가까워지고 있는 이스라엘과 UAE

[위종민]

이란전쟁 이후 이스라엘과 UAE가 더 가까워지고 있다고 합니다. 이스라엘이 UAE에 아이언 돔과 아이언 빔을 배치했네요 ㄷㄷㄷ 

UAE를 제외한 다른 나라, 특히 사우디의 아브라함 협정 이행은 거의 불가능할 것으로 평가하고 있습니다. 

이란 전쟁은 UAE–이스라엘 안보 협력을 강화시켰다: 정상화의 위험과 가능성
Dr Burcu Ozcelik
2026년 5월 7일
8분 읽기

2026년 3월 1일 일요일, 아랍에미리트 두바이 항만 지역에서 이란 드론 공격 이후 연기가 피어오르고 있다.

UAE는 이스라엘의 가장 실질적인 작전 파트너인 아랍 국가로 부상했다. 그러나 현재로서는 이 관계가 보다 광범위한 지역 통합을 보장하지는 않는다. 

지난주 이스라엘이 이란과의 전쟁 중 UAE에 첨단 방공 자산과 인력을 배치했다는 사실이 드러나면서, 양측이 그동안 보다 불투명하게 유지해온 전략적 협력 수준이 공개되었다. 보도에 따르면 이스라엘은 UAE에 Iron Dome 방공체계와 감시체계 “Spectro”, 그리고 단거리 로켓 및 드론 요격용 Iron Beam 레이저 방어체계를 제공했다. 이란은 이스라엘을 포함한 다른 어떤 역내 국가보다도 UAE를 더 집중적으로 공격했다. 에미리트 국방부에 따르면 전쟁 발발부터 4월 8일 휴전까지 UAE는 약 550발의 탄도미사일과 2,200회의 드론 공격을 견뎌야 했다. 이로 인해 UAE는 이란 이슬람 공화국에 대한 입장을 더욱 강경하게 바꾸었으며, 테헤란의 보복 전략을 비판하는 수위는 다른 어떤 걸프 국가보다도 높아졌다.

5월 4일에는 UAE 상공에서 이스라엘이 운용하는 Iron Dome 체계가 이란 미사일을 요격한 것으로 보도되었다. 이는 에미리트 영토에서 이스라엘 인력이 운용한 장비의 첫 실전 사용이자, 실제 분쟁 상황에서 Iron Dome이 이스라엘이나 미국 외 지역에 처음 배치된 사례로 전해졌다. 다음 날 저녁 이란의 반응 역시 주목할 만했다. 이란 Khatam al-Anbiya 중앙사령부 대변인은 그러한 작전은 수행된 적이 없다고 밝히며, 만약 그런 행동이 있었다면 “명확하고 공식적으로 발표되었을 것”이라고 덧붙였다. 그는 UAE 국방부의 주장을 “근거 없는 것”이라고 규정했다.

이스라엘–UAE 안보 협력은 2020년 Abraham Accords 이후 단계적으로 꾸준히 발전해왔다. 이를 가능하게 한 보다 넓은 배경은 2021년 1월 이스라엘이 미 유럽사령부(EUCOM)에서 미 중부사령부(CENTCOM) 체계로 편입된 것이었다. 이 변화의 영향은 상당했으며, 이스라엘과 걸프 국가들 간 보다 긴밀한 정보 공유와 조정을 위한 작전 기반을 제공했다.

이스라엘–UAE 연계는 양측 모두에 명확한 위험과 보다 불투명한 위험을 동시에 안겨주고 있다.

2022년 예멘 후티 세력이 UAE를 공격한 이후, 이스라엘은 Rafael Advanced Defense Systems가 제작한 SPYDER 이동식 요격체계와 Barak 체계 같은 첨단 방공체계를 아부다비에 이전한 것으로 알려졌다. 이러한 이전은 정상화 이후 이스라엘과 걸프 국가 사이에서 이루어진 첫 주요 방산 거래 가운데 하나로 널리 인식되었다. 이는 UAE가 이미 보유한 Patriot·THAAD 같은 서방 제공 체계를 대체하려는 것이 아니라, 다층 방공 구조를 강화하려는 목적이었으며, 양자 안보 협력 심화를 보여주는 사례였다. 이런 관점에서 보면 최근의 움직임은 이미 형성된 안보 협력 패턴이 지속되면서 가시성이 높아지고 있음을 보여준다.

UAE의 안보 접근법 이해하기

UAE는 제한된 인적 자원과 장기 지상작전을 지속하기 어려운 구조 때문에, 자국군과 보조 지원세력을 결합하는 모델로 나아가게 되었다. 동시에 아부다비는 특정 국가에 대한 과도한 의존을 피하고 안보 파트너를 다변화하기 위한 선택적·이익 중심 방위 전략을 추진해왔다. 보다 큰 전략적 자율성 확보를 위한 이러한 움직임은 아시아·태평양 및 유럽 전역으로 확장되는 상업·투자 네트워크에 부분적으로 기반하고 있다. 2026년 2월 EDGE–EM&E 협정은 UAE 기반 합작투자 가능성을 모색하는 내용으로, 약 15억 달러 규모 상업 파이프라인이 이를 뒷받침한다. 이는 보다 광범위한 에미리트 전략도 반영한다. 예를 들어 이탈리아 Leonardo와의 첨단 방산체계 공동 설계·생산 계획, 프랑스 CMN NAVAL과의 AD NAVAL 출범(70억 유로 규모 비NATO 주문 파이프라인 지원), 그리고 2025년 11월 한국 Hanwha와 체결한 방공·미사일방어·장거리 타격·무인체계 협력 논의 등이 있다. 이러한 협정들은 아부다비가 보다 다변화되고 공동개발 지향적이며 국내 산업 기반 중심의 방산 전략을 추구하고 있음을 시사한다.

그러나 실제로는 이란 전쟁이 미국–이스라엘–UAE 연계를 더욱 가속화했다. 4월 초 UAE 대통령 고문이자 이란 비판론자인 Anwar Gargash는 이란의 걸프 아랍국 공격이 “걸프 내 미국 역할을 축소하는 것이 아니라 오히려 더욱 구체화할 것”이라고 말하며, “걸프 지역에서 이스라엘 영향력 역시 줄어드는 것이 아니라 더욱 두드러질 것”이라고 밝혔다. 다소 도전적인 어조로, 그리고 여전히 역내에서 미국 안보력이 핵심임을 강조하며 그는 “우리의 주요 안보 파트너는 미국이다. 우리는 미국과의 관계를 더욱 강화할 것”이라고 덧붙였다.

이스라엘의 UAE 전략

이스라엘 입장에서 그 매력은 분명하다. 홍해 공격과 호르무즈 해협 위협으로 인해 해상안보와 공급망 회복력이 다시 세계적 핵심 의제로 떠오른 시점에서, UAE는 무역·에너지·물류 네트워크로 진입할 수 있는 가치 있는 아랍 관문 역할을 한다. 또한 이는 이스라엘이 걸프에서 아프리카의 뿔까지 이어지는 보다 넓은 지정학적 공간에 발판을 갖게 해준다. 이 지역에서는 항구·회랑·금융·인프라가 공식 동맹만큼이나 영향력을 결정하고 있다. 이러한 논리를 바탕으로 India-Israel-UAE-US(I2U2), Negev Forum, N7 initiative, India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor(IMEC) 같은 다양한 구상이 만들어졌다. 형태와 목표는 다르지만, 이 모든 틀은 UAE가 사우디와의 돌파구를 무한정 기다리지 않고도 이스라엘의 아랍권 통합을 심화시킬 수 있는 지역 허브 역할을 할 수 있다는 가정 위에 세워져 있다.

일부 이스라엘 전략가들에게는 지속되는 호르무즈 해협 위기와 Bab al-Mandeb·홍해를 둘러싼 후티 위협이 “전화위복”처럼 여겨지기도 한다. 논리는 이렇다. 걸프 수출국들이 이란 통제 초크포인트 노출을 줄이는 경로에 더 의존하게 된다면, 사우디(동서 송유관)와 UAE(Fujairah)는 이스라엘을 정치적으로는 불편하지만 점점 더 유용한 파트너로 인식할 수 있다는 것이다. 이스라엘 시각에서는 이는 또한 유럽에 대한 자국의 가치를 높여줄 수 있으며, 에너지 수송 경로에서의 역할도 강화시킬 수 있다. 그러나 이 구상은 여전히 정치적·물류적·전략적 제약에 부딪히고 있다.

2023년 Baker Institute 연구는 UAE가 OPEC을 탈퇴할 경우, 당시의 여유 생산능력과 투자 완료 예상치를 기준으로 연간 최대 500억 달러 추가 수익을 얻을 수 있다고 추산했다. 이제 UAE가 실제로 OPEC을 떠난 상황에서, 이스라엘 역시 다른 OPEC 회원국 문제에 얽매이지 않고 UAE와 장기 양자 공급 계약을 체결할 기회를 보고 있다.

그러나 어느 것도 단순하지 않다. 핵심 질문은 UAE–이스라엘 군사협력이 새로운 지역 질서를 강화하는가, 아니면 양국을 서로의 전쟁 위험에 노출시키는가이다. UAE–이스라엘 연계는 양측 모두에 명확한 위험과 불분명한 위험을 동시에 안겨준다. 아부다비 입장에서 위험은 보다 명확하다. 이스라엘과의 군사협력 심화는 아랍 세계에서의 평판 비용을 증가시키고, 이란의 보복 위험을 키우며, UAE를 이스라엘의 역내 군사작전에 더욱 밀접하게 연결시킨다. 반면 이스라엘 입장에서는 UAE와의 밀착이 리비아의 Khalifa Haftar 지원, 예멘 남부 Transitional Council 지원, 그리고 UAE는 부인하고 있지만 수단 RSF 지원 의혹 등 아부다비의 논란 많은 역내 개입과 더욱 깊게 연결된다는 의미이기도 하다. 결과적으로 역설이 발생한다. UAE는 이스라엘에게 가장 현실적인 아랍 안보 교량을 제공하지만, 동시에 그 파트너십 안으로 에미리트 개입주의의 정치적 부담도 함께 끌어들이고 있는 것이다.

왜 UAE는 여전히 예외적 사례인가

이스라엘 입장에서는 여기서 기대와 지역 현실이 충돌할 수 있다. 이스라엘은 UAE를 Abraham Accords를 보다 넓은 지역 안보 구조로 확장할 수 있는 가장 현실적인 시험 사례로 보고 있는 듯하다. 이스라엘 낙관론자들은 여전히 사우디와의 정상화 가능성이 열려 있다고 믿으며, UAE 경험이 이란에 맞선 구조적 협력의 이점을 보여줄 수 있다고 본다.

그러나 현재 걸프 지역 전반에서는 이러한 변화에 대한 의지가 거의 보이지 않는다. 특히 레바논에서의 다전선 군사작전과 가자·서안지구의 지속적 전쟁과 불안정 상황 속에서는 더욱 그렇다. Bahrain 역시 Abraham Accords 서명국이지만 지정학적 비중은 다르다. 사우디는 완전히 다른 범주에 속한다. 리야드는 정상화를 팔레스타인 국가 수립을 위한 신뢰할 만한 정치적 전망과 연결하고 있으며, 보다 근본적으로는 이스라엘 중심으로 정의되는 지역 안보 의제에 공개적으로 편입되는 것에 신중한 태도를 유지하고 있다. 다시 말해, 이스라엘이 “개념 증명”으로 보는 것을 리야드는 오히려 “경고 사례”로 읽고 있을 가능성이 크다.

한편 이란은 UAE의 자위권과 보다 광범위한 반이란 안보 구조 참여를 깔끔히 구분하지 않을 가능성이 높다. 테헤란 시각에서 UAE는 단순한 걸프 국가가 아니다. 이스라엘과의 심화된 통합이 바로 이란이 저지하려는 지역 연계를 공고히 할 수 있는 핵심 물류·금융·에너지 허브다. 여기에 UAE가 이미 아랍권 일부에서 논란 많은 이미지를 가지고 있으며, 이스라엘 역시 아랍권 전반에서 매우 비인기적이라는 점이 더해지면서, 테헤란이 에미리트 영토를 공격 대상으로 삼은 배경을 어느 정도 설명해준다.

문제는 단순히 미사일이나 방공체계 같은 군사 논리만이 아니다. 핵심은 이란이 남쪽 측면에서 보다 노골적인 이스라엘–걸프 축 형성을 비용 없이 허용할 것인가 하는 점이며, 그렇지 않을 경우 이란의 억지력 회복은 흔들리게 된다.

UAE 입장에서 이스라엘은 첨단 능력·정보 가치·대이란 억지 강화 수단을 제공한다. 그러나 어느 쪽도 이 관계를 더 공개적으로 만들 때 발생하는 정치적 비용에서 자유로울 수는 없다. 연계가 더 공개될수록, 이를 단순히 실용적·기술적·방어적 협력이라고 설명하기는 어려워질 것이다. 이는 점점 더 단순 협력을 넘어 특정한 지역 질서 비전 자체로 평가받게 될 것이다.

그리고 그것이 보다 근본적인 질문이다. UAE–이스라엘 군사협력은 새로운 중동 안보 구조의 기초인가, 아니면 공통된 위협 인식 위에 세워졌지만 보다 광범위한 지역 정당성을 결여한 좁은 연합의 정점인가? 현재로서는 분명 중요한 이정표다. 그러나 아직까지는 걸프의 다른 국가들이 기꺼이 따르려는 모델은 아닌 것으로 보인다.

Iran War Grew UAE–Israel Security Ties: Normalisation’s Peril, Promise | Royal United Services Institute

Iran War Grew UAE–Israel Security Ties: Normalisation’s Peril, Promise

Iran War Grew UAE–Israel Security Ties: Normalisation’s Peril, Promise

Dr Burcu Ozcelik

7 May 20268 Minute Read

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The UAE has emerged as Israel’s most operationally significant Arab partner. But, for now, the relationship is no guarantee of wider regional integration.

Last week’s revelation that Israel had moved advanced air defence assets and personnel to the United Arab Emirates during the war with Iran brought into the open a level of strategic cooperation both sides had previously kept more opaque. It was reported that Israel provided the UAE with an Iron Dome air defence system, as well as a surveillance system ‘Spectro’ and a version of the Iron Beam laser defence system, designed to intercept short-range rockets and drones. Iran targeted the UAE more than any other regional state, including Israel. Since the start of the war until the 8 April ceasefire, the UAE came under intense pressure, sustaining an estimated 550 ballistic missiles and 2,200 drone strikes, according to the Emirati defence ministry. This prompted the UAE to harden its stance against the Islamic Republic of Iran, extending farther than any other Gulf state in its criticism of Tehran’s retaliatory strategy.

On 4 May, an Israeli-operated Iron Dome system was reported to have intercepted an Iranian missile over the UAE, reportedly marking the first operational use of Israeli-manned hardware on Emirati soil and, during an active conflict, the first deployment of Iron Dome outside Israel or the US. Iran’s response the following evening was also telling: the spokesperson for Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters said that no such operations had been conducted, adding that any action would have been ‘clearly and officially announced’ and describing the accusations by the UAE Defence Ministry as ‘baseless.’

Israel–UAE security cooperation has developed steadily, building step by step over time since the 2020 Abrham Accords. The wider enabling context was Israel’s integration in January 2021 into US Central Command (CENTCOM) after being partUS European Command (EUCOM). The impact of this shift was substantial and facilitated the operational infrastructure for closer intelligence and coordination between Israel and the Gulf states.

The UAE-Israel alignment carries both clear and more opaque risks for both sides

Following Yemen-based Houthi attacks on the UAE in 2022, Israel reportedly transferred advanced air defence systems such as the Rafael Advanced Defense Systems-made SPYDER mobile interceptors and Barak systems to Abu Dhabi. These transfers were widely seen as among the first significant defence deals between Israel and a Gulf country after normalisation. Rather than replacing the UAE’s existing Western-provided systems, such as Patriot and THAAD, they were intended to strengthen a layered air defence architecture and reflected a deepening pattern of bilateral security cooperation. Seen this way, the latest step points to the continuation and increasing visibility of an already established pattern of security coordination.

Understanding the Emirati Security Approach

The UAE’s limited personnel depth and its resulting difficulty in sustaining prolonged ground operations have pushed it towards a model that blends national forces with auxiliary support. In parallel, Abu Dhabi has pursued a selective, interest-driven defence strategy designed to diversify its security partnerships and avoid over dependence on any single defence provider. That push for greater strategic autonomy rests in part on an expanding web of commercial and investment ties across Asia-Pacific and Europe. The February 2026 EDGE–EM&E agreement to explore a UAE-based joint venture, supported by a commercial pipeline of roughly $1.5 billion, is a case in point. It also reflects a broader Emirati effort: a planned UAE-based joint venture with Italy’s Leonardo to design and produce advanced defence systems for the UAE and selected export markets; the launch of AD NAVAL with France’s CMN NAVAL, supported by an existing €7 billion non-NATO order pipeline; and an agreement with Korea’s Hanwha in November 2025 to explore cooperation in air and missile defence, long-range strike and unmanned systems. Taken together, these agreements suggest that Abu Dhabi seeks a more diversified, co-development-oriented and domestically anchored defence-industrial strategy.

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In practice, however, the Iran campaign has accelerated a US–Israel–UAE alignment. In early April, Anwar Gargash, advisor to the UAE president and a staunch critic of Iran’s actions, said that Iran’s attacks on its Gulf Arab neighbours are likely to ‘concretize’ the US role in the Gulf, ‘not reduce it,’ and “We will also see Israeli influence become more prominent in the Gulf, not less.” In a somewhat defiant tone, and underscoring the continued primacy of US security power in the region, he added, ‘Our main security partner is the United States. We will double down on our relationship with the United States.’

Israel’s Emirati Strategy

For Israel, the attraction is clear. The UAE offers a valuable Arab gateway into a wider network of trade, energy and logistics at a time when attacks in the Red Sea and threats to the Strait of Hormuz have pushed maritime security and supply-chain resilience back to the top of the global agenda. It also gives Israel a stake in a broader geography – stretching from the Gulf to the Horn of Africa – in which ports, corridors, finance and infrastructure increasingly shape influence as much as formal alliances do. Various concepts were built around this logic, such as: the India-Israel-UAE-US grouping, or I2U2; the Negev Forum; the N7 initiative; and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, or IMEC. Different in form and ambition, each of these frameworks rest on the assumption that the UAE could function as a regional hub through which Israel might deepen its Arab-facing integration without waiting indefinitely for a Saudi breakthrough.

For some Israeli planners, the stubbornly ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, and the latent Houthi threat over the Bab al-Mandeb and the Red Sea is a blessing in disguise. The argument is that, if Gulf exporters are forced to rely more heavily on routes that reduce exposure to Iranian-controlled chokepoints, Saudi Arabia (through the East-West Pipeline) and the UAE (through Fujairah) may come to regard Israel as an increasingly useful, if politically awkward, partner. In Israeli thinking, this could also bolster the country’s value to Europe by reinforcing its role in onward energy transit. That ambition, however, still runs up against a formidable list of political, logistical and strategic constraints.

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A 2023 Baker Institute study estimated that leaving OPEC could generate up to $50 billion in additional annual revenue for the UAE, based on an assessment of its then-current spare capacity and the expected completion of ongoing capital investment. Now, with the UAE officially out of the cartel, Israel also sees an opportunity for bilateral long-term supply agreements directly with the UAE, without the complications of other OPEC members.

But none of this is straightforward. The central question is whether UAE–Israel military cooperation strengthens a new regional order, or whether it exposes both states to the liabilities of each other’s wars. The UAE-Israel alignment carries both clear and more opaque risks for both sides. For Abu Dhabi, the risks are clearer: deeper military cooperation with Israel increases reputational costs in the Arab world, sharpens its exposure to Iranian retaliation, and ties the UAE more closely to Israel’s regional military campaigns. For Israel, a closer embrace of the UAE also means deeper association with Abu Dhabi’s controversial regional footprint – including its past backing for Khalifa Haftar in Libya, its support for the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen, and allegations, denied by the UAE, that it has supported the RSF in Sudan. The result is a paradox: the UAE offers Israel its most viable Arab security bridge but also imports into that partnership the political liabilities of Emirati interventionism.

Why the UAE Remains an Outlier

For Israel, this is where expectations may collide with regional reality. Israel appears to view the UAE as the most viable test case for whether the Abraham Accords can be translated into a wider regional security architecture. Israeli optimists still believe Saudi normalisation is not off the table, and that the UAE’s experience can demonstrate the benefits of structured cooperation against Iran.

For now, however, scant appetite exists across the Gulf for such a shift, especially in the context of Israel’s multi-front military operations in Lebanon and the ongoing war and instability in Gaza and the West Bank. Bahrain may also be an Abraham Accords signatory, but it does not carry the same geopolitical weight. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, remains in a different category altogether. Riyadh continues to tie normalisation to a credible political horizon for Palestinian statehood, and more broadly remains wary of being drawn into an openly Israeli-defined regional security agenda. In other words, what Israel sees as a proof of concept, Riyadh likely reads as a cautionary example.

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Iran, for its part, is unlikely to distinguish neatly between Emirati self-defence and Emirati participation in a broader anti-Iran security architecture. From Tehran’s vantage point, the UAE is not just another Gulf state. It is a crucial logistical, financial and energy hub whose deeper integration with Israel threatens to consolidate precisely the kind of regional alignment Iran seeks to disrupt. Combined with the UAE’s already contested image in parts of the Arab world, and particularly as Israel is deeply unpopular across the Arab world, this goes some way towards explaining Tehran’s decision to target Emirati territory.

The issue is not simply missiles or air defence in hard military logic, rather, it is whether Iran allows the emergence of a more overt Israel-Gulf axis on its southern flank without imposing costs, without which Iranian deterrence restoration falters.

For the UAE, Israel offers advanced capabilities, intelligence value and a stronger deterrent posture against Iran. Yet neither side can escape the political costs of making that relationship more visible. The more public the alignment becomes, the harder it will be to present it as merely pragmatic, technical or defensive. It will increasingly be judged for what it represents: not just cooperation, but a particular vision of regional order.

And that is the deeper question. Is UAE-Israel military cooperation the foundation of a new Middle Eastern security architecture, or is it the high-water mark of a narrower coalition built around shared threat perceptions but lacking broader regional legitimacy? For now, it is undoubtedly a milestone. But it is not yet a model that others in the Gulf appear ready to follow.

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