이란전쟁은 미공군의 가장 성공적인 실패 사례

[위종민]

미 공군이 이란 상공 제공권을 성공적으로 장악하고 원하는 것은 다 두들겨 부수며 '파괴의 전쟁'에선 승리했지만, 이란이 드론과 미사일로 호르무즈 해협을 위협하는 걸 막지 못해 '교란의 전쟁'에선 패했다고 논평하네요. 저자는 미공군 예비역 대령입니다. 

미국 공군력 역사에서 이란은 가장 성공적인 실패였다

미국은 파괴를 위한 전쟁에 대해서는 치밀한 계획을 가지고 있었지만, 이란의 교란 전쟁에 대응하기 위한 진지한 계획은 갖고 있지 않았다.

Maximilian K. Bremer 대령, Kelly Grieco

2026년 7월 2일

미 해군 알레이 버크급 유도미사일 구축함 USS Frank E. Petersen Jr.가 2026년 2월 28일 'Operation Epic Fury'에서 토마호크 미사일을 발사하고 있다. (미 해군)

미국이 이란을 공격한 이후 4개월 동안에는 이라크 침공 당시 '충격과 공포(Shock and Awe)' 작전 이후 가장 강도 높은 6주간의 공중전이 포함되어 있었다. 그러나 그 결과 마련된 합의는 아직 최종 협상 중이지만, 기껏해야 무승부 수준이며 여러 측면에서 이란에 유리한 결과를 낳은 것으로 보인다. 도널드 트럼프 대통령이 여러 차례 언급한 것처럼 폭격 재개를 위협하는 것은 그 이유를 제대로 이해하지 못한 것이다.

미국은 동시에 두 개의 공중전을 수행하고 있었다. 하나는 파괴의 전쟁이었고, 다른 하나는 교란의 전쟁이었다. 그리고 미국은 더 중요한 전쟁에서 패배했다.

첫 번째인 '파괴의 공중전'은 미국과 이스라엘이 이란 상공의 제공권을 장악하고 이를 활용해 대규모 타격을 가하는 것이 핵심이었다. 스텔스기와 정밀유도무기가 승패를 좌우하는 고도 2만 피트 이상의 공역에서 미군은 설계된 그대로의 성능을 발휘했다. 남부와 서부 이란의 넓은 지역에서 제공권을 확보했고, 방공망을 약화시켰으며, 이란의 전통적인 해군 전력 상당수를 격침시키고 미사일 및 드론 전력 일부를 손상시켰다. 파괴의 전쟁은 군사 용어로 DMPI(Desired Mean Point of Impact, 목표 타격 지점)에 얼마나 많은 표적을 명중시켰고 얼마나 많은 능력을 파괴했는가로 평가된다. 그 기준으로 보면 미국은 승리했다.

그러나 이란은 호르무즈 해협을 사실상 계속 봉쇄하는 데 성공했다. 결국 승패를 결정한 것은 파괴가 아니라 교란, 즉 정치적으로 더 이상 전쟁을 감당하기 어려울 정도의 심리적·경제적 비용을 지속적으로 부과하는 두 번째 공중전이었다.

전쟁 첫날부터 이란의 드론과 미사일은 미국이 테헤란 상공의 제공권을 확보하는 것을 막기 위한 것이 아니었다. 그것을 무의미하게 만드는 것이 목적이었다. 고고도 공역을 사실상 포기한 이란은 군사적 노력을 호르무즈 해협 상공과 주변의 저고도 공역으로 전환했다. 이곳에서는 저렴한 드론과 미사일만으로도 세계에서 가장 중요한 에너지 해상 통로를 상선과 미 해군 모두에게 지나치게 위험하고 비용이 큰 항로로 만들기에 충분했다.

다르게 말하면, 이란은 파괴의 전쟁에서 승리할 필요가 없었다. 미국이 그 전쟁에서 이기는 것이 더 이상 가치 있는 일처럼 느껴지지 않게 만드는 것만으로 충분했다.

테헤란의 전략은 단순한 비대칭성에 기반하고 있었다. 사람들은 급격한 파괴보다는 점차 심해지는 만성적인 불편을 더 견디기 어려워한다는 점이다. 이란에게는 국가의 존망이 걸린 전쟁이었기 때문에 파괴는 감내해야 할 대상이었다. 지도자와 장군이 사망하고, 공군기지가 폭격당하고, 함정이 침몰할수록 오히려 정권의 결속은 강화됐다. 반면 미국에게는 이해관계가 훨씬 제한적이었기 때문에 불편함은 빨리 벗어나야 할 대상이 됐다.

미국의 공군력이 이란의 공군력이 봉쇄한 호르무즈 해협을 다시 열지 못하자 미국은 보다 광범위한 경제 압박 작전으로 확대했다. 이란 원유 수출에 대한 해상 봉쇄를 통해 이란 경제에도 같은 수준의 압박을 가하고, 파괴의 공중전으로 얻지 못한 협상력을 확보하려 했다. 그러나 해상 봉쇄는 결국 시간과의 경쟁이 됐고 미국은 그 경쟁에서 유리한 위치에 있지 못했다. 정보기관들은 이란이 최소 90일에서 120일, 어쩌면 그 이상까지 봉쇄를 견딜 수 있다고 평가했다. 반면 미국에서는 휘발유 가격 상승을 체감하는 소비자들의 불만, 경제적 비용을 계산하는 유럽과 아시아 국가들, 그리고 미국에 이 상황이 얼마나 오래 지속될 것인지 조용히 문의하는 걸프 지역 국가들의 압박이 계속 누적됐다.

이란의 핵심 교란 수단은 샤헤드(Shahed) 드론이었다. 미국 기준으로 보면 이 드론은 느리고 저고도로 비행하며 쉽게 격추되고, 가격도 수억 달러가 아니라 수만 달러 수준에 불과하다. 그러나 이 드론들은 훨씬 비싼 레이더와 지휘통제 시설을 파괴했고, 석유 생산을 방해했으며, 중동 전역의 항만과 공군기지를 타격했다.

이란은 우연히 이런 방식을 선택한 것이 아니었다. 홍해에서 후티 반군의 공격과 이라크 내 민병대 작전을 통해 수년간 이 개념을 시험하고 발전시켰으며, 값싸고 소모 가능한 체계가 얼마나 큰 비용을 상대에게 강요할 수 있는지를 학습했다. 또한 러시아에 샤헤드 드론을 공급하면서 2만 달러짜리 드론이 얼마나 큰 효과를 내는지도 확인했다. 따라서 이번 전쟁이 시작됐을 때 이란은 이미 무엇이 효과적인지 알고 있었다.

이러한 위협 때문에 미군은 후방으로 물러날 수밖에 없었고, 그것 자체가 이란의 성공을 보여주는 지표였다. 2003년에는 대부분의 미군 전투기와 지원기가 쿠웨이트, 카타르, UAE, 바레인, 사우디아라비아에 전진 배치됐고 항공모함은 지중해와 페르시아만에서 작전을 수행했다. 그러나 이번 이란과의 전쟁에서는 상황이 달라졌다. 이란의 공격 위협 때문에 알 우데이드 공군기지의 연합항공작전센터(CAOC) 중심 지휘체계가 변경됐고, 항공모함과 스텔스 전투기, 공중급유기들은 점차 이스라엘, 요르단, 아라비아해 쪽으로 후퇴했다.

미군은 그 거리에서도 이란 전역의 표적을 계속 공격할 수 있었다. 그러나 그 거리에서는 폭이 약 21마일인 호르무즈 해협을 통제할 수 없었다. 해상 항로를 안전하게 유지하려면 위협이 도달하기 전에 탐지하고 대응할 수 있도록 지속적이고 근접한 감시가 필요하다. 이란 해안에서 발사된 드론은 몇 분 만에 유조선에 도달할 수 있다. 미군은 이러한 교란 전쟁을 수행하도록 배치되어 있지 않았다.

이 격차를 메우려면 미국이 오랫동안 경시했거나 아예 개발하지 않았던 능력이 필요하다. 예를 들어 저고도에서 장시간 체공하면서 많은 무장을 탑재할 수 있는 항공기, 기동식 방공체계, 그리고 드론과 미사일을 방어하기 위해 대량 생산 가능한 저가 요격무기 등이 그것이다. 이것이 바로 이란의 교란 전쟁이 요구한 능력이었고, 미국이 충분한 규모로 투입하지 못한 능력이기도 했다.

호르무즈 해협이 봉쇄된 기간이 길어질수록 어떤 공중전이 더 중요했는지에 대한 이란의 주장은 더욱 설득력을 얻었다. 선박 보험료는 사실상 기능을 잃었고 수백 척의 선박이 걸프만에 발이 묶였다. 세계 최강의 군대는 이란 전역을 공격할 수 있었지만 세계에서 가장 중요한 해상 교통로 가운데 하나의 안전은 보장하지 못했다. 이란은 지역 수준의 무기로 세계적인 영향을 만들어내는 방법을 찾아낸 것이다.

이것이 이번 전쟁의 가장 중요한 교훈이다. 수십 년 동안 미국의 무기 획득은 장거리 정밀타격, 스텔스, 원거리에서 적 통합방공망을 무너뜨리는 능력 등 '파괴의 전쟁'에 최적화되어 왔다. 그 결과 미국은 근거리에서 지속적으로 소모전을 수행하는 능력에는 공백이 생겼다. 미국에 부족한 것은 생존성과 사거리보다 지속성과 수량이 더 중요한 저고도 환경에서 대량 운용할 수 있는 저렴한 체계를 생산하는 능력이다. 이란의 샤헤드를 모방한 LUCAS는 올바른 방향을 제시하고 있지만, 3천만 달러 규모 계약으로 수백 대를 생산하는 수준으로는 수만 대를 생산하는 이란 같은 상대를 따라잡을 수 없다.

이를 해결하려면 국방부가 그동안 주저해왔던 무기 획득 방향을 우선시해야 한다. 장시간 체공하는 드론, 많은 무장을 탑재할 수 있는 플랫폼, 기동식 방공체계, 대량 배치가 가능한 저가 요격무기 등이 그것이다.

그러나 더 근본적인 문제는 개념에 있다. 미국은 파괴의 전쟁에 대해서는 치밀한 계획을 갖고 이번 전쟁에 들어왔지만, 교란의 전쟁에 대해서는 진지한 계획이 없었다. 미국은 이란의 미사일과 드론을 본격적인 공중전이 진행되는 동안 관리해야 할 성가신 존재 정도로 취급했다. 이러한 오판은 테헤란 상공에서는 제공권을 확보했지만, 실제로 승패가 결정된 전장에서는 적을 제압하지 못하는 결과를 낳았다. 다음 전쟁에서도 교란의 전쟁이 국방부가 선호하는 전쟁에 대한 부차적인 고려가 아니라 핵심 계획 시나리오가 되지 않는다면 결과는 달라지지 않을 것이다.

현재 협상이 진행 중인 기본 합의(framework agreement)는 결국 어떤 공중전이 더 중요했는지를 보여주는 결과다. 트럼프 대통령이 이란을 "다시, 그리고 훨씬 더 강하게" 공격하겠다고 위협하는 것은 핵심을 놓치고 있다. 미국의 공중작전이 실패한 것은 강도가 부족해서가 아니었다. 승패를 결정하지 않은 공중전에 우선순위를 두었기 때문에 실패한 것이다. 더 많은 폭탄으로는 진짜 승부를 결정한 전쟁에서 이길 수 없다.

처음부터 핵심은 테헤란 상공을 누가 지배하느냐가 아니었다. 진짜 문제는 그 아래에서 벌어진 교란의 전쟁을 누가 이기느냐였다.

Maximilian K. Bremer는 예비역 미 공군 대령으로, 스팀슨센터(Stimson Center) '미국 대전략 재구상(Reimagining US Grand Strategy)' 프로그램의 비상근 연구원이자 Atropos Group의 Mission Engineering and Strategy 책임자이다.

Kelly A. Grieco는 스팀슨센터 '미국 대전략 재구상' 프로그램의 선임연구원이자 조지타운대학교 안보연구센터 겸임교수이다.

Iran was the most successful failure in US airpower history - Breaking Defense

Iran was the most successful failure in US airpower history

The US entered the conflict with a detailed plan for a war of destruction, but no serious plan for Iran’s war of disruption.

By Col. Maximilian K. Bremer and Kelly Grieco on July 02, 2026 10:32 am

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The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. fires a Tomahawk during Operation Epic Fury, Feb. 28, 2026. (U.S. Navy Photo)

Nestled inside the four months since the United States launched attacks on Iran was six weeks of the most intensive air campaign since the “shock and awe” opening of the Iraq invasion. Yet the deal it produced, while still in final negotiations, seems to be a draw at best and, in many ways, favors Iran. Threatening to resume the bombing, as President Donald Trump has done several times, misunderstands why. 

The US was engaged in two air wars simultaneously — one of destruction, and one of disruption. It lost the one that mattered most. 

The first — the air war of destruction — centered on the US and Israel seizing the airspace high above Iran and exploiting it to strike at scale. Above 20,000 feet, where stealth and precision-guided munitions decide outcomes, the US military performed exactly as designed. It achieved air superiority over large swaths of southern and western Iran, degraded air defenses, sank much of Iran’s traditional navy, and damaged elements of its missile and drone capabilities. The war of destruction was measured in targets (DMPIs, or “desired mean points of impact” in military parlance) hit and capabilities destroyed. By those metrics, the US won. 

Yet Iran managed to keep the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed. A second air war — a war not of destruction but of disruption, imposing psychological and economic costs until the fighting became politically unbearable — decided that. 

From the first day of this conflict, Iran’s drones and missiles were aimed not at preventing American air superiority over Tehran, but at making it beside the point. Having largely ceded the higher altitudes, Tehran shifted its military effort downward, to the air littoral — the low-altitude airspace — over and around the Strait of Hormuz, where inexpensive drones and missiles proved sufficient to make the world’s most important energy chokepoint too costly and dangerous to transit, for commercial vessels and the US Navy alike.

Put another way: Iran did not need to win the war of destruction. It needed to make winning it not feel worth it to the US. 

Tehran’s strategy rested on a simple asymmetry: Populations tolerate acute devastation better than chronic and increasing inconvenience. For Iran, fighting an existential war, devastation was something to be endured — martyred leaders and generals, bombed airfields, and sunk ships only hardened regime resolve. For the US, with more limited interests at stake, inconvenience became something to escape. 

When American airpower failed to open the chokepoint closed by Iranian airpower, the US expanded to a broader campaign of economic pressure. The naval blockade on Iranian oil exports sought to impose reciprocal pressure on Tehran’s economy and achieve leverage the air war of destruction had not. But the blockade became a time horizon contest, and the US was not positioned to win it. Intelligence assessments concluded Iran could endure the blockade for at least 90 to 120 days, if not longer, while political and economic pressures — from American consumers watching gas prices rise, European and Asian governments calculating the cost to their economies, and Gulf states quietly asking Washington how long this would go on —  continued to accumulate. 

Iran’s primary weapon of disruption was the Shahed drone. By American standards, it hardly rates; it’s slow, low-flying, easy to shoot down, and costs tens of thousands of dollars rather than hundreds of millions. Yet these drones destroyed much more expensive radar and command and control facilities, disrupted oil production, and struck ports and airfields across the region.  

Iran did not stumble into this. It tested and refined the approach for years through Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and militia operations in Iraq — learning how cheap, expendable systems could impose disproportionate costs. It watched $20,000 drones prove their value when it supplied them to Russia. By the time this conflict began, Iran already knew what worked. 

The threat forced American forces back — and that itself was a measure of Iran’s success. In 2003, the bulk of US combat and support aircraft were forward deployed in Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, while carriers operated from the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. That has changed with this war against Iran. The threat of Iranian strikes shifted command of operations away from the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid, while carriers, stealth fighters, and tankers were increasingly pushed back to Israel, Jordan, and the Arabian Sea.

The US could still strike targets across Iran from those distances. What it could not do from those distances was police a 21-mile strait. Keeping shipping lanes open requires persistent, close-in coverage — forces positioned near enough to detect and respond before a threat arrives. A drone launched from the Iranian coast can reach an oil tanker in minutes. The US military is not postured for the war of disruption.

Closing that gap would require capabilities the US has systematically deemphasized or never developed, such as aircraft with large magazines that loiter for long periods at relatively low altitudes, mobile air defenses, and mass-produced weapons to defend ships against incoming drones and missiles. These are precisely the capabilities Iran’s war of disruption demanded. They are precisely what the US could not bring to bear at scale.  

Every day the strait remained closed strengthened Iran’s argument about which air war mattered. War-risk insurance for transits effectively collapsed, leaving hundreds of ships stranded in the Gulf. The world’s most powerful military could strike targets across Iran but could not guarantee the safety of one of the world’s most important waterways. Iran had found a way to achieve global impact with local weapons.  

That is the central lesson of this conflict. Decades of procurement choices optimized for the war of destruction — long-range precision strikes, stealth, and the ability to dismantle integrated air defenses from a distance — have left a gap in the US ability to wage the close-in, attritional fight. What the US lacks is the ability to produce large numbers of inexpensive systems near the surface, where persistence and mass matter more than survivability and range. LUCAS — a copy of Iran’s own Shahed design — points in the right direction, but a $30 million contract producing hundreds of drones still leaves the US outmatched against adversaries like Iran producing tens of thousands. 

Fixing that means prioritizing procurement choices the Pentagon has resisted: drones with long on-station times, platforms with deep magazines, mobile air defenses, and mass-produced interceptors cheap enough to field at scale.

But the deeper problem is conceptual. The US entered this conflict with a detailed plan for the war of destruction and no serious plan for the war of disruption. It approached Iranian missiles and drones as a nuisance to be managed while the real campaign proceeded overhead. That miscalculation created air superiority over Tehran but failed to defeat the adversary where it actually mattered. The next time it will be no different unless fighting the war of disruption becomes part of the primary planning scenario, not an afterthought to the one the Pentagon prefers to fight.

The framework agreement now being worked out is a measure of which air war mattered more. Trump’s threat to hit Iran “very hard again, only harder” misses the point. The US air campaign did not fail because it was not intense enough. It failed because it prioritized the air war that did not decide the outcome. More bombs will not win the war that mattered. 

The question was never who controls the skies over Tehran. It was always who wins the war of disruption below them.  

Maximilian K. Bremer, a retired U.S. Air Force colonel, is a nonresident fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center and head of Mission Engineering and Strategy for Atropos Group.  

Kelly A. Grieco is a senior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center and adjunct professor in the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University. 

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