호주의 핵잠수함 보유를 지지하는 주장들

[위종민]

THE STRATEGIST에 호주의 핵잠수함 보유를 지지하는 글들이 여럿 올라왔네요.

1) 2030년 - 2040년대에는 핵잠수함이 진정한 잠수함 보유국을 가르는 기준이 될 것이며, (의미있는) 잠수함 운용국 그룹은 더 줄어들 것이다

2) 해군 함정은 두 가지 종류가 있을 뿐이다. 잠수함과 그 표적. 

3) 호주 상원의원은 핵잠수함은 호주가 쇠사슬에 묶이지 않게 해 주는 절단기라고 상원 연설에서 주장했습니다. 

SSN-AUKUS 도입 전까지 버지니아급 중고 2척과 신조 1척을 도입하기로 했다가 미해군이 굴리던 중고 3척을 받는 걸로 내용이 바뀌었나 보네요. 

**AUKUS, 호주를 점점 줄어드는 잠수함 운용국 그룹에 남게 할 것 – Marles**

2026년 6월 25일

ASPI

AUKUS 제1축(Pillar One)은 앞으로 수십 년 동안 호주가 잠수함을 운용하는 국가들의 점점 줄어드는 그룹에 계속 남을 수 있도록 할 것이라고 Richard Marles 호주 부총리가 목요일 열린 ASPI 국방 콘퍼런스에서 밝혔다.

잠수함 운용은 앞으로 더욱 어려워질 것이므로 잠수함 자체도 더욱 뛰어난 성능을 갖춰야 한다고 국방장관을 겸임하고 있는 Marles는 말했다.

Marles는 세부 사항을 제대로 검토하지 않고 비판만 하는 사람들에게 답하며, 영국·미국과의 AUKUS 안보협력 가운데 잠수함 분야인 제1축(Pillar One)의 논리를 간단하게 설명했다.

Marles는 캔버라에서 열린 콘퍼런스에서 호주가 장거리 작전이 가능한 잠수함 능력을 갖추지 못한다면 미국에 훨씬 더 의존하게 될 것이라고 말했다.

"…2030년대와 2040년대에도 장거리 작전이 가능한 잠수함을 운용하려면 핵추진이어야 합니다. 그리고 그러한 능력을 가장 높은 수준의 주권을 유지하면서 확보할 수 있는 유일한 길은 영국과 미국이 공동으로 호주에 기술을 이전하는 것입니다."

"사실 2030년대와 2040년대에는 잠수함을 운용하는 것이 2000년 당시보다 훨씬 어려워질 것입니다. 탐지되지 않으려면 잠수함은 지금보다 훨씬 더 뛰어난 성능을 갖춰야 합니다."

Marles는 구체적인 기술적 이유는 설명하지 않았다. 그러나 2021년 AUKUS를 출범시킨 당시 정부의 국방장관이었던 Peter Dutton은 2022년에 그 근거를 제시한 바 있다. 그는 *The Australian* 기고문에서 전문가들이 2035년 이후에는 디젤잠수함이 남중국해에서 중국을 상대로 사실상 생존하기 어려울 것이라고 조언했다고 밝혔다. 새로운 레이더 기술이 배터리 충전을 위해 디젤 엔진을 가동하려고 잠망 통기관(snort)을 수면 위로 올리는 순간 잠수함을 탐지할 수 있기 때문이다.

핵추진 잠수함은 그러한 과정을 거칠 필요가 없다.

ASPI 콘퍼런스에서 Marles는 이러한 논리를 바탕으로 호주가 잠수함 운용국 가운데 점점 더 소수의 국가에 속하게 될 것이라고 결론지었다.

그는 "잠수함은 앞으로 훨씬 더 운용하기 어려운 능력이 될 것입니다."라고 말했다. 이어 호주에는 선택지가 있다고 덧붙였다. 한편으로는 이러한 어려움에도 불구하고 잠수함 전력을 계속 유지하기 위해 노력할 수 있다.

"그렇게 된다면 우리는 잠수함을 운용하는 더 작은 국가 그룹의 일원이 될 것이며, 그 결과 더 높은 수준의 주권을 갖게 될 것입니다."

"아니면 잠수함 능력을 포기할 수도 있습니다. 그렇게 되면 우리는 2000년 당시보다도 낮은 수준의 능력을 운용하게 될 것입니다."

이 문제는 20척이 넘는 디젤잠수함을 운용하는 일본에도 중요한 과제다. 집권 연립여당의 일원인 일본혁신당은 지난주 핵추진 잠수함으로 전환할 것을 촉구했다.

비슷한 규모의 디젤잠수함 전력을 보유한 한국도 이미 핵추진 잠수함 개발 사업을 시작했다.

미국, 영국, 프랑스는 수십 년 전에 디젤잠수함 운용을 포기했다. 현재 이들 국가의 잠수함은 모두 핵추진 방식이다. 반면 중국은 핵추진 잠수함과 함께 디젤잠수함도 계속 건조하고 있다. 또한 동남아시아 여러 국가는 1990년대 이후 처음으로 잠수함을 도입했는데 모두 디젤잠수함이며, 현재 또는 향후 남중국해에서 이를 운용할 계획인 것으로 보인다.

AUKUS 제1축에 따라 호주는 2030년대에 미국 해군이 운용하던 버지니아급 핵추진 잠수함 3척을 인도받고, 2040년대부터는 영국과 공동 개발하는 SSN-AUKUS급 잠수함 5척을 도입할 예정이다. 이들 잠수함은 1996년부터 2003년 사이 취역한 콜린스급 디젤잠수함 6척을 대체하게 된다.

사진: SSN-AUKUS 개념도. (영국 정부)

이 기사의 작성에는 AI가 어떠한 아이디어도 제공하지 않았다. — ASPI 편집부

**호주의 핵추진 잠수함은 다영역 억제 전략에서 어떤 역할을 하게 될 것인가**

2026년 6월 26일

Malcolm Davis (ASPI)

잠수함전에 이런 말이 있다. "해군 함정에는 두 종류만 있다. 잠수함과 표적이다." 핵추진 잠수함(SSN)은 전시 바다에서 진정한 최상위 포식자다.

호주 해군참모총장이자 차기 국방군총장인 Mark Hammond 중장은 6월 25일 열린 ASPI 국방 콘퍼런스에서 다영역 억제 전략을 설명하며 핵추진 잠수함의 역할을 언급했다.

그는 다음과 같이 말했다.

"잘 모르시는 분들을 위해 설명하자면, 핵추진 잠수함이 실제 전투에 투입된 사례는 사실 두 번뿐입니다. 첫 번째는 1982년 포클랜드 전쟁으로, 당시 영국 해군의 HMS Conqueror가 직진형 어뢰를 일제 발사해 아르헨티나 해군의 기함인 순양함 General Belgrano를 격침했습니다. 그 교전 이후 아르헨티나 수상함대는 다시는 바다로 나오지 못했습니다."

이어 그는 말했다.

"더 최근에는 올해 초 미국의 핵추진 잠수함 한 척이 이란 호위함을 격침했습니다. 그 교전이 끝난 뒤 인도양에 있던 다른 이란 수상전투함들은 중립국 항구에 입항한 뒤 그대로 머물러 있습니다."

그리고 그는 다음과 같이 결론지었다.

"전투에서 핵추진 잠수함이 가져오는 비대칭적 효과는 놀라울 정도입니다. 핵추진 잠수함은 위치를 찾는 것조차 극도로 어렵고, 무력화하는 데에는 훨씬 더 많은 비용이 듭니다. 따라서 바다를 건너야만 접근할 수 있는 섬나라가 거부(denial) 전략을 추구하는 상황에서 핵추진 잠수함은 매우 중요한 억제 수단입니다. 이것이 의미하는 바는 '만약 당신이 적대적 의도를 가지고 호주 해안으로 접근한다면 우리는 그것에 대응할 능력을 갖추고 있다'는 것입니다."

AUKUS 제1축(Pillar One)의 '최적 경로(Optimal Pathway)'에 따라 재래식 무장을 갖춘 핵추진 잠수함을 도입하는 것은 2026년 국가국방전략(National Defence Strategy)에서 제시된 거부 전략 수행 능력을 획기적으로 강화할 것이다. 이 계획에 따라 호주 해군은 2030년대에 먼저 버지니아급 핵추진 잠수함 3척(추후 최대 2척 추가 가능)을 인도받고, 이어 2040년대부터 SSN-AUKUS급 잠수함을 도입하게 된다. 호주의 SSN-AUKUS는 남호주 오스본 조선소에서 건조될 예정이다. 핵추진 잠수함으로의 전환은 적이 호주 대륙을 향해 군사력을 투사하려 할 때 불확실성을 높여주며, 호주 국방군(ADF)의 거부 전략 수행 능력을 강화하게 된다.

호주의 핵추진 잠수함은 수상과 수중의 적 해군 전력을 모두 위협할 수 있어 잠재적 침략자가 치러야 할 비용을 크게 높인다. 어떤 적이라도 호주의 공중 및 해상 접근로에 전력을 투입하려 한다면 치명적인 화력망을 통과해야 한다. 핵추진 잠수함은 호주 공군의 장거리 타격 능력, 호주 육군의 연안 작전, 자국 우주 역량의 지원, 해군 수상전투함 등 다른 장거리 전력투사 수단과 함께 운용될 것이다.

지난해 중국 해군 기동부대 두 개가 호주 주변 해역에 전개된 것은 베이징이 호주를 상대로 군사력을 투사하려는 의도를 분명히 보여주는 신호였다. 첫 번째 기동부대는 호주를 일주했으며, 호주 연안 태즈먼해에서 사전 통보 없이 실사격 훈련까지 실시했다. 이는 거부 전략을 통한 억제가 실패할 위험성을 보여줬으며, 전시에는 이러한 전개를 격퇴할 능력이 필요하다는 점을 일깨워 주었다.

적은 직접 호주를 공격하는 대신 해상 무역로를 통한 경제 생명선을 위협함으로써 원거리에서 호주를 강압하려 할 가능성도 있다.

이러한 상황에서도 핵추진 잠수함은 핵심적인 역할을 수행할 수 있다. 물론 핵추진 잠수함만으로 모든 문제가 해결되는 것은 아니다. 그러나 콜린스급과 같은 디젤전기 잠수함보다 훨씬 빠른 항해 속도와 기동성, 전술적 우위, 그리고 훨씬 긴 작전 지속 능력을 제공한다. 또한 해양 감시를 지원하고 보안 통신망을 활용해 공중·해상 영역 또는 육상에서 작전 중인 다른 호주 국방군 부대에 정보를 제공하는 데에도 적합하다. Ghost Shark와 Speartooth 같은 반자율 무인 잠수정과 협력해 운용할 수 있다는 점은 적이 호주의 핵심 해상교통로를 위협하거나 해상 요충지를 통과하는 해저 통신 케이블을 공격하려는 시도에 대응하는 데 중요한 역할을 하게 한다.

AUKUS에 반대하는 사람들은 제1축 최적 경로를 통해 도입되는 핵추진 잠수함이 제공하는 작전적·전술적 이점을 외면하고 있다. 또한 핵추진 잠수함이 거부 전략과 핵심 해상교통로 방어에서 수행할 핵심 역할도 무시하고 있다. 그러나 광대한 해양 환경을 가진 호주에게 핵추진 잠수함의 필요성은 매우 분명하다. Hammond 중장은 콘퍼런스에서 다시 한번 이를 잘 설명했다.

"다시 재래식 무장을 갖춘 핵추진 잠수함으로 돌아가 보면, 그것은 어디든 갈 수 있습니다. 그리고 매우 빠르게 어디든 도달할 수 있습니다. 하지만 그것만으로는 충분하지 않습니다. 그래서 우리가 Ghost Shark 같은 무인 수중체계를 함께 추진하는 것입니다. 충분한 숫자의 무인체계는 핵추진 잠수함이 없는 다른 모든 중요한 지역을 담당할 수 있습니다."

"가장 생존성이 높은 전력을 활용해 신속하게 대응하는 능력과, 위험하고 힘들며 반복적인 임무를 수행할 수 있는 대량의 무인체계를 함께 갖추는 균형은 절대적으로 중요합니다. 특히 우리는 세계에서 세 번째로 넓은 배타적경제수역(EEZ)을 관리하는 국가이며, 지구상에서 가장 광대한 해상 접근로의 혜택을 받는 동시에 그 제약도 함께 안고 있기 때문입니다."

**저자**

Malcolm Davis는 ASPI 선임연구원이다.

사진: ASPI 국방 콘퍼런스에서 연설하는 Mark Hammond 중장. (ASPI)

이 기사의 작성에는 AI가 어떠한 아이디어도 제공하지 않았다. — Malcolm Davis

**핵추진 잠수함: 호주가 결코 쇠사슬에 묶이지 않도록 하는 볼트 커터**

2026년 6월 26일

Raff Ciccone

호주는 오랫동안 잠수함 전력의 미래를 둘러싸고 논쟁을 이어왔다. 우리가 내린 결론은 핵추진 잠수함이 그 해답이라는 것이다. 그 결정을 내린 이후 실제로 달라진 것은 거의 없지만, 최근 몇몇에서는 자신들이 만족스럽지 않다고 여기는 일부 세부 사항을 이유로 사업 전체를 재검토해야 한다고 주장하고 있다.

무엇이 걸려 있는지 분명히 하자. 호주는 세계에서 세 번째로 넓은 해양 관할 구역을 가진 섬나라 무역국가다. 우리의 무역 대부분은 바다를 통해 이루어진다. 연료, 식량, 비료, 의약품, 공산품 등 수많은 필수 물자가 해상 공급망을 통해 들어온다. 우리 경제의 기반과 국가를 방어할 수 있는 능력은 모두 안전한 해상 접근에 달려 있다. 이는 국가의 존립과 직결되는 취약성이다. 호주의 해상 무역을 보호하는 일을 중요하지 않거나, 더 나아가 우스꽝스럽다고 치부하는 정치인이나 논평가는 국가안보를 진지하게 생각하지 않는 정도를 넘어, 직무를 소홀히 하는 것이다.

우리가 도입하려는 전력이 무엇인지도 분명히 해야 한다. 현재 핵추진 잠수함을 운용하는 국가는 미국, 영국, 프랑스, 러시아, 중국, 인도 등 전 세계에서 단 여섯 나라뿐이다. 핵추진 잠수함을 도입하는 것은 호주의 안보가 세계 최강국들과 동등한 수준의 능력을 요구하고 있으며, 그럴 만한 가치가 있다는 점을 인정하는 것이다. 이처럼 중요하면서도 소수 국가만 보유한 능력을 확보하려면 인내와 결단, 그리고 지속적인 헌신이 필요할 수밖에 없다. 호주와 미국, 영국의 파트너들은 이 약속에서 흔들린 적이 없다.

자국의 핵추진 잠수함을 건조하고 유지하기 위한 산업 기반과 인력, 기반시설을 구축하는 동안 호주는 미국으로부터 버지니아급 핵추진 잠수함 3척을 도입하게 된다. 이 잠수함들은 단순히 콜린스급과 AUKUS급 사이를 메우는 과도기 전력이 아니다. 세계에서 가장 뛰어난 성능을 가진 잠수함 가운데 하나다. 호주 잠수함청은 호주가 인도받는 각 잠수함이 20년 이상의 운용 수명을 보유해 국가 방위에 기여할 것이라고 확인했다. 이 잠수함들이 인도되는 날은 호주가 태평양뿐 아니라 세계적인 해양 강국의 반열에 오르는 역사적 순간으로 기록될 것이다.

일부 사람들의 외교안보관은 보다 평온했던 시대에 형성됐다. 과거를 향한 향수에 이끌리는 저명한 인사들은 AUKUS의 목적을 과거의 전략적 환경에 근거해 비극적이고 극적인 방식으로 해석하고 있다. 그러나 그들의 견해를 존중한다 하더라도 세상은 변했다. 우리의 지역도 변했으며, 지금 이 순간에도 인도·태평양 전역에서는 군 현대화가 빠른 속도로 진행되고 있다. 호주는 과거가 아니라 현재의 세계에 맞춰 대응해야 한다. 이들 가운데 일부는 이른바 독립적인 AUKUS 공공조사위원회를 구성하기도 했다. 참여자들의 경험은 의심할 여지가 없지만, 그들이 실제로 무엇을 이루려는 것인지는 알기 어렵다.

AUKUS가 발표된 지 거의 5년이 지난 지금 필요한 것은 구체적인 행동이다. 막연한 의문과 우려만 제기하는 것은 건설적이지 않다.

Richard Marles 부총리가 올바르게 지적했듯이, AUKUS를 포기하는 것은 호주를 미국에 덜 의존하게 만드는 것이 아니라 오히려 더 의존하게 만들 것이다. AUKUS를 통해 파트너들과 협력함으로써 호주는 궁극적으로 진정한 주권적 핵추진 잠수함 산업을 국내에 구축하게 된다. 반대로 녹색당 등이 주장하는 길을 선택해 미국 자체나 그때그때의 미국 대통령에 대한 호불호를 외교정책의 기반으로 삼는다면, 호주는 능력이 약화되고 근본적으로 주권도 줄어들게 될 것이다. 해군 분석가 Jennifer Parker가 말했듯이, "호주의 해상 공급망을 어떻게 보호할 것인지에 대해서는 진지한 사람들이 서로 다른 의견을 가질 수 있다. 그러나 그 누구도 그 문제가 존재하지 않는 척할 수는 없다."

버지니아급 잠수함의 필요성은 변하지 않았다. 전 국방부 차관 Dennis Richardson은 최근 시드니에서 열린 Morgan Stanley 행사에서 현재의 논쟁을 "평생 본 것 가운데 가장 과장된 논란 중 하나"라고 직설적으로 평가했다. 그의 평가는 단순했다. 이미 운용됐던 잠수함이든 신조 잠수함이든, 버지니아급 3척은 현재 호주의 잠수함 전력보다 훨씬 뛰어난 능력을 제공한다는 것이다. 이는 단순히 미래를 위한 투자만이 아니다. 그 자체로 하나의 역사적 전환점이다. 호주는 신조 1척과 중고 2척을 도입하는 대신 실전 운용 중인 버지니아급 3척을 도입함으로써 상당한 비용을 절감하게 된다. 또한 두 종류의 새로운 선체를 운용하는 대신 하나의 선체만 운용하면 복잡성이 줄어들고 교육과 정비도 더욱 효율적으로 이루어진다. 이는 전력의 격하가 아니라 합리적인 계획이다. 이 잠수함들은 2050년대까지 호주를 위해 복무할 것이며, 이후에는 AUKUS급과 함께 임무를 수행한 뒤 퇴역하게 될 것이다.

21세기에 들어 우리의 전략 환경은 크게 변했다. 호주는 현재의 현실에 맞춰 대응해야 한다. 우리는 더욱 치열해지는 전략 경쟁의 시대에 들어섰으며, 이는 신중한 국가 운영을 요구한다. 핵추진 잠수함은 우리의 생활방식을 지탱하는 해상 공급망을 위협하는 세력을 억제할 수 있는 유일한 플랫폼이다. 그러한 억제를 실질적으로 수행하는 데 필요한 속도와 항속거리, 은밀성을 모두 갖춘 것은 핵추진 잠수함뿐이다. 그것은 호주가 결코 쇠사슬에 묶이지 않도록 해 줄 볼트 커터다.

이곳, 즉 상원에서 이루어지는 토론은 건강한 일이다. 감시는 필수적이다. 그러나 감시는 사실에 근거해야 하며, 반대에는 반드시 대안이 따라야 한다. 지금은 전략적 명확성이 필요한 순간이다. 우리는 세 개의 대양으로 둘러싸인 섬나라이며, 전략 경쟁은 갈수록 심화되고 있다. 우리에게는 억지력이 필요하고, 주권적인 잠수함 전력이 필요하며, 이를 국내에서 건조하고 유지할 수 있는 산업 역량도 필요하다. Albanese 정부는 바로 이러한 주권적 능력을 구축하고 있으며, 그 능력이 완성되기 전까지는 버지니아급 잠수함이 우리의 뛰어난 작전 능력을 계속 유지하도록 보장할 것이다. 이것이 우리 국가안보를 위한 올바른 계획이다.

이 글은 Raff Ciccone 상원의원이 2026년 6월 23일 상원에서 행한 연설을 수정·편집한 것이다.

**저자**

Raff Ciccone 상원의원은 호주 의회 정보·안보 합동위원회(Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security) 위원장이다.

미국 해군 버지니아급 핵추진 잠수함 **USS Mississippi**가 서호주 록킹엄의 Fleet Base West에 정박해 있는 모습. (Yuri Ramsey/호주 국방부)

AUKUS to keep Australia in a shrinking submarine club – Marles | The Strategist

AUKUS to keep Australia in a shrinking submarine club – Marles | The Strategist

AUKUS to keep Australia in a shrinking submarine club – Marles

25 Jun 2026|ASPI staffASPI staff

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AUKUS Pillar One will keep Australia in a shrinking group of countries operating submarines in coming decades, Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles told the ASPI Defence Conference on Thursday.

Submarines would become harder to operate, so they’d need to be better, said Marles, who is also Australia’s defence minister.

Responding to critics who he said were just not engaging with details, Marles set out a simple train of logic behind Pillar One, the submarine element of the AUKUS defence partnership with Britain and the United States.

If Australia didn’t have a long-range submarine capability, it would be far more dependent on the US, Marles told the conference in Canberra.

‘… To have a long-range capable submarine in the 2030s and 40s, it will need to have nuclear propulsion. And the one avenue which gives us the greatest sovereignty to achieve that is through a technology transfer from the United Kingdom and the US jointly to Australia.’

‘The fact of the matter is it’s just going to be harder to operate submarines in the 2030s and 40s than it was in the year 2000. In order for them not to be detected, they will need to be so much more capable.’

Marles did not elaborate on technical reasons, but former defence minister Peter Dutton, a member of the government that launched AUKUS in 2021, spelled out the case in 2022. He wrote in The Australian that experts had advised that diesel submarines would be unviable against China in the South China Sea beyond 2035. New radar technologies would detect them when they extended breathing pipes, called snorts, above the waves to run engines for battery recharging.

Nuclear submarines don’t need to do that.

At ASPI’s conference Marles drew the conclusion that Australia would be part of a shrinking submarine-operating club.

‘It’s just a harder capability to engage in,’ he said. So Australia had a choice, he added. On the one hand, it could work to maintain submarine capability despite the challenges. ‘And that will mean that we will be part of a smaller group of countries which do it, with more sovereignty as a result.’

‘Or do we let it go, in which case we are operating at a capability less than what we had in the year 2000?’

This is also a large issue for Japan, which operates more than 20 diesel submarines. The Japan Innovation Party, part of the ruling coalition, called last week for a switch to nuclear propulsion.

South Korea, with a similarly numerous fleet of diesel submarines, has already launched a project to build nuclear boats.

The United States, Britain and France gave up on diesel submarines decades ago. All their submarines are nuclear. But China still builds diesel submarines, as well as nuclear ones. Several Southeast Asian countries have acquired their first submarines since the 1990s – all diesels – and presumably operate or intend to operate them in the South China Sea.

Under AUKUS Pillar One, Australia is due to receive three second-hand submarines of the US Virginia class in the 2030s and, beginning in the 2040s, five boats of the SSN-AUKUS class to be built in a joint program with Britain. They are to replace six diesel submarines of the Collins class, which were commissioned from 1996 to 2003.

Author

Image of a concept of SSN-AUKUS: British government.

AI contributed no ideas to this article – ASPI staff.

How Australian SSNs will fit into multi-domain deterrence | The Strategist

How Australian SSNs will fit into multi-domain deterrence | The Strategist

How Australian SSNs will fit into multi-domain deterrence

26 Jun 2026|Malcolm DavisASPI staff

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There’s a saying about submarine warfare: ‘there are two types of naval vessels – submarines and targets.’ Nuclear-powered submarines, SSNs, are the true apex predator of the oceans in war.

The chief of the Royal Australian Navy and soon-to-be chief of the defence force, Vice Admiral Mark Hammond, brought the SSN into the picture in a discussion of multi-domain deterrence at the ASPI Defence Conference on 25 June.

For those that don’t know, nuclear-powered submarines have really only been involved in combat operations twice. First time, 1982 Falklands War, [when the Royal Navy’s] HMS Conqueror sank the Argentinian Navy’s flagship, the cruiser the General Belgrano, with a spread of straight-running torpedoes. After that engagement, the Argentine surface navy did not come back to sea.

The vice admiral continued:

More recently, earlier this year, one US nuclear-powered submarine [sank] an Iranian frigate. On completion of that engagement, the other Iranian surface combatants that were in the Indian Ocean went alongside in the neutral ports and they’ve stayed there.

And he finished by saying:

The disproportional impact of a nuclear-powered submarine in combat is remarkable. It is extremely difficult and extremely expensive to neutralise, let alone locate. So, in the context of a strategy of denial for an island nation whose approaches require traversing the oceans, it is an extremely important deterrent capability. What it says is, ‘If your determination is to approach Australia’s coast with lethal intent, we will have the capability to deal with it.’

Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed but nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS Pillar One Optimal Pathway will dramatically enhance Defence’s ability to undertake a strategy of denial as laid out in the 2026 National Defence Strategy. The Optimal Pathway will see Navy receive a potent fleet of SSNs – first three Virginia-class SSNs in the 2030s (potentially two more later) and then submarines of the SSN-AUKUS class beginning in the 2040s. Australia’s SSN-AUKUS boats will be built at Osborne in South Australia. The transition to SSNs will enhance the Royal Australian Navy’s ability to create uncertainty for an adversary seeking to project power against our continent and thus enhance the Australian Defence Force’s ability to undertake denial.

The ability of Australia’s SSNs to hold at risk adversary naval forces, on or below the surface, increases the potential cost to any would-be aggressor. Any adversary would have to run a gauntlet of lethal firepower if it sought to deploy forces into Australia’s air and maritime approaches. The SSNs would be combined with other means of long-range power projection, including long-range strike delivered by the Royal Australian Air Force, possibly Australian Army littoral operations, support by sovereign space capabilities, as well as the navy’s surface combatants.

Last year’s deployment by China of two naval task groups – the first of which circumnavigated Australia and conducted unannounced live fire exercises in the Tasman Sea, off Australia’s coast – was a clear signal of Beijing’s intent to project military power against us. It highlighted the risk of failing to deter through denial and highlighted the need to have the ability to defeat such a deployment in wartime.

There is also a risk that an adversary could instead choose to coerce Australia at a distance, by threatening our economic lifeline to the world along maritime trade routes.

Once again SSNs can play a key role in meeting this challenge. While SSNs are not, by themselves, a complete solution, they exploit the benefit of high-speed transit, far greater manoeuvrability and speed in any tactical engagement in comparison with diesel-electric submarines such as the Collins class boats, and much greater endurance on station. They will be well equipped to support maritime surveillance and exploit secure communications to provide information to other ADF units operating in the air and maritime domains, or ashore as part of a joint and integrated force. An ability to work in cooperation with semi-autonomous uncrewed submarines, such as Ghost Sharks and Speartooths, allows SSNs to play a key role in countering adversary efforts to threaten our vital sea lanes – or indeed, to disrupt any attempt to attack submarine cables running through maritime chokepoints.

Opponents of AUKUS choose to ignore the operational and tactical benefits offered by SSNs being introduced under the Pillar One Optimal Pathway and the key role that SSNs will play in supporting both a strategy of denial and helping to defend our vital sea lanes of communication. Yet, given Australia’s vast maritime environment, the case for SSNs is very clear. Once again, Hammond put it well at the conference:

Again, if I go back to the conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarine, that can be anywhere. It can be anywhere really quick. But that in itself is not sufficient. It’s why we’re pursuing the uncrewed underwater vehicles as well, things like Ghost Shark, which in numbers can be everywhere else that matters.

So, having that balance of responsiveness at speed in the most survivable of capabilities available to us, backed up by mass and uncrewed systems capable of doing the dangerous, the dirty and the dull missions, it is absolutely important, especially given that we are the custodians of the third largest exclusive economic zone in the world and we are both the beneficiaries of and somewhat constrained by the most extreme maritime approaches on the planet.

Author

Malcolm Davis is a senior analyst at ASPI.

Image of Vice Admiral Mark Hammond speaking at ASPI’s Defence Conference: ASPI.

AI contributed no ideas to this article – Malcolm Davis.

Nuclear submarines: bolt-cutters to ensure Australia is never wrapped in chains | The Strategist

Nuclear submarines: bolt-cutters to ensure Australia is never wrapped in chains | The Strategist

Nuclear submarines: bolt-cutters to ensure Australia is never wrapped in chains

26 Jun 2026|Raff Ciccone

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Australia has long debated the future of our submarine capability. The decision that we’ve reached is that nuclear-powered submarines are the answer. Since reaching that decision, very little has actually changed, but, in recent months, some voices have been demanding that we rethink the entire project over details that they find dissatisfying.

Let us be clear about what is at stake. Australia is an island trading nation with the third-largest maritime domain in the world. Almost all of our trade travels by sea. Our fuel, food, fertiliser, pharmaceuticals, manufactured goods and many other essentials arrive through maritime supply chains. The very foundations of our economy and our capacity to defend ourselves depend on secure access to the sea. That is an existential vulnerability, and any politician or commentator who dismisses the protection of Australia’s maritime trade as insignificant or, far worse, as ridiculous is not just unserious about national security; they are negligent.

Let us also be clear about the capability that we are acquiring. Only six countries in the world operate nuclear-powered submarines: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and India. By acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, Australia is recognising that the security of our nation deserves and demands capability equal to the most powerful nations of the world. Developing such a critical but exclusive capability was always going to demand patience, determination and commitment. Neither Australia nor our partners in the US and the United Kingdom have wavered on this commitment.

While we build the industrial base, workforce and infrastructure required to construct and sustain our own nuclear-powered submarines, we will acquire three Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the United States. These submarines are far more than a mere bridge between our Collins class and our AUKUS class. They are among the most capable submarines operating anywhere in the world. The Australian Submarine Agency has confirmed that each boat we receive will have more than 20 years of operational life to serve in the defence of our country. Their delivery will be marked in history as the day Australia takes its place as one of the premier maritime powers not just of the Pacific but of the world.

There are those whose foreign policy beliefs were shaped in a more benign era. Distinguished voices now animated by nostalgia are based in tragic and dramatic claims about the very purpose of AUKUS on the strategic needs of the past. With respect to these voices, the world has changed. Our region has changed and, as we speak, military modernisation across the Indo-Pacific continues at pace. Australia must respond to the world as it exists today and not as it existed in the past. Some of these voices have decided to form a so-called independent public inquiry into AUKUS. Although its contributors are certainly not lacking in experience, it is difficult to say what they expect to achieve.

Nearly five years after AUKUS was announced, now is the time for concrete action. Vague questions and concerns are not constructive.

As the deputy prime minister, Richard Marles, has rightly argued, walking away from AUKUS would make Australia more reliant on the United States, not less. By working with our partners through AUKUS, Australia will ultimately develop a domestic nuclear-powered submarine industry that is truly sovereign. If we choose the other path, the path that others like the Greens are proposing, and build our foreign policy on the dislike of America or who is in the chair of the president of the day, we will find ourselves less capable and fundamentally less sovereign. [The naval analyst Jennifer Parker] said, ‘Serious people can disagree on how best to protect Australian supply chains, but what they cannot do is pretend that the problem does not exist.’

The case for the Virginia-class submarines has not changed. Former defence secretary Dennis Richardson put it bluntly at a Morgan Stanley summit in Sydney recently, describing the current debate as ‘one of the greatest beat ups that I have ever seen in my life’. His assessment was simple: regardless of whether they have already seen service or are new, the three Virginias will give Australia greatly improved submarine capability compared to our current fleet. This is more than holding out for the future. It is a watershed moment in itself. By acquiring three in-service Virginias as opposed to one new and two previously operated, Australia faces significant savings. Rather than operating two new hull classes, just using one will reduce complexity and streamline training and maintenance. This is not a downgrade. It is sound planning. These submarines will serve Australia well into the 2050s, and they will eventually retire, having served alongside the AUKUS class.

Our strategic environment has changed materially in the 21st century, and Australia must respond to the world as it is. We face a period of growing strategic competition that demands careful statecraft. Nuclear-powered submarines are the only platforms that can provide Australia with the ability to deter threats to our maritime supply chains, on which our way of life depends. They alone have the speed, the endurance and the stealth necessary to effectively provide this deterrence. They are the bolt-cutters that will ensure that we are never wrapped in chains.

Debate in this place [the Senate] is healthy. Scrutiny is essential, but scrutiny must be anchored in facts, and opposition must come with alternatives. This is a moment for strategic clarity. We are an island nation that is surrounded by three oceans in an era of intensifying competition. We need that deterrence, and we need sovereign submarine capability, and we need the industrial capability to build and sustain it here at home. This government, the Albanese government, is delivering that sovereign capability, and, before it arrives, our Virginia-class submarines will ensure that we continue to maintain exceptional operational capability. This is the right plan for the security of our nation.

This is an edited version of a speech that Senator Raff Ciccone delivered in the Senate on 23 June 2026.

Author

Senator Raff Ciccone is chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security.

Image of US Navy Virginia-class submarine USS Mississippi at Fleet Base West, Rockingham, Western Australia: Yuri Ramsey/Department of Defence.