미 국방부, 중국 군사력 연례평가 발표

[위종민]

2024 China Military Power Report

2024 China Military Power Report

미 국방부가 2024년 중국 군사력 연례평가 보고서를 발표했습니다. 

2023년 발표된 중국의 국방예산은 2,200억 달러이고, 실제 국방비 지출은 40%~90% 더 많을 수 있어 2024년 예산은 3,300억에서 4,500억 달러에 이를 수 있다고 합니다. 

핵탄두는 2024년 중반 기준 600개, 2030년까지 1천개 이상으로 증가할 것으로 예상되며 육해공 및 핵, 우주, 사이버전 등 다양한 영역에서 현대화를 추진중이지만 지휘관의 숙련도나 병참 및 시가전 능력이 약점이라고 하네요. 

인민해방군 해군이 동아시아를 넘어 아덴만 지속 주둔을 포함해 점점 더 먼 거리에서의 작전능력을 점진적으로 확장하고 있다고 합니다. 

US DoD report analyses China's military growth and strategy

US DoD report analyses China's military growth and strategy

US DoD report analyses China’s military growth and strategy 

China is estimated to have more than 600 active nuclear warheads by mid-2024.

December 19, 2024

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In 2024, the US Department of Defense and the PLA re-engaged in military communication. Credit: Studio Romantic/Shutterstock.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) has published its annual assessment, required by Congress, examining military and security developments involving China.  

The report, titled ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China’ outlines China’s national strategy, which aims to realise the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and achieve modernisation by 2049.  

This strategy is underpinned by advancements across political, social, economic, technological, and military spheres, with the goal of reshaping the international order to align with China’s governance model and national interests. 

China’s defence budget for 2023 was reported to have reached $220bn after adjustments for inflation.  

Analyses suggest that China’s actual defence expenditure could be 40% to 90% higher than the publicly disclosed budget, potentially amounting to $330bn to $450bn in 2024.  

These funds are earmarked for the modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), encompassing weapon systems, personnel management, and strategic capacity enhancements. 

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The DoD estimates that China’s operational nuclear arsenal exceeded 600 warheads by mid-2024 and projects an increase to more than 1,000 by 2030.  

The PLA is actively modernising its forces to become proficient in various domains, including land, air, maritime, nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare, and cyberspace operations. 

Despite these advancements, the PLA faces challenges such as commander proficiency, logistics, and urban warfare capabilities.  

Defense China, Taiwan and Mongolia deputy assistant secretary said: “[What] we’ve seen over time is that they’ve expanded to a nuclear triad, with the PLA Navy having ballistic missile submarines, conducting deterrence patrols, as we cover in the report, and that the PLA Air Force has also regained a nuclear deterrence and strike mission with the addition of nuclear-capable bombers.” 

In 2023, the PLA made structural adjustments, fielded modern systems, improved readiness, and focused on joint operation competencies. 

Additionally, China leverages bilateral and multilateral military exercises to expand its global presence and strengthen defence relationships.  

The report also underscores certain challenges within China’s armed forces, particularly in the proficiency and effectiveness of its leaders. The PLA uses the term “the five incapables” to pinpoint areas needing enhancement among officers, such as situational assessment, comprehension of higher-level directives, decision-making in operations, troop deployment, and handling of contingencies. 

The document further identifies potential shortcomings of the PLA, pointing to urban combat and extended logistics as areas that may require further development. 

Additionally, the report touches on the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) connections with international allies like Russia. The PRC also maintains relationships with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, and various Iranian-affiliated entities. 

The PRC has publicly committed to the PLA’s modernisation goals. Despite irregular advancements towards its 2027 modernisation benchmark—which is seen as pivotal for enhancing the PLA’s efficacy concerning the Chinese Communist Party’s aspirations for Taiwan integration—the report indicates this progress is critical.  

Furthermore, 2035 is noted as the year by which the PLA aims to finalise its modernisation initiatives, with an overarching objective to establish a “world-class military” by 2049.

China Expanding Pacific Operations, Taiwan Invasion 'Not Possible' by 2027, Say DoD Officials - USNI News

China Expanding Pacific Operations, Taiwan Invasion ‘Not Possible’ by 2027, Say DoD Officials

John Grady

December 19, 2024 6:31 PM

Two Chinese carriers drill in the South China Sea in late October. Chinese MoD Photo

The People’s Liberation Army Navy is “gradually expanding its operational reach beyond East Asia into a sustained ability to operate at increasingly longer ranges, including a continuous presence in the Gulf of Aden,” the Pentagon reported in its latest assessment of Beijing’s military power.

Ely Rattner, assistant secretary for Indo-Pacific security affairs, said the report released this week recognizes that China has “both the will and capability to alter the international order in its favor.”

China’s announced military budget is $220 billion, but actual spending is running 40 to 90 percent higher, he said at the event at CSIS. Last year, the report estimated Beijing was spending between 30 and 40 percent more than what it publicly released.

While possessing the world’s largest navy, personnel quality especially in the officer corps for all service remains a challenge, Michael Chase, deputy assistant secretary for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, said at the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ event Wednesday.

Rattner said Xi Jinping’s goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”

“Despite its rapid progress, the force has not yet demonstrated the type and scale of sophisticated urban warfare or long-distance logistic capabilities that would likely be required for operations against Taiwan or major contingencies overseas,” the report stated.

The report also highlighted lingering issues with the Chinese officer corps, known as the “five incapables” by Chinese media. Those include“critiques officers who cannot judge situations, understand higher authorities’ intentions, make operational decisions, deploy troops, or deal with unexpected situations.”

Chase called these deficiencies “long-standing shortcomings,” reads the report. Chinese media blamed the “peace disease” for these continuing problems.

The report said the Chinese have introduced more realistic training exercises that also call for officers to operate in a joint environment” to correct the situation.

In terms of the maritime, “today the PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-role platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors,” reads the report.
“This modernization aligns with the PRC’s growing emphasis on the maritime domain and increasing demands for the PLAN to operate at greater distances from mainland China.”

Longer-range, precision strike from submarines and surface combatants on land targets remain priorities for military planners.

Chinese amphibious landing craft on Nov. 25, 2022. PLA Navy Photo

China and Russia also expanded joint operations in 2023 that have continued into this year. Rattner said these air and sea exercises “have rattled cages in Japan and Kora. But they should not be seen as building “advanced operational capability, but viewed as “coordinated” exercises.

Chase said the Pentagon expects China’s nuclear arsenal to grow to 1,000 warheads by 2030. The report puts the number now at 600.

“What are all these nuclear weapons for,” Rattner asked during the CSIS session. In attempting to talk with the Chinese about nuclear arms, he added, “they haven’t answered the question.” Beijing’s “refusal to discuss” stance includes cyber and space military efforts.

At the same time as the number of warheads has grown, the Chinese diversified how they are delivered. Beijing now has a functional nuclear triad with a modernized strategic bomber force and six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. The warheads themselves run from low-yield nuclear explosions to weapons with much more devastating impact.

Chase added what this adds up to is the Chinese have “more rungs on the escalation ladder in terms of how they could conduct nuclear operations.”

In the background of modernization and build-up is the impact of Xi’s anti-corruption drive. The first targets purged two years ago on graft charges came from the senior ranks of the Rocket Force and its missile development program. Until the investigations took hold, Chase said the Rocket Force “was the most trusted of the services.”

The most recently named official is Adm. Miao Hua, who directed the public work department of the Central Military Commission since 2017.

Similarly, two officials who held the title of defense minister have disappeared from public view.

Rattner said the purge could continue for some time. The impact on lower-ranking military officials and their civilian counterparts could make them more “risk adverse” to engaging in activities that could lead to more investigations.

Earlier this week, a Pentagon official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said, “Xi Jinping appears to have made the anti-corruption campaign not only in the PLA, but in the party more broadly, really a hallmark of his tenure as the top leaders. …I think they’ve identified it as something that really poses great risks to the political reliability and ultimately the operational capability of the PLA.”

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