영국 해군의 하이브리드 해군 올인 - 수상함 전력의 승부수

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영국 해군의 하이브리드 해군 전략에 대한 NAVY LOOKOUT의 기사입니다. CCV, 91형 미사일 바지선, 92형 슬루프, 94형 피켓함이란 개념들이 같이 나왔나 보네요. 

'분산된 치명성'을 추구하지만, '분산된 단절'이 될 수도 있다고 지적합니다. 네트워크 연결성 유지가 무엇보다 중요한데 기능을 여러 플랫폼으로 나누면 이 의존도가 더 높아지고, 대공전처럼 몇 초 안에 교전 결정이 이뤄져야 하는 경우에 수백마일 떨어진 인간이 제대로 결정을 내릴 수 있을지, 대잠전에서 접촉신호 판별이 제대로 될 지 우려를 표하네요. 승조원이 없으니 대미지 컨트롤도 문제가 되고... 

영국 해군의 하이브리드 해군 올인 전략 – 수상함 전력의 승부수

국방투자계획(DIP)은 수십 년 만에 영국 해군 수상전력의 가장 큰 변화를 공식화할 예정이다. Type 45 구축함을 또 다른 대형 방공 구축함으로 대체하는 대신, 영국 해군은 유·무인 함정이 하나의 통합 체계로 전투를 수행하는 분산형 전력을 구축하려 한다. 

DIP는 2030년대 후반 영국 해군이 지향하는 미래 수상전력의 모습을 처음으로 공식 제시한다. Type 83 구축함 사업은 폐기됐으며, 대신 Type 45는 장차 6척의 공통전투함(Common Combat Vessel, CCV)으로 대체된다. 이들 함정은 무장, 센서, 대잠체계를 탑재한 여러 종류의 대형 무인수상함의 지원을 받게 된다. 

이러한 방향은 지난 18개월 동안 제1해군참모총장(First Sea Lord)이 추진해 온 하이브리드 해군(Hybrid Navy) 개념과 Atlantic Bastion, Atlantic Shield, Atlantic Strike 개념을 통해 점차 분명해졌다. 공식 발표와 업계 제안들 역시 미래 함대가 소수의 고가 호위함이 아니라 유인 및 자율 함정으로 구성된 네트워크가 될 것임을 시사해 왔다. 

공통전투함(Common Combat Vessel)

아직 구체적인 제원은 거의 공개되지 않았지만, CCV는 미래 호위전력의 핵심이 될 것으로 보인다. 구축함이나 호위함으로 분류되기보다는 분산 배치된 자율 전투함 집단을 통제하는 지휘 플랫폼으로 설계되고 있으며, 국방부는 이를 "통제 허브(control hub)"라고 설명하고 있다. 다만 Babcock이 ARMOR 개념에서 LUSV와 함께 운용하는 'Command Command Vessel'이라는 다소 다른 형태의 CCV 개념을 먼저 공개했다는 점은 주목할 만하다. 

CCV가 얼마나 강력한 무장을 갖출지는 아직 명확하지 않다. 그러나 'Combat Vessel'이라는 명칭은 단순한 비무장 지휘함 이상을 의미한다. 하나의 가능성은 상당한 미사일 무장과 고성능 센서를 갖춘 기존 호위함과 유사한 형태이면서 무인 호위함까지 지휘하는 것이다. 또 다른 가능성은 훨씬 단순한 함정으로, 공격과 방어 능력 대부분을 함께 운용되는 자율 '충성스러운 윙맨(loyal wingmen)'에게 맡기는 형태다. 

가장 현실적인 출발점은 기존 Type 31 호위함 설계다. 검증된 플랫폼을 기반으로 하면 개발 위험을 줄이고 기존 공급망을 활용하며 Type 31 사업 종료 이후 Rosyth 조선소의 건조 작업도 이어갈 수 있다. 여러 면에서 CCV는 폐기된 Type 32 호위함 개념의 실질적인 후계자가 될 수 있다. 한편 BAE Systems는 향후 수년간 영국과 노르웨이용 Type 26 호위함 건조에 집중하게 된다. 따라서 Type 31 파생형 개발은 영국 조선산업 전반에 일감을 분산시키면서 새로운 대형 구축함을 처음부터 설계하는 비용과 지연을 피할 수 있다. 

Type 91 '미사일 바지선(Missile Barge)'

Type 91은 대량의 수직발사관을 탑재한 '미사일 바지선' 또는 '아스널 쉽(Arsenal Ship)'으로 널리 알려져 있다. 현재 알려진 내용에 따르면 통합 수직발사체계와 컨테이너형 발사 모듈을 함께 사용해 CAMM 및 Aster 계열 미사일 전부를 운용할 수 있을 것으로 보인다. DragonFire 지향성 에너지 무기와 미래의 Stratus 지상공격 및 대함미사일도 탑재 가능할 것으로 예상된다. 

이 개념 자체는 새로운 것이 아니다. 해군은 수십 년 동안 고급 호위함을 추가 건조하지 않고도 미사일 탑재량을 크게 늘릴 방법으로 아스널 쉽을 논의해 왔다. 차이점은 Type 91이 최소한의 승조원만 탑승하거나 완전 무인 상태에서 분산 전투체계의 일부로 운용될 것이라는 점이다. 수십 발의 미사일을 구축함 한 척에 집중시키는 대신 여러 플랫폼에 분산함으로써 적이 한 번의 공격으로 전투단 전체의 공격력을 무력화하기 훨씬 어렵게 만든다. 

Type 92 '슬루프(Sloop)'

Type 92는 대잠전에 최적화된 플랫폼으로 보인다. 세부 내용은 많지 않지만 예인식 소나, 가변심도 소나, 소노부이, 그리고 무인 회전익기 등을 조합해 운용하는 자율 소나 플랫폼이 될 가능성이 높다. 

이는 Atlantic Bastion 개념과 밀접하게 연결된다. 이 개념에서는 다수의 자율체계가 북대서양과 GIUK(Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom) 갭에서 지속적인 감시를 수행한다. 소수의 고성능 호위함에 의존하는 대신 광범위한 고정 및 이동식 센서망이 적 잠수함을 지속적으로 추적하고 이후 유인 플랫폼이 이를 확인하거나 공격한다. 

지속적인 감시는 항상 함정과 승조원의 부족으로 제약을 받아왔다. 대형 자율 대잠함과 소형 무인센서를 함께 운용하면 부족한 호위함 숫자에도 불구하고 훨씬 넓은 해역을 감시할 수 있다. 

Type 94 '피켓(Picket)'

Type 94는 새로운 개념으로, 정교한 레이더를 탑재한 자율 센서 플랫폼으로 설계된 것으로 보인다. 미사일 운반함이라기보다 장거리 탐지와 추적을 담당하며 표적 정보를 CCV와 Type 91에 제공하는 역할을 수행한다. 

센서와 타격 기능을 분리하면 전술적 장점이 있다. 분산된 센서망은 더 넓은 지역을 감시할 수 있고, 함정 한 척이 격침되더라도 전투단 전체가 눈을 잃는 위험을 줄일 수 있다. 이는 센서, 의사결정, 무장을 하나의 플랫폼에 집중시키기보다 여러 플랫폼으로 분산시키는 현대전의 흐름과도 일치한다. 

Type 93 'Chariot'는 영국 해군의 Excalibur 프로그램을 기반으로 개발되는 초대형 무인잠수정(XLUUV)으로 장기 수중감시와 기타 기밀 임무를 수행할 예정이다. 번호 체계를 보면 Type 93이 먼저 배정된 뒤 Type 94 개념이 추가된 것으로 보인다. 

Type 91, 92, 94가 동일한 선체를 사용할지는 아직 알 수 없다. Type 94는 대형 레이더를 높은 위치에 설치해야 하므로 더 큰 선체가 필요할 수도 있다. 북대서양 전천후 운용을 고려하면 이들 함정은 길이 80~100m, 배수량 2,000~3,000톤 수준이 될 가능성이 크다. 이는 제2차 세계대전 구축함이나 Batch II 초계함과 비슷한 규모로, 사람들이 흔히 떠올리는 단순한 '드론'이 아니라 소형이지만 복잡한 군함이다. 

분산된 치명성인가, 분산된 단절인가?

이 개념의 핵심은 분산된 치명성(distributed lethality)이다. 적은 훨씬 복잡한 표적 문제에 직면하게 되고 다양한 방향에서 공격을 받게 된다. 전력 규모는 크게 증가하며, 장기적으로 약 30척 정도의 대형 무인수상함이 소규모 호위함대를 지원할 수도 있다. 미사일 발사관 수도 크게 늘어난다. 

그러나 자세히 살펴보면 문제도 많다. 분산 전투체계는 견고한 통신망에 절대적으로 의존한다. 위성은 전파방해, 사이버공격, 파괴 대상이 될 수 있고 무선망 역시 전자전에 취약하다. 데이터 링크가 가장 필요할 때 끊길 수도 있다. 기능이 여러 플랫폼으로 분산될수록 이 연결망에 대한 의존도는 커진다. 

지휘권 문제도 있다. 대공전은 몇 초 안에 결정을 내려야 하는 경우가 많다. 탐지, 식별, 판단, 타격 기능을 분리하면 지연이 발생한다. 수백 마일 떨어진 인간이 최종 결정을 내리는 구조에서는 현대 위협에 신속히 대응하기가 더욱 복잡해진다. 

대잠전도 마찬가지다. 자율 소나 플랫폼은 센서 수를 크게 늘릴 수 있지만 잠수함 접촉 신호를 판별하는 일은 해군전에서 가장 어려운 분야 가운데 하나다. 접촉 대상이 실제 적인지, 언제 치명적 무력 사용을 승인할지는 여전히 인간의 신속한 판단이 필요하다. 

더 저렴한 선택인가?

이론적으로 무인수상함은 더 저렴하며 인명 위험을 줄인다는 큰 장점이 있다. 승조원이 필요 없기 때문에 영국 해군의 만성적인 인력 부족 문제도 일부 해결할 수 있다. 승조원 거주공간, 식당, 식량 및 식수 저장시설, 냉난방 등 각종 설비도 줄일 수 있다. 다만 입출항이나 해상 정비를 위해 단기간 승조원이 탑승해야 할 가능성은 여전히 존재한다. 

무인함은 매우 높은 신뢰성을 갖춰야 한다. 원격감시와 예지정비가 가능하더라도 현장에서 즉시 고장을 수리할 승조원이 없다. 자동 소화체계가 발전했더라도 손상통제는 결국 사람을 완전히 대체할 수 없다. 

또한 무인함도 정비, 군수지원, 소프트웨어 지원, 성능개량, 항만시설, 전문 기술인력이 필요하다. 연료와 무기도 소비한다. 미사일 가격은 구축함에서 발사하든 무인함에서 발사하든 동일하다. 교육, 지원, 정비, 기반시설, 교리, 소프트웨어 개발과 통합 등 모든 방위역량 개발요소(DLOD)도 여전히 필요하다. 

재정 현실도 무시할 수 없다. Type 45급 차세대 구축함은 매우 비쌌을 것이다. 영국 해군은 인력 부족으로 호위함 수를 늘리기도 어렵다. 무인함은 두 문제를 동시에 일부 해결할 수 있지만, CCV와 Type 9X 계열 전체의 개발비를 고려하면 총비용은 Type 83 여섯 척을 건조하는 것과 비슷해질 수도 있다. 

유연성 문제

고급 호위함은 평생 대부분을 실제 전투가 아닌 해양안보, 제재 집행, 방위협력, 인도적 지원 및 재난구호, 존재감 과시, 순찰 임무 등에 투입된다. 자율 미사일 바지선은 이러한 임무에서는 활용도가 낮다. 미래 함대의 상당수가 특화된 자율 플랫폼으로 구성되면 전투력은 늘어나도 평시 활용성은 떨어질 위험이 있다. 전투력과 평시 효용성의 균형은 하이브리드 해군이 해결해야 할 핵심 과제다. 

일부에서는 이를 재무부 예산 압박에 따른 무모한 실험이라고 비판한다. 반대로 해군전을 재정의할 혁신이라고 평가하는 시각도 있다. 두 평가는 반드시 상충되는 것은 아니다. 영국 해군은 자율 수상전력 통합에서 서방 해군 가운데 가장 적극적인 편이며, 우크라이나 전쟁의 교훈과 인공지능 발전, 대규모 함대의 취약성을 반영한 일관된 구상을 제시하고 있다. 

DIP는 영국 해군이 하이브리드 해군에 완전히 승부를 건 순간으로 기록될 수도 있다. 성공한다면 기존 방식으로는 불가능했던 더 크고, 더 생존성이 높고, 더 강력한 함대를 구축할 수 있다. 그러나 위험도 상당하다. 총비용과 기술적·교리적 난관은 충분히 논의되지 않고 있다. 특히 Type 83을 포기한 것은 장거리 미사일, 탄도미사일 위협, 자율 공격체계가 확산되는 시점에 세계 최고 수준의 방공 구축함을 직접 계승할 전력을 포기하는 것이기도 하다. 현재 Type 45는 영국이 독자적으로 보유한 유일한 해상 탄도미사일방어(BMD) 능력을 제공하고 있으며, 앞으로 수십 년 동안 이 역할의 중요성은 줄어들기는커녕 더욱 커질 것이다.

결국 핵심적인 질문은 미래 함대에 자율 군함이 포함되어야 하느냐가 아니다. 모든 주요 해군이 이미 그 방향으로 나아가고 있기 때문이다.

진짜 질문은 자율 군함이 기존 유인 호위함을 보완해야 하는가, 아니면 완전히 대체해야 하는가이다.

All in on the hybrid navy – the Royal Navy’s surface fleet gamble - Navy Lookout

All in on the hybrid navy – the Royal Navy’s surface fleet gamble

The Defence Investment Plan (DIP) will confirm‎ the RN’s most significant shift in surface warfare for decades. Rather than replacing the Type 45 destroyer with another generation of large air defence ships, the RN intends to build a distributed force of crewed and uncrewed vessels designed to fight as an integrated system.

The DIP offers the first official glimpse of what the RN believes the surface fleet of the late 2030s should look like. Type 83 destroyer has been abandoned. Instead, the Type 45s will eventually be replaced by six Common Combat Vessels (CCVs), supported by several new classes of large uncrewed surface vessels carrying weapons, sensors and anti-submarine systems.

The direction of travel has been increasingly apparent over the past eighteen months through the Hybrid Navy concept championed by First Sea Lord, together with the Atlantic Bastion, Atlantic Shield and Atlantic Strike concepts. Official presentations and industry proposals have all hinted that the future fleet would consist of networks of crewed and autonomous vessels rather than a handful of expensive escorts.

Common Combat Vessel

Although little technical information has been released, the CCV appears set to become the centrepiece of the future escort force. Rather than being described as a destroyer or frigate, it appears intended as a command platform capable of controlling a dispersed group of autonomous warships and the MoD has described it as a “control hub”. It should be noted that Babcock first publicised the CCV idea, although subtly different, named the ‘Command Command Vessel’ to be teamed with LUSVs under the ARMOR concept.

Babcock CCV concept imagery.

Exactly how heavily armed the CCV will be remains unclear, although the Combat Vessel name suggests more than an unarmed command ship. One possibility is that it will resemble a conventional escort with substantial missile armament and high-end sensors, while also commanding its uncrewed escorts. Equally plausible is a significantly simpler ship that delegates much of its offensive and defensive capability to accompanying autonomous ‘loyal wingmen’.

The most obvious starting point would be the existing Type 31 frigate design. Basing the CCV on a proven platform would minimise development risk, exploit an existing supply chain and maintain shipbuilding continuity at Rosyth once the current Type 31 programme concludes. In many respects, the CCV could represent the spiritual successor to the abandoned Type 32 frigate concept, albeit with a better defined operational purpose. BAE Systems will remain fully occupied constructing Type 26 frigates for the RN and Norway throughout much of the next decade. Developing a derivative of the Type 31 would spread work across the UK’s naval industrial base while avoiding the cost and delay of designing an entirely new class of large destroyer.

Type 91 ‘missile barge’

The Type 91 is widely described as a missile barge or arsenal ship designed to carry a large concentration of missile launch cells. Current indications suggest it will employ a mixture of integrated vertical launch systems and modular containerised launch modules capable of firing the full CAMM and Aster families of missiles. It could also accommodate DragonFire directed energy weapons and future strike systems such as the Stratus land attack and anti-ship missile.

The concept itself is far from new. Naval planners have discussed arsenal ships for decades as a means of dramatically increasing missile capacity without building additional high-end escorts. The difference here is that the Type 91 is expected to operate with minimal or no permanent crew as part of a distributed combat system. Rather than concentrating dozens of missiles aboard a single destroyer, missile capacity could be dispersed, making it significantly harder for an opponent to eliminate an entire task group’s offensive power with a single successful strike.

Initial concepts for the Type 83 destroyer included a fleet of minimally crewed, missile barges with high-end radar. Not built to warship standards and utilising large void spaces filled with foam to minimise the effects of damage (image: Navy Lookout mock up).Type 92 ‘sloop’

The Type 92 appears optimised for anti-submarine warfare. Although details remain sparse, it is likely to operate as an autonomous sonar platform carrying combinations of towed array sonar, variable depth sonar, sonobuoys and possibly unmanned rotary-wing aircraft.

Its role fits closely with the Atlantic Bastion concept, under which large numbers of autonomous systems maintain persistent surveillance across the North Atlantic and the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap. Rather than relying solely on a handful of highly capable frigates, the RN envisages an extensive network of fixed and mobile sensors continuously tracking hostile submarines before cueing crewed platforms to investigate or engage contacts.

Persistent surveillance has always been constrained by the availability of ships and crews. Large autonomous ASW vessels paired with smaller uncrewed sensors could provide dramatically greater coverage, given the shortage of frigates to search vast ocean areas.

Type 94 ‘picket’

The Type 94 is a new concept and appears intended primarily as an autonomous sensor platform carrying sophisticated radar systems. Rather than acting as a missile ship, it would provide long-range detection and tracking for the wider force, feeding targeting information back to the CCV and missile-equipped Type 91s.

Separating the sensing and shooting functions offers some tactical advantages. A dispersed sensor network extends radar coverage over a much wider area while reducing the risk that destroying a single ship blinds an entire task group. This approach mirrors wider trends across modern warfare, where sensors, decision-making and weapons are increasingly distributed across multiple platforms rather than concentrated aboard a single exquisite asset.

Type 93 ‘Chariot ’ will be an Extra Large Uncrewed Underwater Vehicle (XLUUV) developed from the RN’s current Excalibur programme for long-endurance underwater surveillance and potentially other classified roles. Interestingly, the numbering sequence suggests the surface vessel concepts were developed around an already allocated Type 93 designation. The appearance of the Type 94 after Type 93 indicates that the picket vessel emerged later in the conceptual development process.

Whether the Type 91, 92 and 94 can be built on a common hull remains to be seen. Possibly, Type 94 will need to be larger in order to allow a large radar to be carried at height. These vessels, required to operate in all weathers in the North Atlantic, are likely to be at least 80 to 100m in length, potentially displacing between 2-3,000 tonnes. These are roughly equivalent in size to a World War II destroyer or a Batch II OPV, not the simple ‘drone’ that many people imagine, but are small complex warships.

Distributed or disconnected lethality?

The underlying concept is one of distributed lethality. An adversary faces a much more difficult targeting problem while also presenting multiple axes of attack. The potential advantages are significant. Fleet mass increases dramatically. Theoretically, a force of 30 or so LUSVs could eventually accompany the small escort fleet. Many more missile cells become available.

Unfortunately, the attractive concept becomes rather more complicated when subject to detailed scrutiny. Distributed combat systems rely fundamentally on resilient communications. Satellites can be jammed, cyber-attacked or destroyed. Radio networks can be disrupted by electronic warfare. Data links may be denied precisely when they are needed most. The more functions are distributed across separate platforms, the more dependent the force becomes on maintaining those connections.

There are also difficult questions about command authority. Anti-air warfare often demands decisions within seconds. Separating the ‘sense’, ‘classify’, ‘decide’ and ‘effect’ functions inevitably introduces latency. Autonomous systems that need to react quickly against modern threats while retaining a human decision-maker in the loop, potentially hundreds of miles away, adds complexity.

Anti-submarine warfare presents similar challenges. While autonomous sonar platforms can undoubtedly multiply the number of sensors in the water, the classification of submarine contacts remains one of naval warfare’s most complex disciplines. Determining whether a contact is genuinely hostile and deciding when lethal force should be authorised still requires rapid human judgement.

BAE Systems’ Sensor Effector platform (SEP) concept from 2025 – equipped with missile silo and Next Generation Radar (Navy Lookout mock up).The cheaper option?

In theory, USVs should be cheaper and have the major advantage of reducing risk to human life. Removing sailors should also help solve the lack of personnel, one of the RN’s greatest long-term pressures. The significant design overhead associated with supporting human life on board ship is removed. SOLAS requirements, messes and sleeping space, galleys, food and water storage, heating, ventilation and air conditioning can supposedly be dispensed with. However, some of this equipment may still be required as people may still need to be embarked for short periods for pilotage in and out of harbour and to conduct maintenance at sea and certainly while alongside.

USVs will also have to be engineered to a very high standard of reliability. Even with remote monitoring systems and predictive maintenance routines, there will be no sailors on hand to quickly fix emerging defects. Although modern automated firefighting systems are effective, there is no substitute for sailors to perform damage control tasks.

Uncrewed vessels still require maintenance, logistics, software support, periodic upgrades, harbour facilities and specialist technicians. They still consume fuel and weapons. Missiles cost the same whether fired from a destroyer or an autonomous missile ship. Autonomous warships do not eliminate the wider Defence Lines of Development (DLOD) that accompany any new equipment programme. Training, support and maintenance, infrastructure, doctrine, software development and integration all remain necessary.

Financial reality cannot be ignored. Building another generation of large destroyers comparable to the Type 45 would have been extraordinarily expensive. The RN also faces severe manpower constraints that make expanding traditional escort numbers increasingly difficult. Uncrewed vessels potentially partially address both problems simultaneously, although the total cost of the CCV and a fleet of Type 9Xs may ultimately end up being close to that of six Type 83s once all the development challenges are considered.

The flexibility problem

High-end escorts generally spend only a small part of their careers preparing for or in actual combat. While the deterrent effect of a fleet in being should never be underestimated, most naval deployments involve maritime security operations, sanctions enforcement, defence engagement, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, presence and patrol missions. Autonomous missile barges have limited value in many of these situations. If a substantial proportion of future fleet numbers consists of highly specialised autonomous vessels, there is a risk that the RN possesses more combat mass but less day-to-day utility. That balance between combat power and peacetime usefulness remains one of the central questions the hybrid navy must answer.

Some commentators portray the proposals as reckless experimentation driven entirely by Treasury pressures. Others present them as visionary innovations that could redefine naval warfare. These two views are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The RN is undoubtedly among the most ambitious Western navies in embracing autonomous surface warfare. Few other fleets have articulated such a comprehensive vision for integrating large uncrewed vessels into front-line operations. The thinking is coherent and reflects lessons emerging from Ukraine, advances in artificial intelligence and the increasing vulnerability of concentrated naval formations.

The DIP may ultimately be remembered as the moment the RN fully committed to the Hybrid Navy. This is a gamble which, if successful, could produce a larger, more resilient and more lethal fleet than would have been possible through traditional procurement. Yet the risks are equally significant. The full costs, together with the technical and doctrinal challenges to overcome, are being underplayed. The apparent abandonment of the Type 83 leaves the future fleet without a direct successor to the world’s premier air defence destroyer at precisely the moment long-range missiles, ballistic threats and autonomous attack systems are proliferating. Today, the Type 45 provides the UK’s only sovereign naval ballistic missile defence capability, a role that will become more important, not less, over the coming decades.

Ultimately, the question is not whether autonomous warships belong in the future fleet. Every major navy is moving in that direction. The real question is whether they should supplement conventional escorts or fully replace them.

Main image: LASV75 concept (via Navantia UK).

[Black Knights (윤재산)]

영국이 청년학파라니

[위종민]

말씀 듣고나니 무인수상함의 능파성 포함한 대양항행성은 어떨지 모르겠네요. 북해나 노르웨이해 겨울바다에서 고장나면 수리도 해야될 텐데..