는 이후 모가디슈에 대한 상당한 금융·군사 지원을 대체로 축소했다. 그러나 당시에는 앙카라가 도하의 “주니어 파트너” 정도로 여겨졌으며, 카타르를 대신해 후원과 원조를 조정하는 역할을 수행했다.

시추하라, 더 시추하라

그러나 Hassan Sheikh Mohamud의 두 번째 행정부 들어서는 터키가 전면에 나서게 되었으며, 최근의 탄화수소 개발 가능성은 지금까지 소말리아-터키 관계에서 가장 중대한 확장으로 평가된다. 터키는 NATO 회원국이지만, 동시에 중동·북아프리카, 그리고 최근에는 아프리카의 뿔 지역에서 점점 더 공세적인 태도를 취하고 있다. 그리고 이러한 독자 외교정책의 일환으로, 앙카라는 아제르바이잔·이라크·카자흐스탄·러시아로부터의 탄화수소 수입 의존도를 줄이려 하고 있으며, 최근 몇 년 동안 국내 생산 능력도 크게 확대해왔다.

소말리아처럼 빈곤한 국가에서는 석유 자금이 가져올 변혁적 효과에 대한 기대감이 분명 존재하지만, 앙카라와 Villa Somalia 사이의 양자 간 — 종종 비밀스럽게 진행되는 — 거래 방식 역시 점점 더 큰 우려를 낳고 있다.

그 결과 수십 년간 이어져 온 소말리아의 석유·가스(육상 및 해상) 개발 약속은 앙카라에 특히 매력적으로 다가왔으며, 양국은 2024년 초 터키가 소말리아의 잠재 자원을 개발하는 신속한 계약을 체결했다. 소말리아 내 지지자들에게 이는 오랫동안 기다려온 꿈의 실현이다. 석유는 식민지 시대 영국과 이탈리아 지질학자들에 의해 처음 공식 확인되었다. 1950년대 Chevron과 Shell의 계약은 실제 개발로 이어지지 못했고, 1990년대 초 소말리아 국가 붕괴와 이어진 수십 년의 불안정·분쟁으로 인해 매장량은 손대지 않은 상태로 남아 있었다. 그리고 그 규모는 상당한 것으로 여겨진다. 최근 지진파 조사에서는 약 300억 배럴 규모로 추정되며, 이는 UAE 현재 확인 원유 매장량의 약 4분의 1 수준이다.

이러한 터키의 논리는 중동의 대격변 속에서 더욱 강화될 가능성이 높다. 미국과 이스라엘의 이란 공격으로 걸프 에너지 체계가 흔들리고 있기 때문이다. 이 전쟁과 호르무즈 해협의 선택적 봉쇄 여파는 앞으로 수년간 세계 에너지 및 무역 네트워크에 영향을 미칠 것이며, 앙카라의 에너지 자립 추구에 새로운 긴박함을 부여하고 있다.

그러나 소말리아 측에서는 이 불균형 계약에 대해 여러 비판이 제기되고 있다. 무엇보다 충분한 검토 없이 의회에서 졸속 통과되었다는 점이다. 이 계약은 에티오피아와 Somaliland 사이의 “해상 접근권 대가 주권 승인” 합의에 맞서 외국 동맹국들을 결집시키려던 시점에 체결되었다. 이후 터키 중재 협상으로 아디스아바바가 Somaliland와의 협정에서 물러났지만, 터키는 여전히 생산된 소말리아 석유·가스 비용의 최대 90%를 먼저 회수할 수 있도록 허용되며, 그 이후에야 이익 분배가 시작된다. 또한 터키 국영 석유회사는 생산 보너스 지급 의무에서도 면제된다.

반면 소말리아 측 로열티는 단 5%로 제한된다. 소말리아처럼 극도로 빈곤한 나라에서는 석유 자금에 대한 기대감이 존재하지만, 앙카라와 Villa Somalia 간의 비공개적 거래 구조는 점점 더 큰 우려를 낳고 있다. 게다가 소말리아 연방정부는 선거 개편 문제로 관계를 끊은 Jubaland와 Puntland에 대한 지원을 보류하는 등 자금 독점 및 정치화 의혹을 반복적으로 받아왔다.

그러나 탄화수소 계약은 계속 추진되고 있으며, 4월에는 터키 최신 심해 시추선 Çağrı Bey가 — 터키 영해 밖에 처음 배치된 사례로 — 대대적인 환영 속에 모가디슈 항에 도착했다. 탐사 시추는 향후 수주 내 모가디슈에서 370km 떨어진 Curad-1 유정에서 수심 7,500m 깊이로 시작될 예정이다. 아직 상당한 인프라 건설이 필요하지만, 앙카라는 착실히 진전을 이루고 있다.

커지는 터키의 군사적 이해관계

지난 2년 동안 소말리아-터키 관계의 군사적 측면 역시 함께 확대되었으며, 일부에서는 이를 앙카라 상업적 이해관계의 보증 수단으로 보고 있다. 최근 수개월 동안 전투기, 드론, 헬리콥터, 군함 등이 모가디슈에 등장했으며, 이는 터키의 인상적인 국산 군사기술을 과시하고 있다. 이러한 공중 지원은 지난 20년간 소말리아 국가를 상대로 소모전을 벌여온 알샤바브 지하디스트 반군 및 알카에다 연계 세력에 대한 작전에도 활용되고 있다.

소말리아 정부의 정치적 의지는 오히려 더 의문스럽다. 외국 동맹국 지원에 고무된 Villa Somalia는 권력을 독점적으로 강화하려 하고 있으며, 2026년 초 “직접민주주의 회복”을 명분으로 역사적 견제장치를 무시한 채 임시헌법 상당 부분을 개정했다. 동시에 터키의 이해관계와 고문단은 소말리아 국가기관 곳곳에 상당히 침투했으며, 이는 Erdoğan의 정치운동을 모델로 한 이슬람주의 색채의 신집권 Justice and Development Party 설립에서 상징적으로 드러난다.

또한 피로감에 지친 외교 세력 — 특히 미국과 UN — 의 축소는 이러한 권력 집중을 위한 공간을 열어주었다. 3월, 남부 소말리아에서 정부 선거 구상에 반기를 든 지역 지도자가 폭력적으로 축출되는 과정에서, 터키가 군사·재정 지원을 통해 제거를 도왔다는 비난을 받았다. 소말리아의 복잡한 국내 정치에 이처럼 적극적으로 개입하는 것은 비판자들이 오래전부터 경고해온 유형의 내정 개입이며, 앙카라가 Villa Somalia의 논란 많은 국내 모험주의까지 후원할 의지가 있음을 시사할 수도 있다.

지역 경쟁 속에서

그러나 소말리아는 결코 앙카라 야망의 한계가 아니라, 오히려 더 넓은 지역 전략의 발판이다. 2025년 12월 말 이스라엘이 UAE 지원 아래 Somaliland를 일방적으로 승인한 직후, Hassan Sheikh 대통령이 가장 먼저 방문한 나라가 앙카라였다는 것은 우연이 아니었다. 그 방문에서 합의되고 현재 구체화되고 있는 계획은, 아덴만의 분쟁 지역인 Laas Qoray에 터키 군사기지를 건설하는 것이다. 이곳은 홍해와 인도양을 연결하는 전략적 좁은 수로이며, 전 세계 무역의 약 12%가 통과한다. Laas Qoray 기지는 해안 반대편 Somaliland에서 확대되고 있는 이스라엘·에미리트 영향력에 대한 직접적 대응이 될 것이다. 앙카라와 텔아비브 간 직접 무력충돌 가능성은 낮지만, 소말리아·시리아·동지중해 등 양국 이해관계가 충돌하는 전장은 점점 늘어나고 있다.

이 경쟁은 홍해 양안 전반에서 진행 중인 보다 광범위하고 가속화된 영향력 재편의 일부다. 이 거대한 상호연결된 공간에서 연안국들의 운명은 이스라엘·카타르·사우디·터키·UAE 간 경쟁에 의해 형성되고 있다. 각 국가는 항구와 수로 확보, 탄화수소 의존도 완화, 정치적 이슬람에 대한 상이한 시각 등 다양한 동기에 따라 아프리카의 뿔 해안과 내륙에서 이해관계를 추구해왔다. 지금까지 이러한 외부의 거래적·군사화된 정치는 소말리아 반도에서 나일강 수자원 문제를 둘러싼 이집트와 에티오피아 간 갈등에 이르기까지 기존 균열을 더욱 심화시키며, 지역의 취약한 다자 평화·안보 구조를 약화시켰다.

2023년 이후 중심축은 수단 전쟁이었다. 이는 사실상 UAE가 주로 지원하는 Rapid Support Forces와, 사우디·이집트가 지원하는 수단 정부군 간의 대리전 형태를 띠고 있으며, 여러 아프리카·아랍 국가들이 양측에 가세하고 있다. 분열된 소말리아 내부에서도 Puntland 정부는 UAE가 보사소 공항을 통해 무기를 밀반입하도록 허용했다는 비난을 받았고, 반면 수단 군 정보기관은 모가디슈 지원 민병대를 지원해왔다.

지속 중인 미국/이스라엘-이란 전쟁 이전부터 서인도양과 아덴만은 이미 다양한 해군과 이해관계로 가득 차 있었다. 예멘의 이란 지원 후티 세력부터 해적 대응을 위한 EU 임무인 Operation ATALANTA까지 다양하다. Laas Qoray의 터키 기지는 지부티에 이미 존재하는 중국·프랑스·이탈리아·일본·미국 기지들과 더불어 Bab al-Mandab 인근 외국 군사력 집중을 더욱 심화시킬 것이다. 이곳은 아덴만과 홍해를 연결하는 핵심 초크포인트이며, 이란 전쟁은 그 전략적 중요성을 극명하게 드러냈다. 석유와 함께, 이러한 대동맥 해협 통제의 지정학적 가치는 최근 몇 주 사이 급등했다.

소말리아에서 터키의 이해관계는 더 긴 역사적 흐름의 표현이다. 이러한 핵심 수로를 통한 상업과 안보 이해관계의 결합은 영국 해군 프리깃이든 미국 항공모함이든 수세기 동안 이어져왔다. 달라진 것은 냉전 이후 경쟁에 어느 정도 구조를 제공했던 — 비록 불완전했더라도 — 다자주의 틀이 붕괴하고 있다는 점이다. 그 자리를 보다 노골적인 거래 중심의 지정학·약탈 논리가 대체하고 있으며, 에너지 확보 경쟁이 전 세계 정치를 재편하고 있다.

아프리카의 뿔 국가들 가운데서도 특히 소말리아 반도의 지리적 위치는 수천 년 동안 중동 및 그 너머와의 무역·종교·문화 교류를 끌어들여왔다. 많은 소말리아 씨족들이 스스로를 “아프리카인”보다 “아랍인”으로 인식하는 점만 보더라도, 소말리아의 정치와 문화를 더 넓은 지역 맥락과 분리해 생각하는 것은 불가능하다. 결국 소말리아와 아프리카의 뿔 전체에 남은 질문은, 각국 정부가 홍해 건너편 경쟁을 불안정의 원천이 아니라 자국 발전을 위한 긍정적 지렛대로 전환할 수 있느냐는 점이다. 터키의 증가하는 지정학적 투자가 소말리아에 변혁적 모델을 제공할지, 아니면 기존 외부 불안정 구조를 반복할지는 아직 지켜봐야 하지만, 현재 징후는 그리 긍정적이지 않다.

The New Scramble: Turkey, Somalia and the Battle for the Red Sea | Royal United Services Institute

The New Scramble: Turkey, Somalia and the Battle for the Red Sea

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CommentaryGuest Commentary

The New Scramble: Turkey, Somalia and the Battle for the Red Sea

Matthew Chandler de Waal

7 May 202610 Minute Read

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The abundance of oil deposits in Somalia has lured interest from Turkey, deepening the Mogadishu-Ankara relationship.

In August 2011, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his family travelled to Mogadishu amidst a gruelling famine, becoming the first non-African head of state to visit Somalia in almost two decades.

Rallying humanitarian support, Erdoğan's visit spurred an outpouring of affection for Turkey, with the white crescent and star on red subsequently adorning much of the country. Some Somali children were even named after the Turkish leader. Flash forward nearly fifteen years, and much of the regional and global political landscape has changed almost beyond recognition – as have Turkish geostrategic stakes in Somalia. What followed has been a transformation in kind and scale, spanning military bases and now deepwater drillships, and situated in a broader geopolitical contest for the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea.

Ankara's engagement has passed through several distinct phases over the years, shifting from soft power and humanitarian diplomacy through infrastructure management to becoming Mogadishu's foremost foreign allytoday. Since Erdoğan's visit, Turkish soft power has proliferated, with thousands of Somali students in Istanbul or Ankara, the Mogadishu elite holidaying in Turkey, and Turkish brands such as Enza Home becoming markers of middle-class aspiration in the capital. At the same time, Turkish companies have assumed control of the management of the Mogadishu port and airport, whilst Camp TURKSOM – Ankara's largest overseas military base – has facilitated the training of thousands of Gorgor special forces since 2017.

Throughout, Turkey has channelled its support exclusively through the federal government in Mogadishu, a posture that distinguishes it from the UAE – a geostrategic rival of Ankara's in the Horn of Africa – and Ethiopia, which both have cultivated ties with Somalia's semi-autonomous regional administrations of Puntland and Jubaland, as well as Somaliland. Today, it is Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that are grappling for ascendancy over the Red Sea, but in 2017, simmering tensions within the Gulf Cooperation Council erupted into the open, with a Saudi-Emirati-led coalition seeking to blockade Qatar, aligned with Turkey, due to its alleged ties with Iran and various Islamist movements. Though publicly neutral, Mogadishu allied itself with Qatar and Turkey in the fallout– infuriating the UAE, which subsequently broadly steered its considerable financial and military support away from Mogadishu. In this period, however, Ankara was broadly considered the 'junior partner' in Somalia for Doha, helping to steer patronage and aid on Qatar's behalf.

Drill, Baby, Drill

During Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's second administration, though, it is Turkey that has stepped into the fore, with the more recent prospect of hydrocarbon extraction marking the most significant expansion of the Somali-Turkish relationship to date. Though a NATO member, Turkey has simultaneously taken an increasingly assertive posture across the Middle East, North Africa, and, more recently, the Horn. And as part of this independent foreign policy, Ankara has similarly sought to diversify its reliance on hydrocarbon imports from Azerbaijan, Iraq, Kazakhstan and Russia, significantly expanding its domestic extraction capacity in recent years.

In a country as impoverished as Somalia, there is discernible excitement about the prospect of a transformative injection of oil money, but the nature of Ankara's bilateral – often clandestine – dealings with Villa Somalia is causing growing concern as well

In turn, the decades-old promise of oil and gas – onshore and offshore – in Somalia has proven particularly enticing to Ankara, with the two countries striking a rapid deal in early 2024 for Turkey to exploit Somalia's latent resources. For its proponents in Somalia, it offers the realisation of a long-awaited dream, with seeps of oil first formally identified by British and Italian geologists in the colonial era. Agreements with Chevron and Shell in the 1950s never translated into formal extraction, and the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s – leading to decades of persistent instability and conflict – has left the reserves untapped. And they are believed to be substantial, with more recent seismic studies suggesting around 30 billion barrels, around a quarter of the UAE's current proven crude oil reserves.

Such a Turkish rationale is likely to grow only further amid the conflagration in the Middle East, with the Gulf energy architecture set ablaze in the US-Israeli assault on Iran. The repercussions of this war – and the selective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz – will reverberate through globalised energy and trade networks for years to come, placing fresh urgency on Ankara's search for self-sufficiency.

However, a number of criticisms from Somali parties have been levied at the lopsided deal, not least that it was rushed through Somalia's parliament without scrutiny. The agreement came as Mogadishu sought to rally its foreign allies against a promised deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland, for sovereign recognition in exchange for sea access. Though Addis eventually backed away from its pact with Somaliland following Turkish-mediated negotiations with Mogadishu, Ankara is still permitted to recover up to 90% of the cost of Somali oil or gas produced before any sharing of profits, and its state-owned petroleum company is exempt from production bonuses.

Somalia's royalties, on the other hand, are capped at just 5%. In a country as impoverished as Somalia, there is discernible excitement about the prospect of a transformative injection of oil money, but the nature of Ankara's bilateral – often clandestine – dealings with Villa Somalia is causing growing concern as well. Furthermore, Somalia's federal government has been repeatedly accused of monopolising and politicising funds, withholding support for Jubaland and Puntland after they severed relations over its electoral agenda.

But the hydrocarbon deal is moving ahead and, in April, Turkey's latest deepwater drillship, the Çağrı Bey – the first deployed outside Turkish territorial waters – arrived at Mogadishu Port amidst much pomp and fanfare. Exploratory drilling is expected to begin in the coming weeks at the Curad-1 well-site, 370 km from Mogadishu, at a depth of 7,500 m. Substantial infrastructure will still need to be constructed, but Ankara is making headway.

Turkey's Growing Military Stakes

In the past two years, the military dimensions of the Somali-Turkish relationship have grown in lockstep, with some considering them a guarantor of Ankara's commercial stakes. Jets, drones, helicopters, warships and more have appeared in Mogadishu in recent months, showcasing Turkey's impressive homegrown military technology. Such aerial support, too, has played a role in operations against Al-Shabaab, the jihadist insurgency and Al-Qaeda affiliate that has waged a grinding war against the Somali state for two decades.

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The political will of the Somali government, though, is more questionable. Emboldened by its foreign allies' support, Villa Somalia has monopolistically sought to consolidate power at home, overriding historic guardrails to rewrite much of the Provisional Constitution earlier in 2026 under the guise of restoring direct democracy. Simultaneously, the gradual penetration of Turkish interests and advisors into parts of the Somali state has become considerable, epitomised by the government's new Islamist-flavoured ruling Justice and Development Party in Mogadishu, having been modelled on Erdoğan's own movement.

Moreover, the drawing down of a wearied diplomatic corps – particularly the United States and the UN – from Somalia has opened space for such consolidation. In March, during the violent ousting of a regional leader in southern Somalia after he broke ranks with the government's electoral agenda, Ankara was accused of facilitating his removal with military and fiscal support. Such an assertive role in Somalia's fraught domestic politics represents precisely the kind of internal deployment that its critics had long cautioned against, and may yet signal Ankara's willingness to underwrite Villa Somalia's own controversial adventurism at home.

In the Regional Contest

But Somalia is far from the limit of Ankara's ambitions in the region, rather a broader platform for them. It was no coincidence that President Hassan Sheikh's first visit following Israel's unilateral recognition of Somaliland in late December 2025 – a bombshell development facilitated by the UAE – was to Ankara. Agreed during his trip and now coming into sharper focus are plans for a Turkish military base in Laas Qoray, located in a contested region on the Gulf of Aden, the strategic, narrow waterway that connects the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean and through which roughly 12% of global trade passes. The Laas Qoray base would serve as a direct riposte to the growing Israeli and Emirati presence in Somaliland, further along the coast. Though a direct armed conflict between Ankara and Tel Aviv remains unlikely, the theatres in which their geostrategic interests diverge – from Somalia to Syria to the eastern Mediterranean – are multiplying.

That rivalry is part of a broader and accelerating reconfiguration of influence across both sides of the Red Sea; a vast, interlocking theatre, in which the fates of littoral states are being shaped by competition between Israel, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE. Each state has pursued interests along the Horn's coastlines and hinterlands, driven by a combination of imperatives, including securing ports and waterways, hedging against hydrocarbon dependence, and divergent views on the role of political Islam. To date, such external transactional and militarised politics have wrought immense damage on the Horn, deepening pre-existing fissures and fractures from the Somali peninsula to divergences between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Nile water basin, as well as eroding the region's fragile multilateral peace and security architecture.

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Since 2023, the epicentre has been the war in Sudan, effectively a proxy conflict pitting the UAE, principally backing the Rapid Support Forces, against Saudi Arabia and Egypt, supporting the Sudanese army, with an array of African and Arab states behind either party. Within a divided Somalia itself, the Puntland government has been accused of allowing Abu Dhabi to smuggle weapons through Bosaaso airport, whilst the Sudanese military intelligence has facilitated militia support for Mogadishu.

Even before the continuing US/Israel-Iranian war, the western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden were bristling with competing navies and interests, ranging from the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen to Operation ATALANTA, the EU mission designed to combat piracy. And a Turkish installation at Laas Qoray would join facilities operated by China, France, Italy, Japan, and the US in neighbouring Djibouti, further deepening the concentration of foreign military power near the Bab al-Mandab, the critical chokepoint between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, whose strategic significance the Iran conflict has thrown into savage relief. Alongside oil, the real estate value of control over these aortic straits has soared in the past weeks.

Turkish interests in Somalia are an expression‎ of a longer history; the blending of commercial and security interests through these arterial waterways is centuries old, be it through Royal Navy frigates or American aircraft carriers. What has changed, though, is the collapse of the multilateral framework that once provided a degree of structure, however imperfect, to the post-Cold War competition and the dying era of the 'liberal peace.' In its place, a bluntly transactional geo-kleptocratic logic has stepped forward, in which the scramble for energy is reshaping politics across the globe.

More than most countries in the Horn of Africa, the Somali peninsula's geographic position has drawn trade, religion, and cultural exchange for millennia with the Middle East and beyond. It is impossible to divorce Somalia's politics or culture from the broader region, not least with many Somali clans regarding themselves as 'Arab' rather than 'African.' Instead, the question for Somalia and the Horn writ large remains whether its governments can convert the rivalries from across the Red Sea from a source of instability into positive leverage for their own countries. Whether Turkey's rising geostrategic investments in Somalia offer a transformative model of engagement or simply more of the same externalised insecurity will have to be seen, but the augurs are hardly positive.

© Matthew Chandler de Waal, 2026, published by RUSI with permission of the author.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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